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Turkey's Soft Power Successes
Wendy Kristianasen is editorial director of Le Monde diplomatique's
English edition.
© 2010 Le Monde diplomatique - distributed by Agence Global
Turkey wants to expand its influence throughout its surrounding
region, creating a peaceful, stable environment in which its economy
can prosper. And as the country struggles internally to demilitarize
and democratize, there is broad support for the AKP government's bold
aims abroad, says Wendy Kristianasen.
Ahmet Davutoglu's vision is wide. He wants peace and security for the
wider region around Turkey and believes Ankara is well-placed as a
member of the G20 and NATO to make it happen. He is the architect of
Turkey's new policy, which relies on zero problems with neighboors,
and soft power. He was chief foreign policy adviser to the prime
minister from the start of the Justice and Development (AK) Party
government, which came to power in a landslide general election on 3
November 2002. In May 2009 he became foreign minister.
He says Turkey is well-poised to play a mediating role in various
conflicts, with strong ties with different religious and ethnic groups
where there are Turkish speakers. That means the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Russia, Cyprus, the Middle East. His vision of security for
all and peace means more than mediation; it means `high-level
political dialogue, economic interdependency and a multicultural
character.'
Davutoglu is not a politician, but an academic, and not even a member
of parliament, so free of ties to constituents. And he has not just
thought out an innovative foreign policy, he has implemented it. His
achievements: `Sixty one agreements signed with Syria; 48 with Iraq;
visa requirements lifted with eight neighbors; resolution of Lebanon's
problem with Syria [over presidential succession]; two protocols
signed with Armenia.' He has also attempted mediation between Israel
and the Palestinians. He conducted the talks between Syria and Israel
in 2007-8: `We came close, not to peace, but to agreement; but then
Israel's attack on Gaza [in December 2008] put an end to all that
work. Gaza wasn't an issue in our negotiations but it was a negative
context... When Israel has a vision of peace we will be ready to
listen: this is an issue of principle.'
This new foreign policy has won widespread popular support among a
population divided internally by unresolved questions of identity:
Secular Turks worry about Islamization and resent AKP patronage that
excludes them (especially in the state sector).
At the same time, this is a crucial moment as Turkey sends its
military back to the barracks and exposes the dark secrets of its
`deep state' -- in particular shadowy elements within the military
(which toppled four governments between 1960 and 1998) that are
accused, inter alia, of coup attempts against the AKP
government. These include a plot to assassinate the deputy prime
minister, Bulent Arinc, on 19 December 2009. The findings promise for
the first time to `touch the untouchables' within the army. This has
been happening within the framework of the ongoing Ergenekon trial. In
January a flood of media revelations provided yet greater details of
coup attempts (including a document exposing the so-called Balyoz or
Sledgehammer operation).
There's a new dynamic
As the shades are lifted from Turkey's recent history, and the country
demilitarizes, the way is now open to real democratization. Much needs
to be done, including constitutional and other reform (not least to
allow the military to be prosecuted in civilian courts). But the pace
of change is undeniable; new elites are emerging, with a growing,
vibrant middle class (even if disparity in income levels has
widened). The energy is echoed abroad. Rising above a core divide over
identity and internal direction, Turks can agree on a foreign policy
that is coherent and promises economic gain and security, and
expresses a clear sense of how Turkey sees itself in the world.
As Ihsan Bal, professor at the Police Academy, pointed out: `There's a
new dynamic, and it's driven by the people. The West is missing that
point.' It started in 2003, when the United States had wanted to use
Turkey as a front for its invasion of Iraq. `And it was the people --
the MPs and their constituents -- who said no.'
You would expect Turks to worry about the effects of the global
financial crisis, and unemployment (near to 15%; probably 30% among
the young) but they discuss Gaza instead. A year ago 5,000 waved flags
to greet their prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on his return
from the World Economic Forum in Davos. He had just stormed out of a
televised debate, on 29 January 2009, with Shimon Peres, the Israeli
president. Erdogan told Peres: `You are killing people,' and the
moderator refused to allow him to rebut Peres' justification of the
war on Gaza. Turks care about Palestine. They appreciate that
Erdogan's feelings are genuine and respond to his charisma, ordinary
origins, and the always present family of this populist prime
minister.
The Davos incident made Erdogan an instant hero among Arabs and
Muslims. The United States seemed not too unhappy about the outburst,
although it wishes that Turkey would show sympathy for Fatah, and not
just Hamas, to help unblock the frozen peace process. A number of
Turks feel that government support of Hamas (including inviting its
leader Khalid Mesha'al to Ankara) should have paid a dividend -- say
the release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, captured on 25 June
2006 and held under Hamas authority in the Gaza Strip. Davutoglu's
people reply that this misses the point.
Yet when the AKP came to power in 2002, it continued Turkey's previous
close relations with Israel, as the mediating effort with Syria
showed. The context changed with the invasion of Gaza. Later the next
year, in October 2009, Turkey excluded Israel from scheduled military
exercises and postponed them indefinitely. This January, Israel was
forced to apologize for its deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon's
treatment of the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv. Ahmet Oguz Celikkol,
summoned to hear complaints about a Turkish TV drama seen as
anti-semitic, was forced to sit on a low sofa without a handshake or
the ritual Turkish flag while Ayalon explained to local TV stations
that the humiliation was intentional.
What does this mean for future relations between the two countries?
Meliha Altunisik, professor at Ankara's Middle East Technical
University, said that after the Gaza war `any government would have
had to moderate its policy. Plus, Israel is growing more isolated
under its present government and with Obama in power: its strategic
position is declining.' Many Turks point out that Turkey is now more
important to Israel than vice versa, even economically. However, they
do not foresee more than a downscaling of relations: Neither Turks nor
Arabs want Turkey to burn its bridges.
`One of us has made it'
Altunisik said of the Arab world: `People in the region look to Turkey
to play a constructive role. The economy is key. But Erdogan is
personally popular: I even found women in Damascus who are learning
Turkish on his account.' It started in 2003 when Turkey stood up to
the US and refused to allow the country to be used as a launchpad for
the Iraq war. `There was the feeling that one of us has made it.' She
says that with Iran there is still competition. `Turkey has been
trying to steal its thunder by its open support of Gaza, engagement of
Syria with Israel, and resolving Lebanon's presidential crisis.' With
the new aim of solving problems through cooperation, the benefits are
multiple. `Just in the Middle East, there is the straight benefit of
developing relations with the Arabs; plus the extra benefit that
brings over Iran; plus the economic benefit; plus stability. This
provides a win-win possibility. It's a new language. And it's
important.'
Iran is one of the few foreign-policy topics on which Turks
disagree. Yavuz Baydar, political correspondent at the pro-government
English language daily Today's Zaman, said: `No cause for concern;
what goes on between Erdogan and Ahmadinejad is just two men of the
street with the same body language. They are cautious of each other.'
But many feel attempts to mediate on Iran's nuclear capability are
dangerous, pointless, or naïve. The disagreement reflects the
difficulty of deciphering Iranian ambitions. There is also the fear of
an explosive situation on the doorstep.
Among Arab countries, Syria has captured the Turkish imagination: In
university foreign affairs departments the staff talk of their latest
trips to Damascus. Considering the old, bad relations -- Syrian
support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), its claim to Hatay
(Alexandretta) cross-water problems -- today's social and economic
relations seem miraculous. In Iraq, economic and social relations, and
Turkish help in bringing Sunni groups to the negotiating table, have
created a stable environment that contrasts with the instability of
recent years in the Kurdish north, marked by PKK separatist activity
and Turkish incursions. Business is booming in Africa, especially
Libya and Sudan (scene of another prime ministerial gaffe); Turkey's
non-combatant role in Afghanistan (with 1,750 troops) is approved of.
It is not just the Muslim world: there's Russia, Serbia, Georgia,
Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, with two protocols signed on 10 October 2009
calling for diplomatic ties and the opening of borders.
What about the suggestion in the western press that Turkey's turn to
the east and south is a symptom of renewed Ottoman longings? The idea
doesn't register among Turks today. Temel Iskit, a former diplomat and
Turkey's first director general for EU affairs in the 1980s, says that
the idea is a `way of saying Turkey has lost interest in joining
Europe and is going Islamic. These criticisms come from countries that
don't want Turkey inside the EU and the pro-Israel US press. I think
they are neither true nor sincere.' Iskit is one of the many
disaffected who supported the CHP (Republican People's Party, the
secular center-left party that goes back to Ataturk's single party
state) but have lost confidence in the party under its current leader,
Deniz Baykal. `After a lifetime of having publicly to defend all the
old taboos on Armenia, Cyprus, the Kurds, I revised my opinions, and
decided to speak out.'
Turkey has always had a central geopolitical place, explained
Iskit. But because of its youth and struggle for independence, and
then the cold war, it was always on the defensive. `What has changed
is that Turkey has begun to democratize. That happened with agreement
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, engaged before the AKP came to
power, and the army's agreement to stop meddling in politics. This
democratization has led to a new spirit of co-operation and
compromise.'
Kadri Gursel, a columnist on the secularist daily Milliyet, thinks
that Turkey's present foreign policy stance would have come about
under any government. `Our foreign policy assets multiplied with the
economic boom in 2002-3, the process of EU accession, and the end of a
major security concern with the capture of [the PKK leader Abdullah]
Ocalan.'
Turkey is seeing a natural adjustment to new realities of the
post-cold war and globalization, which have created a new
dynamic. `But a secular party could not have profited so well: The AKP
feels at home in the Middle East, especially with the Sunnis.' Many in
and around the government speak Arabic. But that does not mean an
`eastern axis.'
Insurance policy
Gursel thinks it's about the economy. `Turkey is condemned to economic
growth based on export because there's no domestic saving structure.'
So it has to find new markets, and that means the Middle
East. `Overall, this has worked,' he says. `The government has run the
economy properly and they're business minded, even if they behave in a
rather tribal way and keep the benefits for themselves. Indirectly it
helps their Anatolian base to form a new middle class and this is an
insurance policy towards a stable democracy.'
Soli Ozel, professor of international relations at Istanbul's Bilgi
University, said: `The eastern axis fuss is about the West's inability
to digest a Turkey that is calling its own shots.' He pointed out that
the AKP has very good relations with the United States. `Turkey wants
stability, a zone of prosperity, security aimed at peace. In contrast
to Israel and Iran.' He, too, talked of the continuity in foreign
policy: `The AKP have conceptualized this better than others.' He
thinks the question of Turkey's `Westness' is less about its strategic
orientation than about whether it will become a real western
country. `If the EU takes itself out of the equation through its
inadequate understanding of what Turkey does, even though this is in
the West's interest, then most of our foreign relations will be
conducted through the US.' In that case, Ozel wonders, will Washington
push the EU harder to move ahead on Turkey's membership? `That would
mean that it rightly sees Turkey as a member of the western alliance
with particular strengths in the Middle East, rather than a Middle
East country allied to the West.'
Turks hope that Barack Obama will be better able to do this than
George W. Bush. On Obama himself, Yasemin Congar, managing editor of
the Istanbul daily Taraf says: `There is a lot to be said for his
bi-racial, multi-cultural background and knowledge of the Muslim
world. His middle name is Hussein and Turks keep that in mind.' The
Obama message of a new dialogue with the Muslim world and respect for
human rights is in tune with Turkey's efforts to democratize and to
find an equitable solution to its Kurdish problem. But his failure to
pressure Israel over the Palestinians, and particularly settlement
activity, and his decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, have
disappointed people. At the same time, they note that Turkey's own
outspoken stance on Israel has gone without criticism, and may not be
unwelcome given Obama's poor relations with the current Israeli
government. However, if Obama is to dispel the anti-Americanism of
recent years, he will need to secure real progress on the
Palestinians.
There is deep bitterness about Europe that underlies all talk on
foreign policy. And the opposition's complaint that the government has
failed to pursue EU membership with sufficient enthusiasm has grown
unconvincing since President Sarkozy's rejection of Turkey. Rather,
Turks believe that the country's enhanced standing in the region means
that it will be able to deliver more to the EU party. And if Turkey is
not invited in? Its role in the world will in any case have been
boosted.
Zafar Yavan, secretary-general of Tusiad (Turkish Industrialists' and
Businessmen's Association), the association for big business,
traditionally in the hands of the old secular Istanbul families,
complains that the government has not moved fast enough on the EU,
especially on public procurement and other economic chapters, creating
doubts about its enthusiasm. But he admits that maybe the slowing down
of the pace of convergence is to do with Sarkozy, not Turkey. `The
direction is right, as long as they stay on track. Turkey will make
progress with or without this government. But the AKP's democratic
attempts will remain: it's a one-way process. And the pace of the AKP
and its perseverance is not to be compared with that of any previous
government.'
Ayse Celikel, a former CHP minister of justice, has every reason to
oppose the government; she heads an association (Cagdas Yasam Dernegi)
that offers secular education to girls, now under pressure from the
government, with 14 employees detained without charges being made
known. She calls herself `a Kemalist, but an open-minded one.' On
foreign policy she recognizes that, `with EU adhesion on the back
burner, the government is engaged in a balancing act with openings to
the east and south. And as long as it doesn't go any further away from
Europe, or closer to Iran, okay.'
Armagan Kuloglu, a retired general and adviser at a new Ankara
think-tank ORSAM (Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies), is a
self-proclaimed `Ataturkcu' (Ataturk devotee), `though not a Kemalist,
which means defending the Turkish nation as an ethnic base.' He
defends the old taboos, and condemns the government initiatives on
Cyprus, the Kurds and Armenia. Yet he too agrees that there has been
no change of axis: `The government just wants good relations with
neighboring countries, and this is the first opportunity for this.'
(He doesn't criticize the government's EU policy either, since he
would be happy not to enter.)
Some Turks worry that the AKP government is juggling too much and may
drop something. And is it in danger of overstating Turkey's soft power
potential? Meliha Altunisik says the question is premature and misses
the point. `How foreign policy is conducted is as important as the end
results. We used to be peripheral to all our neighbors. Now you can't
discuss many regions without talking about Turkey.'
Wendy Kristianasen is editorial director of Le Monde diplomatique's
English edition.
© 2010 Le Monde diplomatique - distributed by Agence Global
Wendy Kristianasen is editorial director of Le Monde diplomatique's
English edition.
© 2010 Le Monde diplomatique - distributed by Agence Global
Turkey wants to expand its influence throughout its surrounding
region, creating a peaceful, stable environment in which its economy
can prosper. And as the country struggles internally to demilitarize
and democratize, there is broad support for the AKP government's bold
aims abroad, says Wendy Kristianasen.
Ahmet Davutoglu's vision is wide. He wants peace and security for the
wider region around Turkey and believes Ankara is well-placed as a
member of the G20 and NATO to make it happen. He is the architect of
Turkey's new policy, which relies on zero problems with neighboors,
and soft power. He was chief foreign policy adviser to the prime
minister from the start of the Justice and Development (AK) Party
government, which came to power in a landslide general election on 3
November 2002. In May 2009 he became foreign minister.
He says Turkey is well-poised to play a mediating role in various
conflicts, with strong ties with different religious and ethnic groups
where there are Turkish speakers. That means the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Russia, Cyprus, the Middle East. His vision of security for
all and peace means more than mediation; it means `high-level
political dialogue, economic interdependency and a multicultural
character.'
Davutoglu is not a politician, but an academic, and not even a member
of parliament, so free of ties to constituents. And he has not just
thought out an innovative foreign policy, he has implemented it. His
achievements: `Sixty one agreements signed with Syria; 48 with Iraq;
visa requirements lifted with eight neighbors; resolution of Lebanon's
problem with Syria [over presidential succession]; two protocols
signed with Armenia.' He has also attempted mediation between Israel
and the Palestinians. He conducted the talks between Syria and Israel
in 2007-8: `We came close, not to peace, but to agreement; but then
Israel's attack on Gaza [in December 2008] put an end to all that
work. Gaza wasn't an issue in our negotiations but it was a negative
context... When Israel has a vision of peace we will be ready to
listen: this is an issue of principle.'
This new foreign policy has won widespread popular support among a
population divided internally by unresolved questions of identity:
Secular Turks worry about Islamization and resent AKP patronage that
excludes them (especially in the state sector).
At the same time, this is a crucial moment as Turkey sends its
military back to the barracks and exposes the dark secrets of its
`deep state' -- in particular shadowy elements within the military
(which toppled four governments between 1960 and 1998) that are
accused, inter alia, of coup attempts against the AKP
government. These include a plot to assassinate the deputy prime
minister, Bulent Arinc, on 19 December 2009. The findings promise for
the first time to `touch the untouchables' within the army. This has
been happening within the framework of the ongoing Ergenekon trial. In
January a flood of media revelations provided yet greater details of
coup attempts (including a document exposing the so-called Balyoz or
Sledgehammer operation).
There's a new dynamic
As the shades are lifted from Turkey's recent history, and the country
demilitarizes, the way is now open to real democratization. Much needs
to be done, including constitutional and other reform (not least to
allow the military to be prosecuted in civilian courts). But the pace
of change is undeniable; new elites are emerging, with a growing,
vibrant middle class (even if disparity in income levels has
widened). The energy is echoed abroad. Rising above a core divide over
identity and internal direction, Turks can agree on a foreign policy
that is coherent and promises economic gain and security, and
expresses a clear sense of how Turkey sees itself in the world.
As Ihsan Bal, professor at the Police Academy, pointed out: `There's a
new dynamic, and it's driven by the people. The West is missing that
point.' It started in 2003, when the United States had wanted to use
Turkey as a front for its invasion of Iraq. `And it was the people --
the MPs and their constituents -- who said no.'
You would expect Turks to worry about the effects of the global
financial crisis, and unemployment (near to 15%; probably 30% among
the young) but they discuss Gaza instead. A year ago 5,000 waved flags
to greet their prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on his return
from the World Economic Forum in Davos. He had just stormed out of a
televised debate, on 29 January 2009, with Shimon Peres, the Israeli
president. Erdogan told Peres: `You are killing people,' and the
moderator refused to allow him to rebut Peres' justification of the
war on Gaza. Turks care about Palestine. They appreciate that
Erdogan's feelings are genuine and respond to his charisma, ordinary
origins, and the always present family of this populist prime
minister.
The Davos incident made Erdogan an instant hero among Arabs and
Muslims. The United States seemed not too unhappy about the outburst,
although it wishes that Turkey would show sympathy for Fatah, and not
just Hamas, to help unblock the frozen peace process. A number of
Turks feel that government support of Hamas (including inviting its
leader Khalid Mesha'al to Ankara) should have paid a dividend -- say
the release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, captured on 25 June
2006 and held under Hamas authority in the Gaza Strip. Davutoglu's
people reply that this misses the point.
Yet when the AKP came to power in 2002, it continued Turkey's previous
close relations with Israel, as the mediating effort with Syria
showed. The context changed with the invasion of Gaza. Later the next
year, in October 2009, Turkey excluded Israel from scheduled military
exercises and postponed them indefinitely. This January, Israel was
forced to apologize for its deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon's
treatment of the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv. Ahmet Oguz Celikkol,
summoned to hear complaints about a Turkish TV drama seen as
anti-semitic, was forced to sit on a low sofa without a handshake or
the ritual Turkish flag while Ayalon explained to local TV stations
that the humiliation was intentional.
What does this mean for future relations between the two countries?
Meliha Altunisik, professor at Ankara's Middle East Technical
University, said that after the Gaza war `any government would have
had to moderate its policy. Plus, Israel is growing more isolated
under its present government and with Obama in power: its strategic
position is declining.' Many Turks point out that Turkey is now more
important to Israel than vice versa, even economically. However, they
do not foresee more than a downscaling of relations: Neither Turks nor
Arabs want Turkey to burn its bridges.
`One of us has made it'
Altunisik said of the Arab world: `People in the region look to Turkey
to play a constructive role. The economy is key. But Erdogan is
personally popular: I even found women in Damascus who are learning
Turkish on his account.' It started in 2003 when Turkey stood up to
the US and refused to allow the country to be used as a launchpad for
the Iraq war. `There was the feeling that one of us has made it.' She
says that with Iran there is still competition. `Turkey has been
trying to steal its thunder by its open support of Gaza, engagement of
Syria with Israel, and resolving Lebanon's presidential crisis.' With
the new aim of solving problems through cooperation, the benefits are
multiple. `Just in the Middle East, there is the straight benefit of
developing relations with the Arabs; plus the extra benefit that
brings over Iran; plus the economic benefit; plus stability. This
provides a win-win possibility. It's a new language. And it's
important.'
Iran is one of the few foreign-policy topics on which Turks
disagree. Yavuz Baydar, political correspondent at the pro-government
English language daily Today's Zaman, said: `No cause for concern;
what goes on between Erdogan and Ahmadinejad is just two men of the
street with the same body language. They are cautious of each other.'
But many feel attempts to mediate on Iran's nuclear capability are
dangerous, pointless, or naïve. The disagreement reflects the
difficulty of deciphering Iranian ambitions. There is also the fear of
an explosive situation on the doorstep.
Among Arab countries, Syria has captured the Turkish imagination: In
university foreign affairs departments the staff talk of their latest
trips to Damascus. Considering the old, bad relations -- Syrian
support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), its claim to Hatay
(Alexandretta) cross-water problems -- today's social and economic
relations seem miraculous. In Iraq, economic and social relations, and
Turkish help in bringing Sunni groups to the negotiating table, have
created a stable environment that contrasts with the instability of
recent years in the Kurdish north, marked by PKK separatist activity
and Turkish incursions. Business is booming in Africa, especially
Libya and Sudan (scene of another prime ministerial gaffe); Turkey's
non-combatant role in Afghanistan (with 1,750 troops) is approved of.
It is not just the Muslim world: there's Russia, Serbia, Georgia,
Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, with two protocols signed on 10 October 2009
calling for diplomatic ties and the opening of borders.
What about the suggestion in the western press that Turkey's turn to
the east and south is a symptom of renewed Ottoman longings? The idea
doesn't register among Turks today. Temel Iskit, a former diplomat and
Turkey's first director general for EU affairs in the 1980s, says that
the idea is a `way of saying Turkey has lost interest in joining
Europe and is going Islamic. These criticisms come from countries that
don't want Turkey inside the EU and the pro-Israel US press. I think
they are neither true nor sincere.' Iskit is one of the many
disaffected who supported the CHP (Republican People's Party, the
secular center-left party that goes back to Ataturk's single party
state) but have lost confidence in the party under its current leader,
Deniz Baykal. `After a lifetime of having publicly to defend all the
old taboos on Armenia, Cyprus, the Kurds, I revised my opinions, and
decided to speak out.'
Turkey has always had a central geopolitical place, explained
Iskit. But because of its youth and struggle for independence, and
then the cold war, it was always on the defensive. `What has changed
is that Turkey has begun to democratize. That happened with agreement
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, engaged before the AKP came to
power, and the army's agreement to stop meddling in politics. This
democratization has led to a new spirit of co-operation and
compromise.'
Kadri Gursel, a columnist on the secularist daily Milliyet, thinks
that Turkey's present foreign policy stance would have come about
under any government. `Our foreign policy assets multiplied with the
economic boom in 2002-3, the process of EU accession, and the end of a
major security concern with the capture of [the PKK leader Abdullah]
Ocalan.'
Turkey is seeing a natural adjustment to new realities of the
post-cold war and globalization, which have created a new
dynamic. `But a secular party could not have profited so well: The AKP
feels at home in the Middle East, especially with the Sunnis.' Many in
and around the government speak Arabic. But that does not mean an
`eastern axis.'
Insurance policy
Gursel thinks it's about the economy. `Turkey is condemned to economic
growth based on export because there's no domestic saving structure.'
So it has to find new markets, and that means the Middle
East. `Overall, this has worked,' he says. `The government has run the
economy properly and they're business minded, even if they behave in a
rather tribal way and keep the benefits for themselves. Indirectly it
helps their Anatolian base to form a new middle class and this is an
insurance policy towards a stable democracy.'
Soli Ozel, professor of international relations at Istanbul's Bilgi
University, said: `The eastern axis fuss is about the West's inability
to digest a Turkey that is calling its own shots.' He pointed out that
the AKP has very good relations with the United States. `Turkey wants
stability, a zone of prosperity, security aimed at peace. In contrast
to Israel and Iran.' He, too, talked of the continuity in foreign
policy: `The AKP have conceptualized this better than others.' He
thinks the question of Turkey's `Westness' is less about its strategic
orientation than about whether it will become a real western
country. `If the EU takes itself out of the equation through its
inadequate understanding of what Turkey does, even though this is in
the West's interest, then most of our foreign relations will be
conducted through the US.' In that case, Ozel wonders, will Washington
push the EU harder to move ahead on Turkey's membership? `That would
mean that it rightly sees Turkey as a member of the western alliance
with particular strengths in the Middle East, rather than a Middle
East country allied to the West.'
Turks hope that Barack Obama will be better able to do this than
George W. Bush. On Obama himself, Yasemin Congar, managing editor of
the Istanbul daily Taraf says: `There is a lot to be said for his
bi-racial, multi-cultural background and knowledge of the Muslim
world. His middle name is Hussein and Turks keep that in mind.' The
Obama message of a new dialogue with the Muslim world and respect for
human rights is in tune with Turkey's efforts to democratize and to
find an equitable solution to its Kurdish problem. But his failure to
pressure Israel over the Palestinians, and particularly settlement
activity, and his decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, have
disappointed people. At the same time, they note that Turkey's own
outspoken stance on Israel has gone without criticism, and may not be
unwelcome given Obama's poor relations with the current Israeli
government. However, if Obama is to dispel the anti-Americanism of
recent years, he will need to secure real progress on the
Palestinians.
There is deep bitterness about Europe that underlies all talk on
foreign policy. And the opposition's complaint that the government has
failed to pursue EU membership with sufficient enthusiasm has grown
unconvincing since President Sarkozy's rejection of Turkey. Rather,
Turks believe that the country's enhanced standing in the region means
that it will be able to deliver more to the EU party. And if Turkey is
not invited in? Its role in the world will in any case have been
boosted.
Zafar Yavan, secretary-general of Tusiad (Turkish Industrialists' and
Businessmen's Association), the association for big business,
traditionally in the hands of the old secular Istanbul families,
complains that the government has not moved fast enough on the EU,
especially on public procurement and other economic chapters, creating
doubts about its enthusiasm. But he admits that maybe the slowing down
of the pace of convergence is to do with Sarkozy, not Turkey. `The
direction is right, as long as they stay on track. Turkey will make
progress with or without this government. But the AKP's democratic
attempts will remain: it's a one-way process. And the pace of the AKP
and its perseverance is not to be compared with that of any previous
government.'
Ayse Celikel, a former CHP minister of justice, has every reason to
oppose the government; she heads an association (Cagdas Yasam Dernegi)
that offers secular education to girls, now under pressure from the
government, with 14 employees detained without charges being made
known. She calls herself `a Kemalist, but an open-minded one.' On
foreign policy she recognizes that, `with EU adhesion on the back
burner, the government is engaged in a balancing act with openings to
the east and south. And as long as it doesn't go any further away from
Europe, or closer to Iran, okay.'
Armagan Kuloglu, a retired general and adviser at a new Ankara
think-tank ORSAM (Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies), is a
self-proclaimed `Ataturkcu' (Ataturk devotee), `though not a Kemalist,
which means defending the Turkish nation as an ethnic base.' He
defends the old taboos, and condemns the government initiatives on
Cyprus, the Kurds and Armenia. Yet he too agrees that there has been
no change of axis: `The government just wants good relations with
neighboring countries, and this is the first opportunity for this.'
(He doesn't criticize the government's EU policy either, since he
would be happy not to enter.)
Some Turks worry that the AKP government is juggling too much and may
drop something. And is it in danger of overstating Turkey's soft power
potential? Meliha Altunisik says the question is premature and misses
the point. `How foreign policy is conducted is as important as the end
results. We used to be peripheral to all our neighbors. Now you can't
discuss many regions without talking about Turkey.'
Wendy Kristianasen is editorial director of Le Monde diplomatique's
English edition.
© 2010 Le Monde diplomatique - distributed by Agence Global