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Putin in Oil Land
EDITORIAL | AUGUST 20, 2013 5:38 PM
By Edmond Y. Azadian
Russia's President Vladimir Putin recently paid a state visit to Azerbaijan
on his way to Iran. Azerbaijan being an oil-rich land, represents a
slippery territory, figuratively and literally. That visit triggered a
plethora of interpretations, both in Russia and in the Western news media.
As Armenia is Russia's strategic ally in the region, it was glaring that
the first visit after his election would take Mr. Putin to Azerbaijan and
not Armenia, despite Yerevan's standing invitation.
Observed within the context of recent developments in the region, this trip
was a cause for concern in Armenia.
Moscow had recently delivered sophisticated deadly weapons to Azerbaijan,
initially estimated to be worth $1.5 billion, but it turns out during
Putin-Aliyev negotiation that the actual value of those weapons was $4
billion.
Azerbaijan also buys arms from Ukraine, Belarus and Israel.
The Armenian public was rightfully alarmed for two reasons: the arms
shipments and Putin's timing of his visit to Azerbaijan. Although in some
official circles these moves were dismissed as normal business contacts,
the fears that something more sinister was going on were not assuaged.
As we observe the arms deal and the visit against the backdrop of recent
Russian-Azerbaijan relations, the developments become more intriguing.
Indeed tensions were building up between the two neighbors after the
failure of negotiations to extend the lease of the Russian listening post
in Gabala. Upon arriving in Baku, Mr. Putin was accorded a very cool
reception. Contrary to the accepted norms of international protocol, the
deputy prime minister of Azerbaijan was sent to the airport to greet the
Russian president. Further, at a state dinner, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov was insulted, something passed off to be a slip of the
tongue, but many believe the insult to be deliberate.
A large delegation accompanied the Russian president with the hopes of
cutting major deals, especially in the oil sector. However, in the end,
only symbolic contracts were signed.
Despite all these negative signals, Mr. Putin took the initiative and
swallowed the indignities. He even had a valuable gift in his pocket: on
the eve of presidential elections, Ilham Aliyev could use any international
support in view of some criticism of his authoritarian rule. He had already
manipulated his rubber-stamp parliament to change the constitution to allow
him to run for a third term extending his dynastic reign. Putin's visit was
thus a deliberate boost to Aliyev's election prospects.
Additionally, there are four nominal candidates in the Azeri presidential
campaign, obviously planted by the Aliyev administration. But the entire
opposition has rallied around Roustam Ibrahimbekov, a political activist
living in Moscow with dual citizenship. He has asked the Russian
authorities to revoke his Russian citizenship to make him eligible to
register in Azerbaijan as a presidential candidate. At this writing, the
Russian authorities had not taken any action, much to Mr. Aliyev's delight
and comfort.
Mr. Putin, thus, has made plain his choice for Azerbaijan's presidency.
Another endorsement came from the most improbable quarter, from President
Serge Sargisian, who has stated that from Armenia's standpoint, Aliyev
remains the preferred choice since he is known to be a familiar
interlocutor with the Armenian side with regard to solving the Artsakh
standoff, basically suggesting the devil one knows is preferable. This
endorsement has baffled political analysts and the news media. The
statement was either an echo of his master's voice in the Kremlin, or it
is
an unbelievably sophisticated political move to dent Aliyev's popularity.
Indeed, there is so much anti-Armenian hysteria in Azerbaijan that any
endorsement from Armenia may generate a backlash.
In the vast ocean of the Russian politics, Armenia is a small fish.
Therefore, Putin's visit must not have been motivated by the desire to
spite Armenia. Mr. Putin was after broader strategic goals, although he did
not mind sending a signal of displeasure to Yerevan, where plans are in the
works to sign (or initiate) the Association Agreement at the upcoming
Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, while at the same time contemplating
joining a customs union agreement steered by Russia.
It is Mr. Putin's political style to send blunt messages to his neighbors
as he sent one recently to Ukraine, which was veering towards joining the
European Union. The Kremlin blocked customs between the two countries to
halt the flow of goods and services from Ukraine to Russia. That placed
President Viktor Yanukovych in a difficult spot, since he had to perform a
balancing act between pro-Russian and Pro-European Ukrainian voters who are
almost evenly divided.
There is certainly a discomfort in Armenia over the arms deliveries to
Azerbaijan and the almost enigmatic nature of Mr. Putin's visit to Baku.
Friendly voices in Moscow are consoling Armenia's confused population with
the idea that the Kremlin is seeking military parity between the two
adversaries. But given Mr. Aliyev's bellicose rhetoric, parity cannot
reassure Armenia - only military superiority can.
Political analysts believe that the Russian president took his Baku trip
within his strategy of preserving Russian dominance in the Caucasus: Mr.
Putin believes Armenia to be safely in his pocket as a strategic ally.
Therefore he has to pursue other stray sheep. Georgia's leader, Mikheil
Saakashvili, lacked prudence and openly challenged Russia and he was badly
burnt. Incidentally, Saakashvili and Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili
openly clashed during a reception aboard a US navy ship on a visit to
Batumi, insulting each other in front of their American hosts. It looks
like disrespect towards heads of state is not solely an Armenian disease.
Coming to Azerbaijan, its leaders are veering towards the US discretely
under the tutelage of their Turkish brethren. Israel and Turkey have set up
shop on Azeri territory and despite official declarations to the contrary
Israel has a military base in preparation for an attack against Iran. Some
time ago, Aliyev confessed that nine-tenth of his country's relationship
with Israel was below the surface. The rapprochement seems to have been
initiated and pursued by the US administration. This strategic build-up
will undermine Russian and Iranian influence in the region.
Iran is very wary and prepared for the consequences of this strategic drive
but it has limited resources to counter it. Russian and Iranian interests
coincide in this political chess game and Mr. Putin's trip is part of that
mission.
While in Azerbaijan, Putin has countered Aliyev's aggressive posture with
an emphatic statement that the Karabagh conflict has only a political
solution, not a military one.
Political analyst Alexander Iskandarian believes that Mr. Putin has a
two-prong policy vis-à-vis the Karabagh conflict: not to solve the problem
and not to allow a war. Indeed, Karabagh is a handy political tool for Mr.
Putin to pressure Baku at the opportune moment.
Only time will tell if Mr. Putin left the slippery oil land of Azerbaijan
unscathed or empty-handed.
- See more at:
http://www.mirrorspectator.com/2013/08/20/putin-in-oil-land/#sthash.yKurxWef.dpuf
EDITORIAL | AUGUST 20, 2013 5:38 PM
By Edmond Y. Azadian
Russia's President Vladimir Putin recently paid a state visit to Azerbaijan
on his way to Iran. Azerbaijan being an oil-rich land, represents a
slippery territory, figuratively and literally. That visit triggered a
plethora of interpretations, both in Russia and in the Western news media.
As Armenia is Russia's strategic ally in the region, it was glaring that
the first visit after his election would take Mr. Putin to Azerbaijan and
not Armenia, despite Yerevan's standing invitation.
Observed within the context of recent developments in the region, this trip
was a cause for concern in Armenia.
Moscow had recently delivered sophisticated deadly weapons to Azerbaijan,
initially estimated to be worth $1.5 billion, but it turns out during
Putin-Aliyev negotiation that the actual value of those weapons was $4
billion.
Azerbaijan also buys arms from Ukraine, Belarus and Israel.
The Armenian public was rightfully alarmed for two reasons: the arms
shipments and Putin's timing of his visit to Azerbaijan. Although in some
official circles these moves were dismissed as normal business contacts,
the fears that something more sinister was going on were not assuaged.
As we observe the arms deal and the visit against the backdrop of recent
Russian-Azerbaijan relations, the developments become more intriguing.
Indeed tensions were building up between the two neighbors after the
failure of negotiations to extend the lease of the Russian listening post
in Gabala. Upon arriving in Baku, Mr. Putin was accorded a very cool
reception. Contrary to the accepted norms of international protocol, the
deputy prime minister of Azerbaijan was sent to the airport to greet the
Russian president. Further, at a state dinner, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov was insulted, something passed off to be a slip of the
tongue, but many believe the insult to be deliberate.
A large delegation accompanied the Russian president with the hopes of
cutting major deals, especially in the oil sector. However, in the end,
only symbolic contracts were signed.
Despite all these negative signals, Mr. Putin took the initiative and
swallowed the indignities. He even had a valuable gift in his pocket: on
the eve of presidential elections, Ilham Aliyev could use any international
support in view of some criticism of his authoritarian rule. He had already
manipulated his rubber-stamp parliament to change the constitution to allow
him to run for a third term extending his dynastic reign. Putin's visit was
thus a deliberate boost to Aliyev's election prospects.
Additionally, there are four nominal candidates in the Azeri presidential
campaign, obviously planted by the Aliyev administration. But the entire
opposition has rallied around Roustam Ibrahimbekov, a political activist
living in Moscow with dual citizenship. He has asked the Russian
authorities to revoke his Russian citizenship to make him eligible to
register in Azerbaijan as a presidential candidate. At this writing, the
Russian authorities had not taken any action, much to Mr. Aliyev's delight
and comfort.
Mr. Putin, thus, has made plain his choice for Azerbaijan's presidency.
Another endorsement came from the most improbable quarter, from President
Serge Sargisian, who has stated that from Armenia's standpoint, Aliyev
remains the preferred choice since he is known to be a familiar
interlocutor with the Armenian side with regard to solving the Artsakh
standoff, basically suggesting the devil one knows is preferable. This
endorsement has baffled political analysts and the news media. The
statement was either an echo of his master's voice in the Kremlin, or it
is
an unbelievably sophisticated political move to dent Aliyev's popularity.
Indeed, there is so much anti-Armenian hysteria in Azerbaijan that any
endorsement from Armenia may generate a backlash.
In the vast ocean of the Russian politics, Armenia is a small fish.
Therefore, Putin's visit must not have been motivated by the desire to
spite Armenia. Mr. Putin was after broader strategic goals, although he did
not mind sending a signal of displeasure to Yerevan, where plans are in the
works to sign (or initiate) the Association Agreement at the upcoming
Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, while at the same time contemplating
joining a customs union agreement steered by Russia.
It is Mr. Putin's political style to send blunt messages to his neighbors
as he sent one recently to Ukraine, which was veering towards joining the
European Union. The Kremlin blocked customs between the two countries to
halt the flow of goods and services from Ukraine to Russia. That placed
President Viktor Yanukovych in a difficult spot, since he had to perform a
balancing act between pro-Russian and Pro-European Ukrainian voters who are
almost evenly divided.
There is certainly a discomfort in Armenia over the arms deliveries to
Azerbaijan and the almost enigmatic nature of Mr. Putin's visit to Baku.
Friendly voices in Moscow are consoling Armenia's confused population with
the idea that the Kremlin is seeking military parity between the two
adversaries. But given Mr. Aliyev's bellicose rhetoric, parity cannot
reassure Armenia - only military superiority can.
Political analysts believe that the Russian president took his Baku trip
within his strategy of preserving Russian dominance in the Caucasus: Mr.
Putin believes Armenia to be safely in his pocket as a strategic ally.
Therefore he has to pursue other stray sheep. Georgia's leader, Mikheil
Saakashvili, lacked prudence and openly challenged Russia and he was badly
burnt. Incidentally, Saakashvili and Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili
openly clashed during a reception aboard a US navy ship on a visit to
Batumi, insulting each other in front of their American hosts. It looks
like disrespect towards heads of state is not solely an Armenian disease.
Coming to Azerbaijan, its leaders are veering towards the US discretely
under the tutelage of their Turkish brethren. Israel and Turkey have set up
shop on Azeri territory and despite official declarations to the contrary
Israel has a military base in preparation for an attack against Iran. Some
time ago, Aliyev confessed that nine-tenth of his country's relationship
with Israel was below the surface. The rapprochement seems to have been
initiated and pursued by the US administration. This strategic build-up
will undermine Russian and Iranian influence in the region.
Iran is very wary and prepared for the consequences of this strategic drive
but it has limited resources to counter it. Russian and Iranian interests
coincide in this political chess game and Mr. Putin's trip is part of that
mission.
While in Azerbaijan, Putin has countered Aliyev's aggressive posture with
an emphatic statement that the Karabagh conflict has only a political
solution, not a military one.
Political analyst Alexander Iskandarian believes that Mr. Putin has a
two-prong policy vis-à-vis the Karabagh conflict: not to solve the problem
and not to allow a war. Indeed, Karabagh is a handy political tool for Mr.
Putin to pressure Baku at the opportune moment.
Only time will tell if Mr. Putin left the slippery oil land of Azerbaijan
unscathed or empty-handed.
- See more at:
http://www.mirrorspectator.com/2013/08/20/putin-in-oil-land/#sthash.yKurxWef.dpuf