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US AMBASSADOR DECONSTRUCTS ERDOGAN
By: Nanore Barsoumian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2010/11/29/wikileaks-us-ambassador-deconstructs-erdogan/
Mon, Nov 29 2010
ANKARA, Turkey
A report sent to the State Department by U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman, and carrying the subject line
~Sturkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the
face of strong challenges?~T attempts to sum up Turkey~Rs PM Recep
Tayyip Erdogan~Rs character, before his scheduled visit to Washington.
The ~Sconfidential~T report, leaked by Wikileaks just yesterday,
was dated January 20, 2004, and was scheduled to be declassified on
January 7, 2014.
Erdogan In the report, the Ambassador lists topics that interest the
Turkish PM, such as the intolerability of a Kurdish state in northern
Iraq, the opening of the border with Armenia, economic reform, a
Cyprus settlement, cooperation on Iraq and against terrorist groups,
and ~Sthe clearest possible signal~T that the U.S. stands behind
Erdogan~Rs government.
~SWho are we dealing with?~T asks Edelman~E
~S~ECharismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory
for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the
country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core,~T notes the report.
Erdogan is ~Sa natural politician,~T who ~Sprojects the image of the
Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and
to defend conservative traditions.~T
However, ~S[he] has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to
miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs,
and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium,~T
states the report, and goes on to list five observations.
~SFirst, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming
from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey~E Third, an
authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong
and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or
development of effective communications among the party headquarters,
government, and parliamentary group[s]. This streak also makes him
exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in
power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone
to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute
decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only
in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to
give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.~T
The Ambassador also lists the ~Srival centers of power,~T highlighting
the reported rumors ~Sof the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with
the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan.~T
~SWhile his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this
time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S.
vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe,~T
concludes Edelman.
Full report.
Viewing cable 04ANKARA348, turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington:
how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the
structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See
also the FAQs
Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ~UThe
top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom
it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.~UThe
middle box contains the header information that is associated with
the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a
general subject.~UThe bottom box presents the body of the cable. The
opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables
(browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed
by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific
topics and a comment section.To understand the justification used for
the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article
as reference.
Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a
cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to
a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying
the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please
mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the
hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g.
#04ANKARA348.
Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Date Classification
Origin 04ANKARA348 2004-01-20 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text
of the original cable is not available.
201247Z Jan 04C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject:
turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the
face of strong challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus,
economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In
turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks
believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state
in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and
(3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side
sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy,
Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as
concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently
unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his
party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will
affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democratic development,
and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and
uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington,
where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as
an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of
U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by
May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies;
(3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes,
including Islamist ones (he rejects the term ~SIslamic terrorism~T);
(4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and
(6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in a way
acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations
to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and
diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment
among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating
step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in
northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from
Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus
initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands
behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal
memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across
the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has
led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point
noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal
Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing
Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves
while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone
persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on
the hearts of his more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and
an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations
of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of
Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend
conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds
parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to
AK's image as the party of change at the national level, good record
in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable
political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in
March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that
such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200
municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and
perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of
the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to
try to diminish him ~V whether by blocking legislation or attacking
his motives ~V cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and
across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter
in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no
credible political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit
well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political
reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen
democracy in Turkey. His government's inability to pass legislation
or regulations favored by AK supporters ~V land registry reform,
Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform ~V has not
eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of
AK readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is
counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation
and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global
emerging market trends rather than to the AK government's actions,
Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU
candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has
relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have
had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin
Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February
visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point
as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world.
Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for
Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing
Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid
being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations
in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being
careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening
Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line
of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through
authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He
agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with
long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try
to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be
prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous
Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what
most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de
facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S.
action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American
suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet
(DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in
Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise
the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to
advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter
to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like
Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government
as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious
domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin
to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on
his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
~VErdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him
seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic,
especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those
who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second,
unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him
to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan
and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a
draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion
in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point
about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner
streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful
advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of
effective communications among the party headquarters, government,
and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally
thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which,
despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing
even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth,
a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional
harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women
any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
~VRival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a
raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and
Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan.
Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among
more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on
controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves
at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the
past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on
questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
~VLack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be
capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be
pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing
the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear
constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist
left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts
on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial
levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials
~V from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across
the country ~V admit to us that the party's choice of competent and
broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be
exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept
AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at the
local and national level.
~VWeakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan
lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none
of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military.
His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly
or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue
reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment
or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by
the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist
agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment
(dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
~VCorruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion
against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through
kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now
hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private
secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging
in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited
~Sdirectly~T from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery)
privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's
direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution
company has become a public controversy.
~VIslamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime
Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling
into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry
Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an ~Summetci~T,
i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the
Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz
(who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made
the core of the State Establishment ~V Armed Forces, Presidency,
and Judiciary ~V profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn
these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic
brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen)
on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in
AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep
concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves
are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a
~Sclosed brotherhood mentality~T (cemaatcilik) in political affairs,
as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but
how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and
for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally
reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of
place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success
remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable
of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey
integrated into Europe. Edelman
From: A. Papazian
By: Nanore Barsoumian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2010/11/29/wikileaks-us-ambassador-deconstructs-erdogan/
Mon, Nov 29 2010
ANKARA, Turkey
A report sent to the State Department by U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman, and carrying the subject line
~Sturkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the
face of strong challenges?~T attempts to sum up Turkey~Rs PM Recep
Tayyip Erdogan~Rs character, before his scheduled visit to Washington.
