Tweet
GREATER KURDISTAN: A NEW ACTOR ON MIDDLE EAST MAP?
http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/11/29/greater-kurdistan-a-new-actor-on-middle-east-map.html
Andrei AKULOV | 29.11.2012 | 00:00
A new non-Arab important actor may soon appear on the Middle East
volatile map as the recent events testify. Only this month Kurdistan
was visited by Ukrainian (headed by Foreign Minister), Armenian and
Canadian delegations. The US team went there in October, Ni Jian,
the Chinese ambassador to Iraq, was in Erbil by the end of August.
Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ~_lu paid a symbolic visit to Kirkuk on
August 2, 2012, the first high level visit by Turkish official in
75 years. Much to the chagrin of Baghdad, the visit consolidates
Turkeyâ~@~Ys acceptance of Kurdistan and the importance it now plays
in stabilising the region. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry issued a sharp
rebuke to Turkey for violating its constitution as they claimed that
Davutoglu had neither requested nor obtained permission to enter
Kirkuk. But with Syria provoked into turmoil and US troops out of
the country, some believe that Turkey can offer the Kurdistan Region
political protection, sufficient technical expertise and access to
Western markets for its hydrocarbons.
On November 12, 2012 Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and a delegation
of senior officials from the Kurdistan Region concluded a two-day
visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran to promote greater cooperation
in economic and trade relations. With the volume of trade between the
Kurdistan Region and Iran estimated to be around $8 billion this year,
both sides agreed to develop relations.
In early April, 2012 Kurdistanâ~@~Ys President Massoud Barzani visited
the US to meet top officials, including President Barack Obama and Vice
President Joe Biden. Obama encouraged President Barzani to continue
playing a "vital role" in the Iraqi political processâ~@¦ Barzani
informed the US leaders about the current political crisis in Iraq
and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's "disrespect" to the articles of the
Erbil Agreement and the countryâ~@~Ys constitution. He warned that if
a solution were not found urgently, there was a threat that the country
would head toward dictatorship. President Barzani also met with U.S.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, no details released on the talks. He
encouraged American business to invest in Kurdistan and launched
the America-Kurdistan Business Council, which consists of American
companies investing and operating in Kurdistan. Being a guest
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Barzani said in
unambiguously that â~@~\if a solution to the increasing centralization
of power in the prime minister's hands cannot be negotiated, he
may ask the Kurdish Region's Parliament to consider a referendum to
determine the way forward." The fact that Obama received him alone and
not as part of an Iraqi delegation significantly boosted Barzaniâ~@~Ys
stature as a Kurdish national leader.
Long before that, in January 2012 he made no bones about it in an
interview with the BBC stating: â~@~\I like the Kurdistan Region to
evolve day by day. But what I really wish is to see an independent
Kurdistanâ~@~].
Economic prospects
Kurdistan regional government (KRG) controls parts of Iraqi Kurdistan
estimated to contain around 45 billion barrels of oil, making it the
sixth largest reserve in the world. The prospects in Kurdistan have
caught the attention of major oil traders, who are now prepared to
risk Baghdad's anger to gain a foothold in Kurdistan while the region
heads towards greater autonomy. US ExxonMobil has made public its
intention to sell off the Iraq's West Qurna 1 oil field stake for the
benefit of going to Kurdistan, where it had signed more lucrative oil
deals. Chevron and Total oil majors have done the same. The move will
exacerbate tensions between Baghdad and autonomous Kurdistan. Kurdish
officials say they have a constitutional right to do so, but the
central government dismisses the oil transactions as illegal. There is
nothing to be surprised about because 60% of Iraqi oil is produced in
Kurdistan. In October Kurdistan's oil has begun to reach international
markets in independent export deals that further challenge Baghdad's
claim to full control over Iraqi oil. The Kurds pay little attention
to the Iraqi government protests, the real problem is infrastructure.
In October trucks were used to transport oil to the Turkish port of
Ceyhan because the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline is unreliable often
hit by explosions. So far, Kurdistan's export volumes are tiny in
comparison to its daily exports via national pipelines, moving around
1,000 tons of oil per day (about 8,000 bpd) to Turkey by truck, but
deliveries are on the rise. According to Kurdish industry sources
condensate volumes were expected to reach 1,500 tons per day (about
12,000 bpd) soon and more trucks would be made available towards the
end of the year.
