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IT'S THE TIME FOR REQUIEM?
Hovhannes Nikoghosyan
Hurriyet
March 23 2010
Turkey
Since the very beginning, all advocates have been actively pushing
parties not to lose momentum. Between Zurich in October 2009 and the
Armenian Constitutional Court ruling this Jan. 12, it seemed we were
at the positive end of this particular process and somewhere in the
middle of normalization - in a broader perspective. Now, considering
official statements and personal observations, Turkish leadership
(whether at Cankaya Palace, the Prime Ministry or the General Staff)
speaks in favor of the process itself but not of the results.
The Turkish foreign minister, the "new Kissinger" as he has been
labeled recently, Ahmet Davutoglu, said on March 15 at the Grand
Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission, "Presently, the protocols are
a critical tool [for Turkey]. We use these documents as deterrents."
Days after, on March 19, even the biggest optimist - Armenian President
Serge Sarkisian - was interviewed by Euronews, saying a positive vote
in the Turkish Parliament would be "a miracle."
The common language of all commentators on this point argues that we
are in an impasse. A few days ago I badly missed a chance to pose two
questions to U.S. Undersecretary of State Phil Gordon, who has been
managing this issue for a long time. Those were about a) if the Obama
administration saw "April 24" as a deadline for ratification and b)
if he felt his prediction of a "fading partnership with Turkey" made
in a book called "Winning Turkey" in 2008 became true under the light
of PM Erdogan's refusal to attend a nuclear summit in April.
The Obama administration has had five major foreign policy strategies
since taking the office - a "reset" with Russia, the Iranian nuclear
dossier, the Afghanistan and Iraq issues, the Arab-Israeli never-ending
charade and recovering relations with Turkey. So far all of them have
had no tangible result. Even a major scandal occurred during Vice
President Biden's trip to Israel. While Turkey still has a test to
pass, it will be a "recovery" for previous failures.
On a news service aired all over the world, Turkish PM Erdogan
announced he is ready to get rid of 100,000 Armenian labor migrants
(though the estimations are different), and as pro-Dashnak TV channel
in Armenia coined it, "he failed in his own trap" by exaggerating
the numbers before. No doubt, these remarks to the BBC had a shocking
effect to all those involved in the talks. Like Mr. Mehmet Ali Birand,
whose thoughts I had a chance to comment on before, I could not
believe my ears when I heard the news. I cannot agree with Birand
more when he says it's in Turkey's best interest to proceed further
with the protocols as "there is no alternative way with this."
Even ANCA's comments say these documents are the best "tools" to fight
genocide resolutions elsewhere. Obviously, it was not the best way to
silence the genocide recognition campaign and opponents domestically.
Perhaps this statement will also silence voices in the Armenian
Parliament who recently were openly discussing ratification of the
protocols before Turkey.
Professor Taner Akcam wrote in his letter to PM Erdogan on March 13,
and I also want to say here, hopefully the incumbent leadership in
Turkey has distinguished itself from the Unionists (İttihatcılar)
who committed the horrible crime against humanity in 1915 and hope
Prime Minister Erdogan does not plan to pull the illegal migrants
out of the country through the now-Syrian desert of Deir ez-Zor
(Deyrizor in Turkish).
Armenia plays this big game, relying on the support of her ad hoc
allies in the EU, Russia and the United States - having no other option
to exercise pressure on Turkey for any progress except for calling
on international support and appealing to "reason" (e.g. "No closed
borders in Europe in the 21st century," etc). Perhaps this is the
best interpretation of positions taken after quite proactive trips and
statements made by President Sarkisian and his fellow advisers since
February. The last attempts came again with Le Figaro and Euronews:
"I believe the international community should clearly articulate its
position on that issue."
Coming back to the U.S. House Committee vote, which is at stake now,
we need to address it more as blackmail to Turkey to proceed with
rapprochement rather than a real policy undertaking. I suppose the
reaction from Turkey was stronger that was anticipated in Washington.
On the other hand, both sides realize there is a certain line either
of the parties will not be ready to cross. For instance, Turkey will
stop support in Afghanistan or close the Ä°ncirlik base and side with
terrorists. That's nonsense. Turkey is too dependent upon American
transnational corporations and the IMF/WB to do that.
