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THE MUNICH MEETING BETWEEN ILHAM ALIYEV AND SERZH SARGSYAN
Boris Navasardyan
Eurasian Home Analytical Resource
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert. xml?lang=en&nic=expert&pid=2240&qmonth =0&qyear=0
Nov 25 2009
The Sunday negotiations in Munich, like the majority of previous
meetings between Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev, have not changed the prospects of the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute settlement. I believe this meeting did
not make the Presidents reach an agreement as well as did not make
the using of force more or less likely. One can say that the OSCE
Minsk Group Co-Chairmen's assessments were more cautious than those
made after the meetings that took place on May 6 in Prague and on
October 9 in Chisinau. Then, in Prague Matthew Bryza stated about the
"conceptual breakthrough", while Robert Bradtke, who had replaced
him, said five months later that the sides reached an agreement
concerning the settlement principles: national self-determination,
territorial integrity and non-using of force. The both statements
caused a sensation. A breakthrough in such prolonged processes is
always extraordinary, and although today the international law is based
on the abovementioned three principles of the ethnic and territorial
conflicts settlement, in respect to Nagorno-Karabakh those principles
were interpreted in Baku and Yerevan so differently that there was
no agreement here at all.
Of course, those very optimistic statements should be followed
either by a breakthrough or a "cold shower". Baku sobered the both
Co-Chairmen expressing its dissatisfaction with the negotiations,
their outcome and the Armenian side's unconstructiveness. In Munich,
even after Baku's words, the situation was calm, only good spirits that
the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen traditionally display and the hopes
for a new meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan indicate
that the Minsk process is alive.
The reason for the metamorphoses is likely in the simultaneous process
of Armenia-Turkey rapprochement. In May 2009, Turkey, Armenia and
Switzerland, which acted as a moderator, said that a coordinated Road
Map would be elaborated. In October, shortly after the meeting between
Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, the Armenian-Turkish protocols on
opening the border, establishing diplomatic relations and improving
bilateral relations between the two countries were expected to
be signed. In other words, the rapprochement of two historical
opponents was in full swing. The Minsk Group Co-Chairmen sought to
create favourable conditions for the rapprochement: during the war
with Azerbaijan, which is a strategic partner of Turkey (the slogan
"two states - one nation" has been important in the relations of
the two countries) the successes of the Armenian troops resulted in
closing the border with Armenia by Turkey. Baku was going to discredit
the negotiations process as a means of restraining its ally, Turkey,
in its dialogue with Yerevan. The Azerbaijani side insists that any
progress in the Armenian-Turkish relations be preceded by liberation
of, at least, some areas around Nagorno-Karabakh that are controlled
by the Armenian forces.
In Turkey the Turkish leaders have to take into consideration
Azerbaijan's expectations and the opinions of those coming out against
improvement of relations with Armenia without preliminary conditions.
Armenia-Turkish protocols have yet to be ratified and it is
unclear when the border will be opened. So the expectations
from the Munich meeting as well as any responses to it were more
moderate and reserved. Now there is almost a deadlock concerning the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, which has become habitual:
Yerevan flatly opposes the linking Armenia-Turkey relations
normalization to any other issues. Another issue is that opening of
the border with Turkey would favour the formation of new atmosphere
in the region and would positively influence the attitude of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations sides making them more constructive.
The reverse consequence, or consideration of a much more complicated
Nagorno-Karabakh problem as a prerequisite to solve a simpler problem,
which does not require the harmonization of many details, and which
the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations is, seems to be unlikely.
In addition, while the major global players have reached a consensus
on opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations between
Armenia and Turkey, such an agreement is far from being reached on
different points of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute settlement. That's
why the quickness of the Minsk process will depend on the future of
the Armenian-Turkish protocols in many respects. Their ratification
within the next 4-5 months can stimulate the Armenian-Azerbaijani
negotiations, while their procrastination will hinder the
negotiations. The protocols ratification in the Turkish Parliament
would be speeded up by promoting the resolution on recognition of
the 1915 Armenians Genocide by the U.S. Congress. The 4-5 months
term implies the time period till April 24, the Genocide Victims
Commemoration Day. If Turkey has ratified the protocols by this date,
the resolution will likely be removed from the agenda (why to worsen
the relations between the countries that can come to terms?).
Otherwise, the resolution will most likely be adopted, which means that
the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process will be delayed. This would
mean negative consequences for the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute settlement.
