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DEPLOYING THE CIS COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION AGAINST GEORGIA
by Vladimir Soloviev, Natalia Grib
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
September 3, 2008 Wednesday
Russia
Moscow wants its CSTO partners to support its actions in the Caucasus
Moscow seeks support ahead of Collective Security Treaty Organization
summit; The Russian authorities are engaged in intensive explanation
efforts, as Moscow seeks support for its actions in Georgia. The
results of those efforts will be seen at a Collective Security Treaty
Organization meeting on Friday, when it will become clear whether
Moscow still has any loyal allies in the former Soviet Union.
By the time the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
holds its Moscow summit, Russia expects CSTO member states to formulate
a common stance on the events in South Ossetia. This statement was
made yesterday by President Dmitri Medvedev when he received Armenian
President Serge Sargsian in Sochi yesterday. Sargsian isn't the only
CSTO leader to be targeted by the Russian government's intensive
explanation efforts, as Moscow seeks support for its actions
in Georgia. The results of those efforts will be seen by Friday,
September 5, when it will become clear whether Moscow still has any
loyal allies in the former Soviet Union.
This week offers Russia its last chance to convince the rest of
the world that it's not alone in its harsh assessment of Georgia's
actions against South Ossetia, and to secure at least some support
for Russia's own retaliatory measures against Tbilisi. The foreign
affairs ministers of the seven CSTO member states will meet in Moscow
on September 4; the meeting is supposed to produce a statement on
South Ossetia that is satisfactory for Moscow. To all appearances,
work on this statement's contents has not been straightforward. A
Russian diplomat source close to the talks told us: "A significant
proportion of our partners are only prepared to express support
for Russia's peace-promoting measures. But what we want is a strong
condemnation of Georgia. So far, the statement is reminiscent of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization scenario (at the August 28 summit),
where everyone appeared to give us verbal support, but the final
declaration prioritized the principle of territorial integrity."
The meeting of CSTO foreign affairs ministers is only a warm-up
exercise before a more significant event: the September 5 session of
the CSTO Collective Security Council, attended by heads of state. There
are plans to issue an extensive communique containing assessments of
the conflict in South Ossetia, the overall international situation,
and the role of the CSTO in the world today.
According to our sources, Moscow is insistently promoting the idea
that the CSTO communique should take the form of some sort of policy
document - condemning Georgia, and stating unequivocally that further
NATO expansion toward CSTO member state borders and the deployment
of US missile defense elements in the CSTO's interests zone are
unacceptable. Russian diplomacy is also striving to ensure that all
participants in the September 5 summit express support for Russia's
proposal to develop a European Security Treaty. This idea was proposed
by President Dmitri Medvedev in the new Russian foreign policy concept
which he signed in mid-July.
However, by no means all of Russia's CSTO partners want to complicate
their already-strained relations with the West for Russia's sake. So
Moscow is now working to ensure that the CSTO summit lives up to its
expectations. First of all, Moscow had to get its CSTO allies to
agree to the summit's location. The point here is that the CSTO's
rotating presidency is currently held by Kyrgyzstan, and it would
be more logical for that country to host this week's Collective
Security Council meeting. However, given the Georgia situation,
Russia requested the CSTO to make an exception - and has managed to
ensure that the meeting takes place in Moscow.
At the same time, the Kremlin has attempted to find an individual
approach to each CSTO head of state, seeking to ensure that the CSTO's
Moscow summit takes a united stance which is as strongly anti-Georgian
as possible. For example, Armenian leader Serge Sargsian was invited
to Russia several days before the Collective Security Council meeting;
he met with President Medvedev in Sochi yesterday. At the meeting,
Medvedev said: "You and I will discuss preliminary work in the CSTO
format, and we shall formulate the final position during the summit
in Moscow. Armenia is about to take its turn at the CSTO's rotating
presidency. I would like us to share our thoughts about international
issue, especially since we haven't seen each other since Georgia's act
of aggression." Sargsian's response was restrained in its reference to
the Caucasus events: "I regret that events have turned out this way,
and hope that the consequences are alleviated as soon as possible."
Medvedev held an explanation session with Belarasian President
Alexander Lukashenko on August 20. In exchange for Minsk's expression
of support for Moscow at the international level, Belarus was promised
lower prices for Russian gas and a long-term loan of $2 billion.
Ivan Makushok, spokesman for Pavel Borodin, state secretary of the
Russia-Belarus Union State: "If we demand an alliance relationship
from Belarus, then it's natural that energy price formation should
correspond to the spirit of our alliance treaty, which states that
economic entities in Russia and Belarus have equal rights. That
doesn't mean paying for friendship. It means that the countries which
are prepared to integrate with us should be safeguarded against any
sanctions the West may impose."
Other sources from the Russia-Belarus Union State staff told us that
in exchange for the preferences extended by Russia, the Belarusian
authorities have promised to recognize the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. A source close to President Lukashenko
said: "But it has to be understood that Lukashenko can't do this
until after September 28, when Belarus holds its parliamentary
elections. Otherwise, there's the danger of the West declaring the
new parliament illegitimate again." Belarus has also agreed to sign
an agreement with Russia to establish a common air defense system,
intended as a response to US missile defense bases in Europe.
Moscow has also attempted to secure the support of Uzbekistan. Its
president, Islam Karimov, is regarded as Russia's most recalcitrant
partner in the CSTO. According to our sources, Karimov has shown the
greatest resistance to the idea that the CSTO should issue a joint
communique branding Georgia an aggressor. Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin visited Tashkent yesterday, on a mission to persuade President
Karimov. This visit produced agreements on prices for Gazprom's
purchases of gas from Uzbekistan, and building new gas transport
capacities in the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline corridor, on the
basis of a joint venture. It remains unclear who will finance the new
gas pipeline, since Karimov refused to allocate any funding for new
pipelines a year ago. According to our sources, the Russia-Uzbekistan
agreement should be signed this autumn.
In terms of gas prices, Putin offered Uzbekistan a long-term contract
under which Russia will buy all of Uzbekistan's gas on better terms
than those offered by European energy corporations or EU Energy
Commissioner Andris Piebalgis. Russia is offering $300 per thousand
cubic meters: double the current price. It cannot be ruled out that
such a substantial price increase is payment for Tashkent's support
of Russia's stance on Georgia within the CSTO.
But even if the CSTO does support Moscow on September 5 by unanimously
condemning Tbilisi's policies, CSTO members are unlikely to make
Russia happy by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However,
the Russian authorities appear resigned to the idea of remaining in
extremely uncomfortable isolation on that issue. At any rate, Prime
Minister Putin said yesterday that the situation is not critical,
although no other country except Russia has recognized the independence
of Georgia's breakaway regions.
by Vladimir Soloviev, Natalia Grib
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
September 3, 2008 Wednesday
Russia
Moscow wants its CSTO partners to support its actions in the Caucasus
Moscow seeks support ahead of Collective Security Treaty Organization
summit; The Russian authorities are engaged in intensive explanation
efforts, as Moscow seeks support for its actions in Georgia. The
results of those efforts will be seen at a Collective Security Treaty
Organization meeting on Friday, when it will become clear whether
Moscow still has any loyal allies in the former Soviet Union.
By the time the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
holds its Moscow summit, Russia expects CSTO member states to formulate
a common stance on the events in South Ossetia. This statement was
made yesterday by President Dmitri Medvedev when he received Armenian
President Serge Sargsian in Sochi yesterday. Sargsian isn't the only
CSTO leader to be targeted by the Russian government's intensive
explanation efforts, as Moscow seeks support for its actions
in Georgia. The results of those efforts will be seen by Friday,
September 5, when it will become clear whether Moscow still has any
loyal allies in the former Soviet Union.
This week offers Russia its last chance to convince the rest of
the world that it's not alone in its harsh assessment of Georgia's
actions against South Ossetia, and to secure at least some support
for Russia's own retaliatory measures against Tbilisi. The foreign
affairs ministers of the seven CSTO member states will meet in Moscow
on September 4; the meeting is supposed to produce a statement on
South Ossetia that is satisfactory for Moscow. To all appearances,
work on this statement's contents has not been straightforward. A
Russian diplomat source close to the talks told us: "A significant
proportion of our partners are only prepared to express support
for Russia's peace-promoting measures. But what we want is a strong
condemnation of Georgia. So far, the statement is reminiscent of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization scenario (at the August 28 summit),
where everyone appeared to give us verbal support, but the final
declaration prioritized the principle of territorial integrity."
The meeting of CSTO foreign affairs ministers is only a warm-up
exercise before a more significant event: the September 5 session of
the CSTO Collective Security Council, attended by heads of state. There
are plans to issue an extensive communique containing assessments of
the conflict in South Ossetia, the overall international situation,
and the role of the CSTO in the world today.
According to our sources, Moscow is insistently promoting the idea
that the CSTO communique should take the form of some sort of policy
document - condemning Georgia, and stating unequivocally that further
NATO expansion toward CSTO member state borders and the deployment
of US missile defense elements in the CSTO's interests zone are
unacceptable. Russian diplomacy is also striving to ensure that all
participants in the September 5 summit express support for Russia's
proposal to develop a European Security Treaty. This idea was proposed
by President Dmitri Medvedev in the new Russian foreign policy concept
which he signed in mid-July.
However, by no means all of Russia's CSTO partners want to complicate
their already-strained relations with the West for Russia's sake. So
Moscow is now working to ensure that the CSTO summit lives up to its
expectations. First of all, Moscow had to get its CSTO allies to
agree to the summit's location. The point here is that the CSTO's
rotating presidency is currently held by Kyrgyzstan, and it would
be more logical for that country to host this week's Collective
Security Council meeting. However, given the Georgia situation,
Russia requested the CSTO to make an exception - and has managed to
ensure that the meeting takes place in Moscow.
At the same time, the Kremlin has attempted to find an individual
approach to each CSTO head of state, seeking to ensure that the CSTO's
Moscow summit takes a united stance which is as strongly anti-Georgian
as possible. For example, Armenian leader Serge Sargsian was invited
to Russia several days before the Collective Security Council meeting;
he met with President Medvedev in Sochi yesterday. At the meeting,
Medvedev said: "You and I will discuss preliminary work in the CSTO
format, and we shall formulate the final position during the summit
in Moscow. Armenia is about to take its turn at the CSTO's rotating
presidency. I would like us to share our thoughts about international
issue, especially since we haven't seen each other since Georgia's act
of aggression." Sargsian's response was restrained in its reference to
the Caucasus events: "I regret that events have turned out this way,
and hope that the consequences are alleviated as soon as possible."
Medvedev held an explanation session with Belarasian President
Alexander Lukashenko on August 20. In exchange for Minsk's expression
of support for Moscow at the international level, Belarus was promised
lower prices for Russian gas and a long-term loan of $2 billion.
Ivan Makushok, spokesman for Pavel Borodin, state secretary of the
Russia-Belarus Union State: "If we demand an alliance relationship
from Belarus, then it's natural that energy price formation should
correspond to the spirit of our alliance treaty, which states that
economic entities in Russia and Belarus have equal rights. That
doesn't mean paying for friendship. It means that the countries which
are prepared to integrate with us should be safeguarded against any
sanctions the West may impose."
Other sources from the Russia-Belarus Union State staff told us that
in exchange for the preferences extended by Russia, the Belarusian
authorities have promised to recognize the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. A source close to President Lukashenko
said: "But it has to be understood that Lukashenko can't do this
until after September 28, when Belarus holds its parliamentary
elections. Otherwise, there's the danger of the West declaring the
new parliament illegitimate again." Belarus has also agreed to sign
an agreement with Russia to establish a common air defense system,
intended as a response to US missile defense bases in Europe.
Moscow has also attempted to secure the support of Uzbekistan. Its
president, Islam Karimov, is regarded as Russia's most recalcitrant
partner in the CSTO. According to our sources, Karimov has shown the
greatest resistance to the idea that the CSTO should issue a joint
communique branding Georgia an aggressor. Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin visited Tashkent yesterday, on a mission to persuade President
Karimov. This visit produced agreements on prices for Gazprom's
purchases of gas from Uzbekistan, and building new gas transport
capacities in the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline corridor, on the
basis of a joint venture. It remains unclear who will finance the new
gas pipeline, since Karimov refused to allocate any funding for new
pipelines a year ago. According to our sources, the Russia-Uzbekistan
agreement should be signed this autumn.
In terms of gas prices, Putin offered Uzbekistan a long-term contract
under which Russia will buy all of Uzbekistan's gas on better terms
than those offered by European energy corporations or EU Energy
Commissioner Andris Piebalgis. Russia is offering $300 per thousand
cubic meters: double the current price. It cannot be ruled out that
such a substantial price increase is payment for Tashkent's support
of Russia's stance on Georgia within the CSTO.
But even if the CSTO does support Moscow on September 5 by unanimously
condemning Tbilisi's policies, CSTO members are unlikely to make
Russia happy by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However,
the Russian authorities appear resigned to the idea of remaining in
extremely uncomfortable isolation on that issue. At any rate, Prime
Minister Putin said yesterday that the situation is not critical,
although no other country except Russia has recognized the independence
of Georgia's breakaway regions.