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ALEXANDER KRYLOV: BOTH THE OSCE MG CO-CHAIRS AND THE POPULATIONS OF ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN HAVE GOT TIRED OF THE STATUS QUO IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
ArmInfo's interview with Alexander Krylov, Senior Researcher at the
Institute for World Economics and International Relations of the
Russian Academy of Sciences
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=1C3884F0-D4C8-11E2-A36D0EB7C0D21663
Friday, June 14, 11:57
Russia's military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is limited
enough. In the meanwhile, Russia keeps increasing its military presence
in Armenia through equipment of the102nd military base in Gyumri. What
are the reasons of such different approach?
The reasons of different approaches regarding a military presence of
Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are obvious like the reasons
of growing of the military presence in Armenia via the upgrading
of the 102-nd Russian military base in Gyumri with new types of
weapon.There is no Iranian factor in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
whereas Armenia, Russia's CSTO ally, being in a complex geo-political
situation, requires reliable security. Against the background of the
growing instability of the Big Middle East, its problems will first
of all affect the South Caucasus states, including Armenia. Such an
option is possible, as the scenarios of the Iranian nuclear problem
settlement with help of war, or by means of domestic political
instability and civil war with a purpose to change the regime, are
being discussed. It is very much possible that the situation in the
eastern Turkey, bordering to the South Caucasus, will also become
unstable because of resolving of the Kurdish problem in this or that
way and the possibility of changing the borders. And if Turkey does
not manage to get rid of the present political crisis, it will worsen
the situation even more. And finally, the influence of the Karabakh
conflict: in the conditions of tension, it is especially important
to ensure reliable missile and air defense of Armenia. It is obvious
that there are not such big threats in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and their security may be guaranteed by more limited means.
Representatives of all the three co-chair states of the OSCE Minsk
Group more and more people speak of the necessity of breaking the
status quo in Nagorno Karabakh. Do these trends predetermine an
outcome of the peace process?
Both the OSCE MG co-chairs and the populations of Armenia and
Azerbaijan have got tired of the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. This
does not however mean that the co-chairs will act as radically as
their colleagues did in Kosovo and will impose some solutions on
the conflicting parties. Given the continuing back-door diplomacy,
we can hardly expect any foreign interference in the Nagorno-Karabakh
peace process. Nor will we see any peacekeepers in the area soon. I
think that both Armenia and Azerbaijan would prefer keeping the things
the way they are to facing an external interference - for this would
make them hostage to the interests of external forces. The examples
of the Middle East, North Africa and Serbia have shown that instead
of solving problems such interferences create new ones. A compromise
would be the best solution for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but until then
they better stick to the status quo.
May a possible change of power in Iran after the June 14 presidential
elections reduce tension in the relations of Tehran and Baku or maybe
there are other factors influencing those relations?
The reason of tension in the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran is
not the person of their leaders, but the policy conducted by them. And
the election in Iran will hardly change the policy of Iran regarding
the USA, Israel in the context of the nuclear program. In general,
Baku's active support of the anti-Iranian coalition is the reason of
tension in the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, especially if we take
into consideration the fact that the card of the "South Azerbaijan"
is being actively played within the frames of this policy. Iranian
nuclear problem really exists. But in case of its force settlement, it
may result in great upheavals for the whole region. For this reason,
in such a situation, one should not wait for fast normalization of
the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
Ongoing unrest in Turkey made AKP offer the public a referendum
on Gezi Park liquidation. Does it mean that Erdogan has refused the
policy of the country's Islamization? May the domestic destabilization
in Turkey affect the region? What is the most probable scenario of
further developments?
It is not refusal from Erdogan's previous policy. Erdogan's policy
cannot be characterized Islamization or 'creeping Islamization.' After
all, Istanbul and Ankara look quite secular and less Islamized rather
than the capitals of many EU states. Erdogan's policy brought Turkey
success in social-economic development and he has many supporters.
However, there are many who oppose his policy: starting the supporters
of radical Islamism up to supporters of radical choice in favor of
the current western democracy and lifestyle. Erdogan has occurred
in the center and gets blows from everywhere. In addition, there are
problems with army, discontent with the policy of interference with
Syria's affairs etc. However, it is in favor of Erdgoan that external
forces (USA, Al Qaeda) so far refrain from active involvement into the
situation and the unrest is of domestic nature. He still has a chance
to stay in power and his maneuvers with the referendum on Gezi Park,
dialogues with opposition forces may be effective and help reduce
tension. This is the most probable scenario of developments so far.
However, everything may change under influence of an external factor.
