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AZERBAIJAN-ISRAEL: FIRM ALLIANCE? (1)
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
April 18 2012
Turkey
Conspiracy theories about Israeli-Azerbaijan arms deals are abound,
each new one spawning the next. One immediate effect of this is
that Azerbaijan's strategic partnership with Tel-Aviv has become
more costly; the relationship has always carried concerns about the
potential impact on bilateral relations with Turkey, as well as with
other Muslim countries.
In fact, until 2008, Israel, with strong US support, was a vital
external supporter of the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgian geopolitical
axis. But 2009 saw a deep crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations, when
Turkey condemned Israel's involvement in the Israel-Gaza conflict.
Suddenly Baku was Israel's only strategic ally in the Muslim world --
historically Azerbaijan followed Turkey and Egypt in developing deeper
bilateral strategic and economic relations with Israel. And until
2009, this balance continued, never questioned by Turkey. However,
there is a growing tendency in Turkey, among the public as well as
government officials, to wonder openly about Azerbaijan's allegiances.
Since the deterioration of Ankara-Tel Aviv relations, Azerbaijan
has faced a dilemma: can an enemy of a friend be a friend? Baku has
followed the Jewish aphorism, "Don't sell the sun to buy a candle,"
and has tried to maintain cordial relations with the two countries.
Thus at this point, the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship can best
be described as "strategic, but not diplomatic." Here are some
perspectives on the broader geopolitical significance of the dilemma:
Azerbaijan-Israel thaw related to Washington's policy shift not
Turkey's spat with Israel It is a misunderstanding that Israel
developed its partnership with Baku, in order to maintain its
only Muslim alliance, after losing the strategic partnership with
Turkey. In fact, it's much more to do with US foreign policy towards
Turkey. Since 2008, Washington seems to have moved away from the
Caucasus, and therefore it is in US interests to maintain its strategic
interest in the countries of the Caucasus via Israel. It's difficult
to believe that the United States and Israel are not coordinating
their activities in the Caucasus. Moreover, Azerbaijan and Georgia
see Israel as a messenger to the US, and as a country that can help
them strengthen relations with Washington.
Azerbaijan's partnership with Israel is in Ankara's interests
When Turkey's relations with Israel deteriorated, strengthening the
anti-Israeli front in the Middle East, one of Israel's main strategies
was to take counter-measures against Turkey by establishing close
cooperation with the Armenian diaspora in the US, and beginning talks
about recognizing the 1915 events as a genocide. In December 2011,
when the Israeli Knesset began to discuss the prospect of officially
recognizing 1915, the Azerbaijani diaspora, namely the Association
Israel-Azerbaijan (AZIZ), denied the genocide, and called for the
government to refrain from making any official statements, and wait
for the decision to be made in an international, academic forum.
Hence, in the end Israel decided not to recognize the 1915 events
as genocide, from which one can conclude that they were wary of
touching upon issues sensitive to Azerbaijan, and understood that
any dalliances with the Armenian lobby would be harshly criticized
by Azerbaijan. Furthermore, as part of their strategic alliance with
Azerbaijan, Israel and the Jewish lobby have refused to support the
genocide resolution in the US and have assisted Turkish efforts to
block it.
Azerbaijan is vital for Israel's energy sector This might seem
surprising, but by 2009 Azerbaijan was providing 25-30 percent of all
Israeli oil imports and according to the State Customs Committee of
Azerbaijan, Israel was Azerbaijan's sixth largest trading partner,
with a turnover of $295.9 million in January and February 2012. An
indication of the existence of this odd alliance is that Israeli
companies are active in the Azerbaijani energy sector: Modcon Systems
Ltd., an Israel-based supplier of high-level technology to the oil and
gas industries, has a branch in Azerbaijan. Further, given that Israel
cannot buy gas from Iran under the current conditions of hostility, and
in light of the fact that Iraq and Israel have technically been at war
since 1948, Baku is the country's only potential gas supplier. But this
reliance on Baku depends on the countries relations with Turkey; if
they improve, Israel may consider building an underwater gas pipeline
to Haifa and an oil pipeline extension from Ceyhan to Ashkelon to
reduce their reliance on Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan supported Palestine and Lebanon despite good relations with
Israel Even with the strong economic and political cooperation between
Azerbaijan and Israel, Azerbaijan sided with Palestine. The Azerbaijani
government decided to send an official delegation to the Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC- now Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
Parliamentary Assembly on the crisis in Gaza. In addition, last year
Palestine opened an embassy in Azerbaijan, in line with Baku's legal
recognition of an independent, sovereign state of Palestine. To
put this in context, Baku has supported all international legal
documents that address the Israel-Palestinian issue. When Israel
occupied Lebanon, Azerbaijan was one of the eight OIC states to send
an ultimatum to Israel to stop violent action in Lebanon. Baku also
agreed to send peacekeeping forces to Lebanon.
"Shared strategic interests" Azerbaijan-Israel relations are based on
the exchange of oil for technology and military equipment. This quid
pro quo of "shared strategic interests" means the containment of Iran,
and to a lesser extent Russia. This shared interest dates back to the
1990s when Iran was supplying natural gas and fuel to Armenia, which
helped sustain Armenian action, with Iran using Armenia as a potential
buffer against the future rise of Azerbaijan. In contrast, during the
Nagorno-Karabakh war Israel provided military equipment, including
Stinger missiles, to Azerbaijan. That had a major impact on Iranian
and Azerbaijani relations; two traditional neighbors became "rival
brothers", and at the same time Israel moved from being a friend to a
strategic partner for Azerbaijan. In recent years this cooperation has
gained new meaning, as Iran has directly or indirectly sought to start
a proxy war, supporting terrorist actions in Azerbaijani territory.
Next we will address the question: is this relationship like an
iceberg, nine-tenths below the surface?
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
April 18 2012
Turkey
Conspiracy theories about Israeli-Azerbaijan arms deals are abound,
each new one spawning the next. One immediate effect of this is
that Azerbaijan's strategic partnership with Tel-Aviv has become
more costly; the relationship has always carried concerns about the
potential impact on bilateral relations with Turkey, as well as with
other Muslim countries.
In fact, until 2008, Israel, with strong US support, was a vital
external supporter of the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgian geopolitical
axis. But 2009 saw a deep crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations, when
Turkey condemned Israel's involvement in the Israel-Gaza conflict.
Suddenly Baku was Israel's only strategic ally in the Muslim world --
historically Azerbaijan followed Turkey and Egypt in developing deeper
bilateral strategic and economic relations with Israel. And until
2009, this balance continued, never questioned by Turkey. However,
there is a growing tendency in Turkey, among the public as well as
government officials, to wonder openly about Azerbaijan's allegiances.
Since the deterioration of Ankara-Tel Aviv relations, Azerbaijan
has faced a dilemma: can an enemy of a friend be a friend? Baku has
followed the Jewish aphorism, "Don't sell the sun to buy a candle,"
and has tried to maintain cordial relations with the two countries.
Thus at this point, the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship can best
be described as "strategic, but not diplomatic." Here are some
perspectives on the broader geopolitical significance of the dilemma:
Azerbaijan-Israel thaw related to Washington's policy shift not
Turkey's spat with Israel It is a misunderstanding that Israel
developed its partnership with Baku, in order to maintain its
only Muslim alliance, after losing the strategic partnership with
Turkey. In fact, it's much more to do with US foreign policy towards
Turkey. Since 2008, Washington seems to have moved away from the
Caucasus, and therefore it is in US interests to maintain its strategic
interest in the countries of the Caucasus via Israel. It's difficult
to believe that the United States and Israel are not coordinating
their activities in the Caucasus. Moreover, Azerbaijan and Georgia
see Israel as a messenger to the US, and as a country that can help
them strengthen relations with Washington.
Azerbaijan's partnership with Israel is in Ankara's interests
When Turkey's relations with Israel deteriorated, strengthening the
anti-Israeli front in the Middle East, one of Israel's main strategies
was to take counter-measures against Turkey by establishing close
cooperation with the Armenian diaspora in the US, and beginning talks
about recognizing the 1915 events as a genocide. In December 2011,
when the Israeli Knesset began to discuss the prospect of officially
recognizing 1915, the Azerbaijani diaspora, namely the Association
Israel-Azerbaijan (AZIZ), denied the genocide, and called for the
government to refrain from making any official statements, and wait
for the decision to be made in an international, academic forum.
Hence, in the end Israel decided not to recognize the 1915 events
as genocide, from which one can conclude that they were wary of
touching upon issues sensitive to Azerbaijan, and understood that
any dalliances with the Armenian lobby would be harshly criticized
by Azerbaijan. Furthermore, as part of their strategic alliance with
Azerbaijan, Israel and the Jewish lobby have refused to support the
genocide resolution in the US and have assisted Turkish efforts to
block it.
Azerbaijan is vital for Israel's energy sector This might seem
surprising, but by 2009 Azerbaijan was providing 25-30 percent of all
Israeli oil imports and according to the State Customs Committee of
Azerbaijan, Israel was Azerbaijan's sixth largest trading partner,
with a turnover of $295.9 million in January and February 2012. An
indication of the existence of this odd alliance is that Israeli
companies are active in the Azerbaijani energy sector: Modcon Systems
Ltd., an Israel-based supplier of high-level technology to the oil and
gas industries, has a branch in Azerbaijan. Further, given that Israel
cannot buy gas from Iran under the current conditions of hostility, and
in light of the fact that Iraq and Israel have technically been at war
since 1948, Baku is the country's only potential gas supplier. But this
reliance on Baku depends on the countries relations with Turkey; if
they improve, Israel may consider building an underwater gas pipeline
to Haifa and an oil pipeline extension from Ceyhan to Ashkelon to
reduce their reliance on Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan supported Palestine and Lebanon despite good relations with
Israel Even with the strong economic and political cooperation between
Azerbaijan and Israel, Azerbaijan sided with Palestine. The Azerbaijani
government decided to send an official delegation to the Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC- now Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
Parliamentary Assembly on the crisis in Gaza. In addition, last year
Palestine opened an embassy in Azerbaijan, in line with Baku's legal
recognition of an independent, sovereign state of Palestine. To
put this in context, Baku has supported all international legal
documents that address the Israel-Palestinian issue. When Israel
occupied Lebanon, Azerbaijan was one of the eight OIC states to send
an ultimatum to Israel to stop violent action in Lebanon. Baku also
agreed to send peacekeeping forces to Lebanon.
"Shared strategic interests" Azerbaijan-Israel relations are based on
the exchange of oil for technology and military equipment. This quid
pro quo of "shared strategic interests" means the containment of Iran,
and to a lesser extent Russia. This shared interest dates back to the
1990s when Iran was supplying natural gas and fuel to Armenia, which
helped sustain Armenian action, with Iran using Armenia as a potential
buffer against the future rise of Azerbaijan. In contrast, during the
Nagorno-Karabakh war Israel provided military equipment, including
Stinger missiles, to Azerbaijan. That had a major impact on Iranian
and Azerbaijani relations; two traditional neighbors became "rival
brothers", and at the same time Israel moved from being a friend to a
strategic partner for Azerbaijan. In recent years this cooperation has
gained new meaning, as Iran has directly or indirectly sought to start
a proxy war, supporting terrorist actions in Azerbaijani territory.
Next we will address the question: is this relationship like an
iceberg, nine-tenths below the surface?