Military and political prospects
After the US invasion in 2003 Masoud Barzani took advantage of
Americaâ~@~Ys support and refused to sign the Iraqi new constitution
if the broad autonomy special status was not included. He managed to
achieve his goal. The disagreement with Baghdad followed, especially
related to the oil rich province of Kirkuk. Barzani warned he would
struggle for independence in case no accord is reached. A clash bodes
serious bloodshed; the Peshmergaâ~@~Ys strength is estimated to be
around 200 thousand, a force to reckon with. So far all efforts by
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki to bring the Kurds under strict
central government control have failed.
There are 5.3 million Kurds in Iraq, about one sixth of the population
of over 30 million, the majority living in Iran, Syria and Turkey with
significant Kurdish diasporas communities in Armenia, Georgia, Israel,
Azerbaijan, Russia, Lebanon and, in recent decades, some European
countries and the USA. The situation in Iraq is quite different from
what takes place in Iran, Syria and Turkey. For Instance Iran simply
doesnâ~@~Yt recognize the very existence of Kurds as a minority,
something aptly played on by the US and Israel.
Formed in 2004, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK),
an Israel-supported Kurdish guerrilla group, wages armed struggle
against Iran. The group had been carrying out attacks in the Iranian
Kurdish Province and other Kurdish-inhabited areas, and is closely
affiliated with the Kurdistan Workersâ~@~Y Party operating against
Turkey. There were large-scale clashes with Iranian armed forces In
2011 expected to reignite at any moment. Pursued by Iranian troops
some armed formations crossed the Iraqi border with border tensions
to follow. Like in the case of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in
Turkey, PJAK leaders say their long-term goals are to establish an
autonomous Kurdish region within the Iranian state replacing Iran's
theocracy with a democratic and federal government, where self-rule
is granted to all ethnic minorities of Iran, including Sunni, Arabs,
Azeris and Kurds. The PJRK certainly doesnâ~@~Yt represent the majority
of Iranian Kurds, at least not at present. But itâ~@~Ys a force to
count with and it has destructive potential.
In Syria President Assad granted the Kurds citizenship and certain
rights they hadnâ~@~Yt had before. The troops left the area where the
Kurds live granting them a right to defend it. Thatâ~@~Ys exactly what
theyâ~@~Yre doing fighting back the anti-government Syrian opposition
forces in the vicinity of Turkish border, something that evokes
anger in Ankara. Turkey is waging an unrelenting fight against the
PKK which is declared to be a terrorist, out of law organization there.
The Turkish Kurds have no autonomy and have to fight for their rights.
The Turkish tough stance against Syria has its ramifications. On
July 30, 2012 Hurriyet published an article called ANALYSIS - Kurdish
Nationalism on the Rise, by Semih Idiz devoted to the Kurdish issue in
present day Turkey. It reads, "Prime Minister ErdoÄ~_an cannot have it
both ways. Referring to Sunni Arabs who have risen against the al-Assad
regime as â~@~\freedom fighters who are combating state terror,â~@~]
but then turning and calling the equally oppressed Kurds who are
making political headway now in the confusion that reigns in Syria
â~@~\terroristsâ~@~] is hypocritical." The author adds as a wrap up,
â~@~\"What makes it even worse is that Turkey will most likely be
unable to do anything to prevent the emergence of an autonomous or
independent Kurdish region in Syria, if developments in that country
provide the Kurds with another historic opportunity, to complement
the one they gained in Iraq.
" The question of Kurdish independence has always troubled the
surrounding countries: none of them have ever wanted a Kurdish state.
With war going on in Syria, tensions between the Kurdish minority
may become a major geopolitical threat. As already mentioned Assad
has transferred troops away from the Kurdish provinces. One should
give the devil his due â~@~S so far Syria is the only state with
significant Kurds population to achieve success while tackling
the Kurds minority problem. If President Assad falls, Syria will
splinter into religiously or ethnically homogenous mini-states,
one of which will almost certainly be under Kurdish control. Coupled
with the recent emergence of a relatively independent Kurdish region
in Iraq, this would create something of a league of semi-autonomous
Kurdish states between the northeast regions of Syria and Iraq. This
combustible state of affairs alarms Turkey, which has waged a bloody,
three-decade civil war against its 14 million Kurds. Although it has
supported regime change in Syria, the Turkish government has fear of
a greater Kurdistan, and can be expected to strenuously resist any
attempt at Kurdish unification. Should that powder keg ignite, Turkey
could very well drag NATO into a cross-border shooting war with Syria.
US connection
The US â~@~S Kurds come and go game has its own story. During the
Richard Nixonâ~@~Ys tenure Iraq became friendly with the Soviet
Union. The US began to fund and encourage the Kurds to fight for
their independence against Saddam Hussein as part of a strategy
to weaken the Iraqi regime and general policy aimed at containing
the USSR. But just as the Kurdish independence movement was near to
success it became clear that the stance was part of a political ploy,
the United States didnâ~@~Yt really want independent Kurdistan,
so the support was withdrawn. The story of US betraying the Kurds
is described in the famous book by Stephen Hunter called The Second
Salladin released in 1998. Thatâ~@~Ys a history lesson that should
be remembered by Kurdish leaders dealing with the US.
The Turkish parliament's refusal to join the U.S.- led coalition
created to invade Iraq gave Iraqi Kurdistan a strategic boost. Rather
than transit Turkey, U.S. forces parachuted into the Harir airfield,
north of Erbil. The peshmerga participation cemented an enhanced
relationship. Also enhancing Kurdish influence in Washington has been
the KRG's hiring of former U.S. military and political officials to
represent them. The Kurdish participation alongside U.S. troops led
the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to express a sense of entitlement. The
withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and the new political tensions
along sectarian lines have also raised questions over whether Iraq
would split apart. Some experts believe that the US will only support
an independent Kurdish state if Baghdad becomes hostile toward US
interests in the region. The would support the Kurds if its relations
with the Iraqi government worsened. If so, it would need the support
of the Kurds as leverage against it.
In June 2006 the new Middle East map (1) prepared by retired US Army
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters was published in the June 2006 edition
of Armed Forces Journal under the title of Blood Borders: How a better
Middle East Would Look. The map was a key element in Mr. Petersâ~@~Y
book Never Quit the Fight, which was released the same year. Although
the map does not officially reflect Pentagon doctrine, it has been
used in a training program at NATO educational centers like Defense
College in Rome. Among other things it reduced Turkish landmass
and featured a â~@~\Free Kurdistanâ~@~] that included additional
territory taken from Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Iraq was presented as
just a fragment of what it is now, carved up to also include Sunnis
Iraq and the Arab Shia State.
The term New Middle East was introduced to the world in June 2006 in
Tel Aviv by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in replacement
of the Greater Middle East remaining much the same in substance. This
project consists in creating an arc of instability, chaos, and violence
extending from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian Gulf,
Iran, and the borders of NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan.
The Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan appear to be stepping
stones for extending U.S. influence into the former Soviet Union and
the ex-Soviet Republics of Central Asia, the region termed as Russian
â~@~\Near Abroad.â~@~]
Israeli connection
Over the years, Israel has provided training, military hardware, and
intelligence to Kurds in Northern Iraq, and since the 2003 Iraq war,
relations between Israel and Iraqi Kurds have continued to grow, as
both sides see that mutual cooperation to serve their best national
interest. It is important to note that Israelis have generally
demonstrated sympathy toward Iraqi Kurds, and historically there was
hardly any enmity between the two sides. By and large, both Israel
and the Kurds have at one point or another faced common hostility from
Arab states. At present the Israeli army has stepped up its military
activities in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan Region. In August 2011
Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles were stationed in Iraqi to operate
against Iran (2). Barzani gave Israel the green light to deploy them
in northern Iraq without gaining the approval of the Iraqi central
government in Baghdad, which has no diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv.
Israeli intelligence agents and military advisers, equipped with
special transmission devices, were reported to be sent to Mosul
to train Kurdish security forces. President Barzani has reportedly
agreed to the concession in return for the admission of a number of
Iraqi Kurd students to Israeli universities. On March 25 the Sunday
Times published the article called Israel Spies Scour Iran in Nuclear
Hunt (3). As the story goes Israel is using a permanent base in Iraqi
Kurdistan to launch cross-border intelligence missions in an attempt
to find "smoking gun" evidence that Iran is building a nuclear
warhead. According to Western intelligence sources, the Israelis
have been conducting such operations for several years. These risky
intelligence missions have been intensified to an unprecedented degree
in the past few months. On January 9, 2012 in an the article called
Lâ~@~YIran défie Lâ~@~YAmérique (Iran challenges America) French Le
Figaro ran a story of Israeli intelligence agency Mossad intensifying
its activities against Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan (4). Former Kurdish
leader Mustafa Barzani, Masoud Barzaniâ~@~Ys father, was considered
a friend to Israeli military and defense officials.
Conclusion
Kurdistan has all the trappings of a state: independent institutions
such as the presidency, the parliament, the constitution and the armed
forces (the Peshmerga - hundreds of thousands of seasoned troops)
the flourishing economy and the diplomatic ventures. Real borders
exist between the Kurdish and Arab parts of the Iraqi state. It also
has the flag, the anthem, the language and a strong desire to create
Greater Kurdistan independent from Arabs, Persians and Turks. But for
that to happen Greater Kurdistan would also have to be a great unifier
sharing power inside Iraqi Kurdistan and managing conflicting Kurdish
aspirations in Syria, Iran and Turkey. This requires adroit diplomacy
and long-term vision. The process of unification is a bumpy road. As
mentioned above, the situation of Kurds in Turkey is different from
that of Kurds in Iran which is different from that of Kurds in Iraq or
Syria. There are also Turks, Arabs, and Assyrians to name but a few
of the multitude of peoples in the region. There are also different
religions: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Yazdani.
Unification means getting together different groups with different
backgrounds, cultures and visions. Besides the process has two
options. A new secular, democratic non-Arab nation may appear to
change the volatile Middle East picture. The other outcome is the
emergence of a puppet on a string dancing to the tune of the USA,
Israel and the West in general, an element the allies Great Game
remix. Not all Kurds are adamant in their desire for cessation, there
are those who find the very idea of cessation and partition of Iraq
is a multifaceted problem with iffy gains.
References:
1. The map published by Armed Forces Journal June 2006 edition as an
illustration for the article How a better Middle East Would Look by
Ralph Peters: http://www.oilempire.us/new-map.html
2. Israel Deploys Drones In
Iraq. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bkVQh5CnRI
3. The Sunday Times. March 25, 2012,
Israel Spies Scour Iran in Nuclear Hunt:
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/public/sitesearch.do?querystring="Israeli+spies+scour+Ira n+in+nuclear+hunt"§ionId=7
4. Le Figaro, January 9, 2012, Lâ~@~YIran défie Lâ~@~YAmérique:
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2012/01/09/01003-20120109ARTFIG00640-l-iran-defie-l-amerique.php.
From: A. Papazian
http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/11/29/greater-kurdistan-a-new-actor-on-middle-east-map.html
Andrei AKULOV | 29.11.2012 | 00:00
A new non-Arab important actor may soon appear on the Middle East
volatile map as the recent events testify. Only this month Kurdistan
was visited by Ukrainian (headed by Foreign Minister), Armenian and
Canadian delegations. The US team went there in October, Ni Jian,
the Chinese ambassador to Iraq, was in Erbil by the end of August.
Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ~_lu paid a symbolic visit to Kirkuk on
August 2, 2012, the first high level visit by Turkish official in
75 years. Much to the chagrin of Baghdad, the visit consolidates
Turkeyâ~@~Ys acceptance of Kurdistan and the importance it now plays
in stabilising the region. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry issued a sharp
rebuke to Turkey for violating its constitution as they claimed that
Davutoglu had neither requested nor obtained permission to enter
Kirkuk. But with Syria provoked into turmoil and US troops out of
the country, some believe that Turkey can offer the Kurdistan Region
political protection, sufficient technical expertise and access to
Western markets for its hydrocarbons.
On November 12, 2012 Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and a delegation
of senior officials from the Kurdistan Region concluded a two-day
visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran to promote greater cooperation
in economic and trade relations. With the volume of trade between the
Kurdistan Region and Iran estimated to be around $8 billion this year,
both sides agreed to develop relations.
In early April, 2012 Kurdistanâ~@~Ys President Massoud Barzani visited
the US to meet top officials, including President Barack Obama and Vice
President Joe Biden. Obama encouraged President Barzani to continue
playing a "vital role" in the Iraqi political processâ~@¦ Barzani
informed the US leaders about the current political crisis in Iraq
and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's "disrespect" to the articles of the
Erbil Agreement and the countryâ~@~Ys constitution. He warned that if
a solution were not found urgently, there was a threat that the country
would head toward dictatorship. President Barzani also met with U.S.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, no details released on the talks. He
encouraged American business to invest in Kurdistan and launched
the America-Kurdistan Business Council, which consists of American
companies investing and operating in Kurdistan. Being a guest
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Barzani said in
unambiguously that â~@~\if a solution to the increasing centralization
of power in the prime minister's hands cannot be negotiated, he
may ask the Kurdish Region's Parliament to consider a referendum to
determine the way forward." The fact that Obama received him alone and
not as part of an Iraqi delegation significantly boosted Barzaniâ~@~Ys
stature as a Kurdish national leader.
Long before that, in January 2012 he made no bones about it in an
interview with the BBC stating: â~@~\I like the Kurdistan Region to
evolve day by day. But what I really wish is to see an independent
Kurdistanâ~@~].
Economic prospects
Kurdistan regional government (KRG) controls parts of Iraqi Kurdistan
estimated to contain around 45 billion barrels of oil, making it the
sixth largest reserve in the world. The prospects in Kurdistan have
caught the attention of major oil traders, who are now prepared to
risk Baghdad's anger to gain a foothold in Kurdistan while the region
heads towards greater autonomy. US ExxonMobil has made public its
intention to sell off the Iraq's West Qurna 1 oil field stake for the
benefit of going to Kurdistan, where it had signed more lucrative oil
deals. Chevron and Total oil majors have done the same. The move will
exacerbate tensions between Baghdad and autonomous Kurdistan. Kurdish
officials say they have a constitutional right to do so, but the
central government dismisses the oil transactions as illegal. There is
nothing to be surprised about because 60% of Iraqi oil is produced in
Kurdistan. In October Kurdistan's oil has begun to reach international
markets in independent export deals that further challenge Baghdad's
claim to full control over Iraqi oil. The Kurds pay little attention
to the Iraqi government protests, the real problem is infrastructure.
In October trucks were used to transport oil to the Turkish port of
Ceyhan because the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline is unreliable often
hit by explosions. So far, Kurdistan's export volumes are tiny in
comparison to its daily exports via national pipelines, moving around
1,000 tons of oil per day (about 8,000 bpd) to Turkey by truck, but
deliveries are on the rise. According to Kurdish industry sources
condensate volumes were expected to reach 1,500 tons per day (about
12,000 bpd) soon and more trucks would be made available towards the
end of the year.
Military and political prospects
After the US invasion in 2003 Masoud Barzani took advantage of
Americaâ~@~Ys support and refused to sign the Iraqi new constitution
if the broad autonomy special status was not included. He managed to
achieve his goal. The disagreement with Baghdad followed, especially
related to the oil rich province of Kirkuk. Barzani warned he would
struggle for independence in case no accord is reached. A clash bodes
serious bloodshed; the Peshmergaâ~@~Ys strength is estimated to be
around 200 thousand, a force to reckon with. So far all efforts by
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki to bring the Kurds under strict
central government control have failed.
There are 5.3 million Kurds in Iraq, about one sixth of the population
of over 30 million, the majority living in Iran, Syria and Turkey with
significant Kurdish diasporas communities in Armenia, Georgia, Israel,
Azerbaijan, Russia, Lebanon and, in recent decades, some European
countries and the USA. The situation in Iraq is quite different from
what takes place in Iran, Syria and Turkey. For Instance Iran simply
doesnâ~@~Yt recognize the very existence of Kurds as a minority,
something aptly played on by the US and Israel.
Formed in 2004, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK),
an Israel-supported Kurdish guerrilla group, wages armed struggle
against Iran. The group had been carrying out attacks in the Iranian
Kurdish Province and other Kurdish-inhabited areas, and is closely
affiliated with the Kurdistan Workersâ~@~Y Party operating against
Turkey. There were large-scale clashes with Iranian armed forces In
2011 expected to reignite at any moment. Pursued by Iranian troops
some armed formations crossed the Iraqi border with border tensions
to follow. Like in the case of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in
Turkey, PJAK leaders say their long-term goals are to establish an
autonomous Kurdish region within the Iranian state replacing Iran's
theocracy with a democratic and federal government, where self-rule
is granted to all ethnic minorities of Iran, including Sunni, Arabs,
Azeris and Kurds. The PJRK certainly doesnâ~@~Yt represent the majority
of Iranian Kurds, at least not at present. But itâ~@~Ys a force to
count with and it has destructive potential.
In Syria President Assad granted the Kurds citizenship and certain
rights they hadnâ~@~Yt had before. The troops left the area where the
Kurds live granting them a right to defend it. Thatâ~@~Ys exactly what
theyâ~@~Yre doing fighting back the anti-government Syrian opposition
forces in the vicinity of Turkish border, something that evokes
anger in Ankara. Turkey is waging an unrelenting fight against the
PKK which is declared to be a terrorist, out of law organization there.
The Turkish Kurds have no autonomy and have to fight for their rights.
The Turkish tough stance against Syria has its ramifications. On
July 30, 2012 Hurriyet published an article called ANALYSIS - Kurdish
Nationalism on the Rise, by Semih Idiz devoted to the Kurdish issue in
present day Turkey. It reads, "Prime Minister ErdoÄ~_an cannot have it
both ways. Referring to Sunni Arabs who have risen against the al-Assad
regime as â~@~\freedom fighters who are combating state terror,â~@~]
but then turning and calling the equally oppressed Kurds who are
making political headway now in the confusion that reigns in Syria
â~@~\terroristsâ~@~] is hypocritical." The author adds as a wrap up,
â~@~\"What makes it even worse is that Turkey will most likely be
unable to do anything to prevent the emergence of an autonomous or
independent Kurdish region in Syria, if developments in that country
provide the Kurds with another historic opportunity, to complement
the one they gained in Iraq.
" The question of Kurdish independence has always troubled the
surrounding countries: none of them have ever wanted a Kurdish state.
With war going on in Syria, tensions between the Kurdish minority
may become a major geopolitical threat. As already mentioned Assad
has transferred troops away from the Kurdish provinces. One should
give the devil his due â~@~S so far Syria is the only state with
significant Kurds population to achieve success while tackling
the Kurds minority problem. If President Assad falls, Syria will
splinter into religiously or ethnically homogenous mini-states,
one of which will almost certainly be under Kurdish control. Coupled
with the recent emergence of a relatively independent Kurdish region
in Iraq, this would create something of a league of semi-autonomous
Kurdish states between the northeast regions of Syria and Iraq. This
combustible state of affairs alarms Turkey, which has waged a bloody,
three-decade civil war against its 14 million Kurds. Although it has
supported regime change in Syria, the Turkish government has fear of
a greater Kurdistan, and can be expected to strenuously resist any
attempt at Kurdish unification. Should that powder keg ignite, Turkey
could very well drag NATO into a cross-border shooting war with Syria.
US connection
The US â~@~S Kurds come and go game has its own story. During the
Richard Nixonâ~@~Ys tenure Iraq became friendly with the Soviet
Union. The US began to fund and encourage the Kurds to fight for
their independence against Saddam Hussein as part of a strategy
to weaken the Iraqi regime and general policy aimed at containing
the USSR. But just as the Kurdish independence movement was near to
success it became clear that the stance was part of a political ploy,
the United States didnâ~@~Yt really want independent Kurdistan,
so the support was withdrawn. The story of US betraying the Kurds
is described in the famous book by Stephen Hunter called The Second
Salladin released in 1998. Thatâ~@~Ys a history lesson that should
be remembered by Kurdish leaders dealing with the US.
The Turkish parliament's refusal to join the U.S.- led coalition
created to invade Iraq gave Iraqi Kurdistan a strategic boost. Rather
than transit Turkey, U.S. forces parachuted into the Harir airfield,
north of Erbil. The peshmerga participation cemented an enhanced
relationship. Also enhancing Kurdish influence in Washington has been
the KRG's hiring of former U.S. military and political officials to
represent them. The Kurdish participation alongside U.S. troops led
the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to express a sense of entitlement. The
withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and the new political tensions
along sectarian lines have also raised questions over whether Iraq
would split apart. Some experts believe that the US will only support
an independent Kurdish state if Baghdad becomes hostile toward US
interests in the region. The would support the Kurds if its relations
with the Iraqi government worsened. If so, it would need the support
of the Kurds as leverage against it.
In June 2006 the new Middle East map (1) prepared by retired US Army
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters was published in the June 2006 edition
of Armed Forces Journal under the title of Blood Borders: How a better
Middle East Would Look. The map was a key element in Mr. Petersâ~@~Y
book Never Quit the Fight, which was released the same year. Although
the map does not officially reflect Pentagon doctrine, it has been
used in a training program at NATO educational centers like Defense
College in Rome. Among other things it reduced Turkish landmass
and featured a â~@~\Free Kurdistanâ~@~] that included additional
territory taken from Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Iraq was presented as
just a fragment of what it is now, carved up to also include Sunnis
Iraq and the Arab Shia State.
The term New Middle East was introduced to the world in June 2006 in
Tel Aviv by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in replacement
of the Greater Middle East remaining much the same in substance. This
project consists in creating an arc of instability, chaos, and violence
extending from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian Gulf,
Iran, and the borders of NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan.
The Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan appear to be stepping
stones for extending U.S. influence into the former Soviet Union and
the ex-Soviet Republics of Central Asia, the region termed as Russian
â~@~\Near Abroad.â~@~]
Israeli connection
Over the years, Israel has provided training, military hardware, and
intelligence to Kurds in Northern Iraq, and since the 2003 Iraq war,
relations between Israel and Iraqi Kurds have continued to grow, as
both sides see that mutual cooperation to serve their best national
interest. It is important to note that Israelis have generally
demonstrated sympathy toward Iraqi Kurds, and historically there was
hardly any enmity between the two sides. By and large, both Israel
and the Kurds have at one point or another faced common hostility from
Arab states. At present the Israeli army has stepped up its military
activities in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan Region. In August 2011
Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles were stationed in Iraqi to operate
against Iran (2). Barzani gave Israel the green light to deploy them
in northern Iraq without gaining the approval of the Iraqi central
government in Baghdad, which has no diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv.
Israeli intelligence agents and military advisers, equipped with
special transmission devices, were reported to be sent to Mosul
to train Kurdish security forces. President Barzani has reportedly
agreed to the concession in return for the admission of a number of
Iraqi Kurd students to Israeli universities. On March 25 the Sunday
Times published the article called Israel Spies Scour Iran in Nuclear
Hunt (3). As the story goes Israel is using a permanent base in Iraqi
Kurdistan to launch cross-border intelligence missions in an attempt
to find "smoking gun" evidence that Iran is building a nuclear
warhead. According to Western intelligence sources, the Israelis
have been conducting such operations for several years. These risky
intelligence missions have been intensified to an unprecedented degree
in the past few months. On January 9, 2012 in an the article called
Lâ~@~YIran défie Lâ~@~YAmérique (Iran challenges America) French Le
Figaro ran a story of Israeli intelligence agency Mossad intensifying
its activities against Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan (4). Former Kurdish
leader Mustafa Barzani, Masoud Barzaniâ~@~Ys father, was considered
a friend to Israeli military and defense officials.
Conclusion
Kurdistan has all the trappings of a state: independent institutions
such as the presidency, the parliament, the constitution and the armed
forces (the Peshmerga - hundreds of thousands of seasoned troops)
the flourishing economy and the diplomatic ventures. Real borders
exist between the Kurdish and Arab parts of the Iraqi state. It also
has the flag, the anthem, the language and a strong desire to create
Greater Kurdistan independent from Arabs, Persians and Turks. But for
that to happen Greater Kurdistan would also have to be a great unifier
sharing power inside Iraqi Kurdistan and managing conflicting Kurdish
aspirations in Syria, Iran and Turkey. This requires adroit diplomacy
and long-term vision. The process of unification is a bumpy road. As
mentioned above, the situation of Kurds in Turkey is different from
that of Kurds in Iran which is different from that of Kurds in Iraq or
Syria. There are also Turks, Arabs, and Assyrians to name but a few
of the multitude of peoples in the region. There are also different
religions: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Yazdani.
Unification means getting together different groups with different
backgrounds, cultures and visions. Besides the process has two
options. A new secular, democratic non-Arab nation may appear to
change the volatile Middle East picture. The other outcome is the
emergence of a puppet on a string dancing to the tune of the USA,
Israel and the West in general, an element the allies Great Game
remix. Not all Kurds are adamant in their desire for cessation, there
are those who find the very idea of cessation and partition of Iraq
is a multifaceted problem with iffy gains.
References:
1. The map published by Armed Forces Journal June 2006 edition as an
illustration for the article How a better Middle East Would Look by
Ralph Peters: http://www.oilempire.us/new-map.html
2. Israel Deploys Drones In
Iraq. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bkVQh5CnRI
3. The Sunday Times. March 25, 2012,
Israel Spies Scour Iran in Nuclear Hunt:
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/public/sitesearch.do?querystring="Israeli+spies+scour+Ira n+in+nuclear+hunt"§ionId=7
4. Le Figaro, January 9, 2012, Lâ~@~YIran défie Lâ~@~YAmérique:
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2012/01/09/01003-20120109ARTFIG00640-l-iran-defie-l-amerique.php.
From: A. Papazian