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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 15 2009
Questions
DOGU ERGIL
The right-wing isolationists in Turkey have two basic characteristics:
They are both nationalistic and xenophobic, and as a majority they
happen to be mainly old and new state functionaries. However, "their
state" has never been and will never be a responsive, efficient and
accountable apparatus as long as their grip on it persists. It is they
who disseminate rumors that President Abdullah Gül is of
Armenian extraction and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an is
a crypto Jew. But then all of their memorized rhetoric got bundled up
when Mr. ErdoÄ?an spoke harshly against the dealings of the
Jewish state vis-à-vis the Palestinians to the face of the very
president of the country.
Those who were highly critical of the prime minister and his party
were quite surprised at the positive effect of Mr. ErdoÄ?an's
undiplomatic retort to Shimon Peres. Soaring public sentiment in
support of ErdoÄ?an both on the domestic political scene and in
the Arab/Muslim world led them to take a reserved but hypocritical
position. After all there are local/municipal elections coming up next
month, and who could go against the tide of popular feelings?
This is all to the good. It seems Mr. ErdoÄ?an's party will
benefit from his international bravado for speaking out in favor of
the underdog and the oppressed. In person he is expected to fill in
for the absentee leadership in the Middle East for drawing the moral
boundaries of injustice and exploitation, although he cannot set more
concrete boundaries to deter them. This all happened because he
transcended the code of conduct of a national leader and acquired the
quality of a moral leader, defending a just cause for the leaderless
in the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Having said this, would Mr. ErdoÄ?an's sudden and unprecedented
popularity help him put things in order on alien soil rather than on
his native soil? For the sake of realism, here are some concrete
questions to be addressed:
1- Would he have the leverage over Israel to convince this country to
change its ways of resorting to disproportionate violence when
Palestinians raise their tone in demanding their rights and constantly
delaying a two-state solution?
2- Would he have enough clout to deter Hamas from doing what it has
been doing since its inception: waging a war of existence until the
demise of Israel and remaining an armed militia until it achieves this
end? It is obvious that Hamas' terrorist methods are the basis of
Israeli aggression provided by the legitimacy of "fighting against
terrorism" as self-defense.
3- Would he be able to end the calculated silence of the
leaders/rulers of Arab states by making the voice of the "Arab street"
heard inside the thick walls of their palaces?
4- Would Mr. ErdoÄ?an be able to rally Arab (and other Muslim)
states to support a common agenda that will bring peace and stability
to the Middle East without leaving out both Israel and the
Palestinians?
5- Would he be able to convince the present and future Israeli
governments to set higher humanitarian standards in dealing with
"regional others" rather than seeing them as potential dangers for
their country's national security?
6- What kind of tone would he bring to Turkey's relations with the US
and the European Union when he vies for a peace deal involving both
Israel and its sworn enemy Hamas when a similar armed organization
continues to be a menace in Turkey, constantly seeking representation
at the official/legal level?
These are seminal questions to be addressed to as we take a euphoric
position in support of the defiant attitude of Mr. ErdoÄ?an, as
emotions are for men but states are driven by rationality and most of
the time by compromise.
The streets are the scene of instant love affairs and sudden
divorces. That is why many families prefer marriages of convenience to
temporary togetherness born out of "love at first sight." We will see
what is more realistic in the atmosphere born out of the circumstances
that have elevated Mr. ErdoÄ?an to be labeled as the new Nasser
of the Middle East.
15.02.2009
Feb 15 2009
Questions
DOGU ERGIL
The right-wing isolationists in Turkey have two basic characteristics:
They are both nationalistic and xenophobic, and as a majority they
happen to be mainly old and new state functionaries. However, "their
state" has never been and will never be a responsive, efficient and
accountable apparatus as long as their grip on it persists. It is they
who disseminate rumors that President Abdullah Gül is of
Armenian extraction and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an is
a crypto Jew. But then all of their memorized rhetoric got bundled up
when Mr. ErdoÄ?an spoke harshly against the dealings of the
Jewish state vis-à-vis the Palestinians to the face of the very
president of the country.
Those who were highly critical of the prime minister and his party
were quite surprised at the positive effect of Mr. ErdoÄ?an's
undiplomatic retort to Shimon Peres. Soaring public sentiment in
support of ErdoÄ?an both on the domestic political scene and in
the Arab/Muslim world led them to take a reserved but hypocritical
position. After all there are local/municipal elections coming up next
month, and who could go against the tide of popular feelings?
This is all to the good. It seems Mr. ErdoÄ?an's party will
benefit from his international bravado for speaking out in favor of
the underdog and the oppressed. In person he is expected to fill in
for the absentee leadership in the Middle East for drawing the moral
boundaries of injustice and exploitation, although he cannot set more
concrete boundaries to deter them. This all happened because he
transcended the code of conduct of a national leader and acquired the
quality of a moral leader, defending a just cause for the leaderless
in the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Having said this, would Mr. ErdoÄ?an's sudden and unprecedented
popularity help him put things in order on alien soil rather than on
his native soil? For the sake of realism, here are some concrete
questions to be addressed:
1- Would he have the leverage over Israel to convince this country to
change its ways of resorting to disproportionate violence when
Palestinians raise their tone in demanding their rights and constantly
delaying a two-state solution?
2- Would he have enough clout to deter Hamas from doing what it has
been doing since its inception: waging a war of existence until the
demise of Israel and remaining an armed militia until it achieves this
end? It is obvious that Hamas' terrorist methods are the basis of
Israeli aggression provided by the legitimacy of "fighting against
terrorism" as self-defense.
3- Would he be able to end the calculated silence of the
leaders/rulers of Arab states by making the voice of the "Arab street"
heard inside the thick walls of their palaces?
4- Would Mr. ErdoÄ?an be able to rally Arab (and other Muslim)
states to support a common agenda that will bring peace and stability
to the Middle East without leaving out both Israel and the
Palestinians?
5- Would he be able to convince the present and future Israeli
governments to set higher humanitarian standards in dealing with
"regional others" rather than seeing them as potential dangers for
their country's national security?
6- What kind of tone would he bring to Turkey's relations with the US
and the European Union when he vies for a peace deal involving both
Israel and its sworn enemy Hamas when a similar armed organization
continues to be a menace in Turkey, constantly seeking representation
at the official/legal level?
These are seminal questions to be addressed to as we take a euphoric
position in support of the defiant attitude of Mr. ErdoÄ?an, as
emotions are for men but states are driven by rationality and most of
the time by compromise.
The streets are the scene of instant love affairs and sudden
divorces. That is why many families prefer marriages of convenience to
temporary togetherness born out of "love at first sight." We will see
what is more realistic in the atmosphere born out of the circumstances
that have elevated Mr. ErdoÄ?an to be labeled as the new Nasser
of the Middle East.
15.02.2009