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FOLLOWING ORDERS OR ORDERING FOLLOWERS?
Hurriyet Daily News
Nov 26 2009
Turkey
A former diplomat was telling me of the days when the power of the
Secretariat General of the National Security Council, or the MGK
was at its height. "We did not know whether to laugh or cry when we
received a message from the Secretariat General," he told me. Once,
all of Turkey's consuls general were asked to get in touch with the
municipalities of the cities where they were posted, in order to
erect a statue of Talat Pasha, the interior minister who is widely
believed to have given the order that resulted in the killings of
Armenians during World War I. This proposal was within the "plan of
action to fight against the baseless Armenian claims of genocide."
Those who prepared the proposal could not see the absurdity of a
Turkish consul general posted in a French or American city with a large
Armenian community going to the mayor and asking for the erection of a
monument to the Turkish personality most hated by the Armenians. The
problem is that the consuls could not ignore these "instructions,"
since they were asked to report back about the progress they made on
the issue.
On another occasion, the diplomats were asked to tell the Turks
living in cities abroad to form a lobby. It is only after telling
the military that a functioning lobby can not be formed within three
months that the MGK extended the deadline to one year.
The obvious tragedy is the fact that the foreign ministry will
just operate like a post office and send these instructions to its
diplomats with a simple note, saying, "Attached is the message from
the Secretariat General of the MGK."
When talking about the role of the military in politics, spotlights
usually turn on the MGK. Yet, MGK is not the most significant platform
from which the army intervenes in politics.
The Secretariat General of the MGK used to be able to require
information from almost all public institutions in Turkey and saw
itself as authorized to issue instructions. "We used to see similar
messages from the military at the desk of the education attaché in the
embassy," said the former diplomat. You can be sure that the military
representatives in civil institutions like the Higher Education Board,
or YOK were not just sitting in the meetings silently.
Unfortunately, Turkey lacks a clear and well defined concept of
"national security." The national security policy document which
is kept secret is very general. We know about it thanks to Å~^ukru
KucukÅ~_ahin, a colleague that published it in the daily Hurriyet a
few years ago. When the concept is penned vaguely, it gives way to
broad interpretations, so that everything can be treated as related to
"national security." As a result, the military has a say in almost
everything.
But as the authority of the Secretariat General of the MGK has been
curbed, since its head, traditionally from within the military, was
replaced by a civilian. The army started to lose its main organs to
execute its power over civilian institutions. The Secretariat General
has stopped sending instructions. The fact that the military is no
longer represented in civil institutions like YOK has further limited
its room to maneuver.
MGK influence is decreasing
Attending two separate, recent panels in Istanbul on civil-military
relations organized by think tanks, I got the impression that the
European Union reforms undertaken in Turkey to reduce the role of
the military in politics were not sufficiently appreciated.
Some argue that the changes made are not sufficiently reflected in
practice. Again the spotlights are trained on the MGK. The fact that
the MGK holds its meeting once every two months instead of once a
month and that the number of civilian representatives has increased
does not mean that the military no longer has a say in politics,
argue the pessimists.
But let's look to the practice then. Most of us know that if the view
of the military regarding the northern Iraqi Kurds had prevailed, then
relations with northern Iraq would not have progressed to the point
they are at now. The government executed its policy on northern Iraq,
despite the military's objection which was no doubt voiced during
MGK meetings.
In this respect, it will not be wrong to say that the military has
lost it former power under the framework of the MGK.
Obviously, I am not trying to say that the military is under civilian
control and that the army no longer plays a role in Turkish politics.
But there is significant progress and we should now also concentrate
on addressing the question of "how civilians can assume more
responsibility in the domain of national security."
As emphasized by Ali Bayramoglu, a columnist for the daily Yeni
Å~^afak, a total demilitarization is going to take a long time. This
is not just because the military is unwilling to give up its authority,
but also because civilians are lacking an alternative national-security
strategy. The most recent report of TESEV penned by Hale Akın, which
offers proposals to that effect, could make for a good starting point.
