Tweet
MEMORANDUM ON RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT
A1+
[04:58 pm] 29 September, 2008
1. The Bureau of the Assembly, at its meeting on 5 September 2008,
decided to set up an Ad Hoc Committee to study the situation on the
ground in Russia and Georgia from 21 to 26 September 2008. The Ad
Hoc Committee was composed of the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring
Committee for Russia, myself and Mr Theodoros Pangalos (Greece,
SOC); the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for Georgia, Mr
Mátyás Eörsi (Hungary, ALDE) and Mr Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC);
the Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Mr Göran Lindblad
(Sweden, EPP/CD); the Chairwoman of the Committee on Migration,
Population and Refugees, Ms Corien Jonker (Netherlands, EPP/CD);
the Chairman of the Socialist Group, Mr Andreas Gross (Switzerland);
the Chairman of the Unified Left Group, Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands);
and the First Vice-Chairman of the European Democrat Group, Mr David
Wilshire (United Kingdom). 2. The delegation visited the Russian
Federation from 21 to 23 September 2008 and, subsequently, Georgia
from 24 to 26 September 2008. During their visit in the two countries,
the delegation met with high-level state authorities, representatives
of international organisations, as well as representatives of civil
society and the diplomatic community. In addition, during the visit
in Georgia, the delegation visited the so-called "buffer zone"
and South Ossetia. The programme of the delegation is attached
to this memorandum. The delegation wishes to thank the National
Delegations of the Russian Federation and Georgia to the Assembly,
as well as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
of the Council of Europe in Tbilisi, for the excellent programme and
logistical support provided to the delegation. 3. The itinerary of the
delegation led to prolonged discussions with our Russian counterparts,
who felt that the itinerary decided by the Bureau would not allow
the Russian side to respond to the Georgian points of view -while
this possibility existed for the Georgian side- and would not allow
time for a visit to North Ossetia. They therefore proposed that the
delegation should travel to Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) and from
there directly to South Ossetia via the Roki tunnel. The delegation
reconfirmed that it was willing to travel to Vladikavkaz in the
framework of the programme in Russia, but that it could, and would,
only enter Georgia via a border under the control of the Georgian
authorities, also in order to avoid any implicit recognition of
the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia. However, the
Chairwoman of the Committee on Migration, Population and Refugees
was willing to return to Moscow and Vladikavkaz, while three members
of the delegation were willing to return to Moscow on Friday 26
September, in their individual capacity, to meet Prime Minister Putin,
who had indicated that he was interested in meeting members of the
delegation on that day. The original itinerary for the delegation was
therefore maintained, but, unfortunately, the meeting with Mr Putin
could not take place due to scheduling problems, while the visit
to Vladikavkaz could not be organised at such short notice. 4. The
delegation visited several villages in the "buffer zone" and South
Ossetiia, including Tskhinvali. The delegation was able, and allowed,
to visit a majority of the villages on the list it had previously
provided to the Russian military authorities and the visits in the
villages themselves took place completely unimpeded. The delegation
wishes to thank the Russian military authorities for their logistical
support and security provided during this part of the programme. The
delegation was however surprised and concerned about being welcomed
by a member of the Russian State Duma and of our Assembly, Mr Slutsky,
at the Karaleti check point to the "buffer zone", which is deep inside
Georgia proper. Mr Slutsky indicated his understanding for the position
of the delegation, but informed us that it would not be possible for
the Russian military authorities to provide us with access to the
"buffer zone" and South Ossetia without his presence. 5. On request
of the "de facto" authorities in Tskhinvali, the delegation met with
Mr Kokoity and other Ossetian "de facto" authorities The exchange of
views with Mr Kokoity was frank and open and allowed the delegation
to be better informed about the different positions of the "de facto"
authorities. Outbreak of the war 6. During their meetings with the
Russian and Georgian authorities, the delegation was presented with
diametrically opposed versions about the circumstances that led to
the outbreak of the hostilities, as well as the exact events on 7
and 8 August as such. 7. According to the Russian authorities, the
tension and outbreaks of violence, involving small arms and light
artillery fire, between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides had been
steadily escalating over the summer months mainly as a result of, but
not exclusively, Georgian provocations and this despite all efforts
by the Russian Peacekeepers to calm both sides down and bring them
back to the negotiating table. At approximately 22:38 on 7 August,
the Georgian authorities then initiated an unprovoked and, in their
opinion, clearly premeditated, full-scale military attack on Tskhinvali
and Ossetian villages in the security zone, including a "massive and
indiscriminate" shelling with heavy artillery and multiple rocket
systems of Tskhinvali. When reports of heavy civilian casualties and
attacks on Russian Peacekeepers became clear, the Russian authorities
launched their counter-offensive and sent troops through the Roki
tunnel into Georgia. 8. According to the Georgian authorities,
