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CONTESTED SOVEREIGNTY AND COMPETING IDENTITIES IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Atlantic Community
March 19 2013
by Alexandra Lewis
2013
As a territory that remains contested by Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Nagorno-Karabakh reflects a series of local, regional and international
power struggles that have emerged as part of a process of regional
realignment, brought about by the post-Soviet transitioning and rise
of new states and local powers after the 1990s. Nagorno-Karabakh's
"no war/no peace stalemate" (MacGinty, 2010) and reoccurring conflict
offer a microcosm of regional development challenges that have been
brought to the fore in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse
in 1991. Among these issues, self-determination, state sovereignty
and political association with the values of key Western, Russian and
Middle Eastern actors in the global arena have emerged as central
themes in continuing violence. From Armenia to Azerbaijan, from
the Russian Federation to the United States of America, From Iran to
Turkey, and from the European Union to the United Nations, there are no
neutral actors or donors in the disputed territory. Yet despite growing
recent interest on the part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) and other important international strategic players, or perhaps
because of the wealth of competing narratives now associated with
the area, the Nagorno-Karabakh case study remains little understood.
Nagorno-Karabakh as a Post-Soviet Transitioning State
Nagorno-Karabakh is a land-locked mostly-mountainous region situated
on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though an acting
self-administrating province with its own governance system, the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not recognised as a country by the
European Union or the United Nations and is formally considered
Azerbaijani territory in the global political arena, connected to
Armenia by the "illegally" seized Lachin corridor (Kaldor, Oil and
Conflict, 2007). In Soviet times, the province was populated mostly
by Armenians, while the territory itself holds strong cultural and
historic meaning for Azeris (Economist, States of Independence,
2011). According to James Appathurai, NATO's special representative
in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the
wider South Caucasus are also an area of strategic importance
in terms of their geographic location and relevance for regional
natural resource transportation and supply (Trend, 2012). In 2005,
a new pipeline known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was opened
close to Nagorno-Karabakh's peripheries, pumping Azerbaijani oil to
Turkey. The pipeline undermines Russia's dominance in oil supply
to Europe, impacting European and Eastern European politics, but
also representing huge economic benefits for controlling countries
(Economist, Conflict on Ice, 2011). Potential damage to the pipeline
could hold severe economic repercussions for Azerbaijan and surrounding
territories, should regional stability deteriorate further. In the
post-Soviet period, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has therefore been
read as a struggle defined at times by issues of national identity,
security and material interests. With the rising involvement of Iran
and its growing support of Azerbaijan, the conflict has also been
read as a religious one (Flanagan, 2013).
Soviet Influence
The Nagorno-Karabakh area has a strong tradition of Russian influence
and intervention, which has shaped the course of its development and
contributed to its current political climate. The broader Karabakh
territory - which comprises Artsakh, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Southern
Kura-Steppes - became a Russian protectorate in 1805 and was formally
absorbed into the Russian Empire in 1828. Despite periodic power
struggles over Karabakh itself by competing states and Empires,
Russian influence over the region continued up until the 1990s.
Due to local concerns about the potential for religiously-based
prosecution under Russian administration, the 1800s saw the
wide-scale emigration of Azeri Muslims to more Islam-friendly Persian
territories, as well as the influx of Christian Armenians into
Nagorno-Karabakh. This explains why the Azerbaijani province is today
strongly linked to Azeri cultural heritage while being predominantly
populated by Armenians in the 1990s (Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007).
After the 1917 Russian Revolution and the formation of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922, Nagorno-Karabakh became part
of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR), later
to be partitioned into Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Territorial
competition between Armenia and Azerbaijan often resulted in fighting
over the Karabakh region, however analysts find that these early
skirmishes have little in common with the on-going political stalemate
affecting Nagorno-Karabakh today (Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007). In
1923, the Soviet Union placed the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
under Azeri control, having previously promised the territory to
Armenia. This last minute policy switch was likely an attempt to
maintain positive diplomatic relations with Turkey, which, at the
time, had strong economic and social ties with Azerbaijan (Cornell,
Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, 1998). Despite local
hostility towards this arrangement, Nagorno-Karabakh remained largely
peaceful under Soviet control until the dissolution of the USSR,
though competing nationalist narratives of relevance to the current
conflict originated during this period.
The Post-Soviet Transition
The post-Soviet transition brought the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to the
fore in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
>>From 1988, Armenians began heavily protesting the territory's
continued status as a province of Azerbaijan.
Initial skirmishes in 1988 resulted from retaliatory marches by Azeris
against Armenians communities. Early conflicts led immediately to
forced migration and displacement. The population of Nagorno-Karabakh,
which, at the time, was 76 per cent Armenian and 23 per cent Azeri,
was significantly radicalised by escalating violence (Human Rights
Watch, 1994). From 1989 to 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan struggled
to redefine the administrative division of their territories. This
conflict escalated dramatically after 1991, when both coun tries
achieved independence from the Soviet Union. The former USSR was unable
to placate either side by granting Nagorno-Karabakh self-administration
capacities. This led to full-out war, genocide and ethnic cleansing.
Former Soviet troops, mercernaries, Afghan fighters, transnational
organised crime networks and a wealth of other foreign fighters
were also drawn into the conflict. By 1994, Armenia had brought
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Lachin corridor and other key Azerbaijani
territories under its control and a ceasefire was reached through
Russian mediation (Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007).
Despite a peace agreement negotiated under the Bishkek Protocol,
skirmishes continue between
Armenia and Azerbaijan to this day. A number of international
instruments have now been developed to condemn the ethnic cleansing of
Azeri communities in the area, with Middle Eastern states especially
also rejecting Armenian control of seized lands as an illegal
occupation.
On-Going Development and Peace-Keeping Challenges
Though open warfare over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and
Azerbaijan was avoided by the Bishkek Protocol and other negotiated
peace agreements, the current political situation in the Karabakh
region should be understood as a stalemate rather than a resolution
of hostilities. As recently as 2009, conferences and world summits
have been held in Munich and elsewhere in an attempt to reach
permanent solutions to Nagorno-Karabakh's current challenges. However,
continuing threats of renewed violence on behalf Armenia, Azerbaijan
and the Government of Nagorno-Karabakh have consistently undermined
negotiations. On-going development and peace-keeping challenges stem
from the legacies of war, as well as from core issues relating to
the right to self-determination of the Karabakh area and to competing
constructions of national identities and oppositional cultures.
Svante E. Cornell writes that: "Since the beginning of 1988," the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict "has led to over twenty thousand casualties
and almost one and a half million refugees, a refugee flow which has
resulted in a considerable crisis especially in Azerbaijan, with the
number of displaced persons numbering close to one million" (Cornell,
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 1999).
The scale of violence caused by genocide and forced displacement of
Nagorno-Karabakh communities in the 1990s has left a considerable need
for reconciliation at the local and regional levels, but efforts are
undermined by the continued politicisation of the Nagorno-Karabakh
territory. Mary Kaldor argues that:
"Since the ceasefire, the conflict has been immobilised or 'frozen',
providing a long-term obstacle to democracy. Despite early progress
in economic and political reforms, Armenia suffers from pervasive
militarisation and from economic isolation; the borders with both
Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed. In both countries, the dominance
of the Karabakh issue blocks democratic debate and the growth of
civil society. On both sides there are huge numbers of refugees
and/or displaced persons (DPs), and both sides manipulate them for
political purposes."
(Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007)
Resolution of these issues will not only require further investigation
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but will also necessitate
fostering greater understandings and appreciations for the nuances of
international aid and mediation strategies, especially with relation
to the ways in which different parties to the conflict are perceived
by competing regional and international donors.
Regional Relevance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Case Study
Being inherently linked to national narratives whose formations
were deeply impacted by Soviet Union administration, and later by
the collapse of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh case study offers
a microcosm of regional development and peace-keeping challenges
that are connected to political restructuring and realignment from
hegemonic to multi-polar power relations in the South Caucasus. In
this sense, Nagorno- Karabakh offers a so-called "typical instance"
(Yin, 2004) of conflict resulting from contested borderlands in the
aftermath of Soviet administration.
About the Author
Alexandra Lewis is a doctoral student at the University of York,
Department of Politics, specialising in the area of young offending
in Yemen and other fragile states. She also works as an editorial
assistant at Stability: International Journal of Security and
Development.
Works Cited
Cornell, S. E. (1998). Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh:
a delicate balance. Middle Eastern Studies, 34(1), 51-72.
Cornell, S. E. (1999). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Uppsala:
Uppsala University.
Economist. (2011, December 28). Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo: States
of Independence. The Economist.
Economist. (2011, October 28). Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict on Ice. The
Economist.
Flanagan, S. J. (2013). The Turkey-Russia-Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power
Dynamics. The Washington Quarterly, 36(1), 163-178.
Human Rights Watch. (1994). Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Helsinki: Human Rights Watch.
Kaldor, M. (2007). Oil and conflict: the case of. In T. L. Mary Kaldor,
Oil Wars. London: Pluto Press.
Kaldor, M. (2012). New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global
Era. Boston: Staford University Press.
MacGinty, R. (2010). No war, no peace: Why so many peace processes
fail to deliver peace.
International Politics(47), 154-162.
Trend. (2012, March 16). NATO: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be
resolved quickly and legally.
Trend News Agency. Baku, Azerbaijan.
Yin, R. K. (2004). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London:
Sage.
Download PDF: Contested Sovereignty and
Competing Identities in Nagorno-Karabakh:
http://www.atlantic-community.org/documents/10180/97ffac38-c0dd-4ac5-9a54-d423bf701555
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/contested-sovereignty-and-competing-identities-in-nagorno-karabakh?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.atlantic-community.org%2Fyour-opinion%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_GES8xNFE98EL%26p_p _lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dv iew%26p_p_col_id%3Daf-column-1-3%26p_p_col_pos%3D3%26p_p_col_count%3D8
Atlantic Community
March 19 2013
by Alexandra Lewis
2013
As a territory that remains contested by Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Nagorno-Karabakh reflects a series of local, regional and international
power struggles that have emerged as part of a process of regional
realignment, brought about by the post-Soviet transitioning and rise
of new states and local powers after the 1990s. Nagorno-Karabakh's
"no war/no peace stalemate" (MacGinty, 2010) and reoccurring conflict
offer a microcosm of regional development challenges that have been
brought to the fore in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse
in 1991. Among these issues, self-determination, state sovereignty
and political association with the values of key Western, Russian and
Middle Eastern actors in the global arena have emerged as central
themes in continuing violence. From Armenia to Azerbaijan, from
the Russian Federation to the United States of America, From Iran to
Turkey, and from the European Union to the United Nations, there are no
neutral actors or donors in the disputed territory. Yet despite growing
recent interest on the part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) and other important international strategic players, or perhaps
because of the wealth of competing narratives now associated with
the area, the Nagorno-Karabakh case study remains little understood.
Nagorno-Karabakh as a Post-Soviet Transitioning State
Nagorno-Karabakh is a land-locked mostly-mountainous region situated
on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though an acting
self-administrating province with its own governance system, the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not recognised as a country by the
European Union or the United Nations and is formally considered
Azerbaijani territory in the global political arena, connected to
Armenia by the "illegally" seized Lachin corridor (Kaldor, Oil and
Conflict, 2007). In Soviet times, the province was populated mostly
by Armenians, while the territory itself holds strong cultural and
historic meaning for Azeris (Economist, States of Independence,
2011). According to James Appathurai, NATO's special representative
in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the
wider South Caucasus are also an area of strategic importance
in terms of their geographic location and relevance for regional
natural resource transportation and supply (Trend, 2012). In 2005,
a new pipeline known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was opened
close to Nagorno-Karabakh's peripheries, pumping Azerbaijani oil to
Turkey. The pipeline undermines Russia's dominance in oil supply
to Europe, impacting European and Eastern European politics, but
also representing huge economic benefits for controlling countries
(Economist, Conflict on Ice, 2011). Potential damage to the pipeline
could hold severe economic repercussions for Azerbaijan and surrounding
territories, should regional stability deteriorate further. In the
post-Soviet period, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has therefore been
read as a struggle defined at times by issues of national identity,
security and material interests. With the rising involvement of Iran
and its growing support of Azerbaijan, the conflict has also been
read as a religious one (Flanagan, 2013).
Soviet Influence
The Nagorno-Karabakh area has a strong tradition of Russian influence
and intervention, which has shaped the course of its development and
contributed to its current political climate. The broader Karabakh
territory - which comprises Artsakh, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Southern
Kura-Steppes - became a Russian protectorate in 1805 and was formally
absorbed into the Russian Empire in 1828. Despite periodic power
struggles over Karabakh itself by competing states and Empires,
Russian influence over the region continued up until the 1990s.
Due to local concerns about the potential for religiously-based
prosecution under Russian administration, the 1800s saw the
wide-scale emigration of Azeri Muslims to more Islam-friendly Persian
territories, as well as the influx of Christian Armenians into
Nagorno-Karabakh. This explains why the Azerbaijani province is today
strongly linked to Azeri cultural heritage while being predominantly
populated by Armenians in the 1990s (Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007).
After the 1917 Russian Revolution and the formation of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922, Nagorno-Karabakh became part
of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR), later
to be partitioned into Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Territorial
competition between Armenia and Azerbaijan often resulted in fighting
over the Karabakh region, however analysts find that these early
skirmishes have little in common with the on-going political stalemate
affecting Nagorno-Karabakh today (Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007). In
1923, the Soviet Union placed the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
under Azeri control, having previously promised the territory to
Armenia. This last minute policy switch was likely an attempt to
maintain positive diplomatic relations with Turkey, which, at the
time, had strong economic and social ties with Azerbaijan (Cornell,
Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, 1998). Despite local
hostility towards this arrangement, Nagorno-Karabakh remained largely
peaceful under Soviet control until the dissolution of the USSR,
though competing nationalist narratives of relevance to the current
conflict originated during this period.
The Post-Soviet Transition
The post-Soviet transition brought the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to the
fore in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
>>From 1988, Armenians began heavily protesting the territory's
continued status as a province of Azerbaijan.
Initial skirmishes in 1988 resulted from retaliatory marches by Azeris
against Armenians communities. Early conflicts led immediately to
forced migration and displacement. The population of Nagorno-Karabakh,
which, at the time, was 76 per cent Armenian and 23 per cent Azeri,
was significantly radicalised by escalating violence (Human Rights
Watch, 1994). From 1989 to 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan struggled
to redefine the administrative division of their territories. This
conflict escalated dramatically after 1991, when both coun tries
achieved independence from the Soviet Union. The former USSR was unable
to placate either side by granting Nagorno-Karabakh self-administration
capacities. This led to full-out war, genocide and ethnic cleansing.
Former Soviet troops, mercernaries, Afghan fighters, transnational
organised crime networks and a wealth of other foreign fighters
were also drawn into the conflict. By 1994, Armenia had brought
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Lachin corridor and other key Azerbaijani
territories under its control and a ceasefire was reached through
Russian mediation (Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007).
Despite a peace agreement negotiated under the Bishkek Protocol,
skirmishes continue between
Armenia and Azerbaijan to this day. A number of international
instruments have now been developed to condemn the ethnic cleansing of
Azeri communities in the area, with Middle Eastern states especially
also rejecting Armenian control of seized lands as an illegal
occupation.
On-Going Development and Peace-Keeping Challenges
Though open warfare over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and
Azerbaijan was avoided by the Bishkek Protocol and other negotiated
peace agreements, the current political situation in the Karabakh
region should be understood as a stalemate rather than a resolution
of hostilities. As recently as 2009, conferences and world summits
have been held in Munich and elsewhere in an attempt to reach
permanent solutions to Nagorno-Karabakh's current challenges. However,
continuing threats of renewed violence on behalf Armenia, Azerbaijan
and the Government of Nagorno-Karabakh have consistently undermined
negotiations. On-going development and peace-keeping challenges stem
from the legacies of war, as well as from core issues relating to
the right to self-determination of the Karabakh area and to competing
constructions of national identities and oppositional cultures.
Svante E. Cornell writes that: "Since the beginning of 1988," the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict "has led to over twenty thousand casualties
and almost one and a half million refugees, a refugee flow which has
resulted in a considerable crisis especially in Azerbaijan, with the
number of displaced persons numbering close to one million" (Cornell,
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 1999).
The scale of violence caused by genocide and forced displacement of
Nagorno-Karabakh communities in the 1990s has left a considerable need
for reconciliation at the local and regional levels, but efforts are
undermined by the continued politicisation of the Nagorno-Karabakh
territory. Mary Kaldor argues that:
"Since the ceasefire, the conflict has been immobilised or 'frozen',
providing a long-term obstacle to democracy. Despite early progress
in economic and political reforms, Armenia suffers from pervasive
militarisation and from economic isolation; the borders with both
Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed. In both countries, the dominance
of the Karabakh issue blocks democratic debate and the growth of
civil society. On both sides there are huge numbers of refugees
and/or displaced persons (DPs), and both sides manipulate them for
political purposes."
(Kaldor, Oil and Conflict, 2007)
Resolution of these issues will not only require further investigation
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but will also necessitate
fostering greater understandings and appreciations for the nuances of
international aid and mediation strategies, especially with relation
to the ways in which different parties to the conflict are perceived
by competing regional and international donors.
Regional Relevance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Case Study
Being inherently linked to national narratives whose formations
were deeply impacted by Soviet Union administration, and later by
the collapse of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh case study offers
a microcosm of regional development and peace-keeping challenges
that are connected to political restructuring and realignment from
hegemonic to multi-polar power relations in the South Caucasus. In
this sense, Nagorno- Karabakh offers a so-called "typical instance"
(Yin, 2004) of conflict resulting from contested borderlands in the
aftermath of Soviet administration.
About the Author
Alexandra Lewis is a doctoral student at the University of York,
Department of Politics, specialising in the area of young offending
in Yemen and other fragile states. She also works as an editorial
assistant at Stability: International Journal of Security and
Development.
Works Cited
Cornell, S. E. (1998). Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh:
a delicate balance. Middle Eastern Studies, 34(1), 51-72.
Cornell, S. E. (1999). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Uppsala:
Uppsala University.
Economist. (2011, December 28). Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo: States
of Independence. The Economist.
Economist. (2011, October 28). Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict on Ice. The
Economist.
Flanagan, S. J. (2013). The Turkey-Russia-Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power
Dynamics. The Washington Quarterly, 36(1), 163-178.
Human Rights Watch. (1994). Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Helsinki: Human Rights Watch.
Kaldor, M. (2007). Oil and conflict: the case of. In T. L. Mary Kaldor,
Oil Wars. London: Pluto Press.
Kaldor, M. (2012). New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global
Era. Boston: Staford University Press.
MacGinty, R. (2010). No war, no peace: Why so many peace processes
fail to deliver peace.
International Politics(47), 154-162.
Trend. (2012, March 16). NATO: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be
resolved quickly and legally.
Trend News Agency. Baku, Azerbaijan.
Yin, R. K. (2004). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London:
Sage.
Download PDF: Contested Sovereignty and
Competing Identities in Nagorno-Karabakh:
http://www.atlantic-community.org/documents/10180/97ffac38-c0dd-4ac5-9a54-d423bf701555
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/contested-sovereignty-and-competing-identities-in-nagorno-karabakh?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.atlantic-community.org%2Fyour-opinion%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_GES8xNFE98EL%26p_p _lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dv iew%26p_p_col_id%3Daf-column-1-3%26p_p_col_pos%3D3%26p_p_col_count%3D8