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ALTHOUGH NO EURASIAN NATO, CSTO CAN BENEFIT THE REGION
Dmitry Astakhov
RIA Novosti
13/04/2012
Leaders of the Collective Security Treaty Organization member states
Military-political integration in Eurasia will be further enhanced by
the ratification of the agreement on the procedure for establishing
the CSTO Collective Security Forces and their operation, submitted
by President Dmitry Medvedev to parliament.
The Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992. Ten years later, in
2002, the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the charter of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the agreement on the organization's
legal status. Now they are preparing to sign a memorandum between
the CSTO Secretariat and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO), which should strengthen the international legitimacy of the
post-Soviet organization.
Can the CSTO be regarded as the Eurasian alternative to NATO?
Moscow as center of gravity
This is not the only question that comes to mind. Are we witnessing
the development of a second geopolitical pole, especially given
the plans of the United States and its allies to withdraw troops
from Afghanistan? Are there grounds to see this as evidence of the
decline of the unipolar world, which Russian diplomats have criticized
so sharply?
The CSTO may grow into an effective integration organization in the
realm of security. Yet it would be premature to say that it has a
potential to become a real alternative to NATO, let alone to the West
as a whole.
First, its resources are considerably smaller than those of NATO. On
the other hand, as Alexander Suvorov, the 18th-century Russian military
leader, said, "Win with ability, not with numbers," even if experts
are divided in their assessments of the organization's "ability."
The integration potential of the CSTO member countries is extremely
important, but even a cursory glance reveals that Russia is the
largest donor of this project.
Unlike NATO, which is vital not only to the United States but also to
its allies, who contribute to the bloc financially, the CSTO is funded
primarily by Russia. Its other members are not sufficiently motivated.
Regional ties
President Medvedev first voiced the idea of building up the CSTO's
military component at a summit in Moscow in September 2008. The CSTO
leaders met primarily to discuss the "five-day war" between Russia
and Georgia, but ultimately affirmed their willingness to approve
Russia's actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008.
However, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan avoided formally recognizing the two breakaway Georgian
republics' independence, each for its own reasons.
Things have changed on the Eurasian and international agenda since
September 2008, but the CSTO member countries have not recognized the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, some of Russia's
neighbors appear to be openly wary of Russia after August 2008.
That reaction was certainly provoked by the afflictions, phobias
and fears characteristic of all newly independent countries, as
well as a desire of the national elites to maneuver between Moscow
and Washington.
All the Central Asian countries have skeletons in their closets, such
as border conflicts between CSTO members - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
But the key question is the readiness of the CSTO members (even if
without the over-ambitious Ukraine, the objectionable Azerbaijan,
Moldova with its complaints over Transdnestr, as well as Georgia)
to elaborate common political approaches to Eurasian security.
Imagine a hypothetical escalation of violence in the South Caucasus,
for example in the disputed Nagorny Karabakh region claimed by Armenia
and Azerbaijan. As a CSTO member country, Armenia can expect assistance
from its allies. This situation is quite possible as Azerbaijan has
never ruled out the possibility of using military force to solve the
Karabakh issue.
But will Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, whose economic ties with Azerbaijan
have been growing stronger in past years, support Armenia? It appears
if the situation were to deteriorate, Armenia would be unlikely to
receive the consolidated assistance of all CSTO member countries.
Besides, the Central Asian countries are unwilling to get involved in
issues that have no direct bearing on them. Tajikistan's neighbors
were extremely active in the early 1990s during the civil war in
that country, but remained aloof during the peacekeeping operation
in Abkhazia in 1994-2008, although it operated under an official
CIS mandate.
The Collective Security Treaty was signed in May 1992 largely because
of growing tensions on the Tajik-Afghan border. It was initially
closely connected to the Central Asian countries and that geopolitical
focus has shifted only slightly in the past 20 years.
Two pipes better than one?
The Kremlin's allies in the CSTO are not ready to stand up to the
West. As a high-ranking Kazakh official once told me, "Two pipes are
always better than one." This is why a choice between Russia and the
West, which some Russian circles are forcing on the Central Asian
countries, is unrealistic.
All the CIS countries, including Belarus and Armenia, have interests in
the West and expectations connected with the EU and the United States
- especially Armenia, which is aware of the strength of Armenian
lobbies in Washington and Paris. Consequently, the CSTO countries
will do their best to prevent their organization from becoming an
"alternative to NATO," preferring instead to diversify its foreign
and defense policy. Even Abkhazia, which only Russia and a handful
of other countries have recognized, is keeping the Turkish window of
opportunity open. This is logical, as Turkey has the world's largest
Abkhazian diaspora and the second-largest army in NATO.
Armenia has defined this approach as the policy of complementarism.
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and even Kyrgyzstan are pursuing
this policy too, to a larger or smaller degree.
Moreover, Russia itself does not want to fight the West, especially
amid a large-scale economic crisis.
A compromise between Moscow and Washington on many security issues
in Eurasia and outside it will be very difficult to achieve, at least
in the near future. On the other hand, many strategic issues such as
nuclear security, WMD proliferation, Iran, North Korea, the Middle
East and Afghanistan should be addressed jointly.
The CSTO is unlikely to become a Eurasian NATO soon, but it can
and should try to become an effective tool for ensuring security in
Central Asia.
*Sergei Markedonov is a visiting fellow of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, DC
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Dmitry Astakhov
RIA Novosti
13/04/2012
Leaders of the Collective Security Treaty Organization member states
Military-political integration in Eurasia will be further enhanced by
the ratification of the agreement on the procedure for establishing
the CSTO Collective Security Forces and their operation, submitted
by President Dmitry Medvedev to parliament.
The Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992. Ten years later, in
2002, the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the charter of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the agreement on the organization's
legal status. Now they are preparing to sign a memorandum between
the CSTO Secretariat and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO), which should strengthen the international legitimacy of the
post-Soviet organization.
Can the CSTO be regarded as the Eurasian alternative to NATO?
Moscow as center of gravity
This is not the only question that comes to mind. Are we witnessing
the development of a second geopolitical pole, especially given
the plans of the United States and its allies to withdraw troops
from Afghanistan? Are there grounds to see this as evidence of the
decline of the unipolar world, which Russian diplomats have criticized
so sharply?
The CSTO may grow into an effective integration organization in the
realm of security. Yet it would be premature to say that it has a
potential to become a real alternative to NATO, let alone to the West
as a whole.
First, its resources are considerably smaller than those of NATO. On
the other hand, as Alexander Suvorov, the 18th-century Russian military
leader, said, "Win with ability, not with numbers," even if experts
are divided in their assessments of the organization's "ability."
The integration potential of the CSTO member countries is extremely
important, but even a cursory glance reveals that Russia is the
largest donor of this project.
Unlike NATO, which is vital not only to the United States but also to
its allies, who contribute to the bloc financially, the CSTO is funded
primarily by Russia. Its other members are not sufficiently motivated.
Regional ties
President Medvedev first voiced the idea of building up the CSTO's
military component at a summit in Moscow in September 2008. The CSTO
leaders met primarily to discuss the "five-day war" between Russia
and Georgia, but ultimately affirmed their willingness to approve
Russia's actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008.
However, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan avoided formally recognizing the two breakaway Georgian
republics' independence, each for its own reasons.
Things have changed on the Eurasian and international agenda since
September 2008, but the CSTO member countries have not recognized the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, some of Russia's
neighbors appear to be openly wary of Russia after August 2008.
That reaction was certainly provoked by the afflictions, phobias
and fears characteristic of all newly independent countries, as
well as a desire of the national elites to maneuver between Moscow
and Washington.
All the Central Asian countries have skeletons in their closets, such
as border conflicts between CSTO members - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
But the key question is the readiness of the CSTO members (even if
without the over-ambitious Ukraine, the objectionable Azerbaijan,
Moldova with its complaints over Transdnestr, as well as Georgia)
to elaborate common political approaches to Eurasian security.
Imagine a hypothetical escalation of violence in the South Caucasus,
for example in the disputed Nagorny Karabakh region claimed by Armenia
and Azerbaijan. As a CSTO member country, Armenia can expect assistance
from its allies. This situation is quite possible as Azerbaijan has
never ruled out the possibility of using military force to solve the
Karabakh issue.
But will Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, whose economic ties with Azerbaijan
have been growing stronger in past years, support Armenia? It appears
if the situation were to deteriorate, Armenia would be unlikely to
receive the consolidated assistance of all CSTO member countries.
Besides, the Central Asian countries are unwilling to get involved in
issues that have no direct bearing on them. Tajikistan's neighbors
were extremely active in the early 1990s during the civil war in
that country, but remained aloof during the peacekeeping operation
in Abkhazia in 1994-2008, although it operated under an official
CIS mandate.
The Collective Security Treaty was signed in May 1992 largely because
of growing tensions on the Tajik-Afghan border. It was initially
closely connected to the Central Asian countries and that geopolitical
focus has shifted only slightly in the past 20 years.
Two pipes better than one?
The Kremlin's allies in the CSTO are not ready to stand up to the
West. As a high-ranking Kazakh official once told me, "Two pipes are
always better than one." This is why a choice between Russia and the
West, which some Russian circles are forcing on the Central Asian
countries, is unrealistic.
All the CIS countries, including Belarus and Armenia, have interests in
the West and expectations connected with the EU and the United States
- especially Armenia, which is aware of the strength of Armenian
lobbies in Washington and Paris. Consequently, the CSTO countries
will do their best to prevent their organization from becoming an
"alternative to NATO," preferring instead to diversify its foreign
and defense policy. Even Abkhazia, which only Russia and a handful
of other countries have recognized, is keeping the Turkish window of
opportunity open. This is logical, as Turkey has the world's largest
Abkhazian diaspora and the second-largest army in NATO.
Armenia has defined this approach as the policy of complementarism.
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and even Kyrgyzstan are pursuing
this policy too, to a larger or smaller degree.
Moreover, Russia itself does not want to fight the West, especially
amid a large-scale economic crisis.
A compromise between Moscow and Washington on many security issues
in Eurasia and outside it will be very difficult to achieve, at least
in the near future. On the other hand, many strategic issues such as
nuclear security, WMD proliferation, Iran, North Korea, the Middle
East and Afghanistan should be addressed jointly.
The CSTO is unlikely to become a Eurasian NATO soon, but it can
and should try to become an effective tool for ensuring security in
Central Asia.
*Sergei Markedonov is a visiting fellow of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, DC
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.