Boris Navasardyan
Eurasian Home Analytical Resource
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert. xml?lang=en&nic=expert&pid=2240&qmonth =0&qyear=0
Nov 25 2009
The Sunday negotiations in Munich, like the majority of previous
meetings between Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev, have not changed the prospects of the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute settlement. I believe this meeting did
not make the Presidents reach an agreement as well as did not make
the using of force more or less likely. One can say that the OSCE
Minsk Group Co-Chairmen's assessments were more cautious than those
made after the meetings that took place on May 6 in Prague and on
October 9 in Chisinau. Then, in Prague Matthew Bryza stated about the
"conceptual breakthrough", while Robert Bradtke, who had replaced
him, said five months later that the sides reached an agreement
concerning the settlement principles: national self-determination,
territorial integrity and non-using of force. The both statements
caused a sensation. A breakthrough in such prolonged processes is
always extraordinary, and although today the international law is based
on the abovementioned three principles of the ethnic and territorial
conflicts settlement, in respect to Nagorno-Karabakh those principles
were interpreted in Baku and Yerevan so differently that there was
no agreement here at all.
Of course, those very optimistic statements should be followed
either by a breakthrough or a "cold shower". Baku sobered the both
Co-Chairmen expressing its dissatisfaction with the negotiations,
their outcome and the Armenian side's unconstructiveness. In Munich,
even after Baku's words, the situation was calm, only good spirits that
the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen traditionally display and the hopes
for a new meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan indicate
that the Minsk process is alive.
The reason for the metamorphoses is likely in the simultaneous process
of Armenia-Turkey rapprochement. In May 2009, Turkey, Armenia and
Switzerland, which acted as a moderator, said that a coordinated Road
Map would be elaborated. In October, shortly after the meeting between
Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, the Armenian-Turkish protocols on
opening the border, establishing diplomatic relations and improving
bilateral relations between the two countries were expected to
be signed. In other words, the rapprochement of two historical
opponents was in full swing. The Minsk Group Co-Chairmen sought to
create favourable conditions for the rapprochement: during the war
with Azerbaijan, which is a strategic partner of Turkey (the slogan
"two states - one nation" has been important in the relations of
the two countries) the successes of the Armenian troops resulted in
closing the border with Armenia by Turkey. Baku was going to discredit
the negotiations process as a means of restraining its ally, Turkey,
in its dialogue with Yerevan. The Azerbaijani side insists that any
progress in the Armenian-Turkish relations be preceded by liberation
of, at least, some areas around Nagorno-Karabakh that are controlled
by the Armenian forces.
In Turkey the Turkish leaders have to take into consideration
Azerbaijan's expectations and the opinions of those coming out against
improvement of relations with Armenia without preliminary conditions.
Armenia-Turkish protocols have yet to be ratified and it is
unclear when the border will be opened. So the expectations
from the Munich meeting as well as any responses to it were more
moderate and reserved. Now there is almost a deadlock concerning the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, which has become habitual:
Yerevan flatly opposes the linking Armenia-Turkey relations
normalization to any other issues. Another issue is that opening of
the border with Turkey would favour the formation of new atmosphere
in the region and would positively influence the attitude of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations sides making them more constructive.
The reverse consequence, or consideration of a much more complicated
Nagorno-Karabakh problem as a prerequisite to solve a simpler problem,
which does not require the harmonization of many details, and which
the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations is, seems to be unlikely.
In addition, while the major global players have reached a consensus
on opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations between
Armenia and Turkey, such an agreement is far from being reached on
different points of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute settlement. That's
why the quickness of the Minsk process will depend on the future of
the Armenian-Turkish protocols in many respects. Their ratification
within the next 4-5 months can stimulate the Armenian-Azerbaijani
negotiations, while their procrastination will hinder the
negotiations. The protocols ratification in the Turkish Parliament
would be speeded up by promoting the resolution on recognition of
the 1915 Armenians Genocide by the U.S. Congress. The 4-5 months
term implies the time period till April 24, the Genocide Victims
Commemoration Day. If Turkey has ratified the protocols by this date,
the resolution will likely be removed from the agenda (why to worsen
the relations between the countries that can come to terms?).
Otherwise, the resolution will most likely be adopted, which means that
the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process will be delayed. This would
mean negative consequences for the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute settlement.