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Yerevan Report, Armenia
Dec 29 2009
Explaining Azerbaijan's War Rhetoric and Consequences of Appeasement
Dec 29th, 2009
BY GRIGOR HAKOBYAN
Background
As 2009 comes to a close, Azerbaijani war rhetoric does not seem to
abate. Mr. Aliyev uses every public opportunity to threaten Armenia
and the Armenians of Artsakh with resumption of full scale hostilities
in the region.
To substantiate his claims the Azerbaijani president continues to
pressure his parliament into vast increases of budget allocations to
the Azerbaijani war machine and encourages widespread acquisitions of
offensive weapons, military equipment and munitions from every country
in the world willing to sell their weapons to them.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan continues to hold numerically the largest army
in the region despite the fact that active confrontations with the
Armenian side over Artsakh have predominately ended nearly 16 years
ago.
Despite the fact that billions of dollars in revenues are flowing into
state coffers from international operation of oil and gas fields the
vast numbers of Azerbaijani people are barely making their ends meet
and live in continuous poverty and neglect.
Considering that war can only bring destructions, death and suffering
to vast majority of its people, the Azerbaijani leadership doesn't shy
away from making public declarations about their intent to start one
in the region.
So the question arises whether the Azerbaijani government could be
really trusted in securing a lasting peace with Armenia and what could
explain their eagerness to resume hostilities in Artsakh.
Analysis
The Azerbaijani war rhetoric can be explained by a number of factors
that will eventually contribute to its decline and the coming collapse
of the ruling regime in Baku.
There is a high likelihood that the collapse of the regime in Baku
will be accompanied by a civil war within the country that will put
against each other the majority of Azerbaijani people who are
disenchanted and repulsed by the corruption in the country. They feel
the same about the oppressive monarchial rule of a tyrannical dynasty
for the last 16 years and the small minority of people who have been
benefiting from the inglorious corruption reigning the county and the
oppressive regime that fuels it.
First of all, the continued decline of Azerbaijani's economy that
began in 2008 as a result of a lower demand for its oil and gas didn't
yet finish its free fall. Careful analysis of Azerbaijani's economic
indicators will reveal a shrinking GDP and slowing economic growth.
Specifically, in 2006 Azerbaijan's GDP stood at 26.4 percent, in 2007
it rose to 34.5 percent and in 2008 it declined to 23.4 percent. While
in 2009, it stood at 10.8 percent. With very little indication for the
final end of economic recession throughout the world and the much
anticipated economic rebound, Azerbaijan's oil sector will not be able
to produce any more revenues than what it has generated before.
Azerbaijan's economic growth is set to decline even further by
bottoming out in 2012, when the production of oil in the country will
peak and become no longer attractive to foreign investments and
further development.
With no serious projections of a growing demand for its oil in 2010
and the failure of the Azerbaijani government to diversify its
economy, the gap between those who have and those who have not in
Azerbaijan will continue to accelerate causing mass outrage and
discontent among the populace. As such public protests on the streets
of Baku and throughout the Azerbaijan are more than likely to increase
in their frequency and intensity.
Second of all, the massive corruption in the country is eroding the
public trust into its public institutions of power. According to a
2009 Transparency International report, 46 percent of respondents in
Azerbaijan have reported to having bribed various authorities as part
of their daily affairs. In comparison only 43 percent did so in
Armenia, 2 percent in Georgia and 31 percent in Russia. Furthermore,
only 14 percent of Azerbaijani respondents have assessed the actions
of their government in fighting corruption as effective in comparison
to 38 percent in Armenia, 57 percent in Georgia and 22 percent in
Russia.
Such growing public distrust of their authorities opens room for
emergence of a parallel regime in the likeness of the Taliban that is
slowly shimmering in the south of Azerbaijan. In the coming years a
number of religious leaders advocating their own form of pure Islam
and social justice will emerge that countries like Iran or Saudi
Arabia will be very eager to influence and bring to power. In order to
consolidate his base among the common populace and save their
allegiance from shifting over to another center of traditional
authority, the Islam, Mr. Aliyev's leadership is tirelessly portraying
Armenia as the outside threat to the Azerbaijani state and its people.
Conclusion
The eagerness of Azerbaijan's leadership to resolve this issue by
means of military force does nothing else but to undermine the
stability in the region and further show the unconstructive approach
taken by the Azerbaijani authorities toward international efforts to
resolve this conflict through peaceful means.
Furthermore, the recent remarks by various Azerbaijani government
officials in the media about reclaiming the province of Zangezur from
Armenia proper indicates that they have chosen the route of escalation
that, if implemented, will not only harm the countries which are
directly involved in this conflict, but also jeopardize the
international security and internal stability of all the neighboring
states as well.
It is more than apparent that any efforts to resolve this conflict by
forcing Artsakh to remain as part of Azerbaijan or pressure Armenia to
make unilateral concessions on this matter are more than futile ' they
are ill conceived, unrealistic and extremely dangerous. Such
irresponsible actions will put in jeopardy not only the security of
every person in the region but also undermine the greater security
architecture of the Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia.
Azerbaijan must be made to understand that retaking Artsakh by force
is not an option. Moreover, contemplating to put their hands on any
portion of Armenia proper will spell the end of the Azerbaijani state
as it stands right now.
Grigor Hakobyan is a special contributor to Yerevan Report. He is an
independent political analyst residing in Los Angeles and the founder
of Caucasus Watch Public Research Initiative. He is a freelance writer
for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of John Hopkins University. He
has interned at the US House of Representatives where he engaged in
research of ethnic conflicts and terrorism in Russia, the Caucasus and
Central Asia. He also interned at the International Center for
Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies where he
researched international terrorism networks operating in the Caucasus
and Central Asia and prepared congressional briefings for the Director
of ICTS on WMDs. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Arizona
State University.
Dec 29 2009
Explaining Azerbaijan's War Rhetoric and Consequences of Appeasement
Dec 29th, 2009
BY GRIGOR HAKOBYAN
Background
As 2009 comes to a close, Azerbaijani war rhetoric does not seem to
abate. Mr. Aliyev uses every public opportunity to threaten Armenia
and the Armenians of Artsakh with resumption of full scale hostilities
in the region.
To substantiate his claims the Azerbaijani president continues to
pressure his parliament into vast increases of budget allocations to
the Azerbaijani war machine and encourages widespread acquisitions of
offensive weapons, military equipment and munitions from every country
in the world willing to sell their weapons to them.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan continues to hold numerically the largest army
in the region despite the fact that active confrontations with the
Armenian side over Artsakh have predominately ended nearly 16 years
ago.
Despite the fact that billions of dollars in revenues are flowing into
state coffers from international operation of oil and gas fields the
vast numbers of Azerbaijani people are barely making their ends meet
and live in continuous poverty and neglect.
Considering that war can only bring destructions, death and suffering
to vast majority of its people, the Azerbaijani leadership doesn't shy
away from making public declarations about their intent to start one
in the region.
So the question arises whether the Azerbaijani government could be
really trusted in securing a lasting peace with Armenia and what could
explain their eagerness to resume hostilities in Artsakh.
Analysis
The Azerbaijani war rhetoric can be explained by a number of factors
that will eventually contribute to its decline and the coming collapse
of the ruling regime in Baku.
There is a high likelihood that the collapse of the regime in Baku
will be accompanied by a civil war within the country that will put
against each other the majority of Azerbaijani people who are
disenchanted and repulsed by the corruption in the country. They feel
the same about the oppressive monarchial rule of a tyrannical dynasty
for the last 16 years and the small minority of people who have been
benefiting from the inglorious corruption reigning the county and the
oppressive regime that fuels it.
First of all, the continued decline of Azerbaijani's economy that
began in 2008 as a result of a lower demand for its oil and gas didn't
yet finish its free fall. Careful analysis of Azerbaijani's economic
indicators will reveal a shrinking GDP and slowing economic growth.
Specifically, in 2006 Azerbaijan's GDP stood at 26.4 percent, in 2007
it rose to 34.5 percent and in 2008 it declined to 23.4 percent. While
in 2009, it stood at 10.8 percent. With very little indication for the
final end of economic recession throughout the world and the much
anticipated economic rebound, Azerbaijan's oil sector will not be able
to produce any more revenues than what it has generated before.
Azerbaijan's economic growth is set to decline even further by
bottoming out in 2012, when the production of oil in the country will
peak and become no longer attractive to foreign investments and
further development.
With no serious projections of a growing demand for its oil in 2010
and the failure of the Azerbaijani government to diversify its
economy, the gap between those who have and those who have not in
Azerbaijan will continue to accelerate causing mass outrage and
discontent among the populace. As such public protests on the streets
of Baku and throughout the Azerbaijan are more than likely to increase
in their frequency and intensity.
Second of all, the massive corruption in the country is eroding the
public trust into its public institutions of power. According to a
2009 Transparency International report, 46 percent of respondents in
Azerbaijan have reported to having bribed various authorities as part
of their daily affairs. In comparison only 43 percent did so in
Armenia, 2 percent in Georgia and 31 percent in Russia. Furthermore,
only 14 percent of Azerbaijani respondents have assessed the actions
of their government in fighting corruption as effective in comparison
to 38 percent in Armenia, 57 percent in Georgia and 22 percent in
Russia.
Such growing public distrust of their authorities opens room for
emergence of a parallel regime in the likeness of the Taliban that is
slowly shimmering in the south of Azerbaijan. In the coming years a
number of religious leaders advocating their own form of pure Islam
and social justice will emerge that countries like Iran or Saudi
Arabia will be very eager to influence and bring to power. In order to
consolidate his base among the common populace and save their
allegiance from shifting over to another center of traditional
authority, the Islam, Mr. Aliyev's leadership is tirelessly portraying
Armenia as the outside threat to the Azerbaijani state and its people.
Conclusion
The eagerness of Azerbaijan's leadership to resolve this issue by
means of military force does nothing else but to undermine the
stability in the region and further show the unconstructive approach
taken by the Azerbaijani authorities toward international efforts to
resolve this conflict through peaceful means.
Furthermore, the recent remarks by various Azerbaijani government
officials in the media about reclaiming the province of Zangezur from
Armenia proper indicates that they have chosen the route of escalation
that, if implemented, will not only harm the countries which are
directly involved in this conflict, but also jeopardize the
international security and internal stability of all the neighboring
states as well.
It is more than apparent that any efforts to resolve this conflict by
forcing Artsakh to remain as part of Azerbaijan or pressure Armenia to
make unilateral concessions on this matter are more than futile ' they
are ill conceived, unrealistic and extremely dangerous. Such
irresponsible actions will put in jeopardy not only the security of
every person in the region but also undermine the greater security
architecture of the Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia.
Azerbaijan must be made to understand that retaking Artsakh by force
is not an option. Moreover, contemplating to put their hands on any
portion of Armenia proper will spell the end of the Azerbaijani state
as it stands right now.
Grigor Hakobyan is a special contributor to Yerevan Report. He is an
independent political analyst residing in Los Angeles and the founder
of Caucasus Watch Public Research Initiative. He is a freelance writer
for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of John Hopkins University. He
has interned at the US House of Representatives where he engaged in
research of ethnic conflicts and terrorism in Russia, the Caucasus and
Central Asia. He also interned at the International Center for
Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies where he
researched international terrorism networks operating in the Caucasus
and Central Asia and prepared congressional briefings for the Director
of ICTS on WMDs. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Arizona
State University.