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Hurriyet, Turkey
July 11 2009
'Turkey should change bridge rhetoric'
ISTANBUL -Turkey is not a bridge and I think we should forget using
this rhetoric. We should drop this rhetoric from Turkish foreign
policy. We are a kind of melting pot, a hub, a political, cultural,
strategic hub, whatever you would like to call it. A center where
people can meet together, talk together, and where they can interact
together.
During the Cold War, Turkey turned its back and ignored the Middle
East, said Prof. Mustafa Aydın in an interview with the
Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review, adding that since former
Prime Minister Turgut Ã-zal's administration, Turkey has shown more
attention to its surrounding regions.
Aydın's list of accolades and accomplishments is one of the
longest to be found on the Internet. He's written books and articles,
given lectures and served on the boards of prestigious international
organizations. At present he is the chairman of the department of
international relations at the Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce
and Commodity Exchanges, or TOBB, University in Ankara. He spoke with
the Daily News during the second Symposium of the International Centre
for Black Sea Studies on Kalymnos in the Dodecanese Islands of Greece.
Aydın said while Turkey's relationship with the Middle East had
grown stronger, it especially gained emphasis when the ruling Justice
and Development Party, or AKP, government came to power. "You can find
different reasons for that but one of the reasons is the AKP's ability
to play around the Middle East easily. They also have some affinity to
Middle Eastern politics and I suppose they have some inroads and
connections in the region so that they can tap into them for the
benefit of their government and Turkey," he said.
Aydin also said he has two major views when examining Turkey's recent
Middle Eastern policies. His first view is that Turkey is very active
in the region, working to improve its relations with countries such as
Syria, Iraq and Palestine. Aydin said Turkey's activity is a highlight
of its foreign policy, especially when examining Turkey from the
outside. "It gives Turkey a certain input in the eyes of Western
countries, European countries. It shows Turkey's power, ability to
talk to people in different regions and to interact with them."
While he sees Turkey's participation in the Middle East as positive in
improving relations, his second view is that Turkey has pushed its
initiatives too far. "When you are trying to deal with so many
different issues at the same time, you lose because Turkey's capacity
has a limit. You cannot deal with all these problems at the same time
at a sufficient level. And when you are trying to deal with five or
six different projects at the same time, you weaken yourself. You
could have focused on one or two initiatives and been successful."
Aydin said there are many sides to the issue. "Another side of all
this is that many of Turkey's initiatives in the Middle East have been
meticulously programmed, designed and put into force. However,
somehow, sometimes domestic political considerations influence and
intervene in the smooth running of the policies. For example, Turkey
has been trying very strongly for years to become a mediator between
Syria and Israel to gain their trust so that Turkey can play that
role. And finally both sides trusted Turkey to play that role. But
suddenly Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an goes to Davos and in one minute
he ruined it. Now the Turkish foreign minister is trying to go back to
the situation before Davos. It's not easy. I know the foreign minister
is going to visit Israel soon and mend the relationship. They don't
need this. If you have something good, don't break it. This shows that
domestic politics or domestic political aspirations have a bad
influence on Turkish policy sometimes, not only in the Middle East but
especially in the Middle East."
Aydın's looks belie his age and his easy accessibility is far
from what one expects of a professor with such a long list of
credentials. One of his values is that he is not just open to
criticism and different points of view, but he is also very
intelligent and capable of analyzing tough problems with a surgical
knife.
Asked about the results of Turkey's emphasizing its great potential as
a bridge between the West and Eurasia, Aydın reacted strongly
against the use of the word "bridge."
"I think there are two sides to this. The first one is the rhetoric of
being a bridge; I think it does not serve Turkey's interests. A bridge
is something very static, which Turkey is not; it is an ever changing
country. Secondly a bridge is something that connects two sides and
has no influence on either side; the bridge is something that you pass
over. You don't pay attention to it. However, Turkey is not a bridge
and I think we should forget using this rhetoric. We should drop this
rhetoric from Turkish foreign policy. We are a kind of melting pot, a
hub, a political, cultural, strategic hub, whatever you would like to
call it, a center where people can meet together, talk together, and
where they can interact together. So the tough side of this is that I
oppose the rhetoric of the bridge in Turkish foreign policy.
"The second side is that Turkey has gained a certain level of
influence in Eurasian politics. This is again long term. We have to
take a long-term perspective. It started in the 1990s. There is a
tendency in recent Turkish foreign policy to suppose as if everything
started with the AKP government. I don't share this kind of
analysis. Turkish foreign policy is like a straight line. It turns but
when it turns it takes time. It turns slowly. Turkish foreign policy
actually started to turn in the 1990s, since the end of the Cold
War. But here not only recent Turkish politicians but international
developments played a role. So again coming back to Eurasia, Turkey's
Eurasia policy also has been changing since 1990-1991. After a period
of 20 years, after the end of the 1990s, they started to analyze
Eurasia much more rationally, more objectively and more
structurally. And based on that, since the second half of the 1990s,
Turkey has been focusing on the Caucasus rather than Central Asia and
of course in the 2000s on the Black Sea as well as including the
Russian Federation.
"So when you look at these regions, in Central Asia Turkey does not
have the big influence that Turkey wanted to have in the early
1990s. However, we don't have many problems with these countries. We
have normalized relations there. It's not something special anymore.
"But when you look at Turkey's relations with the Caucasus, with
Azerbaijan, and not only with Azerbaijan but also to many people's
surprise with Georgia, they are very special."
Turkey has become the biggest trade partners of both countries, their
biggest investors, specifically in energy. Turkish companies are
building airports and infrastructure, etc. etc. so there is very close
linkage there. And Turkey has certain influence and potential to
affect developments in that region. And also having improved relations
with Russia gives Turkey a certain ability or maneuverability to
affect developments in this area too. Recently this Caucasus operation
and platform idea is one such example. I'm not sure whether it's going
to be successful or not. It's a long-term project. But it's the only
project that you can see on the ground. There's no other project to
develop something remarkable for cooperation within the region.
"The only real puzzle is, of course, how Turkey is going to handle
relations with Armenia. If we succeed in approaching Armenia and
changing Armenia's orientation toward the West, then Turkey's ability
to influence developments in the Caucasus will be greatly increased.
"Again you see here the same thing as in the Middle East, you
meticulously plan, program and put into effect a policy line, a
structured project that suddenly domestic politics influences and you
do something or you destroy everything or you stop everything at least
for some time for the foreseeable future."
Threats to Turkey
>From where does Aydın think the greatest threats to Turkey
will come in the future? He admits he doesn't know because they are
everywhere.
"I think the greatest threat Ã? I will define threat not in a
very conventional way, in a very unconventional way. And I think that
the greatest threat to Turkey in the future is to be left out of the
European Union. Or more correctly, out of the European family of
states. If Turkey is not part of Europe, part of the West, it will be
a country in limbo and a country drifting away, not necessarily from
the West but drifting around. Then we will look at different
alternatives and we'll not be able to make up our minds between
alternatives. It won't be the first time that domestic politics have
influenced foreign policy. That kind of Turkey becomes introverted,
inward looking, xenophobic, ultra-nationalist and everything that
affects Turkey's economic stability. So that I think is the biggest
threat, not necessarily to be a member of the EU but to be part of the
European state of families, within the same mentality and the same
world outlook."
July 11 2009
'Turkey should change bridge rhetoric'
ISTANBUL -Turkey is not a bridge and I think we should forget using
this rhetoric. We should drop this rhetoric from Turkish foreign
policy. We are a kind of melting pot, a hub, a political, cultural,
strategic hub, whatever you would like to call it. A center where
people can meet together, talk together, and where they can interact
together.
During the Cold War, Turkey turned its back and ignored the Middle
East, said Prof. Mustafa Aydın in an interview with the
Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review, adding that since former
Prime Minister Turgut Ã-zal's administration, Turkey has shown more
attention to its surrounding regions.
Aydın's list of accolades and accomplishments is one of the
longest to be found on the Internet. He's written books and articles,
given lectures and served on the boards of prestigious international
organizations. At present he is the chairman of the department of
international relations at the Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce
and Commodity Exchanges, or TOBB, University in Ankara. He spoke with
the Daily News during the second Symposium of the International Centre
for Black Sea Studies on Kalymnos in the Dodecanese Islands of Greece.
Aydın said while Turkey's relationship with the Middle East had
grown stronger, it especially gained emphasis when the ruling Justice
and Development Party, or AKP, government came to power. "You can find
different reasons for that but one of the reasons is the AKP's ability
to play around the Middle East easily. They also have some affinity to
Middle Eastern politics and I suppose they have some inroads and
connections in the region so that they can tap into them for the
benefit of their government and Turkey," he said.
Aydin also said he has two major views when examining Turkey's recent
Middle Eastern policies. His first view is that Turkey is very active
in the region, working to improve its relations with countries such as
Syria, Iraq and Palestine. Aydin said Turkey's activity is a highlight
of its foreign policy, especially when examining Turkey from the
outside. "It gives Turkey a certain input in the eyes of Western
countries, European countries. It shows Turkey's power, ability to
talk to people in different regions and to interact with them."
While he sees Turkey's participation in the Middle East as positive in
improving relations, his second view is that Turkey has pushed its
initiatives too far. "When you are trying to deal with so many
different issues at the same time, you lose because Turkey's capacity
has a limit. You cannot deal with all these problems at the same time
at a sufficient level. And when you are trying to deal with five or
six different projects at the same time, you weaken yourself. You
could have focused on one or two initiatives and been successful."
Aydin said there are many sides to the issue. "Another side of all
this is that many of Turkey's initiatives in the Middle East have been
meticulously programmed, designed and put into force. However,
somehow, sometimes domestic political considerations influence and
intervene in the smooth running of the policies. For example, Turkey
has been trying very strongly for years to become a mediator between
Syria and Israel to gain their trust so that Turkey can play that
role. And finally both sides trusted Turkey to play that role. But
suddenly Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an goes to Davos and in one minute
he ruined it. Now the Turkish foreign minister is trying to go back to
the situation before Davos. It's not easy. I know the foreign minister
is going to visit Israel soon and mend the relationship. They don't
need this. If you have something good, don't break it. This shows that
domestic politics or domestic political aspirations have a bad
influence on Turkish policy sometimes, not only in the Middle East but
especially in the Middle East."
Aydın's looks belie his age and his easy accessibility is far
from what one expects of a professor with such a long list of
credentials. One of his values is that he is not just open to
criticism and different points of view, but he is also very
intelligent and capable of analyzing tough problems with a surgical
knife.
Asked about the results of Turkey's emphasizing its great potential as
a bridge between the West and Eurasia, Aydın reacted strongly
against the use of the word "bridge."
"I think there are two sides to this. The first one is the rhetoric of
being a bridge; I think it does not serve Turkey's interests. A bridge
is something very static, which Turkey is not; it is an ever changing
country. Secondly a bridge is something that connects two sides and
has no influence on either side; the bridge is something that you pass
over. You don't pay attention to it. However, Turkey is not a bridge
and I think we should forget using this rhetoric. We should drop this
rhetoric from Turkish foreign policy. We are a kind of melting pot, a
hub, a political, cultural, strategic hub, whatever you would like to
call it, a center where people can meet together, talk together, and
where they can interact together. So the tough side of this is that I
oppose the rhetoric of the bridge in Turkish foreign policy.
"The second side is that Turkey has gained a certain level of
influence in Eurasian politics. This is again long term. We have to
take a long-term perspective. It started in the 1990s. There is a
tendency in recent Turkish foreign policy to suppose as if everything
started with the AKP government. I don't share this kind of
analysis. Turkish foreign policy is like a straight line. It turns but
when it turns it takes time. It turns slowly. Turkish foreign policy
actually started to turn in the 1990s, since the end of the Cold
War. But here not only recent Turkish politicians but international
developments played a role. So again coming back to Eurasia, Turkey's
Eurasia policy also has been changing since 1990-1991. After a period
of 20 years, after the end of the 1990s, they started to analyze
Eurasia much more rationally, more objectively and more
structurally. And based on that, since the second half of the 1990s,
Turkey has been focusing on the Caucasus rather than Central Asia and
of course in the 2000s on the Black Sea as well as including the
Russian Federation.
"So when you look at these regions, in Central Asia Turkey does not
have the big influence that Turkey wanted to have in the early
1990s. However, we don't have many problems with these countries. We
have normalized relations there. It's not something special anymore.
"But when you look at Turkey's relations with the Caucasus, with
Azerbaijan, and not only with Azerbaijan but also to many people's
surprise with Georgia, they are very special."
Turkey has become the biggest trade partners of both countries, their
biggest investors, specifically in energy. Turkish companies are
building airports and infrastructure, etc. etc. so there is very close
linkage there. And Turkey has certain influence and potential to
affect developments in that region. And also having improved relations
with Russia gives Turkey a certain ability or maneuverability to
affect developments in this area too. Recently this Caucasus operation
and platform idea is one such example. I'm not sure whether it's going
to be successful or not. It's a long-term project. But it's the only
project that you can see on the ground. There's no other project to
develop something remarkable for cooperation within the region.
"The only real puzzle is, of course, how Turkey is going to handle
relations with Armenia. If we succeed in approaching Armenia and
changing Armenia's orientation toward the West, then Turkey's ability
to influence developments in the Caucasus will be greatly increased.
"Again you see here the same thing as in the Middle East, you
meticulously plan, program and put into effect a policy line, a
structured project that suddenly domestic politics influences and you
do something or you destroy everything or you stop everything at least
for some time for the foreseeable future."
Threats to Turkey
>From where does Aydın think the greatest threats to Turkey
will come in the future? He admits he doesn't know because they are
everywhere.
"I think the greatest threat Ã? I will define threat not in a
very conventional way, in a very unconventional way. And I think that
the greatest threat to Turkey in the future is to be left out of the
European Union. Or more correctly, out of the European family of
states. If Turkey is not part of Europe, part of the West, it will be
a country in limbo and a country drifting away, not necessarily from
the West but drifting around. Then we will look at different
alternatives and we'll not be able to make up our minds between
alternatives. It won't be the first time that domestic politics have
influenced foreign policy. That kind of Turkey becomes introverted,
inward looking, xenophobic, ultra-nationalist and everything that
affects Turkey's economic stability. So that I think is the biggest
threat, not necessarily to be a member of the EU but to be part of the
European state of families, within the same mentality and the same
world outlook."