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Eurasia Daily Monitor
Monday, January 25, 2010-Volume 7, Issue 16
TRANSNISTRIA REMAINS THE ONLY REALLY `FROZEN" CONFLICT
by Vladimir Socor
In 2008, Russia `unfroze' the conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia through outright war and occupation of these
Georgian territories. In the latter part of 2009, the United States and
Russia each accelerated negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict,
each pressing for some kind of quick results. Although the U.S. and
Russian initiatives are inherently competitive, they both proceed from
the same flawed point of departure, breaking the link between Armenian
troop withdrawal from seven Azerbaijani districts and normalization of
Turkey-Armenia relations. This approach can only keep the Karabakh
conflict unresolved, although it creates the appearance of intensive
negotiations toward settling it.
Meanwhile, the conflict between Russia and Moldova in Transnistria
remains the only really `frozen' post-Soviet conflict.
If anything, the negotiating deadlock has deepened recently, with Russia
advancing stricter conditions and exploiting Moldova's internal
political vulnerabilities. Russian State Secretary and Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin's just-completed visit to
Chisinau and Tiraspol illustrates this involution (Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs website, Interfax, January 23).
Russian Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov, the former commander of
`peacekeeper' troops in South Ossetia, accompanied
Karasin to Moldova in his new capacity as adviser to Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov for `peacekeeping' issues. Conferring with
officials in Chisinau and Tiraspol, the Russian delegation laid out
familiar positions with some new, harder-line nuances (Moldpres,
Interfax, Olvia Press [Tiraspol], January 20, 21).
1. Russia would accept a `solution based on a special
status for Transnistria, with observance of Moldova's
territorial integrity and its neutrality.' Through this
formulation, Moldova's neutrality becomes an additional
precondition to a settlement of the conflict. Russia would observe
Moldova's integrity while Moldova would observe its own
neutrality. Russia's traditional position had called for a
special status of Transnistria (albeit one subject to Tiraspol's
veto) within a territorially whole Moldova. It had not explicitly
demanded Moldova's neutrality as a precondition, although this
was implied when the Communists governed in Chisinau. The recent regime
change has prompted Moscow to introduce this conditionality explicitly.
2. Furthermore, according to Karasin, the Russian troops would
`certainly stay on as long as the sides [Chisinau and Tiraspol]
keep searching for a settlement;' and `Russia will
withdraw its military contingent only after a final solution to the
conflict is found.' This reformulation is more intransigent than
Moscow's traditional demand for `synchronizing'
a political settlement with a military withdrawal. That Russian concept
envisaged movement on the political track and on the military track in
parallel. Under this latest revision, however, military withdrawal would
have to await a political settlement, even as Moscow and Tiraspol
continue blocking the negotiations. "Synchronization" turns into
sequencing and the conditionality becomes heavier. Moreover, Karasin now
defines the military goal as setting a `timeframe for the
presence [sroki prebyvaniya]' of Russian troops, rather than a
putative withdrawal deadline.
3. Moscow strongly emphasizes negotiations in a bilateral format,
Chisinau-Tiraspol, rather than the international 5+2 framework (Russia,
Ukraine, OSCE, European Union, United States, Chisinau, Tiraspol).
During his visit, Karasin urged shifting the negotiations'
center of gravity into the Chisinau-Tiraspol format, with `the
key condition that the sides enjoy equal rights.' Equal rights
has all along implied Tiraspol's right to demand a political
status incompatible with Moldova's territorial integrity and to
veto anything else in the negotiations. The 5+2 framework remains
inoperative since 2006, blocked by Tiraspol with Moscow's
encouragement.
4. Both Moscow and Chisinau favor `confidence-building
measures' and political dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol,
as well as activating the dormant `working groups' on
economic cooperation. Chisinau values those measures and activities for
reaching out to Transnistria directly, without an obligatory Russian
mediation. Chisinau seeks to operate on three levels in its outreach: to
Transnistria's ordinary residents, to interest groups and
disgruntled elements within the authorities, and to the
`official' Moscow-installed leadership. Tiraspol has
blocked the process at the `official' level since April
2008. For their part, Moscow and the Tiraspol leadership try to use the
Chisinau-Tiraspol process to seek acceptance of Transnistria's
political existence, and a de facto substitute for the international 5+2
negotiations.
Moldova's Acting President Mihai Ghimpu and the Deputy
Prime Minister for Reintegration, Victor Osipov, represented
Chisinau's positions during Karasin's visit. Ghimpu in
particular urged an unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops, in
accordance with Russia's 1999 commitments; objected that
`synchronizing' troop withdrawal with political
settlement is a prescription for deadlock on both tracks; cited
Moldova's constitutionally anchored neutrality, with assurances
that this clause would remain unchanged while other constitutional
clauses are amended; and pointed out that Russia's military
presence is incompatible with Moldova's neutrality, which Moscow
insists must be maintained.
In Tiraspol, `president' Igor Smirnov in unison
with Karasin praised the role of Russian troops in `guaranteeing
stability' and the non-resumption of hostilities. Chisinau,
however, calls for an internationally mandated mission of civilian
observers (mainly police, and including a Russian component) to replace
the existing `peacekeeping' force.
--Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Monday, January 25, 2010-Volume 7, Issue 16
TRANSNISTRIA REMAINS THE ONLY REALLY `FROZEN" CONFLICT
by Vladimir Socor
In 2008, Russia `unfroze' the conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia through outright war and occupation of these
Georgian territories. In the latter part of 2009, the United States and
Russia each accelerated negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict,
each pressing for some kind of quick results. Although the U.S. and
Russian initiatives are inherently competitive, they both proceed from
the same flawed point of departure, breaking the link between Armenian
troop withdrawal from seven Azerbaijani districts and normalization of
Turkey-Armenia relations. This approach can only keep the Karabakh
conflict unresolved, although it creates the appearance of intensive
negotiations toward settling it.
Meanwhile, the conflict between Russia and Moldova in Transnistria
remains the only really `frozen' post-Soviet conflict.
If anything, the negotiating deadlock has deepened recently, with Russia
advancing stricter conditions and exploiting Moldova's internal
political vulnerabilities. Russian State Secretary and Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin's just-completed visit to
Chisinau and Tiraspol illustrates this involution (Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs website, Interfax, January 23).
Russian Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov, the former commander of
`peacekeeper' troops in South Ossetia, accompanied
Karasin to Moldova in his new capacity as adviser to Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov for `peacekeeping' issues. Conferring with
officials in Chisinau and Tiraspol, the Russian delegation laid out
familiar positions with some new, harder-line nuances (Moldpres,
Interfax, Olvia Press [Tiraspol], January 20, 21).
1. Russia would accept a `solution based on a special
status for Transnistria, with observance of Moldova's
territorial integrity and its neutrality.' Through this
formulation, Moldova's neutrality becomes an additional
precondition to a settlement of the conflict. Russia would observe
Moldova's integrity while Moldova would observe its own
neutrality. Russia's traditional position had called for a
special status of Transnistria (albeit one subject to Tiraspol's
veto) within a territorially whole Moldova. It had not explicitly
demanded Moldova's neutrality as a precondition, although this
was implied when the Communists governed in Chisinau. The recent regime
change has prompted Moscow to introduce this conditionality explicitly.
2. Furthermore, according to Karasin, the Russian troops would
`certainly stay on as long as the sides [Chisinau and Tiraspol]
keep searching for a settlement;' and `Russia will
withdraw its military contingent only after a final solution to the
conflict is found.' This reformulation is more intransigent than
Moscow's traditional demand for `synchronizing'
a political settlement with a military withdrawal. That Russian concept
envisaged movement on the political track and on the military track in
parallel. Under this latest revision, however, military withdrawal would
have to await a political settlement, even as Moscow and Tiraspol
continue blocking the negotiations. "Synchronization" turns into
sequencing and the conditionality becomes heavier. Moreover, Karasin now
defines the military goal as setting a `timeframe for the
presence [sroki prebyvaniya]' of Russian troops, rather than a
putative withdrawal deadline.
3. Moscow strongly emphasizes negotiations in a bilateral format,
Chisinau-Tiraspol, rather than the international 5+2 framework (Russia,
Ukraine, OSCE, European Union, United States, Chisinau, Tiraspol).
During his visit, Karasin urged shifting the negotiations'
center of gravity into the Chisinau-Tiraspol format, with `the
key condition that the sides enjoy equal rights.' Equal rights
has all along implied Tiraspol's right to demand a political
status incompatible with Moldova's territorial integrity and to
veto anything else in the negotiations. The 5+2 framework remains
inoperative since 2006, blocked by Tiraspol with Moscow's
encouragement.
4. Both Moscow and Chisinau favor `confidence-building
measures' and political dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol,
as well as activating the dormant `working groups' on
economic cooperation. Chisinau values those measures and activities for
reaching out to Transnistria directly, without an obligatory Russian
mediation. Chisinau seeks to operate on three levels in its outreach: to
Transnistria's ordinary residents, to interest groups and
disgruntled elements within the authorities, and to the
`official' Moscow-installed leadership. Tiraspol has
blocked the process at the `official' level since April
2008. For their part, Moscow and the Tiraspol leadership try to use the
Chisinau-Tiraspol process to seek acceptance of Transnistria's
political existence, and a de facto substitute for the international 5+2
negotiations.
Moldova's Acting President Mihai Ghimpu and the Deputy
Prime Minister for Reintegration, Victor Osipov, represented
Chisinau's positions during Karasin's visit. Ghimpu in
particular urged an unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops, in
accordance with Russia's 1999 commitments; objected that
`synchronizing' troop withdrawal with political
settlement is a prescription for deadlock on both tracks; cited
Moldova's constitutionally anchored neutrality, with assurances
that this clause would remain unchanged while other constitutional
clauses are amended; and pointed out that Russia's military
presence is incompatible with Moldova's neutrality, which Moscow
insists must be maintained.
In Tiraspol, `president' Igor Smirnov in unison
with Karasin praised the role of Russian troops in `guaranteeing
stability' and the non-resumption of hostilities. Chisinau,
however, calls for an internationally mandated mission of civilian
observers (mainly police, and including a Russian component) to replace
the existing `peacekeeping' force.
--Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress