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Andrey Areshev: There are objective restraints to the United States'
policy in Armenia
ArmInfo's interview with Andrey Areshev, researcher from the Institute
of Political and Social Studies of the Black Sea-Caspian region.
by David Stepanyan
Arminfo
Friday, April 26, 18:05
There is an opinion that the OSCE Minsk Group is no longer able to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Is there an aternative to it?
Can this problem be solved if Armenia unilaterally recognizes
Nagorno-Karabakh? What consequences may this have?
The Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is stuck. The existing Minsk Group
format is not effective just like its alternatives, particularly, the
so-called Prague process (the Russia- mediated meetings of the
Armenian and Azeri presidents). Having at least some channels for
cooperating and exchanging information is better than having no such
channels at all. President Serzh Sargsyan has made his position clear
on whether Armenia will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh or not. It's hard
to add anything to it.
A few days ago Azeri mass media reported Azerbaijan's decision to stop
all negotiations for buying new arms from Russia and a simultaneous
decision by some European producers to soften their arms sale terms
for the South Caucasus. If the media did it on purpose, what was their
goal?
The reported shift in Azerbaijan's choice of arms suppliers reflects
the evolution of its foreign policy. In Russia we can see attempts to
separate politics from business, particularly, from military-technical
cooperation. But the loss of mutual confidence between Russia and
Azerbaijan and their reluctance or inability to solve their pending
political problems could not but affect their bilateral ties. The
recent hysteria in the Azeri press, the refusal to let some foreign
journalists into the country, the conference on the future of South
Azerbaijan are all parts of this tendency.
Could you share you vision of further political developments in
Azerbaijan in view of the forthcoming presidential election and
worsening relations with Iran and Russia?
The wish to make Iran subject to external control is the key driver of
the current processes in the Middle East. Azerbaijan, who has a long
border with Iran, cannot avoid being part of these processes. The
Azeris are reported to be actively contacting with the Israelis and
the Americans. This cannot but worry the Iranians. All this may have
quite different outcomes. Religious forces are getting increasingly
active in Azerbaijan. They are appealing to the hearts of the people
and are urging them to consolidate against some external enemy. Here
Azerbaijan is very much like the Middle East countries that have now
become arenas of serious conflicts. So, even though the forthcoming
election of the Azeri President will go well, in the future we may
expect some very unpleasant surprises.
Some experts believe that Russia's insistence with respect to Armenia
has enabled the United States to strengthen its influence in the
country. What tendencies do you see here? And who and why is
interested in the BARevolution in Armenia?
What the United States is doing in the post-Soviet area is a very
systematic and multilevel activity aimed at major social and political
groups. Just look how active American NGOs are in Russia and how much
money they get for their activities. In Armenia things could not be
different. Everybody knows that Raffi Hovannisian appeared in the
country after the earthquake of 1988, when the Soviet Union decided to
open its border to external assistance. He was the first head of the
Yerevan Office of the Armenian Assembly of America, an organization
that has very close contacts with the US State Department. It was
really amazing how he managed to secure most of the protesting votes
in the last presidential race after serious difficulties in getting
into the parliament just a year before. But there already were such
examples in the post-Soviet republics that fell victim to so-called
color revolutions. The characteristic qualities of the United States'
activity in Armenia are high adaptability and political efficiency,
active lobbying and effective use of funds. As far as the work with
political elites and expert communities is concerned, here the
Americans are like a duck to water and can hardly be outdone by the
Russians. I don't think we need doing this, but we still ought to
watch how they do it, particularly, how they use their contacts with
diasporas for gaining influence on certain countries, be it Armenia,
Ukraine or any of the Baltic or Caucasus states.
Moscow should learn from Washington how to effectively cooperate with
the authorities and the opposition of a partner-state creating a
situation when any initiatives of a rival to promote its integration
project would face quite serious and 'objective' difficulties. Of
course, I mean the Eurasian integration project. The USA will offer
Armenia opening of the border with Turkey as an alternative to it.
This is connected with the interests of the USA, first of all.
Normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations is of big importance
for the USA for a range of reasons, including the upcoming centennial
of the Armenian Genocide (in 2015). To neutralize the efforts of the
Armenian lobby, it will do its best to demonstrate, at least, little
Armenian-Turkish 'progress' implying also normalization of economic
ties. However, one can hardly imagine actualization of the given
process without resolution of the Karabakh conflict mostly on
conditions of Baku and discrediting of the idea of Eurasian
integration of Armenia that implies development of relations with
Russia as such. Given the serious positions of the West in the
information space of the country, such attempts will be regularly made
also in future. The U.S. and the Western policy in the region,
specifically in Armenia, have some objective restraints despite
powerful PR-campaign and persuasion. "Russia could take an advantage
of those restraints, in case of a bit foreign policy creative beyond
official speeches and irritating red tape. Cooperation with Baku is
more important for the USA rather than with Yerevan. And no partisan
media is able to deny that circumstance. As regards the so-called
"European integration," it has a certain price for Yerevan. It is
quite possible that the role of Kosovska Mitrovica is prepared for
Stepanakert, but never the role of Pristina. All these circumstances
could become a subject of a constructive dialogue of Moscow and
Yerevan. The contacts of our countries have upwards trends in 2013,
just after outbreak of 'European activity' in Armenia in the end of
2012, which inspires with certain optimism.
Can the May 5 elections into Yerevan's Elders Council trigger new mass protests?
I think these elections may become an example of constructive rivalry
between the ruling regime and the opposition. It will be a good test
for the opposition's ability to act jointly to improve the lives of
the people. Unless this is done, the outflow of human resources will
continue and this may prove bad for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process. Both the opposition and the ruling regime seem to be worried
about the existing social-economic problems and realize the need for
changes. But any fraud during this election may dispirit the people
and lead to a new outburst of social confrontation.
On Apr 24 Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan said
that it is not expedient for Armenia to appeal to appeal to
international courts for recognition of the Armenian Genocide and
elimination of its consequences. Is this process moving in the right
direction?
I think the efforts to convince big international players to recognize
the Armenian Genocide have geo-political implications. This process
will be continued on both regional and national levels and may have
serious political consequences for the Armenian- Turkish rapprochement
and the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
policy in Armenia
ArmInfo's interview with Andrey Areshev, researcher from the Institute
of Political and Social Studies of the Black Sea-Caspian region.
by David Stepanyan
Arminfo
Friday, April 26, 18:05
There is an opinion that the OSCE Minsk Group is no longer able to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Is there an aternative to it?
Can this problem be solved if Armenia unilaterally recognizes
Nagorno-Karabakh? What consequences may this have?
The Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is stuck. The existing Minsk Group
format is not effective just like its alternatives, particularly, the
so-called Prague process (the Russia- mediated meetings of the
Armenian and Azeri presidents). Having at least some channels for
cooperating and exchanging information is better than having no such
channels at all. President Serzh Sargsyan has made his position clear
on whether Armenia will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh or not. It's hard
to add anything to it.
A few days ago Azeri mass media reported Azerbaijan's decision to stop
all negotiations for buying new arms from Russia and a simultaneous
decision by some European producers to soften their arms sale terms
for the South Caucasus. If the media did it on purpose, what was their
goal?
The reported shift in Azerbaijan's choice of arms suppliers reflects
the evolution of its foreign policy. In Russia we can see attempts to
separate politics from business, particularly, from military-technical
cooperation. But the loss of mutual confidence between Russia and
Azerbaijan and their reluctance or inability to solve their pending
political problems could not but affect their bilateral ties. The
recent hysteria in the Azeri press, the refusal to let some foreign
journalists into the country, the conference on the future of South
Azerbaijan are all parts of this tendency.
Could you share you vision of further political developments in
Azerbaijan in view of the forthcoming presidential election and
worsening relations with Iran and Russia?
The wish to make Iran subject to external control is the key driver of
the current processes in the Middle East. Azerbaijan, who has a long
border with Iran, cannot avoid being part of these processes. The
Azeris are reported to be actively contacting with the Israelis and
the Americans. This cannot but worry the Iranians. All this may have
quite different outcomes. Religious forces are getting increasingly
active in Azerbaijan. They are appealing to the hearts of the people
and are urging them to consolidate against some external enemy. Here
Azerbaijan is very much like the Middle East countries that have now
become arenas of serious conflicts. So, even though the forthcoming
election of the Azeri President will go well, in the future we may
expect some very unpleasant surprises.
Some experts believe that Russia's insistence with respect to Armenia
has enabled the United States to strengthen its influence in the
country. What tendencies do you see here? And who and why is
interested in the BARevolution in Armenia?
What the United States is doing in the post-Soviet area is a very
systematic and multilevel activity aimed at major social and political
groups. Just look how active American NGOs are in Russia and how much
money they get for their activities. In Armenia things could not be
different. Everybody knows that Raffi Hovannisian appeared in the
country after the earthquake of 1988, when the Soviet Union decided to
open its border to external assistance. He was the first head of the
Yerevan Office of the Armenian Assembly of America, an organization
that has very close contacts with the US State Department. It was
really amazing how he managed to secure most of the protesting votes
in the last presidential race after serious difficulties in getting
into the parliament just a year before. But there already were such
examples in the post-Soviet republics that fell victim to so-called
color revolutions. The characteristic qualities of the United States'
activity in Armenia are high adaptability and political efficiency,
active lobbying and effective use of funds. As far as the work with
political elites and expert communities is concerned, here the
Americans are like a duck to water and can hardly be outdone by the
Russians. I don't think we need doing this, but we still ought to
watch how they do it, particularly, how they use their contacts with
diasporas for gaining influence on certain countries, be it Armenia,
Ukraine or any of the Baltic or Caucasus states.
Moscow should learn from Washington how to effectively cooperate with
the authorities and the opposition of a partner-state creating a
situation when any initiatives of a rival to promote its integration
project would face quite serious and 'objective' difficulties. Of
course, I mean the Eurasian integration project. The USA will offer
Armenia opening of the border with Turkey as an alternative to it.
This is connected with the interests of the USA, first of all.
Normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations is of big importance
for the USA for a range of reasons, including the upcoming centennial
of the Armenian Genocide (in 2015). To neutralize the efforts of the
Armenian lobby, it will do its best to demonstrate, at least, little
Armenian-Turkish 'progress' implying also normalization of economic
ties. However, one can hardly imagine actualization of the given
process without resolution of the Karabakh conflict mostly on
conditions of Baku and discrediting of the idea of Eurasian
integration of Armenia that implies development of relations with
Russia as such. Given the serious positions of the West in the
information space of the country, such attempts will be regularly made
also in future. The U.S. and the Western policy in the region,
specifically in Armenia, have some objective restraints despite
powerful PR-campaign and persuasion. "Russia could take an advantage
of those restraints, in case of a bit foreign policy creative beyond
official speeches and irritating red tape. Cooperation with Baku is
more important for the USA rather than with Yerevan. And no partisan
media is able to deny that circumstance. As regards the so-called
"European integration," it has a certain price for Yerevan. It is
quite possible that the role of Kosovska Mitrovica is prepared for
Stepanakert, but never the role of Pristina. All these circumstances
could become a subject of a constructive dialogue of Moscow and
Yerevan. The contacts of our countries have upwards trends in 2013,
just after outbreak of 'European activity' in Armenia in the end of
2012, which inspires with certain optimism.
Can the May 5 elections into Yerevan's Elders Council trigger new mass protests?
I think these elections may become an example of constructive rivalry
between the ruling regime and the opposition. It will be a good test
for the opposition's ability to act jointly to improve the lives of
the people. Unless this is done, the outflow of human resources will
continue and this may prove bad for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process. Both the opposition and the ruling regime seem to be worried
about the existing social-economic problems and realize the need for
changes. But any fraud during this election may dispirit the people
and lead to a new outburst of social confrontation.
On Apr 24 Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan said
that it is not expedient for Armenia to appeal to appeal to
international courts for recognition of the Armenian Genocide and
elimination of its consequences. Is this process moving in the right
direction?
I think the efforts to convince big international players to recognize
the Armenian Genocide have geo-political implications. This process
will be continued on both regional and national levels and may have
serious political consequences for the Armenian- Turkish rapprochement
and the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress