Tweet
Today's Zaman, Turkey
May 13 2013
What to expect from Obama-ErdoÄ?an meeting
by ABDULLAH BOZKURT
Among all the possible talking points for US President Barack Obama's
upcoming meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an on
May 16 in the White House, obviously some have to be dropped for
various considerations and sensitivities, not to mention time
constraints for the duration of the meeting. How to prioritize the
agenda items, which seem unusually long, will differ for each side as
bureaucrats and diplomats scramble to harmonize diverging views on
issues of mutual concern in a lead up to the meeting. I think the
discussion of what will be the most important topic at the meeting
that many predict will be Syria, especially after the twin blast that
claimed the lives of almost 50 people on Saturday in the Turkish
border town of Reyhanli, is no longer relevant to US-Turkish
relations.
What makes this visit of the utmost importance for both Turkey and the
US is that it will provide a chance to restore somewhat lost
confidence on both sides amid signs of decoupling on a number of
issues. ErdoÄ?an and Obama have been less talkative since 2011, a year
when Erdogan's access to Obama via direct contact rivaled only that of
Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain who was the most frequent
caller among foreign leaders. This year, Obama spoke to ErdoÄ?an only
once on the phone when he successfully mediated between Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and ErdoÄ?an during his visit to the Jewish
state. Given that both sides are fully aware of their respective
importance for each other, I believe there will be a successful
realignment of common interests by trimming down differences to the
extent it is possible, starting with Syria.
On Syria, the disappointment ErdoÄ?an feels on Obama's lack of
enthusiasm in becoming deeply involved in the Syrian crisis for more
than two years needs to be addressed. The urgency of hastening the
departure of the Bashar al-Assad regime has picked up speed in recent
weeks with the introduction of chemical weapons to the conflict by
pro-regime elements and the chilling reminder of spillover hazards
with respect to the twin blasts in the Turkish border town. Similarly,
ErdoÄ?an needs to allay Obama's concerns on Iranian attempts to bypass
the US sanctions regime using Turkey as a conduit and Ankara's lack of
full cooperation on cracking down on illicit and illegal Iranian
activities in Turkey. On the divided island of Cyprus, Turkey feels
there is now a window of opportunity for the last push for unification
based on the prospect of rich natural gas in the waters off of Cyprus
and economic woes on the Greek Cypriot side. Ankara requires US
support for this initiative, and some groundwork has already been laid
down during US Secretary of the State John Kerry's frequent visits to
Turkey.
The EU process is no longer a significantly important issue for
Turkish-US talks as Ankara seems to have somewhat lost its confidence
in the process amid the eurozone crisis and enlargement fatigue in the
27-nation bloc. It will not ask any more than it has to for the US'
nudging of Europeans to put the frozen process back on track.
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism will be on the agenda in a
different format this time because of the settlement process the
government has been pursuing with the imprisoned leader of the PKK,
Abdullah Ã-calan, since last December. ErdoÄ?an will ask the US to
support the process to make sure it isn't derailed by provocations and
interventions staged by third parties. US intelligence may come in
handy in preventing attempts at sabotaging the process. In the
meantime, he will also repeat the pending Turkish request for armed
drones from the US to be used for the mop-up operations against the
PKK leaders and militants who refuse to lay down arms at the end of
the process if and when it is successfully concluded.
The closer cooperation and coordination in the fight against al-Qaeda
and other radical groups, especially in the Syrian case, and on
cracking down on the leftist Revolutionary People's Liberation
Party/Front (DHKP/C), which claimed the Feb. 1 suicide bomb attack on
the US embassy in Ankara, as well as its splinter groups will be
discussed. There has been a high-level interagency counter-terrorism
dialogue between Turkey and the US in the last couple of years, but
the establishment of a joint counterterrorism task force to share
intelligence and to launch joint operations against common targets as
proposed by the US has not been put into effect yet.
In the Iraqi case, tables have turned. In contrast to the past, Turkey
now has very bad relations with the pro-Iranian Shiite Nouri al-Maliki
government in Baghdad while enjoying very cordial ties with the
Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq. Washington believes
Turkey may be undercutting Maliki by engaging with the Kurds
independently in the energy trade and at the expense of the federal
government, fearing that it may lead to a partition of Iraq along
ethnic and sectarian lines. On the other hand, ErdoÄ?an has given up on
Maliki completely because he believes there is no chance of making a
deal with Maliki who has effectively become the dictator of Iraq and
disenfranchised Sunnis, Kurds and even some Shiite groups. It will be
interesting to see how Obama and ErdoÄ?an can come to a common
understanding on Maliki.
Sharp differences still persist on ErdoÄ?an's announced visit to Gaza
and his close personal relations with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, and
they may prove to be difficult to reconcile. ErdoÄ?an believes the US
should be talking to Hamas, listed as a terrorist organization by
Washington, in addition to the Fatah leadership because Hamas is a
political reality and can't be ignored. The US, however, insists on
three conditions that Hamas needs to fulfill before it has a place
around the negotiating table, i.e. recognizing the right to exist for
Israel, respecting past agreements with Israel and giving up armed
struggle against the occupation. Though the normalization of
Turkish-Israeli ties seem to be set on track, the visit to Gaza
without coordinating with Israel, Egypt and the Palestine Authority
may agitate some people in the US Congress and will draw the ire of
the powerful American Jewish community. Obama, keen to maintain good
relations with the Israeli lobby in the US and the Jewish state in the
Middle East during his second term, wants to avoid an unnecessary
crisis by urging ErdoÄ?an to suspend the visit until the reconciliation
between Fatah and Hamas takes place.
On the reopening of Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary in Ä°stanbul, nothing
has really changed from the last time Obama discussed this issue with
ErdoÄ?an with the exception that some properties have been restored to
their former non-Muslim owners by a government-run commission. Turkey
is waiting for the US and Greek Patriarchate to exert pressure on
Athens to improve the conditions of the Muslim Turkish minority in
Western Thrace so that they can sell the revisions, which will allow
the reopening of the seminary, to deputies in Parliament in particular
and to the public in general. The same standoff is valid for the
Armenian genocide issue as well. The chance for Turkey to normalize
its relations with Armenia before the 2015 centennial seems to be a
far-fetched idea against the background of growing Azeri influence in
Turkey with investment and trade advocacy, not to mention political
capital. In Afghanistan, the US may ask for the further involvement of
Turkey in the country's development and consolidation of its
institutions with more military/police training and reconstruction
programs as it starts to withdraw forces and equipment from
Afghanistan before the 2014 deadline.
Obama will likely press ErdoÄ?an on the need for Turkey to keep
pursuing further democratic reforms in order to address its
shortcomings in human rights, mainly in areas related to freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. The US, keen to shift some of its
regional liabilities to its partners, wants to see its ability to work
with Turkey strengthened, and for that it needs to remove irritants in
bilateral relations. The message should be that Turkey must put its
house in order to boost its democratic credentials. I'm sure Obama was
advised to play a delicate and gentle game with ErdoÄ?an on these
issues because ErdoÄ?an can be quite combative when he is pushed too
far. Obama is also aware of Turkey's domestic political outlook as
well. He must know that Turkey will be undergoing successive elections
starting with the local one in March 2014, followed by presidential
elections the same year and parliamentary elections in 2015. As usual,
the US influence on Turkey will be restricted during the long campaign
period because politicians in Turkey from all spectrums love to bash
the US because it is easy, and there is no cost involved.
ErdoÄ?an will probably raise the issue of how US talks with Russia in
resetting ties within the framework of comprehensive deal have been
progressing on the eve of the drawdown of American forces from
Afghanistan by 2014. Turkey, which does not see Russia as a threat but
is worried about the possible implications from the comeback of
Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, wants to see how a
deal between Washington and Moscow would affect Turkish interests.
There may be other issues of mutual concern ranging from the Balkans
to Africa, from the impact of the EU's free trade talks with the US on
Turkey to re-energizing the Middle East peace process.
The bottom-line is that the visit will be marked as a success to the
extent Obama and ErdoÄ?an can find ways to match up to the label of
`being a strategic partner' on a number of outstanding issues. In the
past, even during difficult and bad times, Turkey and the US had
always found a way to keep this crucial alliance above turbulent
waters. This time they have more reasons to do the same. If the
political commitment is there, the deal on general parameters will be
reached one way or another, leaving the operationalizing of these
plans to technical/bureaucratic teams.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=315322
May 13 2013
What to expect from Obama-ErdoÄ?an meeting
by ABDULLAH BOZKURT
Among all the possible talking points for US President Barack Obama's
upcoming meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an on
May 16 in the White House, obviously some have to be dropped for
various considerations and sensitivities, not to mention time
constraints for the duration of the meeting. How to prioritize the
agenda items, which seem unusually long, will differ for each side as
bureaucrats and diplomats scramble to harmonize diverging views on
issues of mutual concern in a lead up to the meeting. I think the
discussion of what will be the most important topic at the meeting
that many predict will be Syria, especially after the twin blast that
claimed the lives of almost 50 people on Saturday in the Turkish
border town of Reyhanli, is no longer relevant to US-Turkish
relations.
What makes this visit of the utmost importance for both Turkey and the
US is that it will provide a chance to restore somewhat lost
confidence on both sides amid signs of decoupling on a number of
issues. ErdoÄ?an and Obama have been less talkative since 2011, a year
when Erdogan's access to Obama via direct contact rivaled only that of
Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain who was the most frequent
caller among foreign leaders. This year, Obama spoke to ErdoÄ?an only
once on the phone when he successfully mediated between Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and ErdoÄ?an during his visit to the Jewish
state. Given that both sides are fully aware of their respective
importance for each other, I believe there will be a successful
realignment of common interests by trimming down differences to the
extent it is possible, starting with Syria.
On Syria, the disappointment ErdoÄ?an feels on Obama's lack of
enthusiasm in becoming deeply involved in the Syrian crisis for more
than two years needs to be addressed. The urgency of hastening the
departure of the Bashar al-Assad regime has picked up speed in recent
weeks with the introduction of chemical weapons to the conflict by
pro-regime elements and the chilling reminder of spillover hazards
with respect to the twin blasts in the Turkish border town. Similarly,
ErdoÄ?an needs to allay Obama's concerns on Iranian attempts to bypass
the US sanctions regime using Turkey as a conduit and Ankara's lack of
full cooperation on cracking down on illicit and illegal Iranian
activities in Turkey. On the divided island of Cyprus, Turkey feels
there is now a window of opportunity for the last push for unification
based on the prospect of rich natural gas in the waters off of Cyprus
and economic woes on the Greek Cypriot side. Ankara requires US
support for this initiative, and some groundwork has already been laid
down during US Secretary of the State John Kerry's frequent visits to
Turkey.
The EU process is no longer a significantly important issue for
Turkish-US talks as Ankara seems to have somewhat lost its confidence
in the process amid the eurozone crisis and enlargement fatigue in the
27-nation bloc. It will not ask any more than it has to for the US'
nudging of Europeans to put the frozen process back on track.
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism will be on the agenda in a
different format this time because of the settlement process the
government has been pursuing with the imprisoned leader of the PKK,
Abdullah Ã-calan, since last December. ErdoÄ?an will ask the US to
support the process to make sure it isn't derailed by provocations and
interventions staged by third parties. US intelligence may come in
handy in preventing attempts at sabotaging the process. In the
meantime, he will also repeat the pending Turkish request for armed
drones from the US to be used for the mop-up operations against the
PKK leaders and militants who refuse to lay down arms at the end of
the process if and when it is successfully concluded.
The closer cooperation and coordination in the fight against al-Qaeda
and other radical groups, especially in the Syrian case, and on
cracking down on the leftist Revolutionary People's Liberation
Party/Front (DHKP/C), which claimed the Feb. 1 suicide bomb attack on
the US embassy in Ankara, as well as its splinter groups will be
discussed. There has been a high-level interagency counter-terrorism
dialogue between Turkey and the US in the last couple of years, but
the establishment of a joint counterterrorism task force to share
intelligence and to launch joint operations against common targets as
proposed by the US has not been put into effect yet.
In the Iraqi case, tables have turned. In contrast to the past, Turkey
now has very bad relations with the pro-Iranian Shiite Nouri al-Maliki
government in Baghdad while enjoying very cordial ties with the
Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq. Washington believes
Turkey may be undercutting Maliki by engaging with the Kurds
independently in the energy trade and at the expense of the federal
government, fearing that it may lead to a partition of Iraq along
ethnic and sectarian lines. On the other hand, ErdoÄ?an has given up on
Maliki completely because he believes there is no chance of making a
deal with Maliki who has effectively become the dictator of Iraq and
disenfranchised Sunnis, Kurds and even some Shiite groups. It will be
interesting to see how Obama and ErdoÄ?an can come to a common
understanding on Maliki.
Sharp differences still persist on ErdoÄ?an's announced visit to Gaza
and his close personal relations with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, and
they may prove to be difficult to reconcile. ErdoÄ?an believes the US
should be talking to Hamas, listed as a terrorist organization by
Washington, in addition to the Fatah leadership because Hamas is a
political reality and can't be ignored. The US, however, insists on
three conditions that Hamas needs to fulfill before it has a place
around the negotiating table, i.e. recognizing the right to exist for
Israel, respecting past agreements with Israel and giving up armed
struggle against the occupation. Though the normalization of
Turkish-Israeli ties seem to be set on track, the visit to Gaza
without coordinating with Israel, Egypt and the Palestine Authority
may agitate some people in the US Congress and will draw the ire of
the powerful American Jewish community. Obama, keen to maintain good
relations with the Israeli lobby in the US and the Jewish state in the
Middle East during his second term, wants to avoid an unnecessary
crisis by urging ErdoÄ?an to suspend the visit until the reconciliation
between Fatah and Hamas takes place.
On the reopening of Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary in Ä°stanbul, nothing
has really changed from the last time Obama discussed this issue with
ErdoÄ?an with the exception that some properties have been restored to
their former non-Muslim owners by a government-run commission. Turkey
is waiting for the US and Greek Patriarchate to exert pressure on
Athens to improve the conditions of the Muslim Turkish minority in
Western Thrace so that they can sell the revisions, which will allow
the reopening of the seminary, to deputies in Parliament in particular
and to the public in general. The same standoff is valid for the
Armenian genocide issue as well. The chance for Turkey to normalize
its relations with Armenia before the 2015 centennial seems to be a
far-fetched idea against the background of growing Azeri influence in
Turkey with investment and trade advocacy, not to mention political
capital. In Afghanistan, the US may ask for the further involvement of
Turkey in the country's development and consolidation of its
institutions with more military/police training and reconstruction
programs as it starts to withdraw forces and equipment from
Afghanistan before the 2014 deadline.
Obama will likely press ErdoÄ?an on the need for Turkey to keep
pursuing further democratic reforms in order to address its
shortcomings in human rights, mainly in areas related to freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. The US, keen to shift some of its
regional liabilities to its partners, wants to see its ability to work
with Turkey strengthened, and for that it needs to remove irritants in
bilateral relations. The message should be that Turkey must put its
house in order to boost its democratic credentials. I'm sure Obama was
advised to play a delicate and gentle game with ErdoÄ?an on these
issues because ErdoÄ?an can be quite combative when he is pushed too
far. Obama is also aware of Turkey's domestic political outlook as
well. He must know that Turkey will be undergoing successive elections
starting with the local one in March 2014, followed by presidential
elections the same year and parliamentary elections in 2015. As usual,
the US influence on Turkey will be restricted during the long campaign
period because politicians in Turkey from all spectrums love to bash
the US because it is easy, and there is no cost involved.
ErdoÄ?an will probably raise the issue of how US talks with Russia in
resetting ties within the framework of comprehensive deal have been
progressing on the eve of the drawdown of American forces from
Afghanistan by 2014. Turkey, which does not see Russia as a threat but
is worried about the possible implications from the comeback of
Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, wants to see how a
deal between Washington and Moscow would affect Turkish interests.
There may be other issues of mutual concern ranging from the Balkans
to Africa, from the impact of the EU's free trade talks with the US on
Turkey to re-energizing the Middle East peace process.
The bottom-line is that the visit will be marked as a success to the
extent Obama and ErdoÄ?an can find ways to match up to the label of
`being a strategic partner' on a number of outstanding issues. In the
past, even during difficult and bad times, Turkey and the US had
always found a way to keep this crucial alliance above turbulent
waters. This time they have more reasons to do the same. If the
political commitment is there, the deal on general parameters will be
reached one way or another, leaving the operationalizing of these
plans to technical/bureaucratic teams.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=315322