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YEREVAN SHOULD NOT SIGN ANY DOCUMENT, REASONING FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF PHYSICAL EXISTENCE OF ARMENIA AND NKR
Karine Ter-Sahakyan
PanARMENIAN.Net
14.07.2009 GMT+04:00
Armenia, that has no control over Stepanakert, in the eyes of the
world community loses the moral right to conduct negotiations, and
the political competence as a negotiating party is reduced to zero.
The promulgation of much discussed Madrid principles at long last
occurred. Actually no one doubts that they are going to be unacceptable
for Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia. However, some provisions of the
framework agreement, which may be signed already this year, cause
real concern and even fear. Before we try to explain what threat
signing of the agreement can pose to the existence of NKR and Armenia,
let us take as an axiom the following fact: Armenia should not sign
any document, reasoning from considerations of safety and physical
existence of not only Armenia, but also NKR. However, let us analyze
the key points one by one.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The first danger, naturally, proceeds from the fact
that it is "necessary to return" the territories, which actually make
up the safety zone in military-strategic respect. The actual border
between NKR and Azerbaijan lies precisely on the boundary of these
regions, including defense installations. And if we are forced to
hand over those five regions, these installations will go under the
control of the Azerbaijani army and the latter will easily execute
the blitzkrieg it has so long been speaking about. Moreover, Nagorno
Karabakh will no longer be able to form a similar defense system -
Stepanakert will neither be allowed, nor will she have relevant
resources. Though, Madrid principles also very indefinably suggest
the necessity of overland communication with Armenia, it is so unreal
that it is not even worth dwelling on. The so-called corridor will
be immediately populated with Azeris, and it will be possible only
to dream of a safe road from Armenia to NKR.
The second danger consists in the return of the internally displaced
people and refugees to places of permanent inhabitancy. About 40-50
thousand Azeris and 120 thousand Armenians lived in the NKR before
1988. But as soon as return mechanisms are introduced, the ratio
immediately changes. There is a probe-tested method of changing the
demographic setting: criminals are set free with the obligation to
live where the authorities will settle them. It happened so in Cyprus
in 1975, when Turkey let out from prisons about 25 thousand criminals,
populating them in the northern occupied part of the island. It was
also the case with Baku, when the released criminals were sent to raid
and kill Armenians in 1988. Thus, it is exactly what awaits Nagorno
Karabakh. Moreover, the ephemeral promise of "free will" will lead
exactly to the result so much desired by Azerbaijan: Armenians will
be a minority in NKR.
Besides, the principles also imply quartering of international
peacemakers in the conflict zone. How peacemakers "maintain peace"
we know quite well from the Balkan experience.
In subtotal, situation is as follows: Stepanakert upsets all the
efforts of the world and European communities, thus bringing the
Karabakh party into complete isolation and drawing in this orbit also
Armenia, which under appropriate agitation of a number of oppositional
forces will divide the society into conformist-traitors and moderate
patriots, who join hands with radicals. Such a distribution puts
Armenia into a weaker position both in the world arena and in the
framework of the negotiation process. Armenia, that has no control
over Stepanakert, in the eyes of the world community loses the moral
right to conduct negotiations, and the political competence as a
negotiating party is reduced to zero. Moreover, the military security
guarantee of the Artsakh people from the political-legal point of
view becomes an extremely problematic task for Armenia. However, it
is also possible to spit on the opinion of the world community and it
is exactly what will be done at the last moment. Then the positions of
Baku that consecutively conducts clear, bright and simple policy as a
guarantor of stable policy and a party that knows how to patiently and
"peacefully" solve any problem will arouse sympathies in the immoral
Europe and Russia.
In case Armenia signs any peace agreement on the Madrid principles,
about which we have only very rough ideas and which may prove to be
consonant to Aliyev's statement, and in case Stepanakert refuses
to satisfy their conditions, a political-legal situation will
arise under which Baku will have full authority to launch military
operations and to "force to peace", while Armenia, on the contrary,
being obliged by a previously-signed document, will not have a right
to introduce troops into NKR as a guarantor of safety, on the basis
that Stepanakert refuses to recognize the peace signed by Armenia,
who used to be her delegate in negotiations.
Armenia should not sign any agreements, which do not clearly define the
procedure of determination of the NKR status on conditions advantageous
both for Armenia and NKR, which must be carried out simultaneously
with the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from some liberated
territories. As for some certain lands, Baku had better forget about
them for good. Spectral agreements concerning a referendum to be
conducted in 5 or 10 years' time should never be signed by Armenia. We
know from history the price of the obligation signed in its time by
the Ottoman Empire under the pressure of conqueror Europe or Russia,
according to which there were to be conducted constitutional reforms
for Christians and for Armenians, in particular. The experience
gained from history and the signed international legal documents
concerning Armenians throughout history, testify that we should not
make any kind of concessions in any of provisions. Wars occur for
the very purpose to put full-stops on the problems not resolved by
diplomats. After 1994 we have the right to require the recognition
of the independent status of NKR in exchange for some territories,
the loss of which does not present any strategic danger...
Karine Ter-Sahakyan
PanARMENIAN.Net
14.07.2009 GMT+04:00
Armenia, that has no control over Stepanakert, in the eyes of the
world community loses the moral right to conduct negotiations, and
the political competence as a negotiating party is reduced to zero.
The promulgation of much discussed Madrid principles at long last
occurred. Actually no one doubts that they are going to be unacceptable
for Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia. However, some provisions of the
framework agreement, which may be signed already this year, cause
real concern and even fear. Before we try to explain what threat
signing of the agreement can pose to the existence of NKR and Armenia,
let us take as an axiom the following fact: Armenia should not sign
any document, reasoning from considerations of safety and physical
existence of not only Armenia, but also NKR. However, let us analyze
the key points one by one.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The first danger, naturally, proceeds from the fact
that it is "necessary to return" the territories, which actually make
up the safety zone in military-strategic respect. The actual border
between NKR and Azerbaijan lies precisely on the boundary of these
regions, including defense installations. And if we are forced to
hand over those five regions, these installations will go under the
control of the Azerbaijani army and the latter will easily execute
the blitzkrieg it has so long been speaking about. Moreover, Nagorno
Karabakh will no longer be able to form a similar defense system -
Stepanakert will neither be allowed, nor will she have relevant
resources. Though, Madrid principles also very indefinably suggest
the necessity of overland communication with Armenia, it is so unreal
that it is not even worth dwelling on. The so-called corridor will
be immediately populated with Azeris, and it will be possible only
to dream of a safe road from Armenia to NKR.
The second danger consists in the return of the internally displaced
people and refugees to places of permanent inhabitancy. About 40-50
thousand Azeris and 120 thousand Armenians lived in the NKR before
1988. But as soon as return mechanisms are introduced, the ratio
immediately changes. There is a probe-tested method of changing the
demographic setting: criminals are set free with the obligation to
live where the authorities will settle them. It happened so in Cyprus
in 1975, when Turkey let out from prisons about 25 thousand criminals,
populating them in the northern occupied part of the island. It was
also the case with Baku, when the released criminals were sent to raid
and kill Armenians in 1988. Thus, it is exactly what awaits Nagorno
Karabakh. Moreover, the ephemeral promise of "free will" will lead
exactly to the result so much desired by Azerbaijan: Armenians will
be a minority in NKR.
Besides, the principles also imply quartering of international
peacemakers in the conflict zone. How peacemakers "maintain peace"
we know quite well from the Balkan experience.
In subtotal, situation is as follows: Stepanakert upsets all the
efforts of the world and European communities, thus bringing the
Karabakh party into complete isolation and drawing in this orbit also
Armenia, which under appropriate agitation of a number of oppositional
forces will divide the society into conformist-traitors and moderate
patriots, who join hands with radicals. Such a distribution puts
Armenia into a weaker position both in the world arena and in the
framework of the negotiation process. Armenia, that has no control
over Stepanakert, in the eyes of the world community loses the moral
right to conduct negotiations, and the political competence as a
negotiating party is reduced to zero. Moreover, the military security
guarantee of the Artsakh people from the political-legal point of
view becomes an extremely problematic task for Armenia. However, it
is also possible to spit on the opinion of the world community and it
is exactly what will be done at the last moment. Then the positions of
Baku that consecutively conducts clear, bright and simple policy as a
guarantor of stable policy and a party that knows how to patiently and
"peacefully" solve any problem will arouse sympathies in the immoral
Europe and Russia.
In case Armenia signs any peace agreement on the Madrid principles,
about which we have only very rough ideas and which may prove to be
consonant to Aliyev's statement, and in case Stepanakert refuses
to satisfy their conditions, a political-legal situation will
arise under which Baku will have full authority to launch military
operations and to "force to peace", while Armenia, on the contrary,
being obliged by a previously-signed document, will not have a right
to introduce troops into NKR as a guarantor of safety, on the basis
that Stepanakert refuses to recognize the peace signed by Armenia,
who used to be her delegate in negotiations.
Armenia should not sign any agreements, which do not clearly define the
procedure of determination of the NKR status on conditions advantageous
both for Armenia and NKR, which must be carried out simultaneously
with the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from some liberated
territories. As for some certain lands, Baku had better forget about
them for good. Spectral agreements concerning a referendum to be
conducted in 5 or 10 years' time should never be signed by Armenia. We
know from history the price of the obligation signed in its time by
the Ottoman Empire under the pressure of conqueror Europe or Russia,
according to which there were to be conducted constitutional reforms
for Christians and for Armenians, in particular. The experience
gained from history and the signed international legal documents
concerning Armenians throughout history, testify that we should not
make any kind of concessions in any of provisions. Wars occur for
the very purpose to put full-stops on the problems not resolved by
diplomats. After 1994 we have the right to require the recognition
of the independent status of NKR in exchange for some territories,
the loss of which does not present any strategic danger...