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WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 28, 2009 Friday
BURDEN OF INDEPENDENCE
by Ivan Sukhov
RUSSIA RECOGNIZED ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA A YEAR AGO; Recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: pros and cons.
A year ago, Russia officially recognized two republics on its borders
in the Caucasus - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - as sovereign
states. Contrary to Moscow's expectations, Nicaragua became the only
foreign country to follow suit (and even it has to ratify recognition
yet).
Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia followed what is known as
the Five Day War between Russia and Georgia (August 8-12,
2008). Before the war, Russia officially regarded these two
territories as parts of Georgia even though they had withdrawn from
Georgia long ago. Their formal recognition as sovereign states enabled
Moscow to offer Abkhazia and South Ossetia military protection and
replace peacekeepers there with permanent contingents of the regular
army.
>From Russia's point of view, it became the principal result of the
Five Day War. Before the war, Russia had maintained but a battalion of
peacekeepers (500 plus men) in South Ossetia and about 2,000 men in
Abkhazia. Once they were recognized as sovereign states, however,
Moscow immediately signed military assistance agreements with Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Terms of these agreements officially permitted
Russia to establish military bases in these countries and maintain
contingents 3,800 men strong in each. Apart from the regular army,
Russia has some border guards in Abkhazia.
As far as Russian strategists are concerned, appearance of this buffer
zone attains importance in the light of Georgia's forthcoming
membership in the Alliance. (Postponed for the time being, it remains
on the political agenda all the same.) It is fair to add meanwhile
that the Russian borders with NATO countries - Norway, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and United States - have been always safe and
secure without any buffers.
Military victory did worlds of good to Russian national self-awareness
and inflated the ego of the Russian political establishment. The
impression is that deployment of the Armed Forces last year was a kind
of experiment official Moscow ran to gauge patience of the
international community - and that Moscow is pleased with what the
test showed. Russia spent the twelve months following the
Russian-Georgian war in undisguised efforts to regain the status of at
least a regional power, one making political decisions for and sealing
the fate of its neighbors. Russian diplomacy became undeniably more
active in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central Asian countries, and even in
Turkey.
Neither did this demonstration of military might harm Moscow's image
in the eyes of the Russian part of the Caucasus, notoriously unstable
and ever watching how Abkhazia and South Ossetia would fare (or,
rather watching if Moscow would protect them as it had promised it
would do).
In the meantime, some of these pros might turn out to be cons after
all. Borders between Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the one hand and
Georgia on the other firmly blocked, Russia is cut off the southern
part of the Caucasus now, a region where the obstinately pro-Western
Georgia is located side by side with the pro-Russian Armenia. The
route to Armenia via Azerbaijan is unavailable because of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. What is left then? The railway and highways
across Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and through checkpoint Verhkny Lars
right on the Russian-Georgian state border. Russia opened it this
spring - with no effect because Georgia refused to do so, of course.
No wonder the problems with logistics the last year outbreak of
hostilities had made forced Yerevan to activate contacts with
Turkey. If these contacts deblock the Armenian-Turkish border which is
problematic but not at all impossible, it will inevitably mean a
dramatic turn in Armenia's foreign policy.
Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia following a Russian-Georgian
war that had affected Azerbaijani oil export couldn't help disturbing
official Baku grappling for years with the problem of runaway
Nagorno-Karabakh. Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan do visit Moscow
every now and then and even sign documents there (non-aggression pact
was signed a year ago, emphasizing importance of Russia as a broker of
peace) but all of that might be dismissed as insignificant. As matters
stand, it is all but impossible for Moscow to use the problem of
Karabakh in its own interests. Russia cannot afford to be logical and
recognize the
Source: Vremya Novostei, August 26, 2009, pp. 1 - 2
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 28, 2009 Friday
BURDEN OF INDEPENDENCE
by Ivan Sukhov
RUSSIA RECOGNIZED ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA A YEAR AGO; Recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: pros and cons.
A year ago, Russia officially recognized two republics on its borders
in the Caucasus - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - as sovereign
states. Contrary to Moscow's expectations, Nicaragua became the only
foreign country to follow suit (and even it has to ratify recognition
yet).
Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia followed what is known as
the Five Day War between Russia and Georgia (August 8-12,
2008). Before the war, Russia officially regarded these two
territories as parts of Georgia even though they had withdrawn from
Georgia long ago. Their formal recognition as sovereign states enabled
Moscow to offer Abkhazia and South Ossetia military protection and
replace peacekeepers there with permanent contingents of the regular
army.
>From Russia's point of view, it became the principal result of the
Five Day War. Before the war, Russia had maintained but a battalion of
peacekeepers (500 plus men) in South Ossetia and about 2,000 men in
Abkhazia. Once they were recognized as sovereign states, however,
Moscow immediately signed military assistance agreements with Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Terms of these agreements officially permitted
Russia to establish military bases in these countries and maintain
contingents 3,800 men strong in each. Apart from the regular army,
Russia has some border guards in Abkhazia.
As far as Russian strategists are concerned, appearance of this buffer
zone attains importance in the light of Georgia's forthcoming
membership in the Alliance. (Postponed for the time being, it remains
on the political agenda all the same.) It is fair to add meanwhile
that the Russian borders with NATO countries - Norway, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and United States - have been always safe and
secure without any buffers.
Military victory did worlds of good to Russian national self-awareness
and inflated the ego of the Russian political establishment. The
impression is that deployment of the Armed Forces last year was a kind
of experiment official Moscow ran to gauge patience of the
international community - and that Moscow is pleased with what the
test showed. Russia spent the twelve months following the
Russian-Georgian war in undisguised efforts to regain the status of at
least a regional power, one making political decisions for and sealing
the fate of its neighbors. Russian diplomacy became undeniably more
active in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central Asian countries, and even in
Turkey.
Neither did this demonstration of military might harm Moscow's image
in the eyes of the Russian part of the Caucasus, notoriously unstable
and ever watching how Abkhazia and South Ossetia would fare (or,
rather watching if Moscow would protect them as it had promised it
would do).
In the meantime, some of these pros might turn out to be cons after
all. Borders between Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the one hand and
Georgia on the other firmly blocked, Russia is cut off the southern
part of the Caucasus now, a region where the obstinately pro-Western
Georgia is located side by side with the pro-Russian Armenia. The
route to Armenia via Azerbaijan is unavailable because of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. What is left then? The railway and highways
across Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and through checkpoint Verhkny Lars
right on the Russian-Georgian state border. Russia opened it this
spring - with no effect because Georgia refused to do so, of course.
No wonder the problems with logistics the last year outbreak of
hostilities had made forced Yerevan to activate contacts with
Turkey. If these contacts deblock the Armenian-Turkish border which is
problematic but not at all impossible, it will inevitably mean a
dramatic turn in Armenia's foreign policy.
Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia following a Russian-Georgian
war that had affected Azerbaijani oil export couldn't help disturbing
official Baku grappling for years with the problem of runaway
Nagorno-Karabakh. Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan do visit Moscow
every now and then and even sign documents there (non-aggression pact
was signed a year ago, emphasizing importance of Russia as a broker of
peace) but all of that might be dismissed as insignificant. As matters
stand, it is all but impossible for Moscow to use the problem of
Karabakh in its own interests. Russia cannot afford to be logical and
recognize the
Source: Vremya Novostei, August 26, 2009, pp. 1 - 2