The Moderate Voice
July 9, 2009 Thursday 9:08 AM EST
Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed (Guest Voice)
Jul. 9, 2009 (The Moderate Voice delivered by Newstex) --
Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed
by Jonathan Spyer
President Shimon Peress landmark visit to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
this week represents a significant advance for Israeli ambitions in
Central Asia. In the wake of the recent decision to permit Israel to
open an embassy in the Turkmen capital of Ashghabad, the visit
reflects the importance Jerusalem attaches to this strategically
significant part of what is sometimes known as the Å`greater Middle
East.
Israels stance reflects a series of hopes, interests and concerns. The
most important of these are: the desire to contain Iranian influence,
and joint opposition to radical Islam. Israeli technological expertise
is of particular interest to energy-rich, rapidly developing Central
Asian economies, forming the basis for growing economic relations. In
turn, Azerbaijan has emerged as a major energy supplier. The country
supplies just under 20 percent of Israels oil.
Israels desire to build strong connections with non-Arab Muslim
countries in the region is of long standing and reflects an obvious
strategic interest. Yet in the past, Central Asian states have
preferred to keep their friendship with the Jewish state far from the
spotlight.
Israel has maintained diplomatic relations with both Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan since 1992. With regard to containing Teheran, relations
with Shiite Azerbaijan, which shares a border with Iran, are of
particular significance. Azerbaijan has close ethnic links with
Iran. Far more Azeris live in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is an ethnic Azeri. Yet relations
between Iran and Azerbaijan have grown tense over the last decade for
a number of reasons. The Islamic republic, for strategic reasons of
its own, tacitly supported Armenia in the Azeri-Armenian war over the
province of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Teheran dislikes the secular nature of Azerbaijani politics, and has
offered support and training to Azeri mullahs and organizations
preaching a pro-Iranian Islamist message. Iran and Azerbaijan also
have competing interests related to energy issues in the Caspian Sea.
As a result, Baku has drawn close to Jerusalem on the basis of a
shared threat. Israeli defense industries have made very significant
inroads. Israel played the central role in rebuilding and modernizing
the Azeri military after its losses in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan has also become one of the key arenas in the ongoing silent
war between Israel and Iran. Both countries are thought to possess
major espionage networks on Azeri soil. Israel is reported to maintain
listening and surveillance posts on the Azerbaijan-Iran border. The
recent foiling of a joint Hizbullah/Iranian plot to bomb the Israeli
Embassy by the authorities in Baku shows the depth of activity.
Kazakhstan, which has no border with Iran, has sought to develop
strong trade and strategic relations with the Islamic republic. Part
of Peress mission was to seek a firm Kazakh commitment that it would
cease the sale of uranium ore to Iran. Astanas stance appears to
reflect a desire to play a part in diplomatic mediation in the region
and beyond it, on the basis of its image as a moderate Muslim state.
The more diffuse threat of radical Islam offers a further natural
basis for friendship. In the Shiite but secular-governed Azerbaijan,
this threat takes the form of Iran-supported local Shiite Islamist
parties, and the presence of Hizbullah.
In largely-Sunni Kazakhstan, meanwhile, Saudi-supported Islamic
extremists and the pan-Islamic Hizb al-Tahrir party constitute a
significant irritant to the authorities, making them more inclined to
greater friendliness toward Israel. The response to domestic Islamic
extremism has been determined and uncompromising.
Kazakhstans commitment to purchase satellite and surveillance
technology from Israel reflects the growing role of Israeli defense
industries in the country - a role which was shaken in April by claims
that Israel had sold faulty military hardware to Kazakhstan.
Despite the extensive cooperation and common interest, Jerusalem has
been frustrated by the unwillingness of both Kazakhs and Azeris to
move toward a more open and overt relationship. There has long been a
sense that both countries preferred to benefit from close links with
Israel in a variety of areas, while keeping the public profile of the
relationship as low as possible. Such a stance reflected the desire of
both countries to maintain good relations with the Arab and wider
Muslim world.
Israeli officials hoped that Peress visit would be of importance in
laying the basis for changing this stance. The Iranian response to the
visit suggests that Teheran shared the sense of this possibility.
The Iranians lobbied hard to have the visit to Azerbaijan called
off. Irans chief of staff visited Baku two weeks ago in an attempt to
persuade the Azeris to cancel the trip. He was unsuccessful. In
response to the Peres visit, Iran has recalled its ambassador for
consultations. In Kazakhstan, the Iranian decision to walk out of an
interfaith conference while Peres was speaking represents an
additional indication of Iranian displeasure, and hence a further
diplomatic point for Israel. The bottom line: Iranian lobbying failed.
Inducing Muslim countries with which Israel has shared interests and
firm connections to overcome the desire to Å`camouflage or downplay
their relations with Israel represents a perennial challenge for
Israeli diplomacy. The latest developments in Central Asia suggest
that, in this region at least, real progress has begun to be made.
Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in
International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya, Israel. This is
cross-posted on that site.
Newstex ID: MODV-0001-36351147
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
July 9, 2009 Thursday 9:08 AM EST
Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed (Guest Voice)
Jul. 9, 2009 (The Moderate Voice delivered by Newstex) --
Analysis: Iranian Lobbying Failed
by Jonathan Spyer
President Shimon Peress landmark visit to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
this week represents a significant advance for Israeli ambitions in
Central Asia. In the wake of the recent decision to permit Israel to
open an embassy in the Turkmen capital of Ashghabad, the visit
reflects the importance Jerusalem attaches to this strategically
significant part of what is sometimes known as the Å`greater Middle
East.
Israels stance reflects a series of hopes, interests and concerns. The
most important of these are: the desire to contain Iranian influence,
and joint opposition to radical Islam. Israeli technological expertise
is of particular interest to energy-rich, rapidly developing Central
Asian economies, forming the basis for growing economic relations. In
turn, Azerbaijan has emerged as a major energy supplier. The country
supplies just under 20 percent of Israels oil.
Israels desire to build strong connections with non-Arab Muslim
countries in the region is of long standing and reflects an obvious
strategic interest. Yet in the past, Central Asian states have
preferred to keep their friendship with the Jewish state far from the
spotlight.
Israel has maintained diplomatic relations with both Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan since 1992. With regard to containing Teheran, relations
with Shiite Azerbaijan, which shares a border with Iran, are of
particular significance. Azerbaijan has close ethnic links with
Iran. Far more Azeris live in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is an ethnic Azeri. Yet relations
between Iran and Azerbaijan have grown tense over the last decade for
a number of reasons. The Islamic republic, for strategic reasons of
its own, tacitly supported Armenia in the Azeri-Armenian war over the
province of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Teheran dislikes the secular nature of Azerbaijani politics, and has
offered support and training to Azeri mullahs and organizations
preaching a pro-Iranian Islamist message. Iran and Azerbaijan also
have competing interests related to energy issues in the Caspian Sea.
As a result, Baku has drawn close to Jerusalem on the basis of a
shared threat. Israeli defense industries have made very significant
inroads. Israel played the central role in rebuilding and modernizing
the Azeri military after its losses in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan has also become one of the key arenas in the ongoing silent
war between Israel and Iran. Both countries are thought to possess
major espionage networks on Azeri soil. Israel is reported to maintain
listening and surveillance posts on the Azerbaijan-Iran border. The
recent foiling of a joint Hizbullah/Iranian plot to bomb the Israeli
Embassy by the authorities in Baku shows the depth of activity.
Kazakhstan, which has no border with Iran, has sought to develop
strong trade and strategic relations with the Islamic republic. Part
of Peress mission was to seek a firm Kazakh commitment that it would
cease the sale of uranium ore to Iran. Astanas stance appears to
reflect a desire to play a part in diplomatic mediation in the region
and beyond it, on the basis of its image as a moderate Muslim state.
The more diffuse threat of radical Islam offers a further natural
basis for friendship. In the Shiite but secular-governed Azerbaijan,
this threat takes the form of Iran-supported local Shiite Islamist
parties, and the presence of Hizbullah.
In largely-Sunni Kazakhstan, meanwhile, Saudi-supported Islamic
extremists and the pan-Islamic Hizb al-Tahrir party constitute a
significant irritant to the authorities, making them more inclined to
greater friendliness toward Israel. The response to domestic Islamic
extremism has been determined and uncompromising.
Kazakhstans commitment to purchase satellite and surveillance
technology from Israel reflects the growing role of Israeli defense
industries in the country - a role which was shaken in April by claims
that Israel had sold faulty military hardware to Kazakhstan.
Despite the extensive cooperation and common interest, Jerusalem has
been frustrated by the unwillingness of both Kazakhs and Azeris to
move toward a more open and overt relationship. There has long been a
sense that both countries preferred to benefit from close links with
Israel in a variety of areas, while keeping the public profile of the
relationship as low as possible. Such a stance reflected the desire of
both countries to maintain good relations with the Arab and wider
Muslim world.
Israeli officials hoped that Peress visit would be of importance in
laying the basis for changing this stance. The Iranian response to the
visit suggests that Teheran shared the sense of this possibility.
The Iranians lobbied hard to have the visit to Azerbaijan called
off. Irans chief of staff visited Baku two weeks ago in an attempt to
persuade the Azeris to cancel the trip. He was unsuccessful. In
response to the Peres visit, Iran has recalled its ambassador for
consultations. In Kazakhstan, the Iranian decision to walk out of an
interfaith conference while Peres was speaking represents an
additional indication of Iranian displeasure, and hence a further
diplomatic point for Israel. The bottom line: Iranian lobbying failed.
Inducing Muslim countries with which Israel has shared interests and
firm connections to overcome the desire to Å`camouflage or downplay
their relations with Israel represents a perennial challenge for
Israeli diplomacy. The latest developments in Central Asia suggest
that, in this region at least, real progress has begun to be made.
Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in
International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya, Israel. This is
cross-posted on that site.
Newstex ID: MODV-0001-36351147
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress