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SARKISSIAN: THE PITFALLS OF A HISTORICAL COMMISSION
By K.M. Greg Sarkissian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2009/11/ 20/sarkissian-the-pitfalls-of-a-historical-commiss ion/
When reviewing the recently signed Protocols regarding diplomatic
relations between Armenia and Turkey, given that settling the border
is a sovereign right, that Armenia's elected leaders have never stated
they have territorial claims on Turkey, and that the Karabagh conflict
is not explicitly part of the Protocols, what remains for debate is
the "sub-commission on the historical dimension."
In the words of the Protocols, the purpose of the sub-commission on
the historical dimension is "to restore mutual confidence between
the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of
the historical records and archives to define existing problems and
formulate recommendations."
It is precisely this mutual confidence that is in question. The
purpose and meaning of this sub-commission continues to generate
heated and divisive debate within both those countries and their
respective diasporas.
There are several reasons for this debate, but one crucial aspect
is the fact that since the announcement of the Protocols at the end
of August 2009, the presidents of the two countries have expressed
diametrically opposing views on the meaning of this sub-commission.
On October 3, in New York, Armenian President Serge Sargsyan explained
to the assembled representatives of the Armenian Diaspora organizations
that the commission is not to judge whether or not genocide took place,
but rather "to discuss the issues of Armenian heritage in Turkey,
issues of restoring and preserving that heritage, issues of heirs of
victims of Genocide."(1)
However, Turkish President Abdullah Gul defines the sub-commission's
objective as one which will provide a historical judgement. On October
6, in Istanbul, he stated, "There are all sorts of allegations about
what happened a century ago. It is clear that people who do not
know what happened where or how are not able to take decisions on
this matter. What we hope is that historians, archive specialists
study this matter and we are ready to accept the conclusions of
this commission. To show that we are sincere, we even said that if a
third country is interested in this matter, if French historians, for
example, want to take part in this commission, they are welcome."(2)
Given these contradicting interpretations, what would be the outcome,
if a commission were to proceed at this time?
There would be a direct and indirect chilling effect on third party
governments and independent scholars, in addition to added obstructions
to Armenian Diaspora organizations in their work for international
recognition of the Genocide. Some well intentioned parties will
genuinely believe in the guise of progress being made and become
unwitting bystanders to denial. Countries that would prefer not to
get entangled in the genocide issue would have the perfect excuse to
say that recognition efforts are not necessary, as Armenia and Turkey
are in negotiation.
In fact, we already have indications of this trend. Two Swedish
newspapers, Metro and Svenska Dagbladet no longer use the term
"Armenian Genocide." Metro's Editor-in-chief refuses to place any
article in the newspaper about the so-called "Armenian Genocide,"
because he is "no longer sure if there was genocide or not."(3) During
a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Spain pledged
its support for Turkey's accession to the European Union. "We are
watching Turkey and its foreign policy with admiration, especially
in relations with its neighbors," sources quoted Spanish Foreign
Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos as saying.(4)
Many observers believe that Turkey is using this commission as a
ploy, to dissuade third parties, such as the US and UK governments,
from considering resolutions to recognize the Genocide. The logic
of this ploy was explicitly admitted by a Turkish member of the
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission in 2001.(5)
The reason for Turkey's unshakeable denialist position is well
explained by Taner Akcam. The foundation myths of the Turkish Republic
are a deep and integral part of Turkish national identity; revealing
the Armenian Genocide as a fundamental part of the formation of the
Republic would have devastating effects on the national psyche, as well
as on the ability of the "Deep State" to maintain its power.(6) Turkish
Prime Minister Erdogan has been quoted as saying, "During its history,
Turkey has never degraded itself to the vile cruelty of committing
genocide. It's out of the question for us to accept this."(7)
Some have argued in favour of the sub-commission on the grounds that
since the Protocols state Armenian, Turkish, as well as Swiss and other
international experts will take part in it, and since Switzerland has
already officially recognized the Genocide, therefore the conclusion
of the commission will be favourable to the Armenians.
That argument fails to take into consideration that Turkey has ignored
resolutions by 20 countries affirming the Genocide and successfully
manages to keep other countries from adopting them. The whole point
of these recognitions and affirmations was to show Turkey that
it stood alone and was out of step with the facts in denying the
Armenian Genocide.
Turkey is a powerful country politically and militarily and has
recently also become powerful economically, ranking 17th in the world.
It uses these leverages skillfully in getting what it wants from
other countries. When Israel, the UK and the US avoid recognizing the
Genocide, they do so not because of uncertainty about the historical
facts- there is no serious dispute among scholars that what happened
to the Armenians in 1915 was genocide-they do so for political,
military and economic considerations, in short, Realpolitik.
It seems that Armenia is now also willing to play this game. By putting
the Genocide on the table via a historical commission, in order to
have political and economic relations with Turkey and to enhance its
security, Armenia has sacrificed its only leverage-the incontestable
truth. Now all countries will feel at still greater liberty to play
the game of Realpolitik regarding the Genocide in whatever way they
choose, because even Armenia does it.
In the short term, the Armenian Government's handling of the
Protocols has exacerbated political divisions within the Armenian
community-especially within the Diaspora, and between Armenia and
parts of the Diaspora. During the Soviet era, the relations of Diaspora
institutions with each other and with Armenia were conditioned along
rivaling partisan lines, not even ideological lines.
This situation continued in the early years of independence, but
eventually more inclusive policies were developed to involve the
Diaspora in Armenia and integrate its relations on a pan-Armenian
basis. It now seems that the Protocols are once again polarizing the
Diaspora and its relations with Armenia. People are no longer debating
the issues, but rather "whose side are you on?"
In the long term, Armenia has compromised the incontestability of
the Armenian Genocide. Even if, for whatever reason, the Armenian
Parliament does not ratify the Protocols, the fact that the Armenian
Government agreed at one point to allow the Armenian Genocide to be
open to debate can be used to further Turkey's denial.
_________________________________________ ______________________ (1)
"An Interview with Serge Sargsian," Armenian Reporter, October 3,
2009, p. 4.
(2) "Gul Invites Historians to
'Study' Genocide," Asbarez, October 6, 2009,
http://www.asbarez.com/2009/10/06/gul-invite s-historians-to-study-genocide/,
accessed November 18, 2009.
(3) "Swedish newspapers call so-called 'Armenian
genocide' into question," Today.Az, October 23, 2009,
http://www.today.az/news/politics/56860.html , accessed November
18, 2009.
(4) "Spain pledges support for
Turkey's EU bid," Today's Zaman, November 16, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-19307 0-102-spain-pledges-support-for-turkeys-eu-bid.htm l,
accessed November 18, 2009.
(5) California Courier Online November 15, 2001, referencing
Azeri newspaper 525-Gazet, July 19, 2001, quoted Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission member Ozdem Sanberk: "The main goal
of our commission is to impede Armenian Genocide recognition
initiatives put forth every year in the US Congress and parliaments
of Western countries for the 'genocide issue' and aimed at weakening
Turkey.... The significant matter for us is that the 'genocide issue'
is not discussed by the American Congress any more. Because, as long
as we continue the dialogue, the issue will not be brought to the
Congress agenda. If it is not discussed in the Congress, we, being
Turkey, will gain from that. The US Congress will see that there is
a channel of dialogue between Turks and Armenians and decide that
'there is no necessity for the Congress to take such [a] decision
while such a channel exists.'" (6) See Taner Akcam, "The Armenian
Genocide and the Silence of the Turks," in Taner Akcam, Dialogue Across
an International Divide: Essays towards a Turkish-Armenian Dialogue
(Cambridge, MA and Toronto: Zoryan Institute, 2001), pp. 75-101.
By K.M. Greg Sarkissian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2009/11/ 20/sarkissian-the-pitfalls-of-a-historical-commiss ion/
When reviewing the recently signed Protocols regarding diplomatic
relations between Armenia and Turkey, given that settling the border
is a sovereign right, that Armenia's elected leaders have never stated
they have territorial claims on Turkey, and that the Karabagh conflict
is not explicitly part of the Protocols, what remains for debate is
the "sub-commission on the historical dimension."
In the words of the Protocols, the purpose of the sub-commission on
the historical dimension is "to restore mutual confidence between
the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of
the historical records and archives to define existing problems and
formulate recommendations."
It is precisely this mutual confidence that is in question. The
purpose and meaning of this sub-commission continues to generate
heated and divisive debate within both those countries and their
respective diasporas.
There are several reasons for this debate, but one crucial aspect
is the fact that since the announcement of the Protocols at the end
of August 2009, the presidents of the two countries have expressed
diametrically opposing views on the meaning of this sub-commission.
On October 3, in New York, Armenian President Serge Sargsyan explained
to the assembled representatives of the Armenian Diaspora organizations
that the commission is not to judge whether or not genocide took place,
but rather "to discuss the issues of Armenian heritage in Turkey,
issues of restoring and preserving that heritage, issues of heirs of
victims of Genocide."(1)
However, Turkish President Abdullah Gul defines the sub-commission's
objective as one which will provide a historical judgement. On October
6, in Istanbul, he stated, "There are all sorts of allegations about
what happened a century ago. It is clear that people who do not
know what happened where or how are not able to take decisions on
this matter. What we hope is that historians, archive specialists
study this matter and we are ready to accept the conclusions of
this commission. To show that we are sincere, we even said that if a
third country is interested in this matter, if French historians, for
example, want to take part in this commission, they are welcome."(2)
Given these contradicting interpretations, what would be the outcome,
if a commission were to proceed at this time?
There would be a direct and indirect chilling effect on third party
governments and independent scholars, in addition to added obstructions
to Armenian Diaspora organizations in their work for international
recognition of the Genocide. Some well intentioned parties will
genuinely believe in the guise of progress being made and become
unwitting bystanders to denial. Countries that would prefer not to
get entangled in the genocide issue would have the perfect excuse to
say that recognition efforts are not necessary, as Armenia and Turkey
are in negotiation.