Hurriyet Daily News
Nov 26 2009
Turkey
A former diplomat was telling me of the days when the power of the
Secretariat General of the National Security Council, or the MGK
was at its height. "We did not know whether to laugh or cry when we
received a message from the Secretariat General," he told me. Once,
all of Turkey's consuls general were asked to get in touch with the
municipalities of the cities where they were posted, in order to
erect a statue of Talat Pasha, the interior minister who is widely
believed to have given the order that resulted in the killings of
Armenians during World War I. This proposal was within the "plan of
action to fight against the baseless Armenian claims of genocide."
Those who prepared the proposal could not see the absurdity of a
Turkish consul general posted in a French or American city with a large
Armenian community going to the mayor and asking for the erection of a
monument to the Turkish personality most hated by the Armenians. The
problem is that the consuls could not ignore these "instructions,"
since they were asked to report back about the progress they made on
the issue.
On another occasion, the diplomats were asked to tell the Turks
living in cities abroad to form a lobby. It is only after telling
the military that a functioning lobby can not be formed within three
months that the MGK extended the deadline to one year.
The obvious tragedy is the fact that the foreign ministry will
just operate like a post office and send these instructions to its
diplomats with a simple note, saying, "Attached is the message from
the Secretariat General of the MGK."
When talking about the role of the military in politics, spotlights
usually turn on the MGK. Yet, MGK is not the most significant platform
from which the army intervenes in politics.
The Secretariat General of the MGK used to be able to require
information from almost all public institutions in Turkey and saw
itself as authorized to issue instructions. "We used to see similar
messages from the military at the desk of the education attaché in the
embassy," said the former diplomat. You can be sure that the military
representatives in civil institutions like the Higher Education Board,
or YOK were not just sitting in the meetings silently.
Unfortunately, Turkey lacks a clear and well defined concept of
"national security." The national security policy document which
is kept secret is very general. We know about it thanks to Å~^ukru
KucukÅ~_ahin, a colleague that published it in the daily Hurriyet a
few years ago. When the concept is penned vaguely, it gives way to
broad interpretations, so that everything can be treated as related to
"national security." As a result, the military has a say in almost
everything.
But as the authority of the Secretariat General of the MGK has been
curbed, since its head, traditionally from within the military, was
replaced by a civilian. The army started to lose its main organs to
execute its power over civilian institutions. The Secretariat General
has stopped sending instructions. The fact that the military is no
longer represented in civil institutions like YOK has further limited
its room to maneuver.
MGK influence is decreasing
Attending two separate, recent panels in Istanbul on civil-military
relations organized by think tanks, I got the impression that the
European Union reforms undertaken in Turkey to reduce the role of
the military in politics were not sufficiently appreciated.
Some argue that the changes made are not sufficiently reflected in
practice. Again the spotlights are trained on the MGK. The fact that
the MGK holds its meeting once every two months instead of once a
month and that the number of civilian representatives has increased
does not mean that the military no longer has a say in politics,
argue the pessimists.
But let's look to the practice then. Most of us know that if the view
of the military regarding the northern Iraqi Kurds had prevailed, then
relations with northern Iraq would not have progressed to the point
they are at now. The government executed its policy on northern Iraq,
despite the military's objection which was no doubt voiced during
MGK meetings.
In this respect, it will not be wrong to say that the military has
lost it former power under the framework of the MGK.
Obviously, I am not trying to say that the military is under civilian
control and that the army no longer plays a role in Turkish politics.
But there is significant progress and we should now also concentrate
on addressing the question of "how civilians can assume more
responsibility in the domain of national security."
As emphasized by Ali Bayramoglu, a columnist for the daily Yeni
Å~^afak, a total demilitarization is going to take a long time. This
is not just because the military is unwilling to give up its authority,
but also because civilians are lacking an alternative national-security
strategy. The most recent report of TESEV penned by Hale Akın, which
offers proposals to that effect, could make for a good starting point.