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Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed

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  • Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed

    The Moderate Voice
    July 9, 2009 Thursday 9:08 AM EST

    Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed (Guest Voice)


    Jul. 9, 2009 (The Moderate Voice delivered by Newstex) --
    Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed

    by Jonathan Spyer

    President Shimon Peress landmark visit to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
    this week represents a significant advance for Israeli ambitions in
    Central Asia. In the wake of the recent decision to permit Israel to
    open an embassy in the Turkmen capital of Ashghabad, the visit
    reflects the importance Jerusalem attaches to this strategically
    significant part of what is sometimes known as the Å`greater Middle
    East.


    Israels stance reflects a series of hopes, interests and concerns. The
    most important of these are: the desire to contain Iranian influence,
    and joint opposition to radical Islam. Israeli technological expertise
    is of particular interest to energy-rich, rapidly developing Central
    Asian economies, forming the basis for growing economic relations. In
    turn, Azerbaijan has emerged as a major energy supplier. The country
    supplies just under 20 percent of Israels oil.

    Israels desire to build strong connections with non-Arab Muslim
    countries in the region is of long standing and reflects an obvious
    strategic interest. Yet in the past, Central Asian states have
    preferred to keep their friendship with the Jewish state far from the
    spotlight.

    Israel has maintained diplomatic relations with both Kazakhstan and
    Azerbaijan since 1992. With regard to containing Teheran, relations
    with Shiite Azerbaijan, which shares a border with Iran, are of
    particular significance. Azerbaijan has close ethnic links with
    Iran. Far more Azeris live in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself.

    Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is an ethnic Azeri. Yet relations
    between Iran and Azerbaijan have grown tense over the last decade for
    a number of reasons. The Islamic republic, for strategic reasons of
    its own, tacitly supported Armenia in the Azeri-Armenian war over the
    province of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Teheran dislikes the secular nature of Azerbaijani politics, and has
    offered support and training to Azeri mullahs and organizations
    preaching a pro-Iranian Islamist message. Iran and Azerbaijan also
    have competing interests related to energy issues in the Caspian Sea.

    As a result, Baku has drawn close to Jerusalem on the basis of a
    shared threat. Israeli defense industries have made very significant
    inroads. Israel played the central role in rebuilding and modernizing
    the Azeri military after its losses in Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Azerbaijan has also become one of the key arenas in the ongoing silent
    war between Israel and Iran. Both countries are thought to possess
    major espionage networks on Azeri soil. Israel is reported to maintain
    listening and surveillance posts on the Azerbaijan-Iran border. The
    recent foiling of a joint Hizbullah/Iranian plot to bomb the Israeli
    Embassy by the authorities in Baku shows the depth of activity.

    Kazakhstan, which has no border with Iran, has sought to develop
    strong trade and strategic relations with the Islamic republic. Part
    of Peress mission was to seek a firm Kazakh commitment that it would
    cease the sale of uranium ore to Iran. Astanas stance appears to
    reflect a desire to play a part in diplomatic mediation in the region
    and beyond it, on the basis of its image as a moderate Muslim state.

    The more diffuse threat of radical Islam offers a further natural
    basis for friendship. In the Shiite but secular-governed Azerbaijan,
    this threat takes the form of Iran-supported local Shiite Islamist
    parties, and the presence of Hizbullah.

    In largely-Sunni Kazakhstan, meanwhile, Saudi-supported Islamic
    extremists and the pan-Islamic Hizb al-Tahrir party constitute a
    significant irritant to the authorities, making them more inclined to
    greater friendliness toward Israel. The response to domestic Islamic
    extremism has been determined and uncompromising.

    Kazakhstans commitment to purchase satellite and surveillance
    technology from Israel reflects the growing role of Israeli defense
    industries in the country - a role which was shaken in April by claims
    that Israel had sold faulty military hardware to Kazakhstan.

    Despite the extensive cooperation and common interest, Jerusalem has
    been frustrated by the unwillingness of both Kazakhs and Azeris to
    move toward a more open and overt relationship. There has long been a
    sense that both countries preferred to benefit from close links with
    Israel in a variety of areas, while keeping the public profile of the
    relationship as low as possible. Such a stance reflected the desire of
    both countries to maintain good relations with the Arab and wider
    Muslim world.

    Israeli officials hoped that Peress visit would be of importance in
    laying the basis for changing this stance. The Iranian response to the
    visit suggests that Teheran shared the sense of this possibility.

    The Iranians lobbied hard to have the visit to Azerbaijan called
    off. Irans chief of staff visited Baku two weeks ago in an attempt to
    persuade the Azeris to cancel the trip. He was unsuccessful. In
    response to the Peres visit, Iran has recalled its ambassador for
    consultations. In Kazakhstan, the Iranian decision to walk out of an
    interfaith conference while Peres was speaking represents an
    additional indication of Iranian displeasure, and hence a further
    diplomatic point for Israel. The bottom line: Iranian lobbying failed.

    Inducing Muslim countries with which Israel has shared interests and
    firm connections to overcome the desire to Å`camouflage or downplay
    their relations with Israel represents a perennial challenge for
    Israeli diplomacy. The latest developments in Central Asia suggest
    that, in this region at least, real progress has begun to be made.

    Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in
    International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya, Israel. This is
    cross-posted on that site.

    Newstex ID: MODV-0001-36351147

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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