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CRITICISM AGAINST ISRAEL IS ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF STRATEGY ON TURNING TURKEY INTO A REGIONAL SUPERPOWER
ArmInfo
2010-02-22 17:50:00
Interview of Director of Russian Centre for Post-Soviet Territory
Research, Editor-in-Chief of "Herald of the Caucasus" portal, Deputy
Dean of the History Faculty of the Moscow State University, Aleksey
Vlasov, with ArmInfo news agency
Mr.Vlasov, at present a number of political experts consider possible
military operation of the United States or Israel against Iranian
nuclear objects as a probable scenario. What role does Israel play
in this process?
If one supposes that the USA has finally decided to hold a military
operation against the Iranian nuclear objects, Israel will most likely
play a part of the key ally of Washington, and possibly the function
of an equal partner in implementation of the key task as well, i.e.
destroying the nuclear potential of Iran, removing the direct
and obvious threat against existence of Israel as a state. There
is fundamentally nothing new in this state of affairs. Over the
second half of XX century the Washington-Tel-Aviv axis was a factor
restraining the ambitions of the Arab countries and neutralizing their
military potential, even by force. The fact that over the past few
years the relations between Israel and the USA have grown cool by no
means concerns the problem of possessing nuclear weapon by Iran. In
this respect, Israel and the United States possibly have no other
way out but supporting each other with all their might, including
coordination of actions at the level of diplomacy, and probably
participation in the military operation, which is still virtual.
Turkish President Gul told Israeli President Peres in Ankara that he
would not go to Israel until the siege of Gaza was stopped. Against
this background Israel stopped the joint exercises of Air Forces with
the USA. Can one speak of the final rupture of relations between Tel
Aviv and Ankara under these conditions?
I think it is early to speak of the final rupture of relations between
Tel Aviv and Ankara, however, one can state that the relations have
approached a dangerous line. The rather harsh statements of President
Gul constantly receive a harsh response from the high-ranking officials
of Israel. I think it is needless to recall the widely-known incident
with the Turkish ambassador to Israel. This is like an indicator of
limiting subjectivism and even comicality of the methods used by both
parties to wound each other. Probably, this is the danger of excessive
use of the accusative rhetoric which is believed in if used too often.
Nevertheless, I think that the current aggravation of bilateral
relations will most likely fail to lead to the final rupture between
Ankara and Tel Aviv, and the Turkish foreign minister himself spoke
about that several days ago. By the way, a year ago similar variants
were discussed in international mass media when the Israeli defence
army was holding operations in the Gaza Sector at the territory of
the Palestinian autonomy. Now, a year later, we see that everything
resumes its normal course. But this recurrence may have another
important regularity - when the conflict runs to the boiling point,
both parties find a reasonable compromise. Though it is certainly
clear that the compromise is situational, and the fundamental reason
leading to such kind of mutual aggression is the difference between
Israeli and Turkish approaches to the regional policy problems. No
steps have been taken yet to make these positions closer anyhow.
Cem Oguz, a member of the Turkish Security Council, has recently said
that Turkey turned its back on Israel, and no matter who is in power
they would have to respond to the Israeli policy adequately. Do you
agree with this, and if yes, then why?
I have read Oguz's statements attentively and, actually, I agree with
them. Ankara will continue its confrontational rhetoric against Israel
in any domestic political state of affairs. As I have already pointed
out, the reason is that for Ankara the current conflict with Israel
is an additional resource from the viewpoint of acquisition of more
reliable allies at the regional level. This meets the new foreign
policy strategy of Turkey as a state offering its partners in the
Islamic and Christian world its own view of geopolitical realities.
Actually, this meets the interests of both the ruling party and the
opposition. Therefore the criticism against Israeli actions is used
for acquisition of bigger authority by Ankara, first and foremost, in
the Arab world. Probably, this is one of the aspects of the strategy
on turning Turkey into a regional superpower. Moreover, it is already
difficult for the USA to play its former role of significant force in
the Near East, and it is quite possible that Ankara wants to receive
part of this "inheritance". In this respect, it will be curious to
observe the change in Washington's stance to the conflict between
Israel and Turkey. This will be like a test for the new administration
from the viewpoint of a way out of extremely knotty and controversial
scenarios which hardly have a possible positive end.
Over his visit to Baku Foreign Minister of Israel Avigdor Liberman
said that the Karabakh conflict is a very sensitive problem which
should not be discussed in the society and mass media. Moreover,
he thinks the activity of international organizations for Karabakh
conflict settlement is not satisfactory. What can Yerevan and Baku
expect from Tel Aviv in this context?
At present Israel is really conducting an active intermediary
activity at the post-Soviet territory on settlement of the local
conflicts, and first of all, the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. But I
think it is just a regular intermediary, but not the force which may
significantly change the situation around Nagornyy Karabakh. Actually,
I have got an impression that in 2010 all the influential regional
and international players have decided to deal with Nagornyy Karabakh
conflict settlement. By the way, not only Israel is concerned about
the destiny of Karabakh, but Kazakhstan too as the OSCE co-chair
state. But at present no special result is noticed from the sum of the
efforts. But taking into account development of the Azerbaijani-Israeli
relations, one can say that the position of Israel is more or less
well-willed towards Baku. At the same time, I would not sex up the
role of Tel Aviv from the point of view of serious changes around
the conflict.
