GAYANE NOVIKOVA: RUSSIA IS, SURELY, NOT INTERESTED IN CLEAR DEFINITION OF ITS STANCE ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
July 25, 11:49
ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for
Strategic Analysis Spectrum, Visiting Researcher at the Davis Center
for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
A number of Azeri and other experts believe that only Russia is able -
if willing - to influence the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and to push its own solution. Do you think this view is realistic?
At first sight, the idea that Russia is the only state able to resolve
the Karabakh conflict is not groundless, as Russia is the most serious
actor in the South Caucasus. Moscow considers the South Caucasus as a
sphere of its privileged interests and has certain levers of influence
on the domestic political and foreign political processes of the
countries in the region. Moscow is building pragmatic relations both
with Armenia and Azerbaijan stemming from its strategic interests. I
don't think that Russia has its own plan of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict's resolution, but it is, surely, not interested in clear
definition of its stance on the given issue, otherwise it would have
to support either Armenia or Azerbaijan, thus narrowing its strategic
space. Consequently, considering the level of the Russian-Georgian
relations, Moscow cannot afford it another "uneasy" neighbor. And the
status quo in the conflict zone is in favor of Russia. Let me remind
you that the presidents of Russia, the United States and France have
repeatedly said that only the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
can and must solve it, and they are right.
Can Armenia and Azerbaijan stop the senseless border bloodshed on
their own or should they rely on the support of the world community
in view that these sabotage attacks may well grow into a large-scale
confrontation?
Subversive actions are inevitable unless there is a comprehensive
peace agreement. The point is that the number of subversive actions
is growing alongside with the growing number of victims on both the
parties. The so-called world community has many other problems and
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's resolution is not among its priorities.
Thus, in the given case, if you're drowning, you're on your own.
However, to stop bloodshed on the line of the contact of the Armenian
and Azerbaijani armed forces, the parties involved in the conflict
must not only display such will but also realize that bloodshed is
senseless. However, Azerbaijan demonstrates determination to return
the territories under control of Armenians at any price. That is,
for Baku the tactics of behavior that provokes the Armenians parties
to make retaliatory actions is not senseless. The Armenian party
has repeatedly suggested removing snipers from the line of contact,
but Azerbaijan cannot do that, as the public will assess it as a
concession to Armenia and deviation from the "national task." In
addition, Azerbaijan is well aware of danger of further escalation
of the conflict from the viewpoint of both severe response by the
Armenian countries and condemnation by the world community.
Azerbaijan's military actions on its border with Armenia will in no way
force the Armenians to leave the territories the Azeris consider to be
their own. So, the latter must have no reasons for escalating tension
on the border. Then why are they doing it not on the contact line
with Nagorno-Karabakh but exactly on the border with Armenia - even
though they know that this may serve as a pretext for the Armenians
to ask Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization for help?
I think that Baku is conducting reconnaissance of the defensive
positions of Armenia, on the one hand, and is looking at the
response of Russia, as the leader of the CSTO, to its possible
military operation, on the other. I rule out the support by the
Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan, as they will probably take
a neutral stance in case of military actions between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The upcoming joint exercises of the CSTO Collective Rapid
Response Forces 'Cooperation 2012' in Armenia arouse nervousness of
Georgia and Azerbaijan. Since the official goal of the given exercises
is to rebuff possible aggression against Armenia, Azerbaijan 'warns'
Armenia and demonstrates its combat efficiency
Can we expect Russia to repeat the 08.08.08 scenario should the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict grow into a large-scale war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan?
You should not expect such a thing. Russia is currently trying to
prevent escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that may have
unpredictable consequences for it. First, it will be very hard
for Moscow to choose what the party to support, and second, Russia
had two reasons to directly interfere into the August war of 2008:
existence of Russian peacekeepers in the zone of the South-Ossetic
conflict and the very 96%-97% of the population in South Ossetia
having Russian citizenship. The situation with Karabakh is different.
One of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was one of the key topics
discussed by Hillary Clinton in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The US
Secretary of State announced some progress after the Paris meeting of
the Azeri and Armenian FMs. But we have seen no progress so far. What
does the US diplomacy have in mind when making such statements?
On the threshold of the presidential election and amid growing domestic
political tension in the USA, the U.S. diplomacy needs successes in
the foreign political arena by means of providing certain stability
in the real and potential 'hot spots'. Meetings and discussions in
Turkey were the focus of Mrs. Clinton's visit to the region. Her
visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan were more like a PR-campaign that
would confirm U.S. interests in stability in the South Caucasus and
would balance the Kremlin's activity in the region.
What trends can you see in Armenia's foreign policy, particularly,
in its efforts to integrate into Europe and the Putin-initiated
Eurasian Union?
Armenia is facing the hard task of keeping a balance between the free
trade area in Europe, on the one hand, and the Eurasian and customs
unions, on the other, with both initiatives having their advantages and
disadvantages. European integration does not imply EU membership: the
European Union is conducting a soft power policy in the South Caucasus
and is not ready to carry out costly economic projects. On the other
hand, European integration can help Armenia to enlarge its political
and economic capacities and to further develop democracy. It may also
have an indirect contribution to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. As regards the Russian initiatives, Armenia has refused to
join the Customs Union with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which is
in line with its policy to balance its political priorities. Armenia
actively cooperates with the members of the Customs Union, especially
with Russia, with all of the countries having agreements for free
trade in the CIS. Russia may well pressure Armenia into joining these
projects. Among the levers will be gas, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem
and the political situation before the presidential election 2013.
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
July 25, 11:49
ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for
Strategic Analysis Spectrum, Visiting Researcher at the Davis Center
for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
A number of Azeri and other experts believe that only Russia is able -
if willing - to influence the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and to push its own solution. Do you think this view is realistic?
At first sight, the idea that Russia is the only state able to resolve
the Karabakh conflict is not groundless, as Russia is the most serious
actor in the South Caucasus. Moscow considers the South Caucasus as a
sphere of its privileged interests and has certain levers of influence
on the domestic political and foreign political processes of the
countries in the region. Moscow is building pragmatic relations both
with Armenia and Azerbaijan stemming from its strategic interests. I
don't think that Russia has its own plan of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict's resolution, but it is, surely, not interested in clear
definition of its stance on the given issue, otherwise it would have
to support either Armenia or Azerbaijan, thus narrowing its strategic
space. Consequently, considering the level of the Russian-Georgian
relations, Moscow cannot afford it another "uneasy" neighbor. And the
status quo in the conflict zone is in favor of Russia. Let me remind
you that the presidents of Russia, the United States and France have
repeatedly said that only the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
can and must solve it, and they are right.
Can Armenia and Azerbaijan stop the senseless border bloodshed on
their own or should they rely on the support of the world community
in view that these sabotage attacks may well grow into a large-scale
confrontation?
Subversive actions are inevitable unless there is a comprehensive
peace agreement. The point is that the number of subversive actions
is growing alongside with the growing number of victims on both the
parties. The so-called world community has many other problems and
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's resolution is not among its priorities.
Thus, in the given case, if you're drowning, you're on your own.
However, to stop bloodshed on the line of the contact of the Armenian
and Azerbaijani armed forces, the parties involved in the conflict
must not only display such will but also realize that bloodshed is
senseless. However, Azerbaijan demonstrates determination to return
the territories under control of Armenians at any price. That is,
for Baku the tactics of behavior that provokes the Armenians parties
to make retaliatory actions is not senseless. The Armenian party
has repeatedly suggested removing snipers from the line of contact,
but Azerbaijan cannot do that, as the public will assess it as a
concession to Armenia and deviation from the "national task." In
addition, Azerbaijan is well aware of danger of further escalation
of the conflict from the viewpoint of both severe response by the
Armenian countries and condemnation by the world community.
Azerbaijan's military actions on its border with Armenia will in no way
force the Armenians to leave the territories the Azeris consider to be
their own. So, the latter must have no reasons for escalating tension
on the border. Then why are they doing it not on the contact line
with Nagorno-Karabakh but exactly on the border with Armenia - even
though they know that this may serve as a pretext for the Armenians
to ask Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization for help?
I think that Baku is conducting reconnaissance of the defensive
positions of Armenia, on the one hand, and is looking at the
response of Russia, as the leader of the CSTO, to its possible
military operation, on the other. I rule out the support by the
Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan, as they will probably take
a neutral stance in case of military actions between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The upcoming joint exercises of the CSTO Collective Rapid
Response Forces 'Cooperation 2012' in Armenia arouse nervousness of
Georgia and Azerbaijan. Since the official goal of the given exercises
is to rebuff possible aggression against Armenia, Azerbaijan 'warns'
Armenia and demonstrates its combat efficiency
Can we expect Russia to repeat the 08.08.08 scenario should the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict grow into a large-scale war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan?
You should not expect such a thing. Russia is currently trying to
prevent escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that may have
unpredictable consequences for it. First, it will be very hard
for Moscow to choose what the party to support, and second, Russia
had two reasons to directly interfere into the August war of 2008:
existence of Russian peacekeepers in the zone of the South-Ossetic
conflict and the very 96%-97% of the population in South Ossetia
having Russian citizenship. The situation with Karabakh is different.
One of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was one of the key topics
discussed by Hillary Clinton in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The US
Secretary of State announced some progress after the Paris meeting of
the Azeri and Armenian FMs. But we have seen no progress so far. What
does the US diplomacy have in mind when making such statements?
On the threshold of the presidential election and amid growing domestic
political tension in the USA, the U.S. diplomacy needs successes in
the foreign political arena by means of providing certain stability
in the real and potential 'hot spots'. Meetings and discussions in
Turkey were the focus of Mrs. Clinton's visit to the region. Her
visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan were more like a PR-campaign that
would confirm U.S. interests in stability in the South Caucasus and
would balance the Kremlin's activity in the region.
What trends can you see in Armenia's foreign policy, particularly,
in its efforts to integrate into Europe and the Putin-initiated
Eurasian Union?
Armenia is facing the hard task of keeping a balance between the free
trade area in Europe, on the one hand, and the Eurasian and customs
unions, on the other, with both initiatives having their advantages and
disadvantages. European integration does not imply EU membership: the
European Union is conducting a soft power policy in the South Caucasus
and is not ready to carry out costly economic projects. On the other
hand, European integration can help Armenia to enlarge its political
and economic capacities and to further develop democracy. It may also
have an indirect contribution to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. As regards the Russian initiatives, Armenia has refused to
join the Customs Union with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which is
in line with its policy to balance its political priorities. Armenia
actively cooperates with the members of the Customs Union, especially
with Russia, with all of the countries having agreements for free
trade in the CIS. Russia may well pressure Armenia into joining these
projects. Among the levers will be gas, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem
and the political situation before the presidential election 2013.