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Time for an overture to Turkey
With the elections behind him, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can
afford to reach out to Ankara and patch up a relationship that is
beneficial to both countries.
Haaretz
Feb.28, 2013
By Nimrod Goren
Apparently, the recent national elections in Israel are having a
positive effect on Israeli-Turkish ties. February 2013 will be
remembered as the best month in the relationship between the two
countries in a very long time. During this month, the Turkish and
Israeli media have been inundated with positive reports on cooperation
between the two states.
The most dramatic of those news items was the report that, for the
first time since the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in May 2010,
Israel was supplying Turkey with military equipment: advanced
electronic warfare systems that will significantly upgrade the
capabilities of the Turkish Air Force's early warning planes. In
addition, there were reports about Israel's consent to transfer
humanitarian aid from Turkey to the Gaza Strip, a plan to lay of an
underwater natural gas pipeline between the Turkey and Israel, and
cooperation regarding Ankara's extradition to Israel of a suspect
accused of trafficking in women. And all this in only one week.
A similar situation occurred, although in a more limited manner,
immediately following the general elections in Turkey in June
2011. The Turkish government decided to prevent the Islamist IHH
organization from dispatching another flotilla to Gaza. After the
Turkish elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally
congratulated his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his
electoral victory and expressed the hope that the friendship and
cooperation that had once existed between Ankara and Jerusalem would
be renewed.
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon hosted a delegation of Turkish
journalists and even agreed to be photographed sitting in a low
chair. (The year before Ayalon had publicly humiliated the Turkish
ambassador to Israel, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, by seating him in a chair
that was lower than the one he sat in.)
In June 2011, this positive dynamics, which was actively encouraged by
the United States, led to the drafting of an agreement for the
improvement of Israeli-Turkish relations. The agreement, which was
signed by representatives of both nations at the conclusion of secret
talks, satisfied Israel's major needs with regard to the Marmara
incident and enjoyed the backing of most of Israel's political
leaders; however, in the end, Netanyahu rejected it. As a result,
relations between Turkey and Israel deteriorated further and reached
an unusually low point with the downgrading of the level of bilateral
diplomatic relations, with militant Turkish declarations and with the
opening of a trial in Turkey against senior commanders in the Israel
Defense Forces.
After it seemed as though the opportunity for an improvement in ties
had vanished, it has suddenly reappeared following the recent Knesset
elections. This time, the thawing is the outcome of a protracted
process of the past six months. Last summer a survey showed that the
Israeli public favored an improvement of relations with Turkey, even
if that meant an official Israeli apology for the Marmara incident.
In the wake of declarations by Israeli leaders, Turkey began to feel
that Israel was no longer ruling out the possibility of an official
apology. Furthermore, Netanyahu noted on several occasions the
importance of relations with Turkey and even sent Erdogan an emissary,
a Jewish businessman. The negotiations between the official teams of
both countries were renewed in November 2012, only a few days before
Operation Pillar of Defense began.
Even the military operation in Gaza, which could have been expected to
create greater friction, actually became a lever for the improvement
of bilateral relations. During that military operation, not only was
it reported that the number of flights between the two countries had
increased, but a channel of communication was created between Mossad
chief Tamir Pardo and the head of Turkish intelligence, Hakan
Fidan. The two met in Cairo as part of the effort to bring about a
ceasefire. Channels of this kind had been blocked, in accordance with
a directive from Erdogan, for a very long time. The channels were
reopened and were even being reported on by the media in both
countries. The state of Israeli-Turkish relations is vastly different
today than what it was only a year ago.
Developments in their region have repeatedly demonstrated to Israel
and Turkey that they can both benefit from improved relations. The
events in Syria have undoubtedly been a significant catalyst. With the
end of Turkey's alliance with Syria, Ankara realizes that its economic
interests would be well served by improved ties with Israel. For its
part, Israel has come to the sober-minded conclusion that even its
national interests would also be best served by an improved
relationship with Turkey, even if it is not as strong as it once was,
and even if serious differences of opinion persist over the
Palestinian issue.
The renewal of full diplomatic relations and the renewal of the
strategic dialogue are vitally important for both Israel and
Turkey. Although the love story might remain a distant memory, the
improvement in bilateral relations would be an important asset in a
neighborhood that is undergoing continual change and which is
characterized by an immense degree of uncertainty.
The political circumstances have also significantly changed. Whereas
Netanyahu refrained in 2011 from improving relations with Turkey for
political and electoral reasons, Israel is now ready to make
overtures. Netanyahu has been given a renewed mandate from the voters,
Avigdor Lieberman - who strongly opposed an agreement with Turkey - is
no longer foreign minister and some of Netanyahu's potential coalition
partners - Yesh Atid, Labor, Hatnuah and Kadima - have on several
occasions expressed support for the rehabilitation of the relationship
between the two countries.
The new Israeli government must place the improvement of the
relationship with Turkey high on its agenda, must express a readiness
to apologize for the operational mistakes that were made during the
takeover by Israel Navy commandos of the Marmara flotilla (according
to the wording of the draft that was agreed upon in 2011) and must
test how serious Turkey's intentions are on this matter. If Israel
moves in that direction, it will send out the clear message that it is
adopting a policy of political moderation and that it has learned its
lessons from Netanyahu's previous term of office, when the government
was trying in vain to find ways to escape the consequences of
developments in the Middle East.
It is apparent that Israel has gradually learned to live with the
ramifications of the Arab Spring, as can be seen, for instance, in its
relationship with Egypt under President Mohamed Morsi. If Israel wants
to return to its home neighborhood, the rehabilitation of relations
with Turkey and the renewal of negotiations with the Palestinians are
the key.
This opportunity must not be allowed to slip away. If there is a need
for a little help from one's friends, the upcoming visit of American
President Barack Obama could provide the impetus for enabling
Jerusalem and Ankara to set off in a new direction together.
Dr. Nimrod Goren is Founder and Chairman of Mitvim - The Israeli
Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; he is also an Adjunct
Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
From: A. Papazian
With the elections behind him, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can
afford to reach out to Ankara and patch up a relationship that is
beneficial to both countries.
Haaretz
Feb.28, 2013
By Nimrod Goren
Apparently, the recent national elections in Israel are having a
positive effect on Israeli-Turkish ties. February 2013 will be
remembered as the best month in the relationship between the two
countries in a very long time. During this month, the Turkish and
Israeli media have been inundated with positive reports on cooperation
between the two states.
The most dramatic of those news items was the report that, for the
first time since the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in May 2010,
Israel was supplying Turkey with military equipment: advanced
electronic warfare systems that will significantly upgrade the
capabilities of the Turkish Air Force's early warning planes. In
addition, there were reports about Israel's consent to transfer
humanitarian aid from Turkey to the Gaza Strip, a plan to lay of an
underwater natural gas pipeline between the Turkey and Israel, and
cooperation regarding Ankara's extradition to Israel of a suspect
accused of trafficking in women. And all this in only one week.
A similar situation occurred, although in a more limited manner,
immediately following the general elections in Turkey in June
2011. The Turkish government decided to prevent the Islamist IHH
organization from dispatching another flotilla to Gaza. After the
Turkish elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally
congratulated his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his
electoral victory and expressed the hope that the friendship and
cooperation that had once existed between Ankara and Jerusalem would
be renewed.
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon hosted a delegation of Turkish
journalists and even agreed to be photographed sitting in a low
chair. (The year before Ayalon had publicly humiliated the Turkish
ambassador to Israel, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, by seating him in a chair
that was lower than the one he sat in.)
In June 2011, this positive dynamics, which was actively encouraged by
the United States, led to the drafting of an agreement for the
improvement of Israeli-Turkish relations. The agreement, which was
signed by representatives of both nations at the conclusion of secret
talks, satisfied Israel's major needs with regard to the Marmara
incident and enjoyed the backing of most of Israel's political
leaders; however, in the end, Netanyahu rejected it. As a result,
relations between Turkey and Israel deteriorated further and reached
an unusually low point with the downgrading of the level of bilateral
diplomatic relations, with militant Turkish declarations and with the
opening of a trial in Turkey against senior commanders in the Israel
Defense Forces.
After it seemed as though the opportunity for an improvement in ties
had vanished, it has suddenly reappeared following the recent Knesset
elections. This time, the thawing is the outcome of a protracted
process of the past six months. Last summer a survey showed that the
Israeli public favored an improvement of relations with Turkey, even
if that meant an official Israeli apology for the Marmara incident.
In the wake of declarations by Israeli leaders, Turkey began to feel
that Israel was no longer ruling out the possibility of an official
apology. Furthermore, Netanyahu noted on several occasions the
importance of relations with Turkey and even sent Erdogan an emissary,
a Jewish businessman. The negotiations between the official teams of
both countries were renewed in November 2012, only a few days before
Operation Pillar of Defense began.
Even the military operation in Gaza, which could have been expected to
create greater friction, actually became a lever for the improvement
of bilateral relations. During that military operation, not only was
it reported that the number of flights between the two countries had
increased, but a channel of communication was created between Mossad
chief Tamir Pardo and the head of Turkish intelligence, Hakan
Fidan. The two met in Cairo as part of the effort to bring about a
ceasefire. Channels of this kind had been blocked, in accordance with
a directive from Erdogan, for a very long time. The channels were
reopened and were even being reported on by the media in both
countries. The state of Israeli-Turkish relations is vastly different
today than what it was only a year ago.
Developments in their region have repeatedly demonstrated to Israel
and Turkey that they can both benefit from improved relations. The
events in Syria have undoubtedly been a significant catalyst. With the
end of Turkey's alliance with Syria, Ankara realizes that its economic
interests would be well served by improved ties with Israel. For its
part, Israel has come to the sober-minded conclusion that even its
national interests would also be best served by an improved
relationship with Turkey, even if it is not as strong as it once was,
and even if serious differences of opinion persist over the
Palestinian issue.
The renewal of full diplomatic relations and the renewal of the
strategic dialogue are vitally important for both Israel and
Turkey. Although the love story might remain a distant memory, the
improvement in bilateral relations would be an important asset in a
neighborhood that is undergoing continual change and which is
characterized by an immense degree of uncertainty.
The political circumstances have also significantly changed. Whereas
Netanyahu refrained in 2011 from improving relations with Turkey for
political and electoral reasons, Israel is now ready to make
overtures. Netanyahu has been given a renewed mandate from the voters,
Avigdor Lieberman - who strongly opposed an agreement with Turkey - is
no longer foreign minister and some of Netanyahu's potential coalition
partners - Yesh Atid, Labor, Hatnuah and Kadima - have on several
occasions expressed support for the rehabilitation of the relationship
between the two countries.
The new Israeli government must place the improvement of the
relationship with Turkey high on its agenda, must express a readiness
to apologize for the operational mistakes that were made during the
takeover by Israel Navy commandos of the Marmara flotilla (according
to the wording of the draft that was agreed upon in 2011) and must
test how serious Turkey's intentions are on this matter. If Israel
moves in that direction, it will send out the clear message that it is
adopting a policy of political moderation and that it has learned its
lessons from Netanyahu's previous term of office, when the government
was trying in vain to find ways to escape the consequences of
developments in the Middle East.
It is apparent that Israel has gradually learned to live with the
ramifications of the Arab Spring, as can be seen, for instance, in its
relationship with Egypt under President Mohamed Morsi. If Israel wants
to return to its home neighborhood, the rehabilitation of relations
with Turkey and the renewal of negotiations with the Palestinians are
the key.
This opportunity must not be allowed to slip away. If there is a need
for a little help from one's friends, the upcoming visit of American
President Barack Obama could provide the impetus for enabling
Jerusalem and Ankara to set off in a new direction together.
Dr. Nimrod Goren is Founder and Chairman of Mitvim - The Israeli
Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; he is also an Adjunct
Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
From: A. Papazian