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Cuban missile crisis: The other, secret one
By Joe Matthews
Journalist
BBC New Magazine
12 October 2012 Last updated at 21:18 ET
How the second missile crisis unfolded
Contrary to popular belief, the Cuban missile crisis did not end with
the agreement between the US and Soviet Union in October, 1962. Unknown
to the US at the time, there were 100 other nuclear weapons also in the
hands of Cuba, sparking a frantic - and ingenious - Russian mission to
recover them.
In November 2011, aware that the 50th anniversary of the most dangerous
few weeks in history was less than a year away, my Russian colleague
Pasha Shilov and I came across several new accounts that changed our
perspective on the Cuban missile crisis and how much we thought we knew
about it.
Growing up in Berkshire, England, through the nuclear paranoia of the
1980s, with Ronald Reagan's Cruise and Pershing missiles stationed only
30 miles away from my family home, I was inculcated with a keen
awareness of Cold War brinkmanship.
Pasha grew up in Moscow and described how it was from the Soviet point
of view - equally frightening by his account.
But what we've now learned about the chilling events of October and
November 1962 has put our own experiences into perspective - and maybe
given rise to a few more grey hairs along the way.
Our investigations took us to St Petersburg and the Soviet Submariners
Veterans' Society via the National Security Archive in Washington DC,
where Svetlana Savranskaya, the director of the Russian archives, told
us an incredible story.
There had been a second secret missile crisis that continued the danger
of a catastrophic nuclear war until the end of November 1962.
This extended the known missile crisis well beyond the weekend of 27-28
October, the time that had always been thought of as the moment the
danger finally lifted with the deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev to
withdraw the Soviet missiles in exchange for a US promise not to invade
Cuba.
The secret missile crisis came about through an unnerving mix of Soviet
duplicity, American intelligence failures and the mercurial temperament
of Fidel Castro.
The Cuban leader, cut out of the main negotiations between the
superpowers over the fate of the long range Soviet missiles stationed in
Cuba, began to cease cooperation with Moscow.
Fearing that Castro's hurt pride and widespread Cuban indignation over
the concessions Khrushchev had made to Kennedy, might lead to a
breakdown of the agreement between the superpowers, the Soviet leader
concocted a plan to give Castro a consolation prize.
The prize was an offer to give Cuba more than 100 tactical nuclear
weapons that had been shipped to Cuba along with the long-range
missiles, but which crucially had passed completely under the radar of
US intelligence.
Khrushchev concluded that because the Americans hadn't listed the
missiles on their list of demands, the Soviet Union's interests would be
well served by keeping them in Cuba.
Kremlin number two, Anastas Mikoyan, was charged with making the trip to
Havana, principally to calm Castro down and make him what seemed like an
offer he couldn't refuse.
Mikoyan, whose wife was seriously ill, took the assignment knowing that
the future of relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union were on the
line. Shortly after arriving in Cuba, Mikoyan received word that his
wife had died, but despite this, he pledged to stay in Cuba and complete
negotiations with Castro.
In the weeks that followed, Mikoyan kept the detail of the missile
transfer to himself while he witnessed the mood swings and paranoia of
the Cuban leader convinced that Moscow had sold Cuba's defence down the
river.
Castro particularly objected to the constant flights over Cuba by
American surveillance aircraft and, as Mikoyan learned to his horror,
ordered Cuban anti-aircraft gunners to fire on them.
Knowing how delicate the state of relations were between the US and
Russia after the worst crisis since World War II, US forces around the
world remained on Defcon 2, one short of global nuclear war until 20
November.
Mikoyan came to a personal decision that under no circumstances should
Castro and his military be given control of weapons with an explosive
force equal to 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs.
He then extricated Moscow from a seemingly intractable situation which
risked blowing the entire crisis back up in the faces of Kennedy and
Khrushchev.
On 22 November 1962, during a tense, four-hour meeting, Mikoyan was
forced to use the dark arts of diplomacy to convince Castro that despite
Moscow's best intentions, it would be in breach of an unpublished Soviet
law (which didn't actually exist) to transfer the missiles permanently
into Cuban hands and provide them with an independent nuclear deterrent.
Finally after Mikoyan's trump card, Castro was forced to give way and -
much to the relief of Khrushchev and the whole Soviet government - the
tactical nuclear weapons were finally crated and returned by sea back to
the Soviet Union during December 1962.
This story has illuminated a chapter in history that has been partially
closed for the past 50 years.
But it leaves us with a great respect for Mikoyan and his ability to
judge and eventually contain an extremely dangerous situation which
could have affected many millions of people.
Joe Matthews is a producer for Wild Iris TV, which has made a short
film about the "secret" Cuban missile crisis
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19930260/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Joe Matthews
Journalist
BBC New Magazine
12 October 2012 Last updated at 21:18 ET
How the second missile crisis unfolded
Contrary to popular belief, the Cuban missile crisis did not end with
the agreement between the US and Soviet Union in October, 1962. Unknown
to the US at the time, there were 100 other nuclear weapons also in the
hands of Cuba, sparking a frantic - and ingenious - Russian mission to
recover them.
In November 2011, aware that the 50th anniversary of the most dangerous
few weeks in history was less than a year away, my Russian colleague
Pasha Shilov and I came across several new accounts that changed our
perspective on the Cuban missile crisis and how much we thought we knew
about it.
Growing up in Berkshire, England, through the nuclear paranoia of the
1980s, with Ronald Reagan's Cruise and Pershing missiles stationed only
30 miles away from my family home, I was inculcated with a keen
awareness of Cold War brinkmanship.
Pasha grew up in Moscow and described how it was from the Soviet point
of view - equally frightening by his account.
But what we've now learned about the chilling events of October and
November 1962 has put our own experiences into perspective - and maybe
given rise to a few more grey hairs along the way.
Our investigations took us to St Petersburg and the Soviet Submariners
Veterans' Society via the National Security Archive in Washington DC,
where Svetlana Savranskaya, the director of the Russian archives, told
us an incredible story.
There had been a second secret missile crisis that continued the danger
of a catastrophic nuclear war until the end of November 1962.
This extended the known missile crisis well beyond the weekend of 27-28
October, the time that had always been thought of as the moment the
danger finally lifted with the deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev to
withdraw the Soviet missiles in exchange for a US promise not to invade
Cuba.
The secret missile crisis came about through an unnerving mix of Soviet
duplicity, American intelligence failures and the mercurial temperament
of Fidel Castro.
The Cuban leader, cut out of the main negotiations between the
superpowers over the fate of the long range Soviet missiles stationed in
Cuba, began to cease cooperation with Moscow.
Fearing that Castro's hurt pride and widespread Cuban indignation over
the concessions Khrushchev had made to Kennedy, might lead to a
breakdown of the agreement between the superpowers, the Soviet leader
concocted a plan to give Castro a consolation prize.
The prize was an offer to give Cuba more than 100 tactical nuclear
weapons that had been shipped to Cuba along with the long-range
missiles, but which crucially had passed completely under the radar of
US intelligence.
Khrushchev concluded that because the Americans hadn't listed the
missiles on their list of demands, the Soviet Union's interests would be
well served by keeping them in Cuba.
Kremlin number two, Anastas Mikoyan, was charged with making the trip to
Havana, principally to calm Castro down and make him what seemed like an
offer he couldn't refuse.
Mikoyan, whose wife was seriously ill, took the assignment knowing that
the future of relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union were on the
line. Shortly after arriving in Cuba, Mikoyan received word that his
wife had died, but despite this, he pledged to stay in Cuba and complete
negotiations with Castro.
In the weeks that followed, Mikoyan kept the detail of the missile
transfer to himself while he witnessed the mood swings and paranoia of
the Cuban leader convinced that Moscow had sold Cuba's defence down the
river.
Castro particularly objected to the constant flights over Cuba by
American surveillance aircraft and, as Mikoyan learned to his horror,
ordered Cuban anti-aircraft gunners to fire on them.
Knowing how delicate the state of relations were between the US and
Russia after the worst crisis since World War II, US forces around the
world remained on Defcon 2, one short of global nuclear war until 20
November.
Mikoyan came to a personal decision that under no circumstances should
Castro and his military be given control of weapons with an explosive
force equal to 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs.
He then extricated Moscow from a seemingly intractable situation which
risked blowing the entire crisis back up in the faces of Kennedy and
Khrushchev.
On 22 November 1962, during a tense, four-hour meeting, Mikoyan was
forced to use the dark arts of diplomacy to convince Castro that despite
Moscow's best intentions, it would be in breach of an unpublished Soviet
law (which didn't actually exist) to transfer the missiles permanently
into Cuban hands and provide them with an independent nuclear deterrent.
Finally after Mikoyan's trump card, Castro was forced to give way and -
much to the relief of Khrushchev and the whole Soviet government - the
tactical nuclear weapons were finally crated and returned by sea back to
the Soviet Union during December 1962.
This story has illuminated a chapter in history that has been partially
closed for the past 50 years.
But it leaves us with a great respect for Mikoyan and his ability to
judge and eventually contain an extremely dangerous situation which
could have affected many millions of people.
Joe Matthews is a producer for Wild Iris TV, which has made a short
film about the "secret" Cuban missile crisis
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19930260/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress