`ARAB SPRING' AND RUSSIA
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5932
25.07.2011
Artashes Ter-Harutyunyan
`Arab spring'; observations
The American and European expert circles has already began presenting
their first general analyses of what the `Arab spring' gave to the
West and to what extent the current dynamics is in tune with the
strategic interests of the American and European powers.
If we try to summarize, according to the overwhelming majority of the
assessments the change of the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and expected
changes in Libya, Yemen and Syria (in this context Iran is mentioned
either) are the initial, `technical' stage of the geopolitical plan
carried out by the United States and its allies. Meanwhile, the main
purpose is to continue the project initiated by George W. Bush after
the events on September 11, 2001, i.e. consolidation of the presence
of the United States and its allies in the Big Middle East, which is
considered a key region in the aspect of international political and
energy security.
Mainly military means of reaching this goal used over the previous
decade (wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) contributed to the fall of the
image of the United States in the Muslim East, and correspondingly to
weakening of its political influence. On the other hand, in course of
time, the western allies were obliged to gradually renounce on the
military component. Firstly, because the efficiency of the later has
been only reducing and means allotted continued increasing. And
secondly, returning troops from the east has become one of the topical
issues on the domestic political agenda in the western countries. In
the end, even the US stated the timeframe of the withdrawal of its
troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Of course, the Arab revolutions first of all were based on objective
reasons because without those reasons no `technology' could be
applied. But the interest and steps taken by the western countries
directed to the initiation, support and supervising of those movements
were obvious1.
It is remarkable that in the time aspect the `Arab spring' was prior
to the withdrawal of the troops of the western coalition from Iraq and
Afghanistan. In this aspect European and American experts characterize
it as substitution of the `hard power' by `soft power'2, and `Arab
spring' in the prospect should result in formation of the
administrations in the Muslim East close to the West and democratic
values. As for the present moment the first result can already be
observed: the American policy is considered in the positive light on
behalf of the `Arab street'.
It should be mentioned that such a project is not a novelty for the
western strategy. In essence the same approach was applied after World
War II in Europe and Far East when `hard power' was followed by a
`soft' one and through which a task was assigned to prove long-term
presence of the US and its allies on the spots. The same we could
observe after the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and on
post-Soviet space.
It is also possible that the project has following peculiarities - to
redraw the map of the region, which can be necessary if we take into
consideration that there is a task to set new order and influence on
the spots. E.g. it was most prominently manifested in Yugoslavia. And
in this aspect we should remember a scandalous article by Ralf Peters,
which was devoted to the reshaping of the borders in the Big Middle
East, published 5 years ago, in June 2006 in authoritative `Armed
Forces Journal'.
Factor of Russia
The `Arab spring' caused different reactions in the region. It is
remarkable that all the regional powers - Iran, Turkey, Israel and
Saudi Arabia, either disapproved or were at lease cautious about those
processes.
Though initially Turkey stuck to the same stance, but after rather
short time stance of Ankara changed and there they saw a possibility
to take advantage of the situation in order to raise their influence
in the region. Turkey's activity even made anxious Russia, which
appeared in a rather difficult situation as a result of the `Arab
spring', as the countries with which Moscow entered military and
political and economic engagements in order to promote its Middle East
policy (i.e. Syria, Libya, Iran) has either weakened or are close to
the change of the regimes in consequence of revolutionary movements.
As for the Turkish activity, according to Russian expert assessments,
the `Arab spring' may contribute to the fall of the Moscow's influence
in the region which began after the Cold War. And in this aspect
Ankara is a new anxiety. The later became to work with the countries,
which have traditionally been connected with Russia (Syria, Libya and
Palestine) even before the revolutionary movements, and now it tends
to take advantage of new possibilities in order to raise its influence
in the aforementioned countries and to try to take Russian `niche'.
Meanwhile, in the initial stage of the `Arab spring' Russia also
seemed to be a beneficiary party.
Firstly, unlike western countries, Russia is not in a state of two
wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq), and it, taking the advantage of Libyan
crisis, which is in fact a third war for the western powers, gives an
opportunity of getting some concessions from West.
Secondly, as a result of the Arab revolutions the oil prices raised by
about 20%, and this is important for the Russian economy, which have
not fully recovered from the global financial and economic crisis
(especially if we take into consideration that in several months
parliamentary and presidential elections are to be held in Russia).
Thirdly, in consequence of the Libyan crisis Greenstream gas pipeline,
which connected Libya with Italy and supplied about 11 billion m3 of
natural gas to Italy, which in its turn was the third biggest gas
consumer in Europe, stopped working. This circumstance has made Rome
buy more gas from `Gazprom' which also provides economic benefit for
Russia.
Fourthly, Arab revolutions complicated the supply of energy carriers
from the Muslim East which gave an opportunity to Russia to underline
its role in the stable supply of gas and oil.
Yet as for the Middle East issues according to the assessments of the
Russian experts Moscow will have difficult times. This is also proved
by the Russia's last steps.
Though in March the prime-minister of Russia Vladimir Putin compared
military campaign in Libya with the medieval crusade but right after
the meetings of the G8 in Deauville, France, Russian president Dmitry
Medvedev stated that M. Kaddafi must quit and Moscow is ready to
undertake the mediatory mission between the Western countries, rebels
and Kaddafi.
Even more remarkable development took place in case with Syria.
Firstly, at the beginning of June Russia stopped the adoption of the
resolution criticizing the Syrian authorities at the UN Security
Council3 and according to the Israeli intelligence data it continues
supplying this country with arms and ammunition. But already in the
middle of the same month in Moscow the representatives of the Syrian
opposition were received by Mikhail Margelov, the Head of the
International Affairs Commission of the Upper Chamber of the Russian
Parliament and Special Envoy of the Russian president
On the one hand the aforementioned measures are directed to the
preservation of Russia's military and political and economic presence
in the countries of the region, and on the other hand Moscow faces the
problem of the key partners - if the region is undergoing large-scale
transformations, with what powers and, correspondingly, with what
countries should Russia be in the partner relations?
1 Despite numerous assurances by the western mass media and even
officials that president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak resigned, nobody saw
it. It is known that the prime-minister of that country stated about
the resignation of Mubarak. This afforded ground for believing that a
coup finally took place in Egypt.
In February-March alongside with disturbances in Libya, Syria and
Yemen, the similar disturbances were initiated in Bahrain, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia. But unlike first three countries the revolutionary wave
in the monarchies, which were the allies of the US, was not vouchsafed
with the long-lasting attention of the western mass media and
officials, though, e.g. in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia the events had
bloody consequences.
2 By the way, in the context of the `soft power' implemented in the
Muslim East, a special place is occupied by the information resources
created on the spot, e.g. `Al-Jazeera' (Qatar) and `Al-Arabia' (UAE)
TV companies. It is remarkable that those information resources
established in the countries, which are not distinguished by political
influence in the region, successfully managed to integrate and take
their own place in the international media space (where, as it is
known, western resources prevail) and even such global political
powers as Russia, China, India and Brazil have not managed to do
anything like that.
3 It should be mentioned that the only Russian military base in the
region is dislocated in the port of Tartus, Syria.
From: A. Papazian
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5932
25.07.2011
Artashes Ter-Harutyunyan
`Arab spring'; observations
The American and European expert circles has already began presenting
their first general analyses of what the `Arab spring' gave to the
West and to what extent the current dynamics is in tune with the
strategic interests of the American and European powers.
If we try to summarize, according to the overwhelming majority of the
assessments the change of the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and expected
changes in Libya, Yemen and Syria (in this context Iran is mentioned
either) are the initial, `technical' stage of the geopolitical plan
carried out by the United States and its allies. Meanwhile, the main
purpose is to continue the project initiated by George W. Bush after
the events on September 11, 2001, i.e. consolidation of the presence
of the United States and its allies in the Big Middle East, which is
considered a key region in the aspect of international political and
energy security.
Mainly military means of reaching this goal used over the previous
decade (wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) contributed to the fall of the
image of the United States in the Muslim East, and correspondingly to
weakening of its political influence. On the other hand, in course of
time, the western allies were obliged to gradually renounce on the
military component. Firstly, because the efficiency of the later has
been only reducing and means allotted continued increasing. And
secondly, returning troops from the east has become one of the topical
issues on the domestic political agenda in the western countries. In
the end, even the US stated the timeframe of the withdrawal of its
troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Of course, the Arab revolutions first of all were based on objective
reasons because without those reasons no `technology' could be
applied. But the interest and steps taken by the western countries
directed to the initiation, support and supervising of those movements
were obvious1.
It is remarkable that in the time aspect the `Arab spring' was prior
to the withdrawal of the troops of the western coalition from Iraq and
Afghanistan. In this aspect European and American experts characterize
it as substitution of the `hard power' by `soft power'2, and `Arab
spring' in the prospect should result in formation of the
administrations in the Muslim East close to the West and democratic
values. As for the present moment the first result can already be
observed: the American policy is considered in the positive light on
behalf of the `Arab street'.
It should be mentioned that such a project is not a novelty for the
western strategy. In essence the same approach was applied after World
War II in Europe and Far East when `hard power' was followed by a
`soft' one and through which a task was assigned to prove long-term
presence of the US and its allies on the spots. The same we could
observe after the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and on
post-Soviet space.
It is also possible that the project has following peculiarities - to
redraw the map of the region, which can be necessary if we take into
consideration that there is a task to set new order and influence on
the spots. E.g. it was most prominently manifested in Yugoslavia. And
in this aspect we should remember a scandalous article by Ralf Peters,
which was devoted to the reshaping of the borders in the Big Middle
East, published 5 years ago, in June 2006 in authoritative `Armed
Forces Journal'.
Factor of Russia
The `Arab spring' caused different reactions in the region. It is
remarkable that all the regional powers - Iran, Turkey, Israel and
Saudi Arabia, either disapproved or were at lease cautious about those
processes.
Though initially Turkey stuck to the same stance, but after rather
short time stance of Ankara changed and there they saw a possibility
to take advantage of the situation in order to raise their influence
in the region. Turkey's activity even made anxious Russia, which
appeared in a rather difficult situation as a result of the `Arab
spring', as the countries with which Moscow entered military and
political and economic engagements in order to promote its Middle East
policy (i.e. Syria, Libya, Iran) has either weakened or are close to
the change of the regimes in consequence of revolutionary movements.
As for the Turkish activity, according to Russian expert assessments,
the `Arab spring' may contribute to the fall of the Moscow's influence
in the region which began after the Cold War. And in this aspect
Ankara is a new anxiety. The later became to work with the countries,
which have traditionally been connected with Russia (Syria, Libya and
Palestine) even before the revolutionary movements, and now it tends
to take advantage of new possibilities in order to raise its influence
in the aforementioned countries and to try to take Russian `niche'.
Meanwhile, in the initial stage of the `Arab spring' Russia also
seemed to be a beneficiary party.
Firstly, unlike western countries, Russia is not in a state of two
wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq), and it, taking the advantage of Libyan
crisis, which is in fact a third war for the western powers, gives an
opportunity of getting some concessions from West.
Secondly, as a result of the Arab revolutions the oil prices raised by
about 20%, and this is important for the Russian economy, which have
not fully recovered from the global financial and economic crisis
(especially if we take into consideration that in several months
parliamentary and presidential elections are to be held in Russia).
Thirdly, in consequence of the Libyan crisis Greenstream gas pipeline,
which connected Libya with Italy and supplied about 11 billion m3 of
natural gas to Italy, which in its turn was the third biggest gas
consumer in Europe, stopped working. This circumstance has made Rome
buy more gas from `Gazprom' which also provides economic benefit for
Russia.
Fourthly, Arab revolutions complicated the supply of energy carriers
from the Muslim East which gave an opportunity to Russia to underline
its role in the stable supply of gas and oil.
Yet as for the Middle East issues according to the assessments of the
Russian experts Moscow will have difficult times. This is also proved
by the Russia's last steps.
Though in March the prime-minister of Russia Vladimir Putin compared
military campaign in Libya with the medieval crusade but right after
the meetings of the G8 in Deauville, France, Russian president Dmitry
Medvedev stated that M. Kaddafi must quit and Moscow is ready to
undertake the mediatory mission between the Western countries, rebels
and Kaddafi.
Even more remarkable development took place in case with Syria.
Firstly, at the beginning of June Russia stopped the adoption of the
resolution criticizing the Syrian authorities at the UN Security
Council3 and according to the Israeli intelligence data it continues
supplying this country with arms and ammunition. But already in the
middle of the same month in Moscow the representatives of the Syrian
opposition were received by Mikhail Margelov, the Head of the
International Affairs Commission of the Upper Chamber of the Russian
Parliament and Special Envoy of the Russian president
On the one hand the aforementioned measures are directed to the
preservation of Russia's military and political and economic presence
in the countries of the region, and on the other hand Moscow faces the
problem of the key partners - if the region is undergoing large-scale
transformations, with what powers and, correspondingly, with what
countries should Russia be in the partner relations?
1 Despite numerous assurances by the western mass media and even
officials that president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak resigned, nobody saw
it. It is known that the prime-minister of that country stated about
the resignation of Mubarak. This afforded ground for believing that a
coup finally took place in Egypt.
In February-March alongside with disturbances in Libya, Syria and
Yemen, the similar disturbances were initiated in Bahrain, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia. But unlike first three countries the revolutionary wave
in the monarchies, which were the allies of the US, was not vouchsafed
with the long-lasting attention of the western mass media and
officials, though, e.g. in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia the events had
bloody consequences.
2 By the way, in the context of the `soft power' implemented in the
Muslim East, a special place is occupied by the information resources
created on the spot, e.g. `Al-Jazeera' (Qatar) and `Al-Arabia' (UAE)
TV companies. It is remarkable that those information resources
established in the countries, which are not distinguished by political
influence in the region, successfully managed to integrate and take
their own place in the international media space (where, as it is
known, western resources prevail) and even such global political
powers as Russia, China, India and Brazil have not managed to do
anything like that.
3 It should be mentioned that the only Russian military base in the
region is dislocated in the port of Tartus, Syria.
From: A. Papazian