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"INDECISIVE" PRESIDENT, CLAN RIVALRIES, DOMINATE AZERI POLITICS
Transitions Online
Nov 23 2009
Czech Rep
Compared with Georgia and Armenia, where opposition demonstrations
and other destabilizing events happen relatively often, Azerbaijan
seems stable. The country saw the last turbulent moments in 2003,
when the authorities put down opposition protests staged after rigged
presidential elections. But the lack of visible signs of potential
destabilization in Azerbaijan is misleading.
Beliefs about Azerbaijan's internal stability are based on the common
conviction that Aliev's position is strong and that he sets the rules
and makes most important decisions independently, especially those
on foreign policy and the oil industry. That he is like his father,
Heidar, president from 1993 to 2003, a cunning and experienced player
whom officials simply feared.
But when speaking privately, Azerbaijani experts question the position
of Aliev Jr.
"Ilham is an indecisive man who fears contacts with journalists,
avoids speaking in public, and has a weakness for risk," commented a
well-known Azerbaijani political scientist speaking on condition of
anonymity. "He has proved during his first term in office that he is
a gifted and clever politician, but cannot equal his father as far
as political games are concerned."
Indeed, Ilham differs from his father in almost everything. He has a
different character, personal and political experience. Heidar was a
product of the KGB and the leader of a strong clan from Nakhichevan,
an Azeri exclave sandwiched between Iran and Armenia. By contrast,
Ilham studied at the prestigious Moscow University and has much closer
ties to Baku's intellectual elite and the community of his Baku-born
wife, Mehriban, than to the people of Nakhichevan.
Perhaps the best measure of an autocrat's power is his ability to
conduct political purges, to remove his predecessor's people and
nominate his own. Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov's purge
of the state administration following his rise to power after the death
of Saparmurat Niyazov is one example. Ilham has come close only once:
in November 2005, when he imprisoned two cabinet ministers, Farhad
Aliev and Ali Insanov. Nevertheless, most members of the old guard
kept their offices. Many commentators on the Azerbaijani political
scene claim that it is they, especially the chief of the president's
administration, Ramiz Mekhtiev, and Interior Minister Ramil Usubov,
not the president, who rule from behind the scenes.
Adding to the president's weakness is the growing dissatisfaction of
the elites with the rule of two clans: the Nakhichevan clan and one
that groups Azerbaijanis originally from Armenia (the so-called Eraz
- from the Russian phrase erevanskie azerbaidjantsy meaning Yerevan
Azerbaijanis), who have dominated the political life of Azerbaijan
and whose members hold almost all offices in the central and regional
administrations.
"The conflicts and tensions within the ruling elites, including those
between the Nakhichevanis and the Eraz, are another threat," said
Leyla Aliyeva of the Center for National and International Studies,
a pro-democracy think tank in Baku. "They are fueled by the rivalry
over the division of oil money."
The assassination of Deputy Defense Minister Rail Rzayev in February
could have been a signal that the rivalry is getting fierce, according
to many commentators. In early October General Prosecutor Zakir
Garalov said the general was probably killed by his subordinates.
Not the West, but Islam
Among the major threats to Azerbaijan's internal stability are massive
corruption, nepotism, and the dependence of the economy on energy
resources. No country struggling with such problems can be considered
securely stable.
Few seem to notice the growing discontent in Azerbaijani society. But
based on dozens of conversations I had with political analysts and
ordinary people, I would say that many Azerbaijanis have lost their
belief in a better future. Common people often stress that they no
longer believe that they will share the profits from oil and gas
sales. They do not trust the government, perceiving its members as
"parasites" who care only for their own interest.
Tofiq, who has lived in Patamdart since 1993, when his family fled
the now-Armenian-occupied Zangilan region, is typical. "How can I
trust the government, which promises to recapture Karabakh from the
Armenians every year, but has so far done nothing to fulfill these
promises? Why are they lying? All they care about are their own
pockets, not ordinary people."
Azerbaijani society has been passive for years and has represented
no threat for the regime. But signs of change are there for those
who look.
"Unrest among young people is on the rise: they discuss, set up their
organizations, opposition websites, and blogs," said Hajizade, of the
FAR Center. "Baku's walls are splattered with hundreds of belligerent
graffiti: from 'Fuck Bush' to 'Allah Akbar.' Leftist movements are
also gaining popularity."
The events that took place in Baku after a gunman killed between 13
and 30 people (the actual number remains undisclosed) at the State
Oil Academy on 30 April [2009] were another measure of the growing
dissatisfaction. After the attack people expected the government to
announce national mourning and disclose detailed information about
the results of the investigation. Meanwhile, the government tried
to cover up the incident and did not even call off the Holiday of
Flowers on 10 May, Heidar Aliev's birthday. In response, students
organized a street march that attracted more than 2,000 people and
was dispersed by the police. Possibly fearing that protests might
continue, the authorities called off all events planned to celebrate
the end of the academic year.
