ABKHAZIAN RAILWAY: NEW CHALLENGES
The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 29 2013
BY: CGS GROUP Tuesday, October 29 On September 11, 2013, the Russian
Duma adopted a package of decisions with regard to Syria, where the
main resolution was to supply Iran with military weapons and ammunition
in the event of a U.S. Military strike against Syria. With this
gesture, Russia openly revealed its support for Assad's government,
which receives much of its weapons from Iran.
The question then becomes: how, and in which ways, does Russia plan
to implement its decision? In particular, how will it supply Iran
with weapons?
Logically, the fastest, most cost-effective and economically viable
way is through the Transcaucasian railway line, neglected since
the Abkhazian war. In particular, its Ochamchire - Ingiri (Zugdidi)
section requires rehabilitation.
A few days prior to the Duma's resolution, on September 6, the Armenian
News agency News.am released a statement by Armenian National Security
Council Secretary Arthur Baghdasaryan, who stated that "Armenia is
actively negotiating with Abkhazia and Iran about the issue of the
railway construction-rehabilitation process. Iran is ready to finance
the costs of railway construction. There are active negotiations
on this issue. Armenia has a strong interest in the opening of the
railway line. Georgia and Russia are also parties having interests,
and Abkhazia has agreed to open the railway line.
Now we must continue the negotiation processes."
Also on September 6, Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
a response to the statement made by Baghdasaryan. Foreign Minister
Maia Panjikidze stated that "The issue of this railway is a very
interesting topic that may lie within our sphere of interest. However,
when negotiations about this issue began, we made it plain that the
Georgian government will do nothing against its own interests, and
that future developments will guide us in how to act. Any information
you may have heard indicating that a permit has been issued by us,
or that any agreement has been reached, is false."
Knowing that the Georgian government has denied the existence of
any negotiations process in this regard, what could Baghdasaryan's
statement mean, that outran the decision made by Duma? Is this a
random coincidence? Or is there a more far-reaching and deliberate
motive behind this?
The issue of opening this railway line is not something new, but has
been the subject of discussion since the close of the Abkhazian war.
At the press conferenceon July 3, 2013, Georgian Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili talked about the recovery of Abkhazian railway
line. He made it clear that rail traffic will be restored, where the
Russian position will be a major factor, and that the rehabilitation
process should be gradual. In fact, he repeated what he had said on
January 17, on the meeting with President Serzh Sargsyan during his
visit to Armenia, where he had also described Russia's position as a
key factor. This had at that time given rise to talk in opposition
parties of "impending dangers." The Prime Minister's statement was
also criticized by President Saakashvili, who claimed that this
process wouldl slow the integration process and help accelerate
Russian expansion in the Caucasus.
But it must be said that comments of opposition and the President
were politically motivated, since Saakashvili's government also
engaged in active negotiation for the restoration of railway, and it
can be said that these negotiations were conducted unsuccessfully,
since Russia managed to establish full control over the railway,
which facilitated the Kremlin's military presence in Abkhazia.
Following Georgia's parliamentary elections in October 2012 and
approval of a new cabinet, the issue of restoration of the railway
line came to the forefront once again.
In November 2012, the new Minister for Reintegration Paata
Zakareishvili initiated the idea of restoration of the railway and road
transit traffic, as presenting a step forward for conflict resolution.
Zakareishvili's initiative was not new but an issue that had been
raised by Aslan Abashidze during President Eduard Shevardnadze's
government. At the time, the Kremlin considered Abashidze as
Shevardnadze's successor, and Abashidze assumed the role of mediator
as a way to raise his rating with support of IDPs from Abkhazia.
Abashidze gave Russia the opportunity to defend its interests during
the negotiation processes. The issue of restoration of the railway
in Abkhazia as a topic for discussion was provided by Russian side.
Restoration in this case meant the restoration of Leselidze -
Ochamchire section, but not the whole traffic.
This enabled Russia to transport military goods in Abkhazia, and
this process was not related to the issue of restoration of transit
with Armenia. In fact, restoration of the whole line was not in the
Russia's interest, as in this case people of the disputed regions
would be able to have contact with each other and this would be the
serious step forward for conflict resolution.
At that time the chairman of the Supreme Council was Tamaz
Nadareishvili, who managed to neutralize Abashidze and remove him
from the processes, lately the issue of restoration of the railway
was closed. Significantly, pressure from the Armenian side has ceased.
But soon after Saakashvili's arrival to power in 2004, as a result of
Armenia's activity (and behind Armenia, there was Russia's interests)
the issue of restoration of railway reawakened. The process was
under UN Observer mission's control. Georgian-Abkhazian commission
was created, restoration works defined, finances was guaranteed
by Russian side and the process was officially registered on the
basis of a special report. Russian railway troops began to move to
Abkhazia but suddenly the process of negotiations was halted and only
Leselidze-Ochamchire road was restored.
It should be noted that Saakashvili's government was either unable
or unwilling to accurately assess the situation. For all practical
purposes, Russia reached its goal, strengthened its presence in
Abkhazia, and restored the railway line that was acceptable for it.
As a result, Georgia was automatically removed from the issue
of restoration of railway and the topic has been left open, with
Ochamchire-Ingiri (Zugdidi) line still in need of restoration to
ensure transit to Armenia.
Armenia has the greatest interest in this issue, as restoration of
the railway is considered strategically important for Armenia, as
the shortest and cheapest route to Russia. For Armenian business,
transporting cargo to Russia currently costs 190 USD per ton, and
would be much lower were use of the railway line restored. President
Sargsyan has high hopes regarding this issue; he has had negotiations
with Putin, who promised to consider this topic.
However, Azerbaijan's interests also must be considered, as they do
not share common satisfaction. Azerbaijani experts believe that this
process may irritate Azerbaijan and this will have negative effect
on the Azerbaijan-Georgia relationship. They think that restoration
of this railway line will facilitate market movement in Armenia and
as a result it becomes stronger, and this is the matter of concern
for Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijani experts believe Georgia would do well to remember that
Azerbaijan is Georgia's strategic partner who always supports Georgia
on International arena, and that economic relations are another
important part of this relationship, as Georgia receives natural gas
with special tariffs and receives investments from Azerbaijani side.
Georgian politicians should make no decisions without consultations
with the Azerbaijani side.
However, it should also be remembered that in 1999 Azerbaijani
government together with EU signed an agreement giving Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia responsibility to open the railway line. This
means that Azerbaijan has signed the document according to which it
has to facilitate restoration of railway line.
In addition, the Azerbaijani Government must accept the fact that this
issue is related to Georgian-Russian relations, in which Azerbaijan
does not have the right to interfere. Moreover, Georgia has not taken
an international obligation about withdrawal of restoration of railway
line, nor has Georgia made any promises to Azerbaijan about this issue.
Regardless, Georgia and Azerbaijan should remain strategic partners,
and Azerbaijan should be interested in this, as Georgia is the only
route for exporting oil and gas to Europe. In addition, Azerbaijani's
private sector has made significant investments in Georgia which they
want to protect.
Russia, who has its military bases in Armenia, is also interested in
this issue. It takes considerable resources for Russia to maintain
these bases and provide logistical support. The issue of the rotation
of military personal is another difficulty. Restoration of railway
line will give Russia the opportunity to keep these bases and squadrons
located near the Turkish border, with less expenditure.
Russia has more far-reaching ambitions. Several years ago, the Russian
Railway bought the Armenian railway line and gave it old Soviet name
"Transcaucasia Railway" (General Director Viktor Rebets). Russian
Railway also controls Abkhazian railway lines, and has hopes that its
restoration of the aforementioned railway line would give it access
to control the "Georgian Railway."
In fact, Russia could not only control railway transit in the South
Caucasus but also have direct access to Iran and Islamic Republics,
who have their own interests regarding the railway line issue.
There is an embargo imposed on Iran by the international community
and in fact it is in isolation. With the restoration of this
railway line, it would have access to its strategic partner Russia,
with whom it actively cooperates in many fields including nuclear
energy issues. At this stage, Russia is not able to supply Iran with
radioactive substances, although there have been several attempts to
do this by using Georgian territory. Restoration of the railway line
would give Russia the potential to provide Iran such resources.
Certainly the railway, specifically the Abkhazia-Ingiri (Zugdidi)
line, has great economic importance in terms of regional policy. But
first of all it is an important step for normalizing Georgia-Russian
relations- one of the requests of the western alliance partners. In
addition, Prime Minister Ivanishvili and the prevailing government
have recognized the Regional Policy as a priority in foreign relations.
When we speak of the issue of restoration of the railway line and
its economic importance, we should bear in mind the risks that may
accompany this process. However, these can be minimized or avoided if
the existing government, unlike the previous one, is realistic about
assessing the landscape and milieu including Russia as a key player.
Areas of risk that should be singled out as needing particular scrutiny
include, first of all, that Georgia must not gave up "Georgian railway"
in favour of Russia. On the contrary, Georgia must try to incorporate
the Abkhazian railway into the Georgian railway line. Secondly,
as the Abkhazian side lacks specialists, it is important to employ
Georgian Specialists along with Russians. Thirdly, Russia must
fulfil its obligation, taken on as a condition of membership in the
World Trade Organization, and let Georgian customs officers on River
Psou. Fourthly, Georgia must be alert to the categories of Russia
cargos, to avoid further military ammunitions and arms movement in
Armenia that would contribute to instability in the region, and be
the violation of OSCE's 1999 Istanbul decision. Finally and related,
international organizations should monitor cargos to prevent delivery
of uranium to Iran.
CGS Group is an American research and consulting firm, which offers a
variety of services to clients interested in establishing themselves
in Georgia and the South Caucasus. Committed to the success of our
clients and partners we offer experience and resources in the areas
of ? Government Relations & Public Affairs ? Business Intelligence
? Due Diligence ? Political Risk Analysis ? Security & Preparedness ?
Investigations & Forensics. Apart from research and consultancy
activities, CGS Group publishes two weekly newsletters to report
on business, economics and political news of Georgia. Find more at
WWW.CGSGROUP.GE
http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2978_october_29_2013/2978_edit1.html
The Messenger, Georgia
Oct 29 2013
BY: CGS GROUP Tuesday, October 29 On September 11, 2013, the Russian
Duma adopted a package of decisions with regard to Syria, where the
main resolution was to supply Iran with military weapons and ammunition
in the event of a U.S. Military strike against Syria. With this
gesture, Russia openly revealed its support for Assad's government,
which receives much of its weapons from Iran.
The question then becomes: how, and in which ways, does Russia plan
to implement its decision? In particular, how will it supply Iran
with weapons?
Logically, the fastest, most cost-effective and economically viable
way is through the Transcaucasian railway line, neglected since
the Abkhazian war. In particular, its Ochamchire - Ingiri (Zugdidi)
section requires rehabilitation.
A few days prior to the Duma's resolution, on September 6, the Armenian
News agency News.am released a statement by Armenian National Security
Council Secretary Arthur Baghdasaryan, who stated that "Armenia is
actively negotiating with Abkhazia and Iran about the issue of the
railway construction-rehabilitation process. Iran is ready to finance
the costs of railway construction. There are active negotiations
on this issue. Armenia has a strong interest in the opening of the
railway line. Georgia and Russia are also parties having interests,
and Abkhazia has agreed to open the railway line.
Now we must continue the negotiation processes."
Also on September 6, Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
a response to the statement made by Baghdasaryan. Foreign Minister
Maia Panjikidze stated that "The issue of this railway is a very
interesting topic that may lie within our sphere of interest. However,
when negotiations about this issue began, we made it plain that the
Georgian government will do nothing against its own interests, and
that future developments will guide us in how to act. Any information
you may have heard indicating that a permit has been issued by us,
or that any agreement has been reached, is false."
Knowing that the Georgian government has denied the existence of
any negotiations process in this regard, what could Baghdasaryan's
statement mean, that outran the decision made by Duma? Is this a
random coincidence? Or is there a more far-reaching and deliberate
motive behind this?
The issue of opening this railway line is not something new, but has
been the subject of discussion since the close of the Abkhazian war.
At the press conferenceon July 3, 2013, Georgian Prime Minister
Bidzina Ivanishvili talked about the recovery of Abkhazian railway
line. He made it clear that rail traffic will be restored, where the
Russian position will be a major factor, and that the rehabilitation
process should be gradual. In fact, he repeated what he had said on
January 17, on the meeting with President Serzh Sargsyan during his
visit to Armenia, where he had also described Russia's position as a
key factor. This had at that time given rise to talk in opposition
parties of "impending dangers." The Prime Minister's statement was
also criticized by President Saakashvili, who claimed that this
process wouldl slow the integration process and help accelerate
Russian expansion in the Caucasus.
But it must be said that comments of opposition and the President
were politically motivated, since Saakashvili's government also
engaged in active negotiation for the restoration of railway, and it
can be said that these negotiations were conducted unsuccessfully,
since Russia managed to establish full control over the railway,
which facilitated the Kremlin's military presence in Abkhazia.
Following Georgia's parliamentary elections in October 2012 and
approval of a new cabinet, the issue of restoration of the railway
line came to the forefront once again.
In November 2012, the new Minister for Reintegration Paata
Zakareishvili initiated the idea of restoration of the railway and road
transit traffic, as presenting a step forward for conflict resolution.
Zakareishvili's initiative was not new but an issue that had been
raised by Aslan Abashidze during President Eduard Shevardnadze's
government. At the time, the Kremlin considered Abashidze as
Shevardnadze's successor, and Abashidze assumed the role of mediator
as a way to raise his rating with support of IDPs from Abkhazia.
Abashidze gave Russia the opportunity to defend its interests during
the negotiation processes. The issue of restoration of the railway
in Abkhazia as a topic for discussion was provided by Russian side.
Restoration in this case meant the restoration of Leselidze -
Ochamchire section, but not the whole traffic.
This enabled Russia to transport military goods in Abkhazia, and
this process was not related to the issue of restoration of transit
with Armenia. In fact, restoration of the whole line was not in the
Russia's interest, as in this case people of the disputed regions
would be able to have contact with each other and this would be the
serious step forward for conflict resolution.
At that time the chairman of the Supreme Council was Tamaz
Nadareishvili, who managed to neutralize Abashidze and remove him
from the processes, lately the issue of restoration of the railway
was closed. Significantly, pressure from the Armenian side has ceased.
But soon after Saakashvili's arrival to power in 2004, as a result of
Armenia's activity (and behind Armenia, there was Russia's interests)
the issue of restoration of railway reawakened. The process was
under UN Observer mission's control. Georgian-Abkhazian commission
was created, restoration works defined, finances was guaranteed
by Russian side and the process was officially registered on the
basis of a special report. Russian railway troops began to move to
Abkhazia but suddenly the process of negotiations was halted and only
Leselidze-Ochamchire road was restored.
It should be noted that Saakashvili's government was either unable
or unwilling to accurately assess the situation. For all practical
purposes, Russia reached its goal, strengthened its presence in
Abkhazia, and restored the railway line that was acceptable for it.
As a result, Georgia was automatically removed from the issue
of restoration of railway and the topic has been left open, with
Ochamchire-Ingiri (Zugdidi) line still in need of restoration to
ensure transit to Armenia.
Armenia has the greatest interest in this issue, as restoration of
the railway is considered strategically important for Armenia, as
the shortest and cheapest route to Russia. For Armenian business,
transporting cargo to Russia currently costs 190 USD per ton, and
would be much lower were use of the railway line restored. President
Sargsyan has high hopes regarding this issue; he has had negotiations
with Putin, who promised to consider this topic.
However, Azerbaijan's interests also must be considered, as they do
not share common satisfaction. Azerbaijani experts believe that this
process may irritate Azerbaijan and this will have negative effect
on the Azerbaijan-Georgia relationship. They think that restoration
of this railway line will facilitate market movement in Armenia and
as a result it becomes stronger, and this is the matter of concern
for Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijani experts believe Georgia would do well to remember that
Azerbaijan is Georgia's strategic partner who always supports Georgia
on International arena, and that economic relations are another
important part of this relationship, as Georgia receives natural gas
with special tariffs and receives investments from Azerbaijani side.
Georgian politicians should make no decisions without consultations
with the Azerbaijani side.
However, it should also be remembered that in 1999 Azerbaijani
government together with EU signed an agreement giving Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia responsibility to open the railway line. This
means that Azerbaijan has signed the document according to which it
has to facilitate restoration of railway line.
In addition, the Azerbaijani Government must accept the fact that this
issue is related to Georgian-Russian relations, in which Azerbaijan
does not have the right to interfere. Moreover, Georgia has not taken
an international obligation about withdrawal of restoration of railway
line, nor has Georgia made any promises to Azerbaijan about this issue.
Regardless, Georgia and Azerbaijan should remain strategic partners,
and Azerbaijan should be interested in this, as Georgia is the only
route for exporting oil and gas to Europe. In addition, Azerbaijani's
private sector has made significant investments in Georgia which they
want to protect.
Russia, who has its military bases in Armenia, is also interested in
this issue. It takes considerable resources for Russia to maintain
these bases and provide logistical support. The issue of the rotation
of military personal is another difficulty. Restoration of railway
line will give Russia the opportunity to keep these bases and squadrons
located near the Turkish border, with less expenditure.
Russia has more far-reaching ambitions. Several years ago, the Russian
Railway bought the Armenian railway line and gave it old Soviet name
"Transcaucasia Railway" (General Director Viktor Rebets). Russian
Railway also controls Abkhazian railway lines, and has hopes that its
restoration of the aforementioned railway line would give it access
to control the "Georgian Railway."
In fact, Russia could not only control railway transit in the South
Caucasus but also have direct access to Iran and Islamic Republics,
who have their own interests regarding the railway line issue.
There is an embargo imposed on Iran by the international community
and in fact it is in isolation. With the restoration of this
railway line, it would have access to its strategic partner Russia,
with whom it actively cooperates in many fields including nuclear
energy issues. At this stage, Russia is not able to supply Iran with
radioactive substances, although there have been several attempts to
do this by using Georgian territory. Restoration of the railway line
would give Russia the potential to provide Iran such resources.
Certainly the railway, specifically the Abkhazia-Ingiri (Zugdidi)
line, has great economic importance in terms of regional policy. But
first of all it is an important step for normalizing Georgia-Russian
relations- one of the requests of the western alliance partners. In
addition, Prime Minister Ivanishvili and the prevailing government
have recognized the Regional Policy as a priority in foreign relations.
When we speak of the issue of restoration of the railway line and
its economic importance, we should bear in mind the risks that may
accompany this process. However, these can be minimized or avoided if
the existing government, unlike the previous one, is realistic about
assessing the landscape and milieu including Russia as a key player.
Areas of risk that should be singled out as needing particular scrutiny
include, first of all, that Georgia must not gave up "Georgian railway"
in favour of Russia. On the contrary, Georgia must try to incorporate
the Abkhazian railway into the Georgian railway line. Secondly,
as the Abkhazian side lacks specialists, it is important to employ
Georgian Specialists along with Russians. Thirdly, Russia must
fulfil its obligation, taken on as a condition of membership in the
World Trade Organization, and let Georgian customs officers on River
Psou. Fourthly, Georgia must be alert to the categories of Russia
cargos, to avoid further military ammunitions and arms movement in
Armenia that would contribute to instability in the region, and be
the violation of OSCE's 1999 Istanbul decision. Finally and related,
international organizations should monitor cargos to prevent delivery
of uranium to Iran.
CGS Group is an American research and consulting firm, which offers a
variety of services to clients interested in establishing themselves
in Georgia and the South Caucasus. Committed to the success of our
clients and partners we offer experience and resources in the areas
of ? Government Relations & Public Affairs ? Business Intelligence
? Due Diligence ? Political Risk Analysis ? Security & Preparedness ?
Investigations & Forensics. Apart from research and consultancy
activities, CGS Group publishes two weekly newsletters to report
on business, economics and political news of Georgia. Find more at
WWW.CGSGROUP.GE
http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2978_october_29_2013/2978_edit1.html