In fact, we already have indications of this trend. Two Swedish
newspapers, Metro and Svenska Dagbladet no longer use the term
"Armenian Genocide." Metro's Editor-in-chief refuses to place any
article in the newspaper about the so-called "Armenian Genocide,"
because he is "no longer sure if there was genocide or not."(3) During
a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Spain pledged
its support for Turkey's accession to the European Union. "We are
watching Turkey and its foreign policy with admiration, especially
in relations with its neighbors," sources quoted Spanish Foreign
Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos as saying.(4)
Many observers believe that Turkey is using this commission as a
ploy, to dissuade third parties, such as the US and UK governments,
from considering resolutions to recognize the Genocide. The logic
of this ploy was explicitly admitted by a Turkish member of the
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission in 2001.(5)
The reason for Turkey's unshakeable denialist position is well
explained by Taner Akcam. The foundation myths of the Turkish Republic
are a deep and integral part of Turkish national identity; revealing
the Armenian Genocide as a fundamental part of the formation of the
Republic would have devastating effects on the national psyche, as well
as on the ability of the "Deep State" to maintain its power.(6) Turkish
Prime Minister Erdogan has been quoted as saying, "During its history,
Turkey has never degraded itself to the vile cruelty of committing
genocide. It's out of the question for us to accept this."(7)
Some have argued in favour of the sub-commission on the grounds that
since the Protocols state Armenian, Turkish, as well as Swiss and other
international experts will take part in it, and since Switzerland has
already officially recognized the Genocide, therefore the conclusion
of the commission will be favourable to the Armenians.
That argument fails to take into consideration that Turkey has ignored
resolutions by 20 countries affirming the Genocide and successfully
manages to keep other countries from adopting them. The whole point
of these recognitions and affirmations was to show Turkey that
it stood alone and was out of step with the facts in denying the
Armenian Genocide.
Turkey is a powerful country politically and militarily and has
recently also become powerful economically, ranking 17th in the world.
It uses these leverages skillfully in getting what it wants from
other countries. When Israel, the UK and the US avoid recognizing the
Genocide, they do so not because of uncertainty about the historical
facts- there is no serious dispute among scholars that what happened
to the Armenians in 1915 was genocide-they do so for political,
military and economic considerations, in short, Realpolitik.
It seems that Armenia is now also willing to play this game. By putting
the Genocide on the table via a historical commission, in order to
have political and economic relations with Turkey and to enhance its
security, Armenia has sacrificed its only leverage-the incontestable
truth. Now all countries will feel at still greater liberty to play
the game of Realpolitik regarding the Genocide in whatever way they
choose, because even Armenia does it.
In the short term, the Armenian Government's handling of the
Protocols has exacerbated political divisions within the Armenian
community-especially within the Diaspora, and between Armenia and
parts of the Diaspora. During the Soviet era, the relations of Diaspora
institutions with each other and with Armenia were conditioned along
rivaling partisan lines, not even ideological lines.
This situation continued in the early years of independence, but
eventually more inclusive policies were developed to involve the
Diaspora in Armenia and integrate its relations on a pan-Armenian
basis. It now seems that the Protocols are once again polarizing the
Diaspora and its relations with Armenia. People are no longer debating
the issues, but rather "whose side are you on?"
In the long term, Armenia has compromised the incontestability of
the Armenian Genocide. Even if, for whatever reason, the Armenian
Parliament does not ratify the Protocols, the fact that the Armenian
Government agreed at one point to allow the Armenian Genocide to be
open to debate can be used to further Turkey's denial.
_________________________________________ ______________________ (1)
"An Interview with Serge Sargsian," Armenian Reporter, October 3,
2009, p. 4.
(2) "Gul Invites Historians to
'Study' Genocide," Asbarez, October 6, 2009,
http://www.asbarez.com/2009/10/06/gul-invite s-historians-to-study-genocide/,
accessed November 18, 2009.
(3) "Swedish newspapers call so-called 'Armenian
genocide' into question," Today.Az, October 23, 2009,
http://www.today.az/news/politics/56860.html , accessed November
18, 2009.
(4) "Spain pledges support for
Turkey's EU bid," Today's Zaman, November 16, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-19307 0-102-spain-pledges-support-for-turkeys-eu-bid.htm l,
accessed November 18, 2009.
(5) California Courier Online November 15, 2001, referencing
Azeri newspaper 525-Gazet, July 19, 2001, quoted Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission member Ozdem Sanberk: "The main goal
of our commission is to impede Armenian Genocide recognition
initiatives put forth every year in the US Congress and parliaments
of Western countries for the 'genocide issue' and aimed at weakening
Turkey.... The significant matter for us is that the 'genocide issue'
is not discussed by the American Congress any more. Because, as long
as we continue the dialogue, the issue will not be brought to the
Congress agenda. If it is not discussed in the Congress, we, being
Turkey, will gain from that. The US Congress will see that there is
a channel of dialogue between Turks and Armenians and decide that
'there is no necessity for the Congress to take such [a] decision
while such a channel exists.'" (6) See Taner Akcam, "The Armenian
Genocide and the Silence of the Turks," in Taner Akcam, Dialogue Across
an International Divide: Essays towards a Turkish-Armenian Dialogue
(Cambridge, MA and Toronto: Zoryan Institute, 2001), pp. 75-101.