The ~Sconfidential~T report, leaked by Wikileaks just yesterday,
was dated January 20, 2004, and was scheduled to be declassified on
January 7, 2014.
Erdogan In the report, the Ambassador lists topics that interest the
Turkish PM, such as the intolerability of a Kurdish state in northern
Iraq, the opening of the border with Armenia, economic reform, a
Cyprus settlement, cooperation on Iraq and against terrorist groups,
and ~Sthe clearest possible signal~T that the U.S. stands behind
Erdogan~Rs government.
~SWho are we dealing with?~T asks Edelman~E
~S~ECharismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory
for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the
country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core,~T notes the report.
Erdogan is ~Sa natural politician,~T who ~Sprojects the image of the
Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and
to defend conservative traditions.~T
However, ~S[he] has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to
miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs,
and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium,~T
states the report, and goes on to list five observations.
~SFirst, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming
from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey~E Third, an
authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong
and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or
development of effective communications among the party headquarters,
government, and parliamentary group[s]. This streak also makes him
exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in
power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone
to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute
decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only
in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to
give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.~T
The Ambassador also lists the ~Srival centers of power,~T highlighting
the reported rumors ~Sof the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with
the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan.~T
~SWhile his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this
time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S.
vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe,~T
concludes Edelman.
Full report.
Viewing cable 04ANKARA348, turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington:
how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the
structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See
also the FAQs
Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ~UThe
top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom
it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.~UThe
middle box contains the header information that is associated with
the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a
general subject.~UThe bottom box presents the body of the cable. The
opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables
(browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed
by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific
topics and a comment section.To understand the justification used for
the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article
as reference.
Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a
cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to
a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying
the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please
mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the
hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g.
#04ANKARA348.
Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Date Classification
Origin 04ANKARA348 2004-01-20 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text
of the original cable is not available.
201247Z Jan 04C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject:
turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the
face of strong challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus,
economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In
turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks
believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state
in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and
(3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side
sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy,
Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as
concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently
unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his
party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will
affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democratic development,
and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and
uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington,
where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as
an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of
U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by
May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies;
(3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes,
including Islamist ones (he rejects the term ~SIslamic terrorism~T);
(4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and
(6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in a way
acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations
to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and
diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment
among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating
step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in
northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from
Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus
initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands
behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal
memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across
the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has
led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point
noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal
Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing
Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves
while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone
persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on
the hearts of his more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and
an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations
of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of
Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend
conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds
parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to
AK's image as the party of change at the national level, good record
in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable
political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in
March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that
such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200
municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and
perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of
the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to
try to diminish him ~V whether by blocking legislation or attacking
his motives ~V cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and
across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter
in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no
credible political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit
well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political
reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen
democracy in Turkey. His government's inability to pass legislation
or regulations favored by AK supporters ~V land registry reform,
Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform ~V has not
eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of
AK readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is
counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation
and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global
emerging market trends rather than to the AK government's actions,
Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU
candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has
relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have
had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin
Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February
visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point
as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world.
Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for
Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing
Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid
being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations
in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being
careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening
Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line
of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through
authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He
agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with
long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try
to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be
prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous
Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what
most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de
facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S.
action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American
suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet
(DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in
Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise
the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to
advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter
to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like
Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government
as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious
domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin
to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on
his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
~VErdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him
seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic,
especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those
who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second,
unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him
to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan
and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a
draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion
in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point
about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner
streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful
advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of
effective communications among the party headquarters, government,
and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally
thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which,
despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing
even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth,
a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional
harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women
any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
~VRival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a
raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and
Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan.
Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among
more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on
controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves
at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the
past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on
questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
~VLack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be
capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be
pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing
the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear
constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist
left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts
on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial
levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials
~V from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across
the country ~V admit to us that the party's choice of competent and
broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be
exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept
AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at the
local and national level.
~VWeakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan
lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none
of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military.
His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly
or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue
reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment
or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by
the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist
agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment
(dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
~VCorruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion
against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through
kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now
hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private
secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging
in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited
~Sdirectly~T from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery)
privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's
direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution
company has become a public controversy.
~VIslamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime
Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling
into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry
Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an ~Summetci~T,
i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the
Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz
(who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made
the core of the State Establishment ~V Armed Forces, Presidency,
and Judiciary ~V profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn
these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic
brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen)
on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in
AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep
concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves
are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a
~Sclosed brotherhood mentality~T (cemaatcilik) in political affairs,
as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but
how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and
for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally
reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of
place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success
remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable
of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey
integrated into Europe. Edelman
From: A. Papazian