tensions in South Ossetia had been steadily escalating for several
months as a result of provocations and attacks on Georgian villages
by South Ossetian separatist forces, which were not prevented by
Russian Peacekeepers. Repeated attempts by the Georgian side to
stop the hostilities by peaceful means were met with a refusal
from the South Ossetian side, with the tacit approval of the
Russian Peacekeepers. On 6 and 7 August, the escalations reached
unprecedented heights, which risked destabilising the country. When,
on the 7 August in the late evening, the Georgian authorities
received multiple intelligence reports that Russian military troops,
including tanks and heavy artillery, were crossing the Roki tunnel
and building up in South Ossetia, a counter-attack was launched in
self defence of the Russian invasion of Georgian territory. 9. The
Russian authorities strongly deny that Russian troops passed the Roki
tunnel before the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali and point out that the
intelligence information to that effect made public by the Georgian
authorities is widely considered to be at best inconclusive and not
independently verified. The delegation was surprised to be informed
that neither Russia nor the United States possess satellite images
that could help either confirm or contradict the Georgian assertion
that Russian troops passed the Roki tunnel prior to the attack on
Tskhinvali. 10. The Russian authorities presented the delegation
with what they allege to be captured Georgian military plans for the
invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the Russian opinion, these
plans are the proof that the attack on South Ossetia was planned and
prepared well in advance. The Georgian side strongly denies any prior
preparation and planning for such an invasion. The delegation itself
considered that military forces in most, if not all, countries would
have plans for hypothetical military situations that could occur,
and that therefore, even if these plans were genuine, the existence
of such plans would not per se constitute the proof that the attack
on Tskhinvali was premeditated and prepared in advance. Moreover,
members of the international community in Georgia asserted that
the level of disorganisation during the Georgian military action in
South Ossetia, as well as the chaotic retreat, would seem to belie
the notion that this attack was prepared well in advance. 11. From
our exchanges with the Georgian and Russian authorities, as well
as with members of the international community, it is clear that at
present it is impossible to fully establish what happened, and what
led to the events on 7 and 8 August. However, it is equally clear
to us that the conflict and the escalation and deterioration of
the situation leading to it did not start at 7 August and that the
peacekeeping process had broken down well before that date. However,
the start of the shelling of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops, on 7
August 2008, initiated a new level of escalation, namely that of
open and full-fledged warfare. The delegation therefore called for an
independent international investigation into the circumstances that
led to the war, as well as into the exact sequence of events on 7
and 8 August 2008. The Georgian authorities indicated that they would
welcome such an international inquiry. Our parliamentarian counterparts
in Russia have also indicated that they would not object to such an
independent international investigation. The immediate aftermath of the
war 12. During our talks with the Russian authorities, the delegation
made it clear that the unilateral recognition by the Russian Federation
of the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
violated the principle of the territorial integrity of Georgia and
is in contravention of international law and the obligations of the
Russian Federation as a member state of the Council of Europe. 13. The
Russian authorities stressed that a decision not to recognise the
self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would have
led to strong reactions in the Northern Caucasus republics which would
have had a potential destabilising effect on this volatile region
of the Russian Federation. Moreover, while agreeing that Kosovo
and South Ossetia are completely different and incomparable cases,
the Russian authorities stressed that the recognition of Kosovo by
several European countries, in their opinion, had opened a Pandora's
Box in this respect. 14. The delegation stressed the need for all
parties to fully implement the provisions of the Sarkozy cease-fire
agreement which was signed by both Presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili,
especially with regard to the withdrawal of troops. 15. The delegation
is seriously concerned about the issue of withdrawal of Russian
troops to their pre-war positions and strengths. According to the
recent negotiations between Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev, Russian
troop withdrawal from the so-called "buffer zone" is foreseen to
have been completed on 1 October, after the arrival of EU monitors,
although the delegation received indications that the withdrawal may
only start at 10 October. However, the Russian authorities informed us
that the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
no longer part of the cease-fire agreement as the Russian authorities
have recognised the independence of these two regions. According to
the Russian authorities, troop presence in those two regions will
now be governed by bilateral agreements. This is a matter of serious
concern to the delegation, as this would be in clear violation
of the cease-fire agreement. 16. The recognition by Russia of the
independence of these two regions also complicates the provision of
humanitarian aid as well as monitoring of the implementation of the
cease-fire agreement by independent monitors.
International organisations are refused entry to South Ossetia via
Georgia proper, while EU and OSCE monitors are prevented from entering
South Ossetia and Abkhazia at all. 17. Several interlocutors informed
the delegation they feared that various forms of provocation could
be used to justify a prolonged presence of Russian troops in the
"buffer zone", which could lead to increased tensions. Humanitarian
and Human Rights concerns 18. The visit to the villages in the "buffer
zone" and South Ossetia made clear the extent of the human rights
violations in these areas. The delegation saw evidence of large-scale
looting and destruction of property and heard accounts of assaults
and robberies. According to the Georgian villagers the delegation
spoke to, the looting and destruction of houses started mostly after
the cease-fire agreement was signed on 12 August and is continuing
unabated to this day. While the looting, assaults and destruction of
property take place mostly during the night, we were informed that
they also occur during the day. 19. When asked, the Georgian villagers
indicated that these crimes were committed by South Ossetian irregular
troops and gangs but also by so-called volunteers from the Northern
Caucasus. Russian troops were not reported to have been involved in
the looting and burning themselves, but allegedly had done nothing
to stop these practices, often turning a blind eye. These accounts
were confirmed by independent reports from Russian human rights
organisations who had been present in South Ossetia both during and
after the outbreak of hostilities. 20. The delegation was informed by
international humanitarian and relief organisations, as well as human
rights organisations and the diplomatic community in Georgia, about
systematic acts of ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in South
Ossetia by South Ossetian irregular troops and gangs. This pattern
seemed to be confirmed by the visit of the delegation to the Georgian
village of Ksuisi in South Ossetia, which had been completely looted
and virtually destroyed. The delegation received reports that, in some
cases, entire villages have been bulldozed over and razed. 21. The
delegation is seriously concerned about these reports of ethnic
cleansing, as well as of the looting and destruction of property it saw
during its visit. The delegation stressed that the Russian Federation,
under international law, bears full responsibility for any crimes
and human rights violations committed on the territories that are
under its effective control. 22. During our visit to Tskhinvali, the
delegation saw several residential areas, as well as public buildings,
that had been completely destroyed by indiscriminate shelling by
Georgian troops in the initial phases of the war, as well as in the
course of subsequent battles between Georgian and Russian troops over
the city. The delegation stressed that the use of indiscriminate
force and weapons in civilian areas can be considered a war crime
and called for a full investigation in order to establish the facts
in this respect. 23. The number of deaths as a result of the conflict
is a matter of controversy, although all sides agree that the initial
high numbers were inflated. Independent reports put the total number
of deaths at between 300 and 400, including the military. However, it
should be stressed that even one victim is a victim too many. 24. In
the initial phases of the conflict, around 35.000 to 40.000 South
Ossetian refugees were recorded in North Ossetia. All interlocutors
highlighted the efficient manner in which this refugee stream was
managed by the Russian authorities. Most of these refugees have now
returned to their place of residence, while an estimated 2.000 remain
in North Ossetia with their families. 25. According to different
sources, the conflict initially led to 130.000 IDPs in Georgia, of
which 60.000 currently remain. Another 29.000 are expected to be able
to return when Russian troops have withdrawn from the so-called "buffer
zone" and security for the population has been re-established. A total
of 31.000 IDPs (25.000 from South Ossetia and 6.000 from Abkhazia)
are considered to be "permanently" unable to return to their original
place of residence. These numbers should be seen in the context of
the approximately 300.000 already existing IDPs from these areas as a
result of the 1992 conflict. 26. The humanitarian situation is further
exacerbated by the uncertainty regarding the "buffer zone". The current
serious security vacuum needs to be urgently addressed but there seem
to be conflicting views regarding the role of the EU Monitors and
Georgian police forces. While the EU is sending strictly civilian
monitors to observe the security situation, and considers it to be
the role of the Georgian law enforcement forces to provide security
to the population in that area, the Russian authorities seem to be of
the view that civilian protection will be also the responsibility of
the EU Monitors and have reservations about the idea of armed Georgian
police in this area. This issue needs to be urgently resolved to avoid
an even further decline of security in this area. Conclusions 27. The
delegation is extremely concerned that two member states of the Council
of Europe, who committed themselves to resolve all conflicts, including
old ones, by peaceful means, did not live up to this commitment. This
can not be tolerated and both countries share responsibilities for
escalating this conflict into war. Taking into account the complexity
of the situation, the diametrically opposed views of the parties
in the conflict, the mutually exclusive national public discourses,
the negation by both states of any share of responsibility, as well
as the short time that the delegation had at its disposal, it is
impossible for the delegation to establish all the facts regarding
the exact sequence of events on 7 and 8 August, as well as the
circumstances that led to them, which are necessary to draw precise
conclusions. The exact facts, as well as the precise responsibility of
each of the parties in this conflict, including the outbreak of the
war, can only be properly established in the framework of a thorough
and independent international investigation as suggested in point 11
in this memorandum. Truth is a prerequisite for reconciliation. This
is of utmost importance as similar conflicts exist in other parts
of this geographical region and it must be made clear that, for the
Council of Europe or its Assembly, it can not be acceptable that such
conflicts escalate into war. 28. It is clear that both sides did not do
enough to prevent the war and that grave human rights violations were
committed and continue to be committed up to this day. There can be
no impunity for such violations and for alleged ethnic cleansing. The
Council of Europe has an important role to play in this respect. All
alleged human rights violations should be investigated and perpetrators
held to account before the courts. In this respect, it is clear that
the Russian Federation bears full responsibility for the protection
of civilians in the territories that are under its effective control
and therefore for the crimes and human rights violations committed
against them. The use of indiscriminate force and weapons by both
Georgian and Russian troops in civilian areas can be considered war
crimes that need to be fully investigated. 29. While it is beyond the
scope of this memorandum to discuss the possible action the Assembly
should take, it is clear that it can not be business as usual. At the
same time, there is a need to maintain the dialogue with, and between,
both countries in the conflict. 30. It is my firm conviction that
the Assembly has an important role to play in resolving the current
situation. Following the debate in the Assembly, the Bureau might
consider sending a follow-up mission to the region, possibly in
different format and composition, in the not too distant future.
--Boundary_(ID_DTg8+7rbo1m2VRYTmCr96Q)--
A1+
[04:58 pm] 29 September, 2008
1. The Bureau of the Assembly, at its meeting on 5 September 2008,
decided to set up an Ad Hoc Committee to study the situation on the
ground in Russia and Georgia from 21 to 26 September 2008. The Ad
Hoc Committee was composed of the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring
Committee for Russia, myself and Mr Theodoros Pangalos (Greece,
SOC); the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for Georgia, Mr
Mátyás Eörsi (Hungary, ALDE) and Mr Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC);
the Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Mr Göran Lindblad
(Sweden, EPP/CD); the Chairwoman of the Committee on Migration,
Population and Refugees, Ms Corien Jonker (Netherlands, EPP/CD);
the Chairman of the Socialist Group, Mr Andreas Gross (Switzerland);
the Chairman of the Unified Left Group, Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands);
and the First Vice-Chairman of the European Democrat Group, Mr David
Wilshire (United Kingdom). 2. The delegation visited the Russian
Federation from 21 to 23 September 2008 and, subsequently, Georgia
from 24 to 26 September 2008. During their visit in the two countries,
the delegation met with high-level state authorities, representatives
of international organisations, as well as representatives of civil
society and the diplomatic community. In addition, during the visit
in Georgia, the delegation visited the so-called "buffer zone"
and South Ossetia. The programme of the delegation is attached
to this memorandum. The delegation wishes to thank the National
Delegations of the Russian Federation and Georgia to the Assembly,
as well as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
of the Council of Europe in Tbilisi, for the excellent programme and
logistical support provided to the delegation. 3. The itinerary of the
delegation led to prolonged discussions with our Russian counterparts,
who felt that the itinerary decided by the Bureau would not allow
the Russian side to respond to the Georgian points of view -while
this possibility existed for the Georgian side- and would not allow
time for a visit to North Ossetia. They therefore proposed that the
delegation should travel to Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) and from
there directly to South Ossetia via the Roki tunnel. The delegation
reconfirmed that it was willing to travel to Vladikavkaz in the
framework of the programme in Russia, but that it could, and would,
only enter Georgia via a border under the control of the Georgian
authorities, also in order to avoid any implicit recognition of
the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia. However, the
Chairwoman of the Committee on Migration, Population and Refugees
was willing to return to Moscow and Vladikavkaz, while three members
of the delegation were willing to return to Moscow on Friday 26
September, in their individual capacity, to meet Prime Minister Putin,
who had indicated that he was interested in meeting members of the
delegation on that day. The original itinerary for the delegation was
therefore maintained, but, unfortunately, the meeting with Mr Putin
could not take place due to scheduling problems, while the visit
to Vladikavkaz could not be organised at such short notice. 4. The
delegation visited several villages in the "buffer zone" and South
Ossetiia, including Tskhinvali. The delegation was able, and allowed,
to visit a majority of the villages on the list it had previously
provided to the Russian military authorities and the visits in the
villages themselves took place completely unimpeded. The delegation
wishes to thank the Russian military authorities for their logistical
support and security provided during this part of the programme. The
delegation was however surprised and concerned about being welcomed
by a member of the Russian State Duma and of our Assembly, Mr Slutsky,
at the Karaleti check point to the "buffer zone", which is deep inside
Georgia proper. Mr Slutsky indicated his understanding for the position
of the delegation, but informed us that it would not be possible for
the Russian military authorities to provide us with access to the
"buffer zone" and South Ossetia without his presence. 5. On request
of the "de facto" authorities in Tskhinvali, the delegation met with
Mr Kokoity and other Ossetian "de facto" authorities The exchange of
views with Mr Kokoity was frank and open and allowed the delegation
to be better informed about the different positions of the "de facto"
authorities. Outbreak of the war 6. During their meetings with the
Russian and Georgian authorities, the delegation was presented with
diametrically opposed versions about the circumstances that led to
the outbreak of the hostilities, as well as the exact events on 7
and 8 August as such. 7. According to the Russian authorities, the
tension and outbreaks of violence, involving small arms and light
artillery fire, between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides had been
steadily escalating over the summer months mainly as a result of, but
not exclusively, Georgian provocations and this despite all efforts
by the Russian Peacekeepers to calm both sides down and bring them
back to the negotiating table. At approximately 22:38 on 7 August,
the Georgian authorities then initiated an unprovoked and, in their
opinion, clearly premeditated, full-scale military attack on Tskhinvali
and Ossetian villages in the security zone, including a "massive and
indiscriminate" shelling with heavy artillery and multiple rocket
systems of Tskhinvali. When reports of heavy civilian casualties and
attacks on Russian Peacekeepers became clear, the Russian authorities
launched their counter-offensive and sent troops through the Roki
tunnel into Georgia. 8. According to the Georgian authorities,
tensions in South Ossetia had been steadily escalating for several
months as a result of provocations and attacks on Georgian villages
by South Ossetian separatist forces, which were not prevented by
Russian Peacekeepers. Repeated attempts by the Georgian side to
stop the hostilities by peaceful means were met with a refusal
from the South Ossetian side, with the tacit approval of the
Russian Peacekeepers. On 6 and 7 August, the escalations reached
unprecedented heights, which risked destabilising the country. When,
on the 7 August in the late evening, the Georgian authorities
received multiple intelligence reports that Russian military troops,
including tanks and heavy artillery, were crossing the Roki tunnel
and building up in South Ossetia, a counter-attack was launched in
self defence of the Russian invasion of Georgian territory. 9. The
Russian authorities strongly deny that Russian troops passed the Roki
tunnel before the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali and point out that the
intelligence information to that effect made public by the Georgian
authorities is widely considered to be at best inconclusive and not
independently verified. The delegation was surprised to be informed
that neither Russia nor the United States possess satellite images
that could help either confirm or contradict the Georgian assertion
that Russian troops passed the Roki tunnel prior to the attack on
Tskhinvali. 10. The Russian authorities presented the delegation
with what they allege to be captured Georgian military plans for the
invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the Russian opinion, these
plans are the proof that the attack on South Ossetia was planned and
prepared well in advance. The Georgian side strongly denies any prior
preparation and planning for such an invasion. The delegation itself
considered that military forces in most, if not all, countries would
have plans for hypothetical military situations that could occur,
and that therefore, even if these plans were genuine, the existence
of such plans would not per se constitute the proof that the attack
on Tskhinvali was premeditated and prepared in advance. Moreover,
members of the international community in Georgia asserted that
the level of disorganisation during the Georgian military action in
South Ossetia, as well as the chaotic retreat, would seem to belie
the notion that this attack was prepared well in advance. 11. From
our exchanges with the Georgian and Russian authorities, as well
as with members of the international community, it is clear that at
present it is impossible to fully establish what happened, and what
led to the events on 7 and 8 August. However, it is equally clear
to us that the conflict and the escalation and deterioration of
the situation leading to it did not start at 7 August and that the
peacekeeping process had broken down well before that date. However,
the start of the shelling of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops, on 7
August 2008, initiated a new level of escalation, namely that of
open and full-fledged warfare. The delegation therefore called for an
independent international investigation into the circumstances that
led to the war, as well as into the exact sequence of events on 7
and 8 August 2008. The Georgian authorities indicated that they would
welcome such an international inquiry. Our parliamentarian counterparts
in Russia have also indicated that they would not object to such an
independent international investigation. The immediate aftermath of the
war 12. During our talks with the Russian authorities, the delegation
made it clear that the unilateral recognition by the Russian Federation
of the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
violated the principle of the territorial integrity of Georgia and
is in contravention of international law and the obligations of the
Russian Federation as a member state of the Council of Europe. 13. The
Russian authorities stressed that a decision not to recognise the
self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would have
led to strong reactions in the Northern Caucasus republics which would
have had a potential destabilising effect on this volatile region
of the Russian Federation. Moreover, while agreeing that Kosovo
and South Ossetia are completely different and incomparable cases,
the Russian authorities stressed that the recognition of Kosovo by
several European countries, in their opinion, had opened a Pandora's
Box in this respect. 14. The delegation stressed the need for all
parties to fully implement the provisions of the Sarkozy cease-fire
agreement which was signed by both Presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili,
especially with regard to the withdrawal of troops. 15. The delegation
is seriously concerned about the issue of withdrawal of Russian
troops to their pre-war positions and strengths. According to the
recent negotiations between Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev, Russian
troop withdrawal from the so-called "buffer zone" is foreseen to
have been completed on 1 October, after the arrival of EU monitors,
although the delegation received indications that the withdrawal may
only start at 10 October. However, the Russian authorities informed us
that the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
no longer part of the cease-fire agreement as the Russian authorities
have recognised the independence of these two regions. According to
the Russian authorities, troop presence in those two regions will
now be governed by bilateral agreements. This is a matter of serious
concern to the delegation, as this would be in clear violation
of the cease-fire agreement. 16. The recognition by Russia of the
independence of these two regions also complicates the provision of
humanitarian aid as well as monitoring of the implementation of the
cease-fire agreement by independent monitors.
International organisations are refused entry to South Ossetia via
Georgia proper, while EU and OSCE monitors are prevented from entering
South Ossetia and Abkhazia at all. 17. Several interlocutors informed
the delegation they feared that various forms of provocation could
be used to justify a prolonged presence of Russian troops in the
"buffer zone", which could lead to increased tensions. Humanitarian
and Human Rights concerns 18. The visit to the villages in the "buffer
zone" and South Ossetia made clear the extent of the human rights
violations in these areas. The delegation saw evidence of large-scale
looting and destruction of property and heard accounts of assaults
and robberies. According to the Georgian villagers the delegation
spoke to, the looting and destruction of houses started mostly after
the cease-fire agreement was signed on 12 August and is continuing
unabated to this day. While the looting, assaults and destruction of
property take place mostly during the night, we were informed that
they also occur during the day. 19. When asked, the Georgian villagers
indicated that these crimes were committed by South Ossetian irregular
troops and gangs but also by so-called volunteers from the Northern
Caucasus. Russian troops were not reported to have been involved in
the looting and burning themselves, but allegedly had done nothing
to stop these practices, often turning a blind eye. These accounts
were confirmed by independent reports from Russian human rights
organisations who had been present in South Ossetia both during and
after the outbreak of hostilities. 20. The delegation was informed by
international humanitarian and relief organisations, as well as human
rights organisations and the diplomatic community in Georgia, about
systematic acts of ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in South
Ossetia by South Ossetian irregular troops and gangs. This pattern
seemed to be confirmed by the visit of the delegation to the Georgian
village of Ksuisi in South Ossetia, which had been completely looted
and virtually destroyed. The delegation received reports that, in some
cases, entire villages have been bulldozed over and razed. 21. The
delegation is seriously concerned about these reports of ethnic
cleansing, as well as of the looting and destruction of property it saw
during its visit. The delegation stressed that the Russian Federation,
under international law, bears full responsibility for any crimes
and human rights violations committed on the territories that are
under its effective control. 22. During our visit to Tskhinvali, the
delegation saw several residential areas, as well as public buildings,
that had been completely destroyed by indiscriminate shelling by
Georgian troops in the initial phases of the war, as well as in the
course of subsequent battles between Georgian and Russian troops over
the city. The delegation stressed that the use of indiscriminate
force and weapons in civilian areas can be considered a war crime
and called for a full investigation in order to establish the facts
in this respect. 23. The number of deaths as a result of the conflict
is a matter of controversy, although all sides agree that the initial
high numbers were inflated. Independent reports put the total number
of deaths at between 300 and 400, including the military. However, it
should be stressed that even one victim is a victim too many. 24. In
the initial phases of the conflict, around 35.000 to 40.000 South
Ossetian refugees were recorded in North Ossetia. All interlocutors
highlighted the efficient manner in which this refugee stream was
managed by the Russian authorities. Most of these refugees have now
returned to their place of residence, while an estimated 2.000 remain
in North Ossetia with their families. 25. According to different
sources, the conflict initially led to 130.000 IDPs in Georgia, of
which 60.000 currently remain. Another 29.000 are expected to be able
to return when Russian troops have withdrawn from the so-called "buffer
zone" and security for the population has been re-established. A total
of 31.000 IDPs (25.000 from South Ossetia and 6.000 from Abkhazia)
are considered to be "permanently" unable to return to their original
place of residence. These numbers should be seen in the context of
the approximately 300.000 already existing IDPs from these areas as a
result of the 1992 conflict. 26. The humanitarian situation is further
exacerbated by the uncertainty regarding the "buffer zone". The current
serious security vacuum needs to be urgently addressed but there seem
to be conflicting views regarding the role of the EU Monitors and
Georgian police forces. While the EU is sending strictly civilian
monitors to observe the security situation, and considers it to be
the role of the Georgian law enforcement forces to provide security
to the population in that area, the Russian authorities seem to be of
the view that civilian protection will be also the responsibility of
the EU Monitors and have reservations about the idea of armed Georgian
police in this area. This issue needs to be urgently resolved to avoid
an even further decline of security in this area. Conclusions 27. The
delegation is extremely concerned that two member states of the Council
of Europe, who committed themselves to resolve all conflicts, including
old ones, by peaceful means, did not live up to this commitment. This
can not be tolerated and both countries share responsibilities for
escalating this conflict into war. Taking into account the complexity
of the situation, the diametrically opposed views of the parties
in the conflict, the mutually exclusive national public discourses,
the negation by both states of any share of responsibility, as well
as the short time that the delegation had at its disposal, it is
impossible for the delegation to establish all the facts regarding
the exact sequence of events on 7 and 8 August, as well as the
circumstances that led to them, which are necessary to draw precise
conclusions. The exact facts, as well as the precise responsibility of
each of the parties in this conflict, including the outbreak of the
war, can only be properly established in the framework of a thorough
and independent international investigation as suggested in point 11
in this memorandum. Truth is a prerequisite for reconciliation. This
is of utmost importance as similar conflicts exist in other parts
of this geographical region and it must be made clear that, for the
Council of Europe or its Assembly, it can not be acceptable that such
conflicts escalate into war. 28. It is clear that both sides did not do
enough to prevent the war and that grave human rights violations were
committed and continue to be committed up to this day. There can be
no impunity for such violations and for alleged ethnic cleansing. The
Council of Europe has an important role to play in this respect. All
alleged human rights violations should be investigated and perpetrators
held to account before the courts. In this respect, it is clear that
the Russian Federation bears full responsibility for the protection
of civilians in the territories that are under its effective control
and therefore for the crimes and human rights violations committed
against them. The use of indiscriminate force and weapons by both
Georgian and Russian troops in civilian areas can be considered war
crimes that need to be fully investigated. 29. While it is beyond the
scope of this memorandum to discuss the possible action the Assembly
should take, it is clear that it can not be business as usual. At the
same time, there is a need to maintain the dialogue with, and between,
both countries in the conflict. 30. It is my firm conviction that
the Assembly has an important role to play in resolving the current
situation. Following the debate in the Assembly, the Bureau might
consider sending a follow-up mission to the region, possibly in
different format and composition, in the not too distant future.
--Boundary_(ID_DTg8+7rbo1m2VRYTmCr96Q)--