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'Baku's ties with Jerusalem are more important than with Teheran'
Sat 28 April 2012 05:54 GMT | 6:54 Local Time
News.Az interviews Israeli political scientist Vladimir Mesamed, an
expert of the Middle East Institute (Moscow).
How do you condition the recent deterioration of relations between
Baku and Tehran?
It seems to me that a serious fact affecting the Iranian-Azerbaijani
dialogue is the more crystallized orientation of Baku to the West. The
Republic of Azerbaijan is the state in the South Caucasus region,
which strategically attracts the US more than others. The features of
this country such as belonging to the Caspian region with its vast
hydrocarbon reserves and a special significance of this country for
Iran because of ethnicity and historical destiny are important for
Washington. The US is attracted by the fact that despite the
relatively developed democratic institutions in Azerbaijan, this
country to some extent has the authoritarian presidential power, with
which it can talk and negotiate.
In recent years, Azerbaijan has been more confidently entering the
western structures, thus demonstrating its commitment to the
pro-Western path of development. Thus, the orientation of Baku to the
West can be considered quite an accomplished act. This is realized
also in Iran where the steps of Azerbaijan are taken with sympathy,
demonstrating its independence, where, however, "red lines" are
placed, making the West accept this reality. In this key, I would
consider the decision that Baku made several years ago to withdraw its
peacekeepers from Iraq. It was taken with a bang in Teheran which
realized that it would not become an obstacle to dialogue with the
West and not harm military cooperation with the US. Iranians here also
have to put up with the existing reality.
Another factor casting shadow on the dialogue between Tehran and Baku,
which is important for the both sides, is the development of relations
between Azerbaijan and Israel. Israel is an essential buyer of Azeri
oil. These countries are very tightly cooperating in military and
technological spheres. Now, nearly a quarter of the "black gold"
consumed by the Israeli market is accounted for Azerbaijan. Due to
this fact, Azerbaijan ranks first among Muslim countries in turnover
with Israel. The both countries need each other. For Israel, it's an
undoubted benefit to get a true partner, a moderate Muslim republic
with a dominant Shiite population, located on the border with Iran.
Azerbaijan will be able to benefit from these advantages of the Jewish
state as a bridge to the West, from the possibility of using the
Jewish lobby in the U.S., from the provider of advanced technology and
know-how, and from the presence in Israel of sufficiently large and
influential community of immigrants from that country. Israel has an
impact on all the leading countries in the world, and this factor is
certainly capable of positively effecting the protection of the
interests of Azerbaijan in the international arena. In this regard, it
is important to note the statement made by the leader of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev during the visit of Israeli President Shimon Peres to
Baku July 2009 that the people and government of Azerbaijan consider
Israel as a strategic partner and are committed to cooperate with
Israel in all possible directions.
To some extent, direct contacts between the leaders of two countries
(the latest example of this - the visit of the Israeli Foreign
Minister Avigdor Lieberman to Baku) show that, without removing the
entire action of the Iranian factor, Azerbaijan will consider it at
minimal. It is safe to say that Iran has long received a message that
for Ilham Aliyev who took the pro-Western course, relations of Baku
with Washington and Jerusalem, both in the strategic and tactical
context, are more important than the dubious "friendship" with Tehran.
As for the substance of your question, the current stage, no doubt, is
very heavy for Tehran, where the fate of the very regime of the
country is at stake, and the country is experiencing a powerful
economic and political pressure. The victory of fundamentalists in the
recent parliamentary elections in Iran could mean even more stringent
resistance of the regime against measures of to break the deadlock. In
this situation, Iranians tend to appeal to their natural allies,
which, no doubt, include the Republic of Azerbaijan. Seeing how
Azerbaijan more clearly takes the side of the West, which the Iranian
propaganda calls the "outsider" (biganegan), the leaders of Iran, in
their natural reaction, are tightening attacks on Baku.
In the foreign policy of Teheran and in many other spheres, many
things are governed by religion. In this sense, how can be explained
the fact that in political terms, Iran is closer to Christian Armenia,
rather than the same Shiite Azerbaijan? It is just the matte of
Azerbaijani-Israeli relations?
