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Why Erdogan Wants Peace With the PKK; The End of An Insurgency

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  • Why Erdogan Wants Peace With the PKK; The End of An Insurgency

    Why Erdogan Wants Peace With the PKK

    The End of An Insurgency


    Article Summary: Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the
    Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party's
    nearly three-decade-long struggle with the Turkish state. His
    announcement came at an opportune time, not least because Turkish
    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems ready to pursue peace with
    the Kurds as a way to consolidate his own power. Still, regional
    developments might be a stumbling block around which neither party can
    maneuver.

    Foreign Affairs
    March 27, 2013

    By F. Stephen Larrabee

    Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
    (PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party's nearly three-decade-long
    struggle with the Turkish state. Before then, the insurgency -- which
    had claimed some 40,000 lives -- had seemed intractable. Ankara's
    attempts to put it down had only inflamed Kurdish nationalism and made
    the PKK stronger. But with Ocalan now apparently ready to try to
    resolve differences peacefully, the prospects that the uprising will
    come to an end have improved.

    Ocalan's announcement came at an opportune time. Several factors had
    already made the moment ripe for peace. First, the ruling Justice and
    Development Party (AKP) and the broader Turkish public had come to
    recognize that trying to end the insurgency with force was a dead end
    and that the government would have to make a more determined effort to
    find a political solution to the Kurdish conflict.

    Second, the Kurdish issue is closely linked to Prime Minister Recep
    Tayyip Erdogan's political ambitions. Under AKP bylaws, Erdogan cannot
    run for another term as prime minister when his second term ends next
    year. Instead, he is widely expected to try to run for president. If
    he wins, he will be the first popularly elected president in Turkish
    history, capping his political career and giving him the chance to
    shape Turkish politics until 2023, the hundredth anniversary of the
    founding of the Turkish Republic.

    The one problem is that, currently, the presidency is largely a
    ceremonial post. Erdogan has thus signaled his intention to amend the
    Turkish constitution to give the president stronger executive powers
    and to diminish the authority of the prime minister. The AKP lacks the
    votes in parliament to make such changes to the constitution; to do
    so, it needs the support of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party
    (BDP), which has 33 seats in parliament. A peace accord with the PKK
    and promises to revise the constitution to expand Kurdish cultural
    rights and to broaden the definition of Turkish citizenship would help
    Erdogan's government secure the BDP's allegiance. In effect, to build
    the presidency he wants, Erdogan will need to strike a grand bargain
    with the Kurds. However, this prospect worries many Turks, who believe
    that a new constitution along these lines would concentrate too much
    power in the hands of one man and open the way to greater
    authoritarianism.

    The final factor that has improved the prospects for peace is a
    rethinking in AKP circles of Ocalan's role in any attempt to bring the
    PKK insurgency to a close. In November 2012, Ocalan helped end a
    67-day hunger strike of more than 600 Kurds. His personal intervention
    demonstrated his influence and the necessity of involving him directly
    in any peace plan. It was thus not surprising when, a month after
    Ocalan's mediation, Erdogan announced the opening of exploratory talks
    with Ocalan aimed at ending the PKK insurgency. On the Turkish side,
    Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization and a
    close confidant of Erdogan's, is leading the discussions. He and
    Ocalan have focused on developing a strategic road map for a peace
    accord.

    Of course, peace is still far from a done deal. Several issues could
    derail an accord. For one, the question of amnesty could pose
    difficulties. Many Kurdish groups -- and Ocalan himself -- insist that
    PKK fighters must be granted amnesty as part of any
    agreement. However, much of the Turkish population considers the PKK
    fighters terrorists and strongly opposes letting them walk.

    In addition, Ocalan might want peace and he might have great sway
    within the Turkish PKK, but the organization is no longer his baby. It
    has become a transnational movement with networks and operations
    across the region. Not all of them are under his control. Even if
    Ocalan can persuade large segments of the PKK to support a peace
    agreement, some hardcore nationalist groups might still be unwilling
    to lay down their arms. After all, many PKK commanders see no future
    for themselves outside of the armed struggle.

    Regional developments have also complicated the peace talks. In Syria,
    the withdrawal of Syrian government forces from five Kurdish-dominated
    towns along the Syrian-Turkish border in July 2012 created a political
    vacuum that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) -- which has close ties
    to the PKK -- rushed to fill. The speed and ease with which the PYD
    was able to establish control raised Turkish suspicions that Assad
    might have orchestrated the withdrawal to strengthen the PKK at the
    expense of Turkey and the Sunni-dominated Syrian opposition. Now
    Turkish officials worry that the PYD-held areas could become a base
    for PKK attacks against Turkish territory and security forces. Turkey
    has threatened to intervene militarily if such attacks take place,
    raising the chance that any scuffle could quickly expand.

    In Iran, as in Turkey, the government has faced a Kurdish
    insurgency. The movement there is led by the Free Life Party of
    Kurdistan (PJAK), an offshoot of the PKK. On occasion, Turkey and Iran
    used to coordinate efforts and share intelligence to combat PKK and
    PJAK attacks. However, the two countries' relationship has grown
    strained over Syria, leading to a sharp reduction in
    cooperation. That, in turn, has weakened Turkey's ability to deter PKK
    attacks. Moreover, according to Turkish officials, Iran has started
    clandestinely supporting the PKK. Iran has little interest in the PKK
    insurgency coming to an end, since that would eliminate one of
    Tehran's main levers for putting pressure on Turkey.


    F. STEPHEN LARRABEE holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security
    at the RAND Corporation.

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