The growing influence of Islam, including its radical versions,
could also help destabilize the internal situation. As recently
as a few years ago everyone would stare at a woman dressed in a
hijab, whereas today there are so many that nobody seems to pay
attention. On Fridays, the Baku mosques fill up, unthinkable only
a few years ago in this strongly secular society. And the city was
the site of demonstrations in support of the Palestinians during the
recent conflict in the Gaza Strip.
"Only Islam can save Azerbaijan from the influence of the rotten West,"
said Mukhtar, a student at the State Oil Academy. "The role of Islam
in Azerbaijan's public life should be stronger, and the government
should cooperate not only with the US, but also with Muslim countries."
That disillusionment with the West is a new phenomenon in Azerbaijan,
and it is getting stronger. Many Azerbaijanis perceive the West as a
cynical player that calls for democratization but values Azerbaijani
oil more. The West is also commonly perceived as supporting Aliev's
authoritarian regime. Azerbaijani opposition politicians, advocacy
groups, and pro-Western elites criticize international organizations
and Western governments who they say are not sufficiently critical
of the government and who try not to let authoritarian practices and
human rights abuses impede relations with Baku. They often recall the
government's violent suppression of the demonstrations against the
rigged presidential election of 2003. Although the West criticized
the government at the time, opposition and civil society activists
had hoped for a "color revolution" and looked on bitterly as Western
officials continued to do business with Aliev.
"The strongest criticism is directed toward the US, on whose support
everyone relied and counted only a few years ago," said Arif Yunusov
from the Institute for Peace and Democracy. "The Azerbaijanis do not
like the materialism and high-spending lifestyle of Western diplomats
and NGO workers living in Baku, who isolate themselves from the local
people, often even despise them. The policy of the West toward the
world of Islam and its insufficiently active stance in the Karabakh
conflict is also regarded with common disapproval."
In view of such an attitude toward the West and the common
disillusionment with Western values, assurances made by politicians
about the pro-Western course of the government sound barely credible.
"We'll get by," said Jaga, opening another bottle of Xirdalan beer,
"if only things don't get worse." But what if they do?
Transitions Online
Nov 23 2009
Czech Rep
Compared with Georgia and Armenia, where opposition demonstrations
and other destabilizing events happen relatively often, Azerbaijan
seems stable. The country saw the last turbulent moments in 2003,
when the authorities put down opposition protests staged after rigged
presidential elections. But the lack of visible signs of potential
destabilization in Azerbaijan is misleading.
Beliefs about Azerbaijan's internal stability are based on the common
conviction that Aliev's position is strong and that he sets the rules
and makes most important decisions independently, especially those
on foreign policy and the oil industry. That he is like his father,
Heidar, president from 1993 to 2003, a cunning and experienced player
whom officials simply feared.
But when speaking privately, Azerbaijani experts question the position
of Aliev Jr.
"Ilham is an indecisive man who fears contacts with journalists,
avoids speaking in public, and has a weakness for risk," commented a
well-known Azerbaijani political scientist speaking on condition of
anonymity. "He has proved during his first term in office that he is
a gifted and clever politician, but cannot equal his father as far
as political games are concerned."
Indeed, Ilham differs from his father in almost everything. He has a
different character, personal and political experience. Heidar was a
product of the KGB and the leader of a strong clan from Nakhichevan,
an Azeri exclave sandwiched between Iran and Armenia. By contrast,
Ilham studied at the prestigious Moscow University and has much closer
ties to Baku's intellectual elite and the community of his Baku-born
wife, Mehriban, than to the people of Nakhichevan.
Perhaps the best measure of an autocrat's power is his ability to
conduct political purges, to remove his predecessor's people and
nominate his own. Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov's purge
of the state administration following his rise to power after the death
of Saparmurat Niyazov is one example. Ilham has come close only once:
in November 2005, when he imprisoned two cabinet ministers, Farhad
Aliev and Ali Insanov. Nevertheless, most members of the old guard
kept their offices. Many commentators on the Azerbaijani political
scene claim that it is they, especially the chief of the president's
administration, Ramiz Mekhtiev, and Interior Minister Ramil Usubov,
not the president, who rule from behind the scenes.
