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The Heritage Party
31 Moscovian Street
Yerevan, Armenia
Tel.: (+374 - 10) 53.69.13
Fax: (+374 - 10) 53.26.97
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
Website: www.heritage.am
15 October 2009
Heritage Yet Again Proposes a Bill on Artsakh's Recognition
Yerevan--On 14 October, the members of the Heritage Party's
parliamentary faction submitted to speaker Hovik Abrahamyan of the
Armenian National National Assembly a draft law `On the Recognition of
the Mountainous Karabagh Republic.' And pursuant to Article 1 of this
proposal, `the Republic of Armenia recognizes the Mountainous Karabagh
Republic.' If adopted, this proposed law will come into effect on the
tenth day following its official public announcement. The Heritage
Party faction's chairman Stepan Safarian expressed hope that `the
parliamentary majority would be realistic and not exclude this law
measure from discussion on the floor, as it myopically did, back in
April 2008, with Heritage Party founder Raffi K. Hovannisian's similar
legislative proposal submitted on 28 August 2007, and adopts it, by
taking into consideration the current and anticipated developments
concerning the Mountainous Karabagh Republic.' `We also will be happy
if our colleagues sign under this bill as its co-authors,' Safarian
concluded. According to the law, the parliament speaker has to
introduce this proposal for discussion in the next two days.
Heritage's central office provides the following complete text of the
Heritage MP's arguments in favor of the adoption of this draft law.
ARGUMENTATION
FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE BILL `ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE MOUNTAINOUS
KARABAGH REPUBLIC'
Based on the fact that the Mountainous Karabagh Republic (MKR) meets
the all of the preconditions under international law for a sovereign
state, Armenia, with the adoption of this bill, will de jure recognize
the de facto status of Artsakh. This law will serve as the basis for
the Republics of Armenia and Mountainous Karabagh toward normalizing
the relations established as a result of the MKR's formal recognition,
clarifying Armenia's rights and commitments for the guarantee and
consolidation of Artsakh's security, determining Armenia's national
interests and state policies, and guaranteeing Armenia's engagement in
the post-1 March restoration process.
Armenia formally recognizes the Mountainous Karabagh Republic because,
a) The Mountainous Karabagh Republic, as a subject of decolonization
from the USSR and just like the ex-Soviet republics, has achieved its
independence in correspondence with the precepts of international law
and legal norms of the USSR, and specifically on the basis of the
people's right for self-determination, and today, the MKR, as an
independent state, is an established reality;
b) Considering the prospect that the OSCE Minsk Group's ongoing talks,
with respect to the resolution of the Karabagh conflict, might
determine another status for the MKR, if all the parties to the
conflict and the involved states--and the residents of Artsakh, in the
first place--reach an agreement, Armenia therefore has not recognized
the Mountainous Karabagh Republic to this day;
c) Even though the MKR and Armenia have continually manifested their
readiness and a political will to find a mutually acceptable solution
to this conflict, as a result of the talks, however, no acceptable
solution has been found to date. At the same time, the Republic of
Azerbaijan formally declares that it rejects any solution that does
not recognize the ex-Azerbaijan SSR's territorial integrity and that
it grants Mountainous Karabagh no other status but autonomy.
Furthermore, official Baku openly and loudly makes war cries to
resolve the problem through military means and, to that end,
continuously increases its military budget, and thus violates the
quotas stipulated in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe. The resolution proposed on the basis of the announced `Madrid
Principles'--which, in November 2007, were formally presented to the
two sides, but not to the MKR, and its `renewed' version was
introduced in August 2009--conflicts with the MKR's Constitution and
Karabagh's national territorial integrity specified in this charter
and, therefore, with Karabagh's national security. Such a solution is
also a threat to Armenia's national security;
d) Although, pursuant to the first point in the USSR Supreme Council's
1 December 1989 decision 1650-11, the Supreme Council of the Armenian
SSR had recognized the `fact of the self-determination of the Nagorno
Karabagh Autonomous Oblast...,' and, in line with the aforesaid
decision's second point, it was determined that `the Armenian SSR's
Supreme Council recognizes the congress of the empowered
representatives of Nagorno Karabagh and the National Council, elected
by this congress, as the Oblast's presently functioning sole power,'
and following Karabagh's 10 December 1991 referendum on independence,
the war that Azerbaijan waged on the MKR and Armenia, and the
ceasefire agreement signed in 1994, altogether new historical,
territorial, and political realities have emerged. And cherishing vain
hopes that Azerbaijan would agree to resolve the problem and be
prepared to make mutual concessions by way of negotiations, Armenia
did not properly acknowledge these realities. The MKR's Constitution
was adopted with the referendum held in 2006, and this document
specifies Karabagh's present-day national territorial integrity;
e) In connection with the bill `On the Recognition of the Mountainous
Karabagh Republic,' which was authored by Raffi K. Hovannisian and
introduced on 28 August 2007, it should be pointed that all the
political arguments, which were made in the Armenian government's 24
September 2007 conclusion with reference to this proposal, have turned
out to be impractical and untruthful, both at the time and during the
two years that followed. Recognizing the MKR, pursuant to Armenia's
laws, does not at all contradict with our country's commitments to the
international organizations such as the UN, Council of Europe, and the
OSCE. This is because the documents of these organizations either
include statements (OSCE/CSCE) on Armenia's formal position, or their
principles directly refer to the people's self-determination and the
indigenous people's rights and the recognition, even unilaterally
(UN), of these rights. With this act, Armenia does not transfer the
matter's resolution to the international bodies, it does not assist in
Azerbaijan's similar wishes, does not jeopardize the fragile peace and
the existing status quo established in the region, and does not want
to decline from its commitment to resolve the issue through talks--to
note, according to the OSCE's documents, along with Armenia, the MKR,
too, is a party to these talks, and it does not and did not decline
from its readiness to negotiate--because such developments depend
exclusively on other factors such as a change in the international
community's stance and a disparity in this stance, a variation in the
balance of the international and the parties' national forces
(political-military and economic balance), Armenia's and the MKR's
diplomatic capabilities, etc.; and
f) In terms of the act of recognition, the international law has no
procedure that rules out other approaches to this matter. This can be
carried out de facto, which Armenia has done but is insufficient, and
de jure, whose necessity exists today. In international practice, this
can be fulfilled by the head of the state, or the executive, and by
the parliament. With this law, the MKR's recognition will clarify the
parliamentary diplomacy in connection with the Karabagh problem, the
talks process--envisioned by the head of the state, or the
executive--aimed at the resolution of the problem, especially when, as
an ultimate goal, it is in keeping with the already made statements
and the points noted in the Strategy for National Security.
At the same time, therefore, and in order to resist the Republic of
Azerbaijan's open military--and now internationally documented yet
disregarded--threat, and in the interest of raising Armenia's and the
MKR's current security level, Armenia, together with the Mountainous
Karabagh Republic, guarantees the security of the people of the MKR
and its territorial integrity, in the case of any offensive operation
against, or open threat toward, the MKR.
With the adoption of this law, however, Armenia does not exclude the
possibility of determining, by the will of the MKR people, another
status, if it is decided through the holding of a national referendum.
And should such a decision be reached by the residents of Artsakh,
Armenia will assist in its fulfillment.
This law will also enable Armenia to provide assistance--during the
post-conflict period, and in common with the MKR, other interested
countries, and donor organizations--for the elimination of the
aftermath of the war, which includes the creation of normal living and
work conditions for the peaceful inhabitants, the return of the
refugees, and the resettlement of the areas.
Founded in 2002, Heritage has regional divisions throughout the
country. Its central office is located at 31 Moscovian Street, Yerevan
0002, Armenia, with telephone contact at (374-10) 536.913, fax at
(374-10) 532.697, email at [email protected] or [email protected], and
website at www.heritage.am
The Heritage Party
31 Moscovian Street
Yerevan, Armenia
Tel.: (+374 - 10) 53.69.13
Fax: (+374 - 10) 53.26.97
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
Website: www.heritage.am
15 October 2009
Heritage Yet Again Proposes a Bill on Artsakh's Recognition
Yerevan--On 14 October, the members of the Heritage Party's
parliamentary faction submitted to speaker Hovik Abrahamyan of the
Armenian National National Assembly a draft law `On the Recognition of
the Mountainous Karabagh Republic.' And pursuant to Article 1 of this
proposal, `the Republic of Armenia recognizes the Mountainous Karabagh
Republic.' If adopted, this proposed law will come into effect on the
tenth day following its official public announcement. The Heritage
Party faction's chairman Stepan Safarian expressed hope that `the
parliamentary majority would be realistic and not exclude this law
measure from discussion on the floor, as it myopically did, back in
April 2008, with Heritage Party founder Raffi K. Hovannisian's similar
legislative proposal submitted on 28 August 2007, and adopts it, by
taking into consideration the current and anticipated developments
concerning the Mountainous Karabagh Republic.' `We also will be happy
if our colleagues sign under this bill as its co-authors,' Safarian
concluded. According to the law, the parliament speaker has to
introduce this proposal for discussion in the next two days.
Heritage's central office provides the following complete text of the
Heritage MP's arguments in favor of the adoption of this draft law.
ARGUMENTATION
FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE BILL `ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE MOUNTAINOUS
KARABAGH REPUBLIC'
Based on the fact that the Mountainous Karabagh Republic (MKR) meets
the all of the preconditions under international law for a sovereign
state, Armenia, with the adoption of this bill, will de jure recognize
the de facto status of Artsakh. This law will serve as the basis for
the Republics of Armenia and Mountainous Karabagh toward normalizing
the relations established as a result of the MKR's formal recognition,
clarifying Armenia's rights and commitments for the guarantee and
consolidation of Artsakh's security, determining Armenia's national
interests and state policies, and guaranteeing Armenia's engagement in
the post-1 March restoration process.
Armenia formally recognizes the Mountainous Karabagh Republic because,
a) The Mountainous Karabagh Republic, as a subject of decolonization
from the USSR and just like the ex-Soviet republics, has achieved its
independence in correspondence with the precepts of international law
and legal norms of the USSR, and specifically on the basis of the
people's right for self-determination, and today, the MKR, as an
independent state, is an established reality;
b) Considering the prospect that the OSCE Minsk Group's ongoing talks,
with respect to the resolution of the Karabagh conflict, might
determine another status for the MKR, if all the parties to the
conflict and the involved states--and the residents of Artsakh, in the
first place--reach an agreement, Armenia therefore has not recognized
the Mountainous Karabagh Republic to this day;
c) Even though the MKR and Armenia have continually manifested their
readiness and a political will to find a mutually acceptable solution
to this conflict, as a result of the talks, however, no acceptable
solution has been found to date. At the same time, the Republic of
Azerbaijan formally declares that it rejects any solution that does
not recognize the ex-Azerbaijan SSR's territorial integrity and that
it grants Mountainous Karabagh no other status but autonomy.
