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Turkey's turning of the tables
By Amir Oren
Mon., February 23, 2009
Haaretz
A veteran Turkish journalist smiled last week when he read the
commentary in Israel after General Avi Mizrahi's verbal counterassault
against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the
counter-counterassault by the Turkish government and army over Israel's
inflicting of civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.
In the Israeli debate, the analyst in Istanbul said, two important
points were overlooked. The first is Erdogan's predilection for sudden
and embarrassing bursts of anger. In Davos, Shimon Peres just happened
to be his next victim; Nicolas Sarkozy or Barack Obama could have found
themselves in the same situation. As proof, one can point to the
restraint shown by President Abdullah Gul, the former foreign minister,
who, like his senior partner in the ruling party Erdogan, is well
versed in the nuances of his country's relationship with Israel.
More critical is the waning of Israel's political and military might as
perceived by foreigners, particularly countries like Turkey. For years
Israel was considered a country that could deliver the goods in
Washington, yet in the last decade Turkey has been moving into a
different position - a country needed in Washington, more so than the
other way around. At the same time, Israel is perceived as too weak to
influence the administration and Congress to improve relations with
Turkey.
America's chilly relationship with Ankara, despite Turkey's importance
to the NATO alliance and its cooperation in the air embargo against
Saddam Hussein (though there was no such cooperation in 2003, when the
Turks refused to allow the Americans to outflank Saddam from Iraq's
northwest border with Turkey) did not stem from Washington's sympathy
with the Armenians or Kurds. It stemmed from the influence of the Greek
lobby. Here is a partial list of politicians and senior officials of
Greek extraction: former vice president Spiro Agnew, former Democratic
presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, Senator Paul Sarbanes, former
prominent congressmen Paul Tsongas and John Brademas, and former CIA
chief George Tenet. The full list of their colleagues of Turkish
origin: not one.
Turkey tried to counterbalance the Greek advantage using its defense
ally, Israel, directly, and AIPAC, indirectly. The image and prestige
of both these players have absorbed severe blows in recent years in the
eyes of the White House and Capitol Hill.
In the Gaza affair, one should also take into account two serious
lapses by Israel's defense establishment: marginalizing the role of the
Civil Administration and the refusal to allow journalists to accompany
the forces fighting in urban territory. Defense Minister Ehud Barak and
Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi could not agree on a candidate to head
the Civil Administration, which coordinates Israel's activities in the
territories. Barak could have named a civilian to the job, without
asking Ashkenazi, but instead, the job of coordinating Israel's
activities in the territories was left without a permanent head ever
since Yosef Mishlav vacated the post. Barak and Ashkenazi also allowed
the previous and successful head of the coordination and liaison
administrative office in Gaza, Colonel Nir Peres, to leave without
lining up a worthy successor, when the Gaza operation was in the
offing.
Liaison officers were left behind and not embedded with the battalion
and brigade commanders, which would have enabled them to warn, even in
the heat of battle, against targeting sensitive buildings not known to
be of military value. Marking the buildings on a map in command
headquarters far from the battlefield did not suffice. The Shin Bet
security service and Military Intelligence pointed to the targets that
needed to be hit, but there was no one to point out which targets were
off limits.
As usual in Israel, the ban on embedding reporters with the forces
yielded a tactical success for the unfettered ground operation, yet it
failed to stem the erosion of Israel's political standing at the end of
the offensive. Had reliable journalists, both foreign and Israeli,
instead been able to document the booby-trapped streets before the army
took steps to protect its soldiers, this would have made Israel's
operational needs understandable and helped dull the criticism evoked
by the destruction in Gaza.
The fairy tale of Israel's control over the global levers of power, in
the spirit of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, has repeatedly
cracked in the face of the realities of the 21st century. Against the
backdrop of the rising political influence of Muslim minorities in
Europe, which threatens to create a European equivalent to the Jews'
political strength in America, perhaps it would behoove Israel to stop
denying the situation and start embracing it, in the hope that someone
will start believing in Israel once again.
By Amir Oren
Mon., February 23, 2009
Haaretz
A veteran Turkish journalist smiled last week when he read the
commentary in Israel after General Avi Mizrahi's verbal counterassault
against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the
counter-counterassault by the Turkish government and army over Israel's
inflicting of civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.
In the Israeli debate, the analyst in Istanbul said, two important
points were overlooked. The first is Erdogan's predilection for sudden
and embarrassing bursts of anger. In Davos, Shimon Peres just happened
to be his next victim; Nicolas Sarkozy or Barack Obama could have found
themselves in the same situation. As proof, one can point to the
restraint shown by President Abdullah Gul, the former foreign minister,
who, like his senior partner in the ruling party Erdogan, is well
versed in the nuances of his country's relationship with Israel.
More critical is the waning of Israel's political and military might as
perceived by foreigners, particularly countries like Turkey. For years
Israel was considered a country that could deliver the goods in
Washington, yet in the last decade Turkey has been moving into a
different position - a country needed in Washington, more so than the
other way around. At the same time, Israel is perceived as too weak to
influence the administration and Congress to improve relations with
Turkey.
America's chilly relationship with Ankara, despite Turkey's importance
to the NATO alliance and its cooperation in the air embargo against
Saddam Hussein (though there was no such cooperation in 2003, when the
Turks refused to allow the Americans to outflank Saddam from Iraq's
northwest border with Turkey) did not stem from Washington's sympathy
with the Armenians or Kurds. It stemmed from the influence of the Greek
lobby. Here is a partial list of politicians and senior officials of
Greek extraction: former vice president Spiro Agnew, former Democratic
presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, Senator Paul Sarbanes, former
prominent congressmen Paul Tsongas and John Brademas, and former CIA
chief George Tenet. The full list of their colleagues of Turkish
origin: not one.
Turkey tried to counterbalance the Greek advantage using its defense
ally, Israel, directly, and AIPAC, indirectly. The image and prestige
of both these players have absorbed severe blows in recent years in the
eyes of the White House and Capitol Hill.
In the Gaza affair, one should also take into account two serious
lapses by Israel's defense establishment: marginalizing the role of the
Civil Administration and the refusal to allow journalists to accompany
the forces fighting in urban territory. Defense Minister Ehud Barak and
Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi could not agree on a candidate to head
the Civil Administration, which coordinates Israel's activities in the
territories. Barak could have named a civilian to the job, without
asking Ashkenazi, but instead, the job of coordinating Israel's
activities in the territories was left without a permanent head ever
since Yosef Mishlav vacated the post. Barak and Ashkenazi also allowed
the previous and successful head of the coordination and liaison
administrative office in Gaza, Colonel Nir Peres, to leave without
lining up a worthy successor, when the Gaza operation was in the
offing.
Liaison officers were left behind and not embedded with the battalion
and brigade commanders, which would have enabled them to warn, even in
the heat of battle, against targeting sensitive buildings not known to
be of military value. Marking the buildings on a map in command
headquarters far from the battlefield did not suffice. The Shin Bet
security service and Military Intelligence pointed to the targets that
needed to be hit, but there was no one to point out which targets were
off limits.
As usual in Israel, the ban on embedding reporters with the forces
yielded a tactical success for the unfettered ground operation, yet it
failed to stem the erosion of Israel's political standing at the end of
the offensive. Had reliable journalists, both foreign and Israeli,
instead been able to document the booby-trapped streets before the army
took steps to protect its soldiers, this would have made Israel's
operational needs understandable and helped dull the criticism evoked
by the destruction in Gaza.
The fairy tale of Israel's control over the global levers of power, in
the spirit of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, has repeatedly
cracked in the face of the realities of the 21st century. Against the
backdrop of the rising political influence of Muslim minorities in
Europe, which threatens to create a European equivalent to the Jews'
political strength in America, perhaps it would behoove Israel to stop
denying the situation and start embracing it, in the hope that someone
will start believing in Israel once again.