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US ANALYST: IN 2012, US WILL LIKELY NOT EXPEND A LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC OR GEOPOLITICAL CAPITAL TO ACTUALLY ENSURE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA
Milaz.info
Dec 14 2011
Azerbaijan
APA US correspondent's interview with Thomas Ambrosio, US analyst on
South Caucasus issues, an Associate Professor of political science
at the North Dakota State University
- How would you characterize the US-Azerbaijan relations during the
year Ambassador Matthew Bryza was in Baku? Did both countries manage
to overcome the problems that they faced previously?
- I would characterize this as the beginning of a 'rebuilding
process' in which the initial, anti-Azerbaijani policy pursued by
the Obama administration - pursued seemingly out of a narrow-minded
desire to reverse the good relationship which existed between the two
countries during the Bush administration, as part of a larger desire
to portray itself as the un-Bush administration - has given way to
the realization that Azerbaijan is an important ally of the United
States in a strategically important location. While I do not believe
that US-Azerbaijani relations will be restored to the Bush-era level,
there is a new, more positive 'normal' in the relationship between
Washington and Baku.
- Did the fact that the Senate still didn't discuss ambassador's
nomination push the bilateral relations back?
- No. There are domestic political reasons for this which not seriously
affect US-Azerbaijani relations. Ultimately, whoever the ambassador is
will simply carry out the policies of the President and his national
security team. The perceptions and policies of the administration
are far more important than the dynamics within the US Senate.
- Can we say the 2011 was unsuccessful in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh
negotiations? How do you see the US' position regarding that in 2012?
- If we define 'success' in terms of a comprehensive diplomatic
agreement on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, then yes, it was
unsuccessful. However, I do not believe that such an outcome is likely
and should definitely not be the definition of success. Was there
large-scale fighting? No. That is one way to measure success - and,
from the perspective of the Minsk Group, this is probably good enough.
>From the perspective of the Armenians (both in Armenia-proper
and Nagorno-Karabakh), another year passed with Nagorno-Karabakh
maintaining its de facto independence - that is how they would define
success. Baku would see it as a failure: one-seventh of its territory
is still outside of its de facto sovereignty and some one million
displaced persons cannot return home.
The US position in 2012 will likely be a continuation of the past
decade: maintain pressure to prevent an outbreak of fighting, support
the 'peace process', but ultimately not expend a level of diplomatic
and/or geopolitical capital to actually ensure a comprehensive peace
agreement. Continuity, not change, is the most likely outcome in 2012.
- Seems like the frozen conflicts' influence not only the regional
security, but even the US foreign and internal policy. For example,
because of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, President Obama's nominee
to US Ambassador post in Azerbaijan faces with Armenian Diaspora's
criticism in the Congress. How do you see this scene in the next
election year? Can the Administration overcome controversial topics
such as "Armenian genocide", Ambassadors' appointments to Baku and
Yerevan, etc, in the next election year?
- Of course, with the election approaching, President Obama will
be interested in counting votes - especially from key states which
have a large Armenian population, such as New York, New Jersey, and
California. It is unlikely that he will do anything to aggravate any
particular constituency, such as the Armenian-Americans. I do not
see how these issues can be overcome next year.
Milaz.info
Dec 14 2011
Azerbaijan
APA US correspondent's interview with Thomas Ambrosio, US analyst on
South Caucasus issues, an Associate Professor of political science
at the North Dakota State University
- How would you characterize the US-Azerbaijan relations during the
year Ambassador Matthew Bryza was in Baku? Did both countries manage
to overcome the problems that they faced previously?
- I would characterize this as the beginning of a 'rebuilding
process' in which the initial, anti-Azerbaijani policy pursued by
the Obama administration - pursued seemingly out of a narrow-minded
desire to reverse the good relationship which existed between the two
countries during the Bush administration, as part of a larger desire
to portray itself as the un-Bush administration - has given way to
the realization that Azerbaijan is an important ally of the United
States in a strategically important location. While I do not believe
that US-Azerbaijani relations will be restored to the Bush-era level,
there is a new, more positive 'normal' in the relationship between
Washington and Baku.
- Did the fact that the Senate still didn't discuss ambassador's
nomination push the bilateral relations back?
- No. There are domestic political reasons for this which not seriously
affect US-Azerbaijani relations. Ultimately, whoever the ambassador is
will simply carry out the policies of the President and his national
security team. The perceptions and policies of the administration
are far more important than the dynamics within the US Senate.
- Can we say the 2011 was unsuccessful in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh
negotiations? How do you see the US' position regarding that in 2012?
- If we define 'success' in terms of a comprehensive diplomatic
agreement on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, then yes, it was
unsuccessful. However, I do not believe that such an outcome is likely
and should definitely not be the definition of success. Was there
large-scale fighting? No. That is one way to measure success - and,
from the perspective of the Minsk Group, this is probably good enough.
>From the perspective of the Armenians (both in Armenia-proper
and Nagorno-Karabakh), another year passed with Nagorno-Karabakh
maintaining its de facto independence - that is how they would define
success. Baku would see it as a failure: one-seventh of its territory
is still outside of its de facto sovereignty and some one million
displaced persons cannot return home.
The US position in 2012 will likely be a continuation of the past
decade: maintain pressure to prevent an outbreak of fighting, support
the 'peace process', but ultimately not expend a level of diplomatic
and/or geopolitical capital to actually ensure a comprehensive peace
agreement. Continuity, not change, is the most likely outcome in 2012.
- Seems like the frozen conflicts' influence not only the regional
security, but even the US foreign and internal policy. For example,
because of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, President Obama's nominee
to US Ambassador post in Azerbaijan faces with Armenian Diaspora's
criticism in the Congress. How do you see this scene in the next
election year? Can the Administration overcome controversial topics
such as "Armenian genocide", Ambassadors' appointments to Baku and
Yerevan, etc, in the next election year?
- Of course, with the election approaching, President Obama will
be interested in counting votes - especially from key states which
have a large Armenian population, such as New York, New Jersey, and
California. It is unlikely that he will do anything to aggravate any
particular constituency, such as the Armenian-Americans. I do not
see how these issues can be overcome next year.