Furthermore, official Baku openly and loudly makes war cries to
resolve the problem through military means and, to that end,
continuously increases its military budget, and thus violates the
quotas stipulated in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe. The resolution proposed on the basis of the announced `Madrid
Principles'--which, in November 2007, were formally presented to the
two sides, but not to the MKR, and its `renewed' version was
introduced in August 2009--conflicts with the MKR's Constitution and
Karabagh's national territorial integrity specified in this charter
and, therefore, with Karabagh's national security. Such a solution is
also a threat to Armenia's national security;
d) Although, pursuant to the first point in the USSR Supreme Council's
1 December 1989 decision 1650-11, the Supreme Council of the Armenian
SSR had recognized the `fact of the self-determination of the Nagorno
Karabagh Autonomous Oblast...,' and, in line with the aforesaid
decision's second point, it was determined that `the Armenian SSR's
Supreme Council recognizes the congress of the empowered
representatives of Nagorno Karabagh and the National Council, elected
by this congress, as the Oblast's presently functioning sole power,'
and following Karabagh's 10 December 1991 referendum on independence,
the war that Azerbaijan waged on the MKR and Armenia, and the
ceasefire agreement signed in 1994, altogether new historical,
territorial, and political realities have emerged. And cherishing vain
hopes that Azerbaijan would agree to resolve the problem and be
prepared to make mutual concessions by way of negotiations, Armenia
did not properly acknowledge these realities. The MKR's Constitution
was adopted with the referendum held in 2006, and this document
specifies Karabagh's present-day national territorial integrity;
e) In connection with the bill `On the Recognition of the Mountainous
Karabagh Republic,' which was authored by Raffi K. Hovannisian and
introduced on 28 August 2007, it should be pointed that all the
political arguments, which were made in the Armenian government's 24
September 2007 conclusion with reference to this proposal, have turned
out to be impractical and untruthful, both at the time and during the
two years that followed. Recognizing the MKR, pursuant to Armenia's
laws, does not at all contradict with our country's commitments to the
international organizations such as the UN, Council of Europe, and the
OSCE. This is because the documents of these organizations either
include statements (OSCE/CSCE) on Armenia's formal position, or their
principles directly refer to the people's self-determination and the
indigenous people's rights and the recognition, even unilaterally
(UN), of these rights. With this act, Armenia does not transfer the
matter's resolution to the international bodies, it does not assist in
Azerbaijan's similar wishes, does not jeopardize the fragile peace and
the existing status quo established in the region, and does not want
to decline from its commitment to resolve the issue through talks--to
note, according to the OSCE's documents, along with Armenia, the MKR,
too, is a party to these talks, and it does not and did not decline
from its readiness to negotiate--because such developments depend
exclusively on other factors such as a change in the international
community's stance and a disparity in this stance, a variation in the
balance of the international and the parties' national forces
(political-military and economic balance), Armenia's and the MKR's
diplomatic capabilities, etc.; and
f) In terms of the act of recognition, the international law has no
procedure that rules out other approaches to this matter. This can be
carried out de facto, which Armenia has done but is insufficient, and
de jure, whose necessity exists today. In international practice, this
can be fulfilled by the head of the state, or the executive, and by
the parliament. With this law, the MKR's recognition will clarify the
parliamentary diplomacy in connection with the Karabagh problem, the
talks process--envisioned by the head of the state, or the
executive--aimed at the resolution of the problem, especially when, as
an ultimate goal, it is in keeping with the already made statements
and the points noted in the Strategy for National Security.
At the same time, therefore, and in order to resist the Republic of
Azerbaijan's open military--and now internationally documented yet
disregarded--threat, and in the interest of raising Armenia's and the
MKR's current security level, Armenia, together with the Mountainous
Karabagh Republic, guarantees the security of the people of the MKR
and its territorial integrity, in the case of any offensive operation
against, or open threat toward, the MKR.
With the adoption of this law, however, Armenia does not exclude the
possibility of determining, by the will of the MKR people, another
status, if it is decided through the holding of a national referendum.
And should such a decision be reached by the residents of Artsakh,
Armenia will assist in its fulfillment.
This law will also enable Armenia to provide assistance--during the
post-conflict period, and in common with the MKR, other interested
countries, and donor organizations--for the elimination of the
aftermath of the war, which includes the creation of normal living and
work conditions for the peaceful inhabitants, the return of the
refugees, and the resettlement of the areas.
Founded in 2002, Heritage has regional divisions throughout the
country. Its central office is located at 31 Moscovian Street, Yerevan
0002, Armenia, with telephone contact at (374-10) 536.913, fax at
(374-10) 532.697, email at [email protected] or [email protected], and
website at www.heritage.am