Adding to the president's weakness is the growing dissatisfaction of
the elites with the rule of two clans: the Nakhichevan clan and one
that groups Azerbaijanis originally from Armenia (the so-called Eraz
- from the Russian phrase erevanskie azerbaidjantsy meaning Yerevan
Azerbaijanis), who have dominated the political life of Azerbaijan
and whose members hold almost all offices in the central and regional
administrations.
"The conflicts and tensions within the ruling elites, including those
between the Nakhichevanis and the Eraz, are another threat," said
Leyla Aliyeva of the Center for National and International Studies,
a pro-democracy think tank in Baku. "They are fueled by the rivalry
over the division of oil money."
The assassination of Deputy Defense Minister Rail Rzayev in February
could have been a signal that the rivalry is getting fierce, according
to many commentators. In early October General Prosecutor Zakir
Garalov said the general was probably killed by his subordinates.
Not the West, but Islam
Among the major threats to Azerbaijan's internal stability are massive
corruption, nepotism, and the dependence of the economy on energy
resources. No country struggling with such problems can be considered
securely stable.
Few seem to notice the growing discontent in Azerbaijani society. But
based on dozens of conversations I had with political analysts and
ordinary people, I would say that many Azerbaijanis have lost their
belief in a better future. Common people often stress that they no
longer believe that they will share the profits from oil and gas
sales. They do not trust the government, perceiving its members as
"parasites" who care only for their own interest.
Tofiq, who has lived in Patamdart since 1993, when his family fled
the now-Armenian-occupied Zangilan region, is typical. "How can I
trust the government, which promises to recapture Karabakh from the
Armenians every year, but has so far done nothing to fulfill these
promises? Why are they lying? All they care about are their own
pockets, not ordinary people."
Azerbaijani society has been passive for years and has represented
no threat for the regime. But signs of change are there for those
who look.
"Unrest among young people is on the rise: they discuss, set up their
organizations, opposition websites, and blogs," said Hajizade, of the
FAR Center. "Baku's walls are splattered with hundreds of belligerent
graffiti: from 'Fuck Bush' to 'Allah Akbar.' Leftist movements are
also gaining popularity."
The events that took place in Baku after a gunman killed between 13
and 30 people (the actual number remains undisclosed) at the State
Oil Academy on 30 April [2009] were another measure of the growing
dissatisfaction. After the attack people expected the government to
announce national mourning and disclose detailed information about
the results of the investigation. Meanwhile, the government tried
to cover up the incident and did not even call off the Holiday of
Flowers on 10 May, Heidar Aliev's birthday. In response, students
organized a street march that attracted more than 2,000 people and
was dispersed by the police. Possibly fearing that protests might
continue, the authorities called off all events planned to celebrate
the end of the academic year.
The growing influence of Islam, including its radical versions,
could also help destabilize the internal situation. As recently
as a few years ago everyone would stare at a woman dressed in a
hijab, whereas today there are so many that nobody seems to pay
attention. On Fridays, the Baku mosques fill up, unthinkable only
a few years ago in this strongly secular society. And the city was
the site of demonstrations in support of the Palestinians during the
recent conflict in the Gaza Strip.
"Only Islam can save Azerbaijan from the influence of the rotten West,"
said Mukhtar, a student at the State Oil Academy. "The role of Islam
in Azerbaijan's public life should be stronger, and the government
should cooperate not only with the US, but also with Muslim countries."
That disillusionment with the West is a new phenomenon in Azerbaijan,
and it is getting stronger. Many Azerbaijanis perceive the West as a
cynical player that calls for democratization but values Azerbaijani
oil more. The West is also commonly perceived as supporting Aliev's
authoritarian regime. Azerbaijani opposition politicians, advocacy
groups, and pro-Western elites criticize international organizations
and Western governments who they say are not sufficiently critical
of the government and who try not to let authoritarian practices and
human rights abuses impede relations with Baku. They often recall the
government's violent suppression of the demonstrations against the
rigged presidential election of 2003. Although the West criticized
the government at the time, opposition and civil society activists
had hoped for a "color revolution" and looked on bitterly as Western
officials continued to do business with Aliev.
"The strongest criticism is directed toward the US, on whose support
everyone relied and counted only a few years ago," said Arif Yunusov
from the Institute for Peace and Democracy. "The Azerbaijanis do not
like the materialism and high-spending lifestyle of Western diplomats
and NGO workers living in Baku, who isolate themselves from the local
people, often even despise them. The policy of the West toward the
world of Islam and its insufficiently active stance in the Karabakh
conflict is also regarded with common disapproval."
In view of such an attitude toward the West and the common
disillusionment with Western values, assurances made by politicians
about the pro-Western course of the government sound barely credible.
"We'll get by," said Jaga, opening another bottle of Xirdalan beer,
"if only things don't get worse." But what if they do?