Much enough has been said about the convergence of Iran and Armenia. I
will not repeat already voiced versions. Let me just say one thing -
it does not have a strategic character, but is subject to tactical
trends emanating from the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus
as a sensitive node of world politics. Iran simply does not have other
choice. Pro-Western regimes Tbilisi and Baku are sufficiently enough
pushing Teheran to not always unambiguously good and frank embrace of
Moscow and Yerevan. With its financial resources (even in light of the
difficult economic situation in the country, with recognition of the
fact that as a result of economic sanctions of the international
community, Iran during the last year failed to receive 28 billion
petrodollars), Iran provides Yerevan serious economic preferences.
Let's pay attention to the last statement of Armenian Ambassador to
Iran Arakelyan that "the Armenian-Iranian relations were close and
friendly from time immemorial, and now the relations between Armenia
and Iran are the warmest among countries in the region." Let us cast
away sentiments and take the facts. An oil pipeline between the two
countries that will soon be constructed really helps Iran overcome the
international blockade. The pipeline with length of 365 km is assumed
to be commissioned in 2014.
It has a significant political aspect: the oil embargo on the supply
of hydrocarbons from Iran will strengthen the economic cooperation
between these two countries. The recent statement of Iranian diplomat
Ali Akbar Salehi shows that the countries are going to maximize the
potential of trade links in order to bring it to USD 1bn a year in the
near future. So the Shiites can, if necessary, forget the fraternal
feelings towards their fellow human beings and because of the economic
and market feasibility to be friends with the enemies of friends.
How logical is the conclusion of the author of publication The Foreign
Policy that Israel intends to use the territory of Azerbaijan to bomb
Iran, given that Azerbaijan and Israel do not have a common border,
and also separated by not very friendly countries to Israel?
I do not think that there is logic here. Israel has repeatedly brushed
aside such statements. In addition, Israel is well aware of the
sensitivity of the relationship between Baku and Tehran, and does not
want to toughen them. Recall in this connection the example of the
appointment of an ambassador of Israel in Ashgabat. Seeing that the
proposed nomination could trigger a worsening of relations between
Iran and Turkmenistan, Israel expressed understanding of the situation
and as a result, decided to make another appointment to the post of
ambassador.
In unofficial conversations, diplomats acknowledge that Azerbaijan
does not open its embassy in Israel because of its unwillingness to
irritate the southern neighbor. However, can Baku go for it in case of
further deterioration in relations with Tehran, and what will it lead
to?
Regarding the first part of your question, I think it is. We in Israel
are well aware what connects the Persians and Azerbaijanis: the
territorial neighborhood, confessional identity, time-tested common
historical destinies. Besides, Iran has provided assistance to
Azerbaijan in the formation and stabilization of the state - it helped
Azerbaijan to join a number of global structures, in particular, the
Organization of Islamic Conference and ECO, established cooperation in
political, trade and economic sphere.
Therefore, Jerusalem would not promote the distancing of the two
countries and peoples from each other, although objectively is
interested in it. However, in this context, let's give examples of
Astana and Tashkent. Their dialogue is fruitful in both directions -
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are friends with Israel and Iran at the same
time. Their embassies have been operating more than a decade and a
half, also in Tel Aviv. However, any comparison as we know "is
limping".
Dr. Vladimir Mesamed lives and works in Jerusalem (Israel). He is a
graduate of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Tashkent State
University. In 1984 he defended his thesis at the Institute of
Oriental Studies in Moscow. In 1994 he immigrated to Israel. Prior to
that, he worked as head of the Department of Radio and Television
Broadcasting to Iran of Republic of Uzbekistan. Since 1996 he has
taught Iranian studies at the Institute of Asia and Africa of the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In parallel, in 1995-2008, he worked
in the broadcast on Iran of radio station "Kol Israel" ("Voice of
Israel").
Since 2008, he also teaches at the Open University of Israel. From
1997, he is a representative of journal "Central Asia and the
Caucasus" (Sweden) in the Middle East. In 1999 - 2003, he was a
columnist of applications "Abroad" of newspaper "News of the Week"
(Tel Aviv). From 2002, he was a political commentator of TV Israel
Plus. Since 2006, he is an expert at the Middle East Institute
(Moscow). He is the author of numerous books and magazine and
newspaper articles on various topical issues of Oriental Studies,
published in Israel, and Russia, Sweden, Germany, USA, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.
F.H.
News.Az
Sat 28 April 2012 05:54 GMT | 6:54 Local Time
News.Az interviews Israeli political scientist Vladimir Mesamed, an
expert of the Middle East Institute (Moscow).
How do you condition the recent deterioration of relations between
Baku and Tehran?
It seems to me that a serious fact affecting the Iranian-Azerbaijani
dialogue is the more crystallized orientation of Baku to the West. The
Republic of Azerbaijan is the state in the South Caucasus region,
which strategically attracts the US more than others. The features of
this country such as belonging to the Caspian region with its vast
hydrocarbon reserves and a special significance of this country for
Iran because of ethnicity and historical destiny are important for
Washington. The US is attracted by the fact that despite the
relatively developed democratic institutions in Azerbaijan, this
country to some extent has the authoritarian presidential power, with
which it can talk and negotiate.
In recent years, Azerbaijan has been more confidently entering the
western structures, thus demonstrating its commitment to the
pro-Western path of development. Thus, the orientation of Baku to the
West can be considered quite an accomplished act. This is realized
also in Iran where the steps of Azerbaijan are taken with sympathy,
demonstrating its independence, where, however, "red lines" are
placed, making the West accept this reality. In this key, I would
consider the decision that Baku made several years ago to withdraw its
peacekeepers from Iraq. It was taken with a bang in Teheran which
realized that it would not become an obstacle to dialogue with the
West and not harm military cooperation with the US. Iranians here also
have to put up with the existing reality.
Another factor casting shadow on the dialogue between Tehran and Baku,
which is important for the both sides, is the development of relations
between Azerbaijan and Israel. Israel is an essential buyer of Azeri
oil. These countries are very tightly cooperating in military and
technological spheres. Now, nearly a quarter of the "black gold"
consumed by the Israeli market is accounted for Azerbaijan. Due to
this fact, Azerbaijan ranks first among Muslim countries in turnover
with Israel. The both countries need each other. For Israel, it's an
undoubted benefit to get a true partner, a moderate Muslim republic
with a dominant Shiite population, located on the border with Iran.
Azerbaijan will be able to benefit from these advantages of the Jewish
state as a bridge to the West, from the possibility of using the
Jewish lobby in the U.S., from the provider of advanced technology and
know-how, and from the presence in Israel of sufficiently large and
influential community of immigrants from that country. Israel has an
impact on all the leading countries in the world, and this factor is
certainly capable of positively effecting the protection of the
interests of Azerbaijan in the international arena. In this regard, it
is important to note the statement made by the leader of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev during the visit of Israeli President Shimon Peres to
Baku July 2009 that the people and government of Azerbaijan consider
Israel as a strategic partner and are committed to cooperate with
Israel in all possible directions.
To some extent, direct contacts between the leaders of two countries
(the latest example of this - the visit of the Israeli Foreign
Minister Avigdor Lieberman to Baku) show that, without removing the
entire action of the Iranian factor, Azerbaijan will consider it at
minimal. It is safe to say that Iran has long received a message that
for Ilham Aliyev who took the pro-Western course, relations of Baku
with Washington and Jerusalem, both in the strategic and tactical
context, are more important than the dubious "friendship" with Tehran.
As for the substance of your question, the current stage, no doubt, is
very heavy for Tehran, where the fate of the very regime of the
country is at stake, and the country is experiencing a powerful
economic and political pressure. The victory of fundamentalists in the
recent parliamentary elections in Iran could mean even more stringent
resistance of the regime against measures of to break the deadlock. In
this situation, Iranians tend to appeal to their natural allies,
which, no doubt, include the Republic of Azerbaijan. Seeing how
Azerbaijan more clearly takes the side of the West, which the Iranian
propaganda calls the "outsider" (biganegan), the leaders of Iran, in
their natural reaction, are tightening attacks on Baku.
In the foreign policy of Teheran and in many other spheres, many
things are governed by religion. In this sense, how can be explained
the fact that in political terms, Iran is closer to Christian Armenia,
rather than the same Shiite Azerbaijan? It is just the matte of
Azerbaijani-Israeli relations?
