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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF ARMENIA: MYTHS, REALITY, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
by David Stepanyan
Thursday, August 29, 00:28
The more time is left till the November initialing of DCFTA and the
Association Agreement with the EU by Armenia, the more the tension
around this document to be signed in Vilnus. The content of this
document consisting of 1500 pages has not been published yet because
of an unknown reason. For this reason, when analyzing the reasons,
aspects and arguments of the discussion that started between Armenian,
Russian and European experts, we are forced to present not specific
points of the agreement, but their general geo-political context.
Anyway, we have to confess that because of several impartial reasons,
the given way of the analysis has turned to be more effective than
possible analysis of the text of DCFTA and the Association Agreement
covered with a stamp "incognita".
>From the very beginning of the negotiations between Armenia and the EU
regarding these documents, the background of the negotiating process
gained numerous myths which directly contradict the reality. The
key one of them is the myth invented by the Armenian authorities and
political experts, according to which the initialing of the agreements
with the EU does not at all contradict development of relations with
Russia. However, recent events are evidence of the contrary. First
of all, I mean the growing pressure upon Yerevan, in which Russia
and partly Europe are using secondary factors, which seem to be such
at first sight. The pressure is still imposed through the non-stop
discussion between Yerevan and Moscow, as well as in Yerevan between
pro-Russian and pro-Western experts. The participants in the discussion
submit any arguments but not the ones that meet reality.
Let's offer several options, how Europe, the Euroatlantic community
and Russia motivate the games around Armenia.
It turns out that the discussion around the Association Agreement of
Armenia covers more global geo-political space than even the territory
of six countries involved in the Eastern Partnership. After the "cold"
war, the Euroatlantic community started creating a new "security zone"
which supposes integration of the neighboring states.
Incidentally, unlike the myths, which say that economy, communications
and even pipelines lay on the basis of this integration, actually,
the European security is in its basis, which undoubtedly, the USA is
also interested in. Within the frames of this logic, the Association
agreement with the "Eastern Partnership" countries is undoubtedly
a political document of the Western policy influence in the 6 CIS
countries including Armenia. In particular, a new format of the EU and
NATO policy is being today formed at least regarding the two South
Caucasus states. However, at present this format does not suppose
obligatory membership of Armenia and Georgia in these two structures.
This seems to be the key motivation of Brussels and Washington,
why the Eastern Partnership Programme arose. Today this programme is
simply supported by a new economic format, such as the Association
Agreement and DCFTA.
It is clear that Russia is not pleased with such a situation,
not only because of its natural and grounded empire ambissi0ons,
but also the concern about its own security. The availability of
the explosively dangerous North Caucasus, supported by Washington,
Turkey as well as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, is enough. And Georgia and
Armenia, neighboring to this region and involved in the circle of
the Western security system, increase the fear of Moscow more. The
"Eastern Partnership" programme idea was put forward by the EU at the
suggestion of Poland, an "old friend" of Russia, out of spite of the
integration ambitions of Moscow at the territories of the post-soviet
space. But taking into account the availability of Ukraine which wanted
to join Europe long ago, and which Russia cannot keep even with a
help of the gas blackmail, undoubtedly this idea has all the chances
to be completed successfully. In this context, Russia's Customs Union
programme with a prospect of setting up of the Eurasian Union is a
natural attempt of contradiction to the policy of the Euratlantic
community on extension of its own influence space. The difference is
that at the time of the Eltsin's Russia this extension was implemented
through fast joining NATO of the former Warsaw Treaty countries,
today it is being implemented within the frames of the soft power
through the economic integration programmes.
We have to confess that both European integration and Eurasian
integration promise certain economic dividends to Armenia. In this
context, signing of the DCFTA supported by the promised aid 3-4
billion EUR, really looks to be attractive to Armenia. In general,
Yerevan's stance is grounded by the fact that Armenia agrees to
the Association agreement with the EU as it hopes for the economic
prosperity. However, there is no calculation how DCFTA will affect the
market and structure of the import-oriented economy of Armenia after
joining the well-developed and competitive European market. Moreover,
one cannot speak about competition with Europe in the sphere of
industry and agriculture. For this reason, we have got an impression
that no Association agreement and DCFTA can lead Armenia to the
economic growth as it practically has no real sector. We cannot either
answer the question if the Customs Union is beneficial to Armenia.
Neither the government nor the political leadership seem to have the
answer to these questions. In this context, we may agree to those
experts which have got an impression that Armenia does not have an
active dialogue with Russia, or it takes place at the top level, when
one man defines the destiny of the whole people. They think it is
inadmissible in both cases, as in such conditions external players
do not know, what to wait from such Armenia and what surprises
its authorities may bring. This results in total distrust in the
complementary position of the Armenian authorities.
By the way, Yerevan has similar distrust in the West as well as
Russia. First of all, just this circumstance makes the authorities of
the republic look for the counterbalances between Moscow and Brussels.
This distrust and concern have been recently demonstrated open in the
statement by Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Shavarsh Kocharyan,
which said when commenting on the Moscow's statement that sale of
weapon to Azerbaijan is just business, that "Armenia's intention to
make the Association Agreement with European Union is also a pure
business, whereas the sale of weapon always has a political context".
"One thing is when we speak about the Association Agreement or DCFTA.
In these conditions we shall not lose our sovereignty and can
adopt decisions about our own tax policy. But we shall lose certain
sovereignty when resolving similar problems, if we become a member
of the common customs system", - Kocharyan said.
Incidentally, the Armenian authorities put security into the hands
just of the Russians, as in Yerevan as well as Moscow and first of
all in Brussels they understand very well that Europe does not want
and cannot ensure security of Yerevan and Karabakh because of several
partial and impartial reasons. Today Moscow has been playing this part,
especially thanks to deployment of the 102-nd Russian military base
at the territory of Armenia. So, to put under blow the availability
of the Armenian Karabakh and bad or good but independent Armenian
state in order to please ghostly prospects of Armenia's European
integration would be wrong and will not be the solution that reflects
reality. Though it seems to be a paradox, but just unsettlement of
the Karabakh conflict, preserving of status-quo of 1994 is the key
tramp card of Yerevan in its relations with external players. In these
conditions, losing of Karabakh will nullify the role and significance
of Armenia in the regional policy and put the Armenian statehood
under the threat of disappearance.
Undoubtedly, Russia unlike NATO can provide Armenia's security at
present stage. The point is that Moscow alone cannot any more fulfill
functions of Armenia's security guarantor. I do not mean even the
problem of the weapon sale to Azerbaijan. The danger is that from
time to time self-interest of some representatives of the Russian
elite prevail over the interests of the state. Here is hidden the key
danger for Armenia but not in the empire ambitions of Russia. In this
context, the elite ruling in Armenia should be extremely careful when
choosing the foreign political discussion between the West and North.
At present, Yerevan must think not about the content of DCFTA
or any other integration document, but how to become a partner
in the developing geo-political combinations. There are many
examples in the world, how even a small state may become a partner,
for instance, Israel. So, on this way Armenia has to take part in
various strategies, to work in the direction of becoming a partner,
as it is very much dangerous to remain a raw material in the context
of the above-mentioned.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=7B6AC6C0-1020-11E3-9D8B0EB7C0D21663
From: A. Papazian
by David Stepanyan
Thursday, August 29, 00:28
The more time is left till the November initialing of DCFTA and the
Association Agreement with the EU by Armenia, the more the tension
around this document to be signed in Vilnus. The content of this
document consisting of 1500 pages has not been published yet because
of an unknown reason. For this reason, when analyzing the reasons,
aspects and arguments of the discussion that started between Armenian,
Russian and European experts, we are forced to present not specific
points of the agreement, but their general geo-political context.
Anyway, we have to confess that because of several impartial reasons,
the given way of the analysis has turned to be more effective than
possible analysis of the text of DCFTA and the Association Agreement
covered with a stamp "incognita".
>From the very beginning of the negotiations between Armenia and the EU
regarding these documents, the background of the negotiating process
gained numerous myths which directly contradict the reality. The
key one of them is the myth invented by the Armenian authorities and
political experts, according to which the initialing of the agreements
with the EU does not at all contradict development of relations with
Russia. However, recent events are evidence of the contrary. First
of all, I mean the growing pressure upon Yerevan, in which Russia
and partly Europe are using secondary factors, which seem to be such
at first sight. The pressure is still imposed through the non-stop
discussion between Yerevan and Moscow, as well as in Yerevan between
pro-Russian and pro-Western experts. The participants in the discussion
submit any arguments but not the ones that meet reality.
Let's offer several options, how Europe, the Euroatlantic community
and Russia motivate the games around Armenia.
It turns out that the discussion around the Association Agreement of
Armenia covers more global geo-political space than even the territory
of six countries involved in the Eastern Partnership. After the "cold"
war, the Euroatlantic community started creating a new "security zone"
which supposes integration of the neighboring states.
Incidentally, unlike the myths, which say that economy, communications
and even pipelines lay on the basis of this integration, actually,
the European security is in its basis, which undoubtedly, the USA is
also interested in. Within the frames of this logic, the Association
agreement with the "Eastern Partnership" countries is undoubtedly
a political document of the Western policy influence in the 6 CIS
countries including Armenia. In particular, a new format of the EU and
NATO policy is being today formed at least regarding the two South
Caucasus states. However, at present this format does not suppose
obligatory membership of Armenia and Georgia in these two structures.
This seems to be the key motivation of Brussels and Washington,
why the Eastern Partnership Programme arose. Today this programme is
simply supported by a new economic format, such as the Association
Agreement and DCFTA.
It is clear that Russia is not pleased with such a situation,
not only because of its natural and grounded empire ambissi0ons,
but also the concern about its own security. The availability of
the explosively dangerous North Caucasus, supported by Washington,
Turkey as well as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, is enough. And Georgia and
Armenia, neighboring to this region and involved in the circle of
the Western security system, increase the fear of Moscow more. The
"Eastern Partnership" programme idea was put forward by the EU at the
suggestion of Poland, an "old friend" of Russia, out of spite of the
integration ambitions of Moscow at the territories of the post-soviet
space. But taking into account the availability of Ukraine which wanted
to join Europe long ago, and which Russia cannot keep even with a
help of the gas blackmail, undoubtedly this idea has all the chances
to be completed successfully. In this context, Russia's Customs Union
programme with a prospect of setting up of the Eurasian Union is a
natural attempt of contradiction to the policy of the Euratlantic
community on extension of its own influence space. The difference is
that at the time of the Eltsin's Russia this extension was implemented
through fast joining NATO of the former Warsaw Treaty countries,
today it is being implemented within the frames of the soft power
through the economic integration programmes.
We have to confess that both European integration and Eurasian
integration promise certain economic dividends to Armenia. In this
context, signing of the DCFTA supported by the promised aid 3-4
billion EUR, really looks to be attractive to Armenia. In general,
Yerevan's stance is grounded by the fact that Armenia agrees to
the Association agreement with the EU as it hopes for the economic
prosperity. However, there is no calculation how DCFTA will affect the
market and structure of the import-oriented economy of Armenia after
joining the well-developed and competitive European market. Moreover,
one cannot speak about competition with Europe in the sphere of
industry and agriculture. For this reason, we have got an impression
that no Association agreement and DCFTA can lead Armenia to the
economic growth as it practically has no real sector. We cannot either
answer the question if the Customs Union is beneficial to Armenia.
Neither the government nor the political leadership seem to have the
answer to these questions. In this context, we may agree to those
experts which have got an impression that Armenia does not have an
active dialogue with Russia, or it takes place at the top level, when
one man defines the destiny of the whole people. They think it is
inadmissible in both cases, as in such conditions external players
do not know, what to wait from such Armenia and what surprises
its authorities may bring. This results in total distrust in the
complementary position of the Armenian authorities.
By the way, Yerevan has similar distrust in the West as well as
Russia. First of all, just this circumstance makes the authorities of
the republic look for the counterbalances between Moscow and Brussels.
This distrust and concern have been recently demonstrated open in the
statement by Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Shavarsh Kocharyan,
which said when commenting on the Moscow's statement that sale of
weapon to Azerbaijan is just business, that "Armenia's intention to
make the Association Agreement with European Union is also a pure
business, whereas the sale of weapon always has a political context".
"One thing is when we speak about the Association Agreement or DCFTA.
In these conditions we shall not lose our sovereignty and can
adopt decisions about our own tax policy. But we shall lose certain
sovereignty when resolving similar problems, if we become a member
of the common customs system", - Kocharyan said.
Incidentally, the Armenian authorities put security into the hands
just of the Russians, as in Yerevan as well as Moscow and first of
all in Brussels they understand very well that Europe does not want
and cannot ensure security of Yerevan and Karabakh because of several
partial and impartial reasons. Today Moscow has been playing this part,
especially thanks to deployment of the 102-nd Russian military base
at the territory of Armenia. So, to put under blow the availability
of the Armenian Karabakh and bad or good but independent Armenian
state in order to please ghostly prospects of Armenia's European
integration would be wrong and will not be the solution that reflects
reality. Though it seems to be a paradox, but just unsettlement of
the Karabakh conflict, preserving of status-quo of 1994 is the key
tramp card of Yerevan in its relations with external players. In these
conditions, losing of Karabakh will nullify the role and significance
of Armenia in the regional policy and put the Armenian statehood
under the threat of disappearance.
Undoubtedly, Russia unlike NATO can provide Armenia's security at
present stage. The point is that Moscow alone cannot any more fulfill
functions of Armenia's security guarantor. I do not mean even the
problem of the weapon sale to Azerbaijan. The danger is that from
time to time self-interest of some representatives of the Russian
elite prevail over the interests of the state. Here is hidden the key
danger for Armenia but not in the empire ambitions of Russia. In this
context, the elite ruling in Armenia should be extremely careful when
choosing the foreign political discussion between the West and North.
At present, Yerevan must think not about the content of DCFTA
or any other integration document, but how to become a partner
in the developing geo-political combinations. There are many
examples in the world, how even a small state may become a partner,
for instance, Israel. So, on this way Armenia has to take part in
various strategies, to work in the direction of becoming a partner,
as it is very much dangerous to remain a raw material in the context
of the above-mentioned.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=7B6AC6C0-1020-11E3-9D8B0EB7C0D21663
From: A. Papazian