Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Armenian Analyst Explains Motives Behind EP Resolution

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Armenian Analyst Explains Motives Behind EP Resolution

    ARMENIAN ANALYST EXPLAINS MOTIVES BEHIND EP RESOLUTION

    15:57 ~U 24.10.13

    In an interview with Tert.am, Karen Bekaryan, the president of
    the European Integration NGO, addresses the European Parliament's
    recent resolution, focusing on the factors that he thinks might have
    caused the EU parliamentarian to adopt a measure conflicting with
    the interests of Armenia. The analyst attributes the decision to
    three major factors: Azerbaijan's "caviar diplomacy", the existing
    discontent with Armenia's Customs Union move and the the continuing
    "club and pancake" policies in relation to Azerbaijan. Bekaryan says it
    would be better for the Armenian ambassadora accredited to different
    European states to gather together in Yerevan one day to agree upon
    future policy lines and developments

    Mr Bekaryan, we now hear opinions that the European Parliament's
    resolution, which is not quite pro-Armenian, is the EU's revenge on
    the Armenian president's statement on the Customs Union membership.

    If we address the resolution or rather its part concerning
    [Nagorno-]Karabakh, I think there are different factors that we may
    encounter. The first, which isn't something new, is the Azerbaijani
    lobby's activities and their influence on different organizations,
    particularly the parliamentarians. This is what is normally considered
    'caviar diplomacy'.

    The second essential factor to my mind is that we repeatedly witness
    what can be termed as "club and pancake" policies by the European
    organizations, especially in parliamentary formats. On the one hand we
    see very big criticism over the elections in Azerbaijan, and on the
    other hand - because they avoid provoking a very aggressive reaction
    and a decline in the relations etc. - they seem to be balancing that
    with the part regarding Karabakh. And the third, I think, has to do
    with parliamentary formats, i.e. - the "September 3" [when President
    Sargsyan made the landmark statement on the CU accession] has not been
    fully and comprehensively perceived. If we address specific provisions
    in the resolution, there are several elements there, which require
    attention. If we see a problem with territorial integrity in the case
    of Georgia, with Abkhazia and Ossetia not being separate [states], the
    same is the case with Moldova. Hence there is 'no' Karabakh as far as
    Azerbaijan and Armenia are concerned. It has been separated. Along
    with the UN resolutions and the abnormal terming. "occupation",
    a reference is made to the L'Aquila statement. Combining them with
    one another, it is very hard to perceive the real intention. So,
    there are lots of things which aren't absolutely normal.

    Does this in general testify to a certain degree of non-competence
    or do they frighten us with what we may return to? And is a return
    possible at all? Is there such a practice of returning to documents
    adopted in any other organization, the UN, for instance, after a
    twenty-year interval?

    There are developments which we must perceive as a fact. The question,
    at this point, has to do with the European parliamentarians and their
    understanding. It is, of course, possible to raise the competency
    issue, but to expect parliamentarians from so many states to have
    a competent approach or attitude would be naivety. And that isn't
    something that has to do only with us and our problems; that problem
    exists globally, and it is characteristic of parliamentary bodies.

    This is one aspect of the issue.

    The other thing is the summary of the three factors I presented. There
    is another issue here: we have to think of our future steps but
    not under the influence of haste or responses made in force majeure
    situations. I don't mean that. We have to clearly realize the public
    perceptions in Europe, particularly on the part of parliamentarians.

    They do not perceive all this, so we have to realize that and take
    proper efforts in this direction.

    It would be very good, for instance, for our ambassadors accredited
    to Europe to come to Yerevan to check watches with one another and to
    understand the future course of developments. It would be very good,
    probably, for our parliamentarians working with European partners
    in different European organizations to take more active efforts and
    carry out certain work with their colleagues in a more intensive
    manner than they do now.

    What implications can we talk about? There don't seem to be legal ones,
    as is normally the case but can that position become predominant in
    European organizations in future?

    There aren't legal implications of course, but that isn't something
    that should leave us with a feeling of relief, lulling us into a false
    sense of security. That's a political statement, be it as it may,
    and it does create a political background.

    May that resolution endanger the signing of the document between
    Armenia and the EU, establishing "other formats of cooperation"?

    I don't think so. There is anyway, a body responsible for that process,
    which is the executive, the European Commission. It is possible to
    point to a couple of more essential facts: a month before September 3,
    the European Commission issued the statement saying the negotiations
    with Armenia had been successfully completed, and the country is
    ready for the initialing of the Association agreement. That is, the
    official position reflects more that than what the European Parliament
    said. But I repeat, there will be by all means a background effect.

    http://www.tert.am/en/news/2013/10/24/karenbeqaryan/



    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Working...
X