Interviewed by David Stepanyan, 19 February 2010, ArmInfo
ArmInfo
2010-02-22 17:50:00
Interview of Director of Russian Centre for Post-Soviet Territory
Research, Editor-in-Chief of "Herald of the Caucasus" portal, Deputy
Dean of the History Faculty of the Moscow State University, Aleksey
Vlasov, with ArmInfo news agency
Mr.Vlasov, at present a number of political experts consider possible
military operation of the United States or Israel against Iranian
nuclear objects as a probable scenario. What role does Israel play
in this process?
If one supposes that the USA has finally decided to hold a military
operation against the Iranian nuclear objects, Israel will most likely
play a part of the key ally of Washington, and possibly the function
of an equal partner in implementation of the key task as well, i.e.
destroying the nuclear potential of Iran, removing the direct
and obvious threat against existence of Israel as a state. There
is fundamentally nothing new in this state of affairs. Over the
second half of XX century the Washington-Tel-Aviv axis was a factor
restraining the ambitions of the Arab countries and neutralizing their
military potential, even by force. The fact that over the past few
years the relations between Israel and the USA have grown cool by no
means concerns the problem of possessing nuclear weapon by Iran. In
this respect, Israel and the United States possibly have no other
way out but supporting each other with all their might, including
coordination of actions at the level of diplomacy, and probably
participation in the military operation, which is still virtual.
Turkish President Gul told Israeli President Peres in Ankara that he
would not go to Israel until the siege of Gaza was stopped. Against
this background Israel stopped the joint exercises of Air Forces with
the USA. Can one speak of the final rupture of relations between Tel
Aviv and Ankara under these conditions?
I think it is early to speak of the final rupture of relations between
Tel Aviv and Ankara, however, one can state that the relations have
approached a dangerous line. The rather harsh statements of President
Gul constantly receive a harsh response from the high-ranking officials
of Israel. I think it is needless to recall the widely-known incident
with the Turkish ambassador to Israel. This is like an indicator of
limiting subjectivism and even comicality of the methods used by both
parties to wound each other. Probably, this is the danger of excessive
use of the accusative rhetoric which is believed in if used too often.
Nevertheless, I think that the current aggravation of bilateral
relations will most likely fail to lead to the final rupture between
Ankara and Tel Aviv, and the Turkish foreign minister himself spoke
about that several days ago. By the way, a year ago similar variants
were discussed in international mass media when the Israeli defence
army was holding operations in the Gaza Sector at the territory of
the Palestinian autonomy. Now, a year later, we see that everything
resumes its normal course. But this recurrence may have another
important regularity - when the conflict runs to the boiling point,
both parties find a reasonable compromise. Though it is certainly
clear that the compromise is situational, and the fundamental reason
leading to such kind of mutual aggression is the difference between
Israeli and Turkish approaches to the regional policy problems. No
steps have been taken yet to make these positions closer anyhow.
Cem Oguz, a member of the Turkish Security Council, has recently said
that Turkey turned its back on Israel, and no matter who is in power
they would have to respond to the Israeli policy adequately. Do you
agree with this, and if yes, then why?
I have read Oguz's statements attentively and, actually, I agree with
them. Ankara will continue its confrontational rhetoric against Israel
in any domestic political state of affairs. As I have already pointed
out, the reason is that for Ankara the current conflict with Israel
is an additional resource from the viewpoint of acquisition of more
reliable allies at the regional level. This meets the new foreign
policy strategy of Turkey as a state offering its partners in the
Islamic and Christian world its own view of geopolitical realities.
Actually, this meets the interests of both the ruling party and the
opposition. Therefore the criticism against Israeli actions is used
for acquisition of bigger authority by Ankara, first and foremost, in
the Arab world. Probably, this is one of the aspects of the strategy
on turning Turkey into a regional superpower. Moreover, it is already
difficult for the USA to play its former role of significant force in
the Near East, and it is quite possible that Ankara wants to receive
part of this "inheritance". In this respect, it will be curious to
observe the change in Washington's stance to the conflict between
Israel and Turkey. This will be like a test for the new administration
from the viewpoint of a way out of extremely knotty and controversial
scenarios which hardly have a possible positive end.
Over his visit to Baku Foreign Minister of Israel Avigdor Liberman
said that the Karabakh conflict is a very sensitive problem which
should not be discussed in the society and mass media. Moreover,
he thinks the activity of international organizations for Karabakh
conflict settlement is not satisfactory. What can Yerevan and Baku
expect from Tel Aviv in this context?
At present Israel is really conducting an active intermediary
activity at the post-Soviet territory on settlement of the local
conflicts, and first of all, the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. But I
think it is just a regular intermediary, but not the force which may
significantly change the situation around Nagornyy Karabakh. Actually,
I have got an impression that in 2010 all the influential regional
and international players have decided to deal with Nagornyy Karabakh
conflict settlement. By the way, not only Israel is concerned about
the destiny of Karabakh, but Kazakhstan too as the OSCE co-chair
state. But at present no special result is noticed from the sum of the
efforts. But taking into account development of the Azerbaijani-Israeli
relations, one can say that the position of Israel is more or less
well-willed towards Baku. At the same time, I would not sex up the
role of Tel Aviv from the point of view of serious changes around
the conflict.
Interviewed by David Stepanyan, 19 February 2010, ArmInfo