Anyway, progressing unrest in Turkey will make the situation in the
Big Middle East even more complicate and fraught with more shocks.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
ArmInfo's interview with Alexander Krylov, Senior Researcher at the
Institute for World Economics and International Relations of the
Russian Academy of Sciences
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=1C3884F0-D4C8-11E2-A36D0EB7C0D21663
Friday, June 14, 11:57
Russia's military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is limited
enough. In the meanwhile, Russia keeps increasing its military presence
in Armenia through equipment of the102nd military base in Gyumri. What
are the reasons of such different approach?
The reasons of different approaches regarding a military presence of
Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are obvious like the reasons
of growing of the military presence in Armenia via the upgrading
of the 102-nd Russian military base in Gyumri with new types of
weapon.There is no Iranian factor in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
whereas Armenia, Russia's CSTO ally, being in a complex geo-political
situation, requires reliable security. Against the background of the
growing instability of the Big Middle East, its problems will first
of all affect the South Caucasus states, including Armenia. Such an
option is possible, as the scenarios of the Iranian nuclear problem
settlement with help of war, or by means of domestic political
instability and civil war with a purpose to change the regime, are
being discussed. It is very much possible that the situation in the
eastern Turkey, bordering to the South Caucasus, will also become
unstable because of resolving of the Kurdish problem in this or that
way and the possibility of changing the borders. And if Turkey does
not manage to get rid of the present political crisis, it will worsen
the situation even more. And finally, the influence of the Karabakh
conflict: in the conditions of tension, it is especially important
to ensure reliable missile and air defense of Armenia. It is obvious
that there are not such big threats in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and their security may be guaranteed by more limited means.
Representatives of all the three co-chair states of the OSCE Minsk
Group more and more people speak of the necessity of breaking the
status quo in Nagorno Karabakh. Do these trends predetermine an
outcome of the peace process?
Both the OSCE MG co-chairs and the populations of Armenia and
Azerbaijan have got tired of the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. This
does not however mean that the co-chairs will act as radically as
their colleagues did in Kosovo and will impose some solutions on
the conflicting parties. Given the continuing back-door diplomacy,
we can hardly expect any foreign interference in the Nagorno-Karabakh
peace process. Nor will we see any peacekeepers in the area soon. I
think that both Armenia and Azerbaijan would prefer keeping the things
the way they are to facing an external interference - for this would
make them hostage to the interests of external forces. The examples
of the Middle East, North Africa and Serbia have shown that instead
of solving problems such interferences create new ones. A compromise
would be the best solution for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but until then
they better stick to the status quo.
May a possible change of power in Iran after the June 14 presidential
elections reduce tension in the relations of Tehran and Baku or maybe
there are other factors influencing those relations?
The reason of tension in the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran is
not the person of their leaders, but the policy conducted by them. And
the election in Iran will hardly change the policy of Iran regarding
the USA, Israel in the context of the nuclear program. In general,
Baku's active support of the anti-Iranian coalition is the reason of
tension in the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, especially if we take
into consideration the fact that the card of the "South Azerbaijan"
is being actively played within the frames of this policy. Iranian
nuclear problem really exists. But in case of its force settlement, it
may result in great upheavals for the whole region. For this reason,
in such a situation, one should not wait for fast normalization of
the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
Ongoing unrest in Turkey made AKP offer the public a referendum
on Gezi Park liquidation. Does it mean that Erdogan has refused the
policy of the country's Islamization? May the domestic destabilization
in Turkey affect the region? What is the most probable scenario of
further developments?
It is not refusal from Erdogan's previous policy. Erdogan's policy
cannot be characterized Islamization or 'creeping Islamization.' After
all, Istanbul and Ankara look quite secular and less Islamized rather
than the capitals of many EU states. Erdogan's policy brought Turkey
success in social-economic development and he has many supporters.
However, there are many who oppose his policy: starting the supporters
of radical Islamism up to supporters of radical choice in favor of
the current western democracy and lifestyle. Erdogan has occurred
in the center and gets blows from everywhere. In addition, there are
problems with army, discontent with the policy of interference with
Syria's affairs etc. However, it is in favor of Erdgoan that external
forces (USA, Al Qaeda) so far refrain from active involvement into the
situation and the unrest is of domestic nature. He still has a chance
to stay in power and his maneuvers with the referendum on Gezi Park,
dialogues with opposition forces may be effective and help reduce
tension. This is the most probable scenario of developments so far.
However, everything may change under influence of an external factor.
Anyway, progressing unrest in Turkey will make the situation in the
Big Middle East even more complicate and fraught with more shocks.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress