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BLEAK FUTURE FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH: RESOLUTION IN STASIS
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Nov 28 2012
ZAUR SHIRIYEV [email protected]
The Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the South Caucasus'
biggest security threat and a continued blockade to future development
of the region, remains unresolved. There has been no tangible progress
in "ending the war"-- the 1994 cease-fire agreement might have ended
the intensive military campaign, but the two states are still at
war. The situation is bleak; there is no peace process, no negotiations
and in this regard, the situation is deteriorating. In fact, since
a January meeting in Sochi of the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian
presidents, the presidents of the conflicting parties have not met;
only their respective foreign ministers have done so. Igor Popov, the
Russian co-chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group, the main facilitator of the peace process,
made it clear a few days ago that such a meeting is not expected in
the coming months.
After their recently concluded visit to the region in November,
the Minsk Group stated that the foreign ministers of the conflicting
sides could meet in Dublin at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting
on Dec. 6-7. It is worth remembering, however, that this is not an
instruction but merely a statement of hope and many such statements
have been issued before to no avail.
The question is not whether the OSCE Minsk Group is effective but
rather, in what direction the conflict resolution is heading; what
is Moscow's strategy, what are the fixed features of the situation
and what are the unfixed variables?
First and foremost is the end of the "trilateral meeting" format,
launched by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The last meeting
of this type was held in January, just before Medvedev handed the
presidency back to Putin. This initiative by Russia stemmed from two
factors: firstly, the need to repair its damaged regional image after
the 2008 August Russo-Georgian war, and secondly, Medvedev's personal
efforts to find a diplomatic solution.
Russia's current president, Vladimir Putin, has a different personal
relationship with the leaders of each of the conflicting parties --
less progressive and less friendly than his predecessor. Putin likely
sees the maintenance of the conflict's status quo as the best option in
the near future; his interest in a peaceful resolution of the conflict
would be as the broker of an agreement that bolsters Moscow's interests
and reputation. Moreover, beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
Russia is now engaged in a period of "hidden war" with Azerbaijan
and Armenia. In the case of Armenia, Moscow is sending mixed signals
to Yerevan regarding next February's presidential elections, and
supporting alternatives to the incumbent, President Serzh Sargsyan.
Towards Azerbaijan, the attitude is more complex. Moscow failed to
reach a compromise on the lease of the Gabala radar station, which is
ending next month without a clear prospect of renewal. In relation to
this, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan recently paid a visit to
the northern part of Azerbaijan and held meetings with members of the
Lezgin separatist movement, Sadval, although Russia officially denied
such meetings. Several months ago, Moscow hosted an international
conference of Lezgins in a building owned by the Russian presidential
administration. Additionally, there is speculation that Russia is
grooming its own presidential candidate for the 2013 elections in
Azerbaijan from a newly formed "Union of Azerbaijani Organizations
in Russia," which consists of Azerbaijani billionaires living in
Russia. This could all be rumors, but there are indications that the
Azerbaijani leadership is dissatisfied with Moscow's behavior. A few
days ago, President Ilham Aliyev made reference to Moscow continuing
to see the post-Soviet space as its colonized zone. For the first
time in years, Azerbaijanis are feeling real concern -- the threat
from Russia seems to be drawing closer.
While there have been increased efforts by civil society to build trust
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis at the expert level and among the
younger generation, this is far removed from real political gains.
Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC)
in Yerevan, believes that: "As tension over this unresolved conflict
has steadily increased over the past two years, a virtual war of
words is now only likely to get worse and may further exacerbate the
already fragile ceasefire. With the Armenian presidential election
set for this coming February, the likelihood for any real progress
in diplomacy seems particularly low, while the danger for renewed
hostilities only grows."
The belief is not simply that during election periods parties are
less eager to negotiate. In the Armenian presidential campaign we
can see an interesting development. Since 1998, Armenian presidents
have been from Karabakh, sometimes referred to as "Karabakh clans,"
dominating Armenian domestic politics with the Karabakh issue. It
would be a real challenge to break this tradition, but one of the
possible presidential candidates, the leader of the Heritage Party,
Raffi Hovannisian, essentially launched his presidential campaign out
of Baku, even if he does not diverge significantly from the policies
of the current leadership.
Thus, in the zero-sum reading of current developments, the key message
is that at least until February 2013 we will see stagnation in conflict
resolution, notwithstanding the importance and unpredictability of
Russia's position along with the reactions of the US and other Western
countries. One thing is clear: the mediators must maximize their
roles. They must possess knowledge of the creative process and have
the capacity to move from one form of negotiations to another: formal
to informal, one-on-one or side talks. Most of all, the "geography"
of the negotiations needs to change; the negotiations that have come
the closest to success took place out of Russia's shadow. The way to
end this war is to end the expectation of war and only by changing
the expectations on both sides can this be achieved.
The leadership and the public in both countries must recognize that
no third party can resolve the conflict; it is up to them.
From: A. Papazian
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Nov 28 2012
ZAUR SHIRIYEV [email protected]
The Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the South Caucasus'
biggest security threat and a continued blockade to future development
of the region, remains unresolved. There has been no tangible progress
in "ending the war"-- the 1994 cease-fire agreement might have ended
the intensive military campaign, but the two states are still at
war. The situation is bleak; there is no peace process, no negotiations
and in this regard, the situation is deteriorating. In fact, since
a January meeting in Sochi of the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian
presidents, the presidents of the conflicting parties have not met;
only their respective foreign ministers have done so. Igor Popov, the
Russian co-chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group, the main facilitator of the peace process,
made it clear a few days ago that such a meeting is not expected in
the coming months.
After their recently concluded visit to the region in November,
the Minsk Group stated that the foreign ministers of the conflicting
sides could meet in Dublin at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting
on Dec. 6-7. It is worth remembering, however, that this is not an
instruction but merely a statement of hope and many such statements
have been issued before to no avail.
The question is not whether the OSCE Minsk Group is effective but
rather, in what direction the conflict resolution is heading; what
is Moscow's strategy, what are the fixed features of the situation
and what are the unfixed variables?
First and foremost is the end of the "trilateral meeting" format,
launched by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The last meeting
of this type was held in January, just before Medvedev handed the
presidency back to Putin. This initiative by Russia stemmed from two
factors: firstly, the need to repair its damaged regional image after
the 2008 August Russo-Georgian war, and secondly, Medvedev's personal
efforts to find a diplomatic solution.
Russia's current president, Vladimir Putin, has a different personal
relationship with the leaders of each of the conflicting parties --
less progressive and less friendly than his predecessor. Putin likely
sees the maintenance of the conflict's status quo as the best option in
the near future; his interest in a peaceful resolution of the conflict
would be as the broker of an agreement that bolsters Moscow's interests
and reputation. Moreover, beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
Russia is now engaged in a period of "hidden war" with Azerbaijan
and Armenia. In the case of Armenia, Moscow is sending mixed signals
to Yerevan regarding next February's presidential elections, and
supporting alternatives to the incumbent, President Serzh Sargsyan.
Towards Azerbaijan, the attitude is more complex. Moscow failed to
reach a compromise on the lease of the Gabala radar station, which is
ending next month without a clear prospect of renewal. In relation to
this, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan recently paid a visit to
the northern part of Azerbaijan and held meetings with members of the
Lezgin separatist movement, Sadval, although Russia officially denied
such meetings. Several months ago, Moscow hosted an international
conference of Lezgins in a building owned by the Russian presidential
administration. Additionally, there is speculation that Russia is
grooming its own presidential candidate for the 2013 elections in
Azerbaijan from a newly formed "Union of Azerbaijani Organizations
in Russia," which consists of Azerbaijani billionaires living in
Russia. This could all be rumors, but there are indications that the
Azerbaijani leadership is dissatisfied with Moscow's behavior. A few
days ago, President Ilham Aliyev made reference to Moscow continuing
to see the post-Soviet space as its colonized zone. For the first
time in years, Azerbaijanis are feeling real concern -- the threat
from Russia seems to be drawing closer.
While there have been increased efforts by civil society to build trust
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis at the expert level and among the
younger generation, this is far removed from real political gains.
Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC)
in Yerevan, believes that: "As tension over this unresolved conflict
has steadily increased over the past two years, a virtual war of
words is now only likely to get worse and may further exacerbate the
already fragile ceasefire. With the Armenian presidential election
set for this coming February, the likelihood for any real progress
in diplomacy seems particularly low, while the danger for renewed
hostilities only grows."
The belief is not simply that during election periods parties are
less eager to negotiate. In the Armenian presidential campaign we
can see an interesting development. Since 1998, Armenian presidents
have been from Karabakh, sometimes referred to as "Karabakh clans,"
dominating Armenian domestic politics with the Karabakh issue. It
would be a real challenge to break this tradition, but one of the
possible presidential candidates, the leader of the Heritage Party,
Raffi Hovannisian, essentially launched his presidential campaign out
of Baku, even if he does not diverge significantly from the policies
of the current leadership.
Thus, in the zero-sum reading of current developments, the key message
is that at least until February 2013 we will see stagnation in conflict
resolution, notwithstanding the importance and unpredictability of
Russia's position along with the reactions of the US and other Western
countries. One thing is clear: the mediators must maximize their
roles. They must possess knowledge of the creative process and have
the capacity to move from one form of negotiations to another: formal
to informal, one-on-one or side talks. Most of all, the "geography"
of the negotiations needs to change; the negotiations that have come
the closest to success took place out of Russia's shadow. The way to
end this war is to end the expectation of war and only by changing
the expectations on both sides can this be achieved.
The leadership and the public in both countries must recognize that
no third party can resolve the conflict; it is up to them.
From: A. Papazian