Much enough has been said about the convergence of Iran and Armenia. I
will not repeat already voiced versions. Let me just say one thing -
it does not have a strategic character, but is subject to tactical
trends emanating from the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus
as a sensitive node of world politics. Iran simply does not have other
choice. Pro-Western regimes Tbilisi and Baku are sufficiently enough
pushing Teheran to not always unambiguously good and frank embrace of
Moscow and Yerevan. With its financial resources (even in light of the
difficult economic situation in the country, with recognition of the
fact that as a result of economic sanctions of the international
community, Iran during the last year failed to receive 28 billion
petrodollars), Iran provides Yerevan serious economic preferences.
Let's pay attention to the last statement of Armenian Ambassador to
Iran Arakelyan that "the Armenian-Iranian relations were close and
friendly from time immemorial, and now the relations between Armenia
and Iran are the warmest among countries in the region." Let us cast
away sentiments and take the facts. An oil pipeline between the two
countries that will soon be constructed really helps Iran overcome the
international blockade. The pipeline with length of 365 km is assumed
to be commissioned in 2014.
It has a significant political aspect: the oil embargo on the supply
of hydrocarbons from Iran will strengthen the economic cooperation
between these two countries. The recent statement of Iranian diplomat
Ali Akbar Salehi shows that the countries are going to maximize the
potential of trade links in order to bring it to USD 1bn a year in the
near future. So the Shiites can, if necessary, forget the fraternal
feelings towards their fellow human beings and because of the economic
and market feasibility to be friends with the enemies of friends.
How logical is the conclusion of the author of publication The Foreign
Policy that Israel intends to use the territory of Azerbaijan to bomb
Iran, given that Azerbaijan and Israel do not have a common border,
and also separated by not very friendly countries to Israel?
I do not think that there is logic here. Israel has repeatedly brushed
aside such statements. In addition, Israel is well aware of the
sensitivity of the relationship between Baku and Tehran, and does not
want to toughen them. Recall in this connection the example of the
appointment of an ambassador of Israel in Ashgabat. Seeing that the
proposed nomination could trigger a worsening of relations between
Iran and Turkmenistan, Israel expressed understanding of the situation
and as a result, decided to make another appointment to the post of
ambassador.
In unofficial conversations, diplomats acknowledge that Azerbaijan
does not open its embassy in Israel because of its unwillingness to
irritate the southern neighbor. However, can Baku go for it in case of
further deterioration in relations with Tehran, and what will it lead
to?
Regarding the first part of your question, I think it is. We in Israel
are well aware what connects the Persians and Azerbaijanis: the
territorial neighborhood, confessional identity, time-tested common
historical destinies. Besides, Iran has provided assistance to
Azerbaijan in the formation and stabilization of the state - it helped
Azerbaijan to join a number of global structures, in particular, the
Organization of Islamic Conference and ECO, established cooperation in
political, trade and economic sphere.
Therefore, Jerusalem would not promote the distancing of the two
countries and peoples from each other, although objectively is
interested in it. However, in this context, let's give examples of
Astana and Tashkent. Their dialogue is fruitful in both directions -
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are friends with Israel and Iran at the same
time. Their embassies have been operating more than a decade and a
half, also in Tel Aviv. However, any comparison as we know "is
limping".
Dr. Vladimir Mesamed lives and works in Jerusalem (Israel). He is a
graduate of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Tashkent State
University. In 1984 he defended his thesis at the Institute of
Oriental Studies in Moscow. In 1994 he immigrated to Israel. Prior to
that, he worked as head of the Department of Radio and Television
Broadcasting to Iran of Republic of Uzbekistan. Since 1996 he has
taught Iranian studies at the Institute of Asia and Africa of the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In parallel, in 1995-2008, he worked
in the broadcast on Iran of radio station "Kol Israel" ("Voice of
Israel").
Since 2008, he also teaches at the Open University of Israel. From
1997, he is a representative of journal "Central Asia and the
Caucasus" (Sweden) in the Middle East. In 1999 - 2003, he was a
columnist of applications "Abroad" of newspaper "News of the Week"
(Tel Aviv). From 2002, he was a political commentator of TV Israel
Plus. Since 2006, he is an expert at the Middle East Institute
(Moscow). He is the author of numerous books and magazine and
newspaper articles on various topical issues of Oriental Studies,
published in Israel, and Russia, Sweden, Germany, USA, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.
F.H.
News.Az