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RETHINKING TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS POST GAZA CRISIS
By Christopher Vasillopulos
Today's Zaman
Jan 20 2009
Turkey
The bitterest medicine can have beneficial effects. So, too,
with bitter experience. Medicine can work without the patient's
effort. Experience, however, requires human knowledge, good will and
action to make it yield its benefits.
The latest Israeli aggression in Gaza, which has resulted in over
1,000 deaths and many more casualties -- more than half of them women
and children -- with the numbers of wounded and killed still rising,
even as an experience this bitter, might yet yield benefits. We
hope, without much optimism, that the world's outrage might help
Palestinians. With more optimism, we hope that the Gaza catastrophe
might cause a rethinking of Turkish-Greek relations. Of the world's
responses to Israeli aggression, Turkish and Greek officials have been
among the most severe. Their common outrage may indicate a deeper
basis for rethinking Turkish-Greek relations on a wide variety of
issues. The natural sympathy for Muslim victims by Turkey has been
matched by a natural Greek sympathy for oppressed minorities. We
believe, however, there is more to the similarity of Turkish and
Greek responses to Israeli aggression than sympathy for Palestinians.
Both Turks and Greeks have had long histories and profound
influence in the Arab Middle East. The center of the Hellenistic
world was the Middle East, extending from Byzantium to Alexandria,
from the Aegean islands and the Cedars of Lebanon to Iran and
Central Asia. More recently, the Ottoman Turks ruled the region
and beyond for 500 years. While Ottoman rule of the Greeks has
been a source of resentment, it, nonetheless, provided multiple
points of interpenetration of language, culture and practices,
especially of ordinary people. Of course, many differences persist,
especially religious, which sometimes help to continue animosity
that may otherwise have receded from memory. While the views of
the religiously observant continue to be politically important in
both nations, neither Greece nor Turkey advocates, even as an ideal,
a theocratic state. Secular voices in both nations are exceptionally
powerful and have controlled their respective foreign policies. In this
respect, Greeks have become more European, especially after admission
to the EU. Since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey has been the most
secular state in the region, including Greece. Without denigrating
the importance of spiritual values and the conflicts they sometimes
aggravate, both Turkey and Greece seem capable of keeping religious
fanaticism at bay. Moreover, properly conceived spiritual values
can be a principal source of reconciliation, as liberal versions of
Christianity and Islam well attest.
Are not moral and spiritual values at the basis of Turkish-Greek
unanimity regarding the oppression of Palestinians? Do not Islam and
Orthodox Christianity obligate their believers to relieve the burdens
of the oppressed, the poor, the dispossessed and the afflicted? More
than charity, does not love, based on divine creation taken as the
sign of God's love, form the most important value in both creeds? Is
this point of convergence not more important than all other points
of doctrinal differences combined, at least with regard to the
moral basis of political action? We do not want to be dismissed
as hopeless idealists. To the contrary, we believe the moral and
political consensus precipitated by the Gaza catastrophe indicates
a realistic basis for a rethinking of Turkish-Greek relations. Is
there not a relationship between perception of interests and the
underlying values of any society? Without denying the factual basis
of many conflicts between nations, can anyone deny the importance
of consonant moral frameworks for estimating the importance of any
given conflict? Is not the benefit of the doubt extended to those we
perceive as similar to us? Do we not tend in these circumstances to
minimize differences in an effort to reconcile material disputes? Our
most powerful example is the Christmas truce spontaneously arranged
by German and British soldiers in World War I. Another is Ataturk's
many comments that urged reconciliation between former enemies on the
battlefield. Do not the lives of Jesus and Muhammad provide lessons
for all decent human beings?
Since we are determined to be realistic, let us consider some obstacles
to recalibrating Turkish-Greek relations. On the Turkish side, some
members of Turkey's foreign policy elite have criticized the Justice
and Development Party's (AK Party) harsh criticism of Israel. While
sympathetic to the plight of Palestinians, these experts believe
that Turkey depends on Israel's good offices for access to the US. In
their view, it is essential to enlist the Jewish and Israeli lobbies
on Turkey's behalf. This support requires Turkish support of Israel,
even when it engages in aggression against Muslims. The underlying
idea is that Turkish nationalism, conceived as embattled by Armenians,
Kurds and to a lesser extent Greek and Greek-American efforts to
take over all of Cyprus, needs Israel to help keep Americans from
undermining Turkish sovereignty and interests.
On the Greek side, apart from traditional resentment of Ottoman rule,
Greece remains conscious of its status as a small nation, surrounded
by much larger and richer nations. Its response has been to find
a big brother who would guarantee Greek security and help advance
Greek interests. Many Greeks believe that Turkey remains Greece's most
important threat. Secondly, Cyprus remains a source of irritation. Many
Greeks believe that Cyprus is Greek and that the Greek majority should
rule and that the Turkish minority should acquiesce or leave. Only
the Turkish army has prevented the realization of a fully Greek
Cyprus, its status as a sovereign nation-state notwithstanding. And,
third, the influence of the Orthodox Church, especially in Cyprus,
has kept religious strife alive and well. Finally, diaspora Greeks,
in the US and elsewhere, have remained hostile to Turkish-Greek
accommodation. Diaspora communities, and this includes the Turks,
tend to be caught in a time warp. They remember the mother countries,
as they were when they left or when their fathers or grandfathers left,
not as they are now. This is especially true of traditional enemies.
These obstacles to a rethinking of Turkish-Greek relations remain
real and potent. They are not, however, the whole story. There are
reasons, practical reasons, for improved Turkish-Greek relations. The
first is the AK Party, which may seem paradoxical. A political party
more sensitive to observant Muslims may seem an absurd reason to
reconcile Greek-Turkish differences. Yet, when it comes to relations
with Greeks, the AK Party has been more accommodating than secular
nationalists. One wonders if nationalism is more divisive than
religious differences. Given the rhetoric of religious fundamentalists,
this idea seems ridiculous. Given the practices of the AK Party, it
seems, however, to be consonant with the facts. As we have suggested,
belief in spiritual values need not exacerbate differences. Spiritual
values, especially if they center on a single loving God that created
a world so that human beings may express their gratitude for life by
loving each other and by worshipping Him, can be a significant force
for reconciliation. The Turks and Greeks may disagree on who is the
Prodigal Son, the son who was dissolute and defiant of his father's
wishes, yet what difference does this make? For whom is the fatted calf
slain? For whom is forgiveness offered? Both Islam and Christianity
realize that spiritual values are not solely for the holy, but for the
sick and sinful. If not, why does nearly every prayer of confession
in every mosque and every church ask for the forgiveness of sin?
On the basis of this spiritual understanding, it has been easier
for the AK Party to see the real interests of Turkey as largely
coincident with the interests of Greece. Our conviction does not
reflect an idealistic binge, a denial of Turkish values. On the
contrary, it reflects a realistic assessment of Turkish interests in
the context of Turkish (Islamic) values. To their credit, the Greek
government has responded favorably. Why? For two reasons. First, it
is consonant with Greek interests to employ their common interests
with the Turks on a variety of international issues. Second, Greek
Christianity sees forgiveness and reconciliation as central to its
values and purpose in the world. We understand there are versions of
dogma that contradict this view, yet we believe most Christians and
Muslims believe that peace is better than war, that love is better
than hate and that we all need forgiveness.
The second reason which undermines obstacles to Greek-Turkish
rapprochement is that neither nation is the same as it was 30, 50 or
100 years ago. Both are NATO allies, Greece is a member of the EU and
Turkey aspires to membership, both realize they are nations between
Europe and Asia and both realize that together they would form the
largest population and military bloc in the EU, should Turkey achieve
membership. Greece would no longer be an insignificant, relatively poor
nation on the edge of Europe. Greece and Turkey would be a potential
economic powerhouse with the youngest demographic in Europe. Moreover,
Greece-Turkey would have significant and positive relations with the
energy-rich Middle East and Central Asia. With this Greek-Turkish
bloc, the EU would be a realistic rival to the US, no longer in fear
of its military prowess or economic power.
By Christopher Vasillopulos
Today's Zaman
Jan 20 2009
Turkey
The bitterest medicine can have beneficial effects. So, too,
with bitter experience. Medicine can work without the patient's
effort. Experience, however, requires human knowledge, good will and
action to make it yield its benefits.
The latest Israeli aggression in Gaza, which has resulted in over
1,000 deaths and many more casualties -- more than half of them women
and children -- with the numbers of wounded and killed still rising,
even as an experience this bitter, might yet yield benefits. We
hope, without much optimism, that the world's outrage might help
Palestinians. With more optimism, we hope that the Gaza catastrophe
might cause a rethinking of Turkish-Greek relations. Of the world's
responses to Israeli aggression, Turkish and Greek officials have been
among the most severe. Their common outrage may indicate a deeper
basis for rethinking Turkish-Greek relations on a wide variety of
issues. The natural sympathy for Muslim victims by Turkey has been
matched by a natural Greek sympathy for oppressed minorities. We
believe, however, there is more to the similarity of Turkish and
Greek responses to Israeli aggression than sympathy for Palestinians.
Both Turks and Greeks have had long histories and profound
influence in the Arab Middle East. The center of the Hellenistic
world was the Middle East, extending from Byzantium to Alexandria,
from the Aegean islands and the Cedars of Lebanon to Iran and
Central Asia. More recently, the Ottoman Turks ruled the region
and beyond for 500 years. While Ottoman rule of the Greeks has
been a source of resentment, it, nonetheless, provided multiple
points of interpenetration of language, culture and practices,
especially of ordinary people. Of course, many differences persist,
especially religious, which sometimes help to continue animosity
that may otherwise have receded from memory. While the views of
the religiously observant continue to be politically important in
both nations, neither Greece nor Turkey advocates, even as an ideal,
a theocratic state. Secular voices in both nations are exceptionally
powerful and have controlled their respective foreign policies. In this
respect, Greeks have become more European, especially after admission
to the EU. Since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey has been the most
secular state in the region, including Greece. Without denigrating
the importance of spiritual values and the conflicts they sometimes
aggravate, both Turkey and Greece seem capable of keeping religious
fanaticism at bay. Moreover, properly conceived spiritual values
can be a principal source of reconciliation, as liberal versions of
Christianity and Islam well attest.
Are not moral and spiritual values at the basis of Turkish-Greek
unanimity regarding the oppression of Palestinians? Do not Islam and
Orthodox Christianity obligate their believers to relieve the burdens
of the oppressed, the poor, the dispossessed and the afflicted? More
than charity, does not love, based on divine creation taken as the
sign of God's love, form the most important value in both creeds? Is
this point of convergence not more important than all other points
of doctrinal differences combined, at least with regard to the
moral basis of political action? We do not want to be dismissed
as hopeless idealists. To the contrary, we believe the moral and
political consensus precipitated by the Gaza catastrophe indicates
a realistic basis for a rethinking of Turkish-Greek relations. Is
there not a relationship between perception of interests and the
underlying values of any society? Without denying the factual basis
of many conflicts between nations, can anyone deny the importance
of consonant moral frameworks for estimating the importance of any
given conflict? Is not the benefit of the doubt extended to those we
perceive as similar to us? Do we not tend in these circumstances to
minimize differences in an effort to reconcile material disputes? Our
most powerful example is the Christmas truce spontaneously arranged
by German and British soldiers in World War I. Another is Ataturk's
many comments that urged reconciliation between former enemies on the
battlefield. Do not the lives of Jesus and Muhammad provide lessons
for all decent human beings?
Since we are determined to be realistic, let us consider some obstacles
to recalibrating Turkish-Greek relations. On the Turkish side, some
members of Turkey's foreign policy elite have criticized the Justice
and Development Party's (AK Party) harsh criticism of Israel. While
sympathetic to the plight of Palestinians, these experts believe
that Turkey depends on Israel's good offices for access to the US. In
their view, it is essential to enlist the Jewish and Israeli lobbies
on Turkey's behalf. This support requires Turkish support of Israel,
even when it engages in aggression against Muslims. The underlying
idea is that Turkish nationalism, conceived as embattled by Armenians,
Kurds and to a lesser extent Greek and Greek-American efforts to
take over all of Cyprus, needs Israel to help keep Americans from
undermining Turkish sovereignty and interests.
On the Greek side, apart from traditional resentment of Ottoman rule,
Greece remains conscious of its status as a small nation, surrounded
by much larger and richer nations. Its response has been to find
a big brother who would guarantee Greek security and help advance
Greek interests. Many Greeks believe that Turkey remains Greece's most
important threat. Secondly, Cyprus remains a source of irritation. Many
Greeks believe that Cyprus is Greek and that the Greek majority should
rule and that the Turkish minority should acquiesce or leave. Only
the Turkish army has prevented the realization of a fully Greek
Cyprus, its status as a sovereign nation-state notwithstanding. And,
third, the influence of the Orthodox Church, especially in Cyprus,
has kept religious strife alive and well. Finally, diaspora Greeks,
in the US and elsewhere, have remained hostile to Turkish-Greek
accommodation. Diaspora communities, and this includes the Turks,
tend to be caught in a time warp. They remember the mother countries,
as they were when they left or when their fathers or grandfathers left,
not as they are now. This is especially true of traditional enemies.
These obstacles to a rethinking of Turkish-Greek relations remain
real and potent. They are not, however, the whole story. There are
reasons, practical reasons, for improved Turkish-Greek relations. The
first is the AK Party, which may seem paradoxical. A political party
more sensitive to observant Muslims may seem an absurd reason to
reconcile Greek-Turkish differences. Yet, when it comes to relations
with Greeks, the AK Party has been more accommodating than secular
nationalists. One wonders if nationalism is more divisive than
religious differences. Given the rhetoric of religious fundamentalists,
this idea seems ridiculous. Given the practices of the AK Party, it
seems, however, to be consonant with the facts. As we have suggested,
belief in spiritual values need not exacerbate differences. Spiritual
values, especially if they center on a single loving God that created
a world so that human beings may express their gratitude for life by
loving each other and by worshipping Him, can be a significant force
for reconciliation. The Turks and Greeks may disagree on who is the
Prodigal Son, the son who was dissolute and defiant of his father's
wishes, yet what difference does this make? For whom is the fatted calf
slain? For whom is forgiveness offered? Both Islam and Christianity
realize that spiritual values are not solely for the holy, but for the
sick and sinful. If not, why does nearly every prayer of confession
in every mosque and every church ask for the forgiveness of sin?
On the basis of this spiritual understanding, it has been easier
for the AK Party to see the real interests of Turkey as largely
coincident with the interests of Greece. Our conviction does not
reflect an idealistic binge, a denial of Turkish values. On the
contrary, it reflects a realistic assessment of Turkish interests in
the context of Turkish (Islamic) values. To their credit, the Greek
government has responded favorably. Why? For two reasons. First, it
is consonant with Greek interests to employ their common interests
with the Turks on a variety of international issues. Second, Greek
Christianity sees forgiveness and reconciliation as central to its
values and purpose in the world. We understand there are versions of
dogma that contradict this view, yet we believe most Christians and
Muslims believe that peace is better than war, that love is better
than hate and that we all need forgiveness.
The second reason which undermines obstacles to Greek-Turkish
rapprochement is that neither nation is the same as it was 30, 50 or
100 years ago. Both are NATO allies, Greece is a member of the EU and
Turkey aspires to membership, both realize they are nations between
Europe and Asia and both realize that together they would form the
largest population and military bloc in the EU, should Turkey achieve
membership. Greece would no longer be an insignificant, relatively poor
nation on the edge of Europe. Greece and Turkey would be a potential
economic powerhouse with the youngest demographic in Europe. Moreover,
Greece-Turkey would have significant and positive relations with the
energy-rich Middle East and Central Asia. With this Greek-Turkish
bloc, the EU would be a realistic rival to the US, no longer in fear
of its military prowess or economic power.