And nowadays some analysts tend to forget last year's presidential
statement on April 24, where Obama did utter the "G-word" in his
message, and perhaps he did it in a better way, introducing the new
label of "Meds Yeghern," which is the common definition of the 1915
events in Armenian.
Recently I was having a very interesting debate on these matters
with an elder colleague of mine who is sort of an "insider." In the
discourse I managed to misuse the term "zero problems with neighbors
policy," coined by professor Davutoglu and used "zero-sum policy"
twice. Now I think it was not a mistake if we pay attention to
the developments with the Kurdish opening, Cyprus issue and the
protocols ....
All in all, I see three very different go-ahead strategies looming
over the process (the available exit-strategies I presented in the
previous contribution). The first one is the ratification and the
follow-up as described in the protocols - becoming extremely unlikely.
An alternative to this is a small-scale political-military clash in
Nagorno-Karabagh, an extremely unwanted scenario either for regional
stability or for major players in the region. Perhaps the smell of
war in the air pushed President Sarkisian to appeal to Azerbaijani
leadership to sign "an agreement not to use force," which was
immediately rejected by a foreign ministry official Elhan Poluhov
in Baku. The statesman applied to the "right to restore territorial
integrity," which obviously means a new war in the region. The history
of Europe proves that a war against an immediate neighbor is impossible
to win.
While the sides now evidently are failing to accomplish what had been
agreed and signed in win-win documents, the third way, which sounds
more likely at the moment, is to establish diplomatic relations
beyond the protocols by April 24, institutionalizing the discussion
between states and leaving aside the mediation. Thus, Turkey could
silence the criticism of the international community and the Armenian
president can regain the support of his one-time fellows. By the way,
this was also the suggestion of Foreign Minister Davutoglu in a recent
statement made in Sofia, Bulgaria.
In the end, no matter what has happened, the reasons Armenia and
Turkey publicized the negotiations and are now engaged in public
debate are still valid. Turkey wants "zero problems," regional weight
and a European image. For Armenia, ironically, Turkey is the best way
toward Europe. As said, let's hope "zero problems" will not turn into a
"zero-sum" policy.
Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a visiting fellow with the Washington-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Hovhannes Nikoghosyan
Hurriyet
March 23 2010
Turkey
Since the very beginning, all advocates have been actively pushing
parties not to lose momentum. Between Zurich in October 2009 and the
Armenian Constitutional Court ruling this Jan. 12, it seemed we were
at the positive end of this particular process and somewhere in the
middle of normalization - in a broader perspective. Now, considering
official statements and personal observations, Turkish leadership
(whether at Cankaya Palace, the Prime Ministry or the General Staff)
speaks in favor of the process itself but not of the results.
The Turkish foreign minister, the "new Kissinger" as he has been
labeled recently, Ahmet Davutoglu, said on March 15 at the Grand
Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission, "Presently, the protocols are
a critical tool [for Turkey]. We use these documents as deterrents."
Days after, on March 19, even the biggest optimist - Armenian President
Serge Sarkisian - was interviewed by Euronews, saying a positive vote
in the Turkish Parliament would be "a miracle."
The common language of all commentators on this point argues that we
are in an impasse. A few days ago I badly missed a chance to pose two
questions to U.S. Undersecretary of State Phil Gordon, who has been
managing this issue for a long time. Those were about a) if the Obama
administration saw "April 24" as a deadline for ratification and b)
if he felt his prediction of a "fading partnership with Turkey" made
in a book called "Winning Turkey" in 2008 became true under the light
of PM Erdogan's refusal to attend a nuclear summit in April.
The Obama administration has had five major foreign policy strategies
since taking the office - a "reset" with Russia, the Iranian nuclear
dossier, the Afghanistan and Iraq issues, the Arab-Israeli never-ending
charade and recovering relations with Turkey. So far all of them have
had no tangible result. Even a major scandal occurred during Vice
President Biden's trip to Israel. While Turkey still has a test to
pass, it will be a "recovery" for previous failures.
On a news service aired all over the world, Turkish PM Erdogan
announced he is ready to get rid of 100,000 Armenian labor migrants
(though the estimations are different), and as pro-Dashnak TV channel
in Armenia coined it, "he failed in his own trap" by exaggerating
the numbers before. No doubt, these remarks to the BBC had a shocking
effect to all those involved in the talks. Like Mr. Mehmet Ali Birand,
whose thoughts I had a chance to comment on before, I could not
believe my ears when I heard the news. I cannot agree with Birand
more when he says it's in Turkey's best interest to proceed further
with the protocols as "there is no alternative way with this."
Even ANCA's comments say these documents are the best "tools" to fight
genocide resolutions elsewhere. Obviously, it was not the best way to
silence the genocide recognition campaign and opponents domestically.
Perhaps this statement will also silence voices in the Armenian
Parliament who recently were openly discussing ratification of the
protocols before Turkey.
Professor Taner Akcam wrote in his letter to PM Erdogan on March 13,
and I also want to say here, hopefully the incumbent leadership in
Turkey has distinguished itself from the Unionists (İttihatcılar)
who committed the horrible crime against humanity in 1915 and hope
Prime Minister Erdogan does not plan to pull the illegal migrants
out of the country through the now-Syrian desert of Deir ez-Zor
(Deyrizor in Turkish).
Armenia plays this big game, relying on the support of her ad hoc
allies in the EU, Russia and the United States - having no other option
to exercise pressure on Turkey for any progress except for calling
on international support and appealing to "reason" (e.g. "No closed
borders in Europe in the 21st century," etc). Perhaps this is the
best interpretation of positions taken after quite proactive trips and
statements made by President Sarkisian and his fellow advisers since
February. The last attempts came again with Le Figaro and Euronews:
"I believe the international community should clearly articulate its
position on that issue."
Coming back to the U.S. House Committee vote, which is at stake now,
we need to address it more as blackmail to Turkey to proceed with
rapprochement rather than a real policy undertaking. I suppose the
reaction from Turkey was stronger that was anticipated in Washington.
On the other hand, both sides realize there is a certain line either
of the parties will not be ready to cross. For instance, Turkey will
stop support in Afghanistan or close the Ä°ncirlik base and side with
terrorists. That's nonsense. Turkey is too dependent upon American
transnational corporations and the IMF/WB to do that.
And nowadays some analysts tend to forget last year's presidential
statement on April 24, where Obama did utter the "G-word" in his
message, and perhaps he did it in a better way, introducing the new
label of "Meds Yeghern," which is the common definition of the 1915
events in Armenian.
Recently I was having a very interesting debate on these matters
with an elder colleague of mine who is sort of an "insider." In the
discourse I managed to misuse the term "zero problems with neighbors
policy," coined by professor Davutoglu and used "zero-sum policy"
twice. Now I think it was not a mistake if we pay attention to
the developments with the Kurdish opening, Cyprus issue and the
protocols ....
All in all, I see three very different go-ahead strategies looming
over the process (the available exit-strategies I presented in the
previous contribution). The first one is the ratification and the
follow-up as described in the protocols - becoming extremely unlikely.
An alternative to this is a small-scale political-military clash in
Nagorno-Karabagh, an extremely unwanted scenario either for regional
stability or for major players in the region. Perhaps the smell of
war in the air pushed President Sarkisian to appeal to Azerbaijani
leadership to sign "an agreement not to use force," which was
immediately rejected by a foreign ministry official Elhan Poluhov
in Baku. The statesman applied to the "right to restore territorial
integrity," which obviously means a new war in the region. The history
of Europe proves that a war against an immediate neighbor is impossible
to win.
While the sides now evidently are failing to accomplish what had been
agreed and signed in win-win documents, the third way, which sounds
more likely at the moment, is to establish diplomatic relations
beyond the protocols by April 24, institutionalizing the discussion
between states and leaving aside the mediation. Thus, Turkey could
silence the criticism of the international community and the Armenian
president can regain the support of his one-time fellows. By the way,
this was also the suggestion of Foreign Minister Davutoglu in a recent
statement made in Sofia, Bulgaria.
In the end, no matter what has happened, the reasons Armenia and
Turkey publicized the negotiations and are now engaged in public
debate are still valid. Turkey wants "zero problems," regional weight
and a European image. For Armenia, ironically, Turkey is the best way
toward Europe. As said, let's hope "zero problems" will not turn into a
"zero-sum" policy.
Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a visiting fellow with the Washington-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies.