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SHOWN BY BIRYULEVO: NEW CHALLENGES FOR RUSSO-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS
Politkom.ru , Russia
Oct 22 2013
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow of the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (Washington, United States)
The unrest in the Moscow district of Biryulevo Zapadnoye has once
again made nationality a matter of current interest in Russia. But
aside from the domestic dimension, this event has directly impacted
foreign-policy storylines also. But this time things have not been
confined to the customary debate about the correlation of Russian
interests in the "near abroad" and a readiness to take in citizens
of the Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The
Biryulevo incidents have had a distinct influence on bilateral
Russo-Azerbaijani relations.
Following the arrest of Azerbaijani citizen Orkhan Zeynalov, who is
suspected of the murder of Yegor Shcherbakov (it was this actual
incident that largely incited the wholesale disturbances), there
was a strongly-worded statement from Polad Bulbuloglu, ambassador of
Azerbaijan in Moscow: "We also have a press, we also have television
stations, we also have the possibility of raising a crowd and saying
that a Russian killed an Azerbaijani, that all Russians should
be kicked out, but we are not doing so." The Foreign Ministry of
Azerbaijan also sent its Russian counterparts a protest note.
But a strong response was heard not only from representatives of
official bodies. Both Azerbaijani media outlets and the public have
made their contribution to the interpretation of events also.
Commentator Akper Gasanov stated in an article with the telling
headline "The Russia That We Have Lost": "Alas, instead of thinking
about how to rectify the state of affairs, how to restore the respect
and love of residents of the republics that were once part of the USSR,
such gentlemen as Kolokoltsev and Sobyanin are doing everything to
repel Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, and
Ukrainians and Belarusians." But perhaps the most cutting statement
was made by representatives of the Karabakh Liberation Organization,
which threatened Russians in Azerbaijan with "appropriate steps" in
the event of occurrences like the Biryulevo disturbances continuing
in Russia. This remark was quoted extensively in Russia's news media,
although the organization is not a government body. Be that as it may,
such people as Akif Naghi, leader of the "liberators," are giving
voice to a definite mood within Azerbaijani society.
Does this mean that a "chill" has entered relations between Moscow
and Baku? And if so, how long might it last?
Before answering these questions, we need in the most abbreviated form
to consider the general dynamics of bilateral relations. Azerbaijan
occupies a special place in Russian policy in the South Caucasus. You
could say that it is positioned between two extreme poles -Armenian
and Georgian. On the one hand the Caspian republic is not a member of
the CSTO (whereas Armenia is a member of this organization) and is not
planning (again, as distinct from Yerevan) to accede to the Customs
or Eurasian unions. Baku treasures its energy partnership with the
EU and the United States, such projects with its participation as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil line and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas conduit
are seen in Moscow as strategic competitors. On the other, the recent
presidential elections in Azerbaijan showed that the West does not,
for all that, accept the Caspian republic as a representative of
"its world". As an important strategic partner, yes, but not as a
"democratic-camp" associate. Azerbaijan itself has been drawn into a
pragmatic partnership with NATO. As distinct from Tbilisi, it is not
Baku's aim to join the alliance. Nor does Azerbaijani foreign policy
have such a strategic goal as membership of the EU.
The Azerbaijani leadership appreciates Moscow's support on issues of
domestic policy here (the continuity between the Aliyev father and
son and the preservation of "sovereign democracy"). The propinquity of
the two countries is an important factor also. The Russian Federation
and Azerbaijan share 284 km of common land border. As distinct from
Georgia, the Azerbaijani authorities have not emphasized such a topic
as "Soviet occupation". Having such a neighbour as Iran, Azerbaijan
has no interest in any foreign interventions in Iranian or Syrian
affairs. Such interference could have negative consequences for Baku.
Whence the extreme caution of Azerbaijani policy and a readiness
to balance between the main power centres in the Caucasus and the
Middle East. All these factors determine the assessments of Russia's
priorities also. From Moscow's perspective, Armenia is a strategic
ally of Russia, Azerbaijan, a strategic partner. Businesslike and
mutually beneficial contacts are paramount in relations with Baku.
Before the Biryulevo business, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia
had, seemingly, demonstrated positive dynamics. Vladimir Putin visited
Baku in August 2013. The parties displayed a readiness for cooperation
on a broad range of issues, in the military-technical sphere included.
It is notable that before Putin's visit to Azerbaijan, the two
countries were experiencing what was not the most dazzling period in
the history of bilateral relations. The negotiations on operation
of the Qabala radar (a military facility on Azerbaijani territory
leased by Russia) were proving unsuccessful. Contradictions in the
approaches to the delivery of Baku oil via the Baku-Novorossiysk
oil line had emerged also. But the visit of Putin accompanied by
influential ministers and captains of Russian big business proved
beneficial. The former contradictions were overshadowed by positive
statements of future intent. Presidential elections, based on the
outcome of which Moscow and Baku were hoping to move closer in
accommodation of each other, were held. The assessment of Aleksandr
Lukashevich, representative of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry,
was highly typical here: "We have the best, most diversified relations
with Azerbaijan in all fields, and I hope that President Aliyev's new
term will help us arrive at a qualitatively new level of strategic
partnership."
The incidents in West Biryulevo disrupted the positive development
of the trend in Russo-Azerbaijani relations. But there should be no
rush to conclusions concerning a total cold snap. It should be borne
in mind primarily that no diplomatic service, as a rule, stints on
strongly-worded comment if it is a question of the persecution of
citizens of the country which it represents. Whether there were any
need for such altogether would otherwise be arguable. The difference
in potentials between Azerbaijan and Russia should be noted also. For a
small country, a former Soviet republic all the more, all that happens
in the "former metropolis" is of tremendous significance. We recall
the "excesses" against ethnic Georgians in 2006 or the recent traffic
accident involving the ethnic Armenian Grachya Arutyunyan. All these
incidents became in the Caucasus republics the No 1 item of news,
although they were not seen as such in a Russian context. But not only
the official response of Russian spokesmen but also the "information
accompaniment" of this incident or the other is important for the
authorities and societies of the Caucasus republics. Your author
has heard repeatedly from his Azerbaijani counterparts the following
interpretation: "Well, they should have arrested this Zeynalov, this
would not have been the end of the world. But why make a spectacle
out of this? Why take him to the office of the head of the MVD? Are
there no other high-profile killings or robberies in Russia?
It turns out that our fellow countrymen are to blame for everything!"
A similar assessment was reproduced practically word for word
by their Armenian counterparts after the business of the traffic
accident involving Grachya Arutyunyan hit the newspapers and television
screens. And it would be naive to think that Baku's chief geopolitical
opponents are today rejoicing in the Biryulevo saga. On the contrary,
many are attempting to try this "shirt" on for themselves, rightly
believing that the pogrom efforts will repel from Russia (not from
the authorities in the Kremlin, from Russia, as from the image of a
potentially attractive country) their compatriots.
Of course, we should note that the big guns of Azerbaijani policy in
the Biryulevo saga have yet to have their say. Baku would obviously
not want to cross red lines and go the Georgian route (as Saakashvili
did in 2004-2008). Nor is Moscow eager for a deterioration in the
relations with Azerbaijan for in this case its positions in the
Caucasus would be weakened. But no matter what the plans are, it
is obvious that no leader of Azerbaijan can ignore the nationalist
and immigrant-phobic protests. Simply because many kinfolk of the
guest workers are potential voters, and large-scale emigration is
a favourite topic of the oppositionists. Both the head of state and
his team are being blamed for it.
To speak of Russia, though, immigrant-phobia is making extraordinarily
complicated its conversion to a Eurasian power laying claim to the role
of a magnet which is an alternative to North Atlantic integration. To
any other integration at all, for that matter. Nor is the problem
confined merely to Azerbaijan. Moscow's CSTO allies (Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan) and its SCO partners (Uzbekistan)
are being mentioned as being among the potential contenders for the
introduction of visa procedures. Nor should the Russian population in
the CIS countries be forgotten either. You may criticize (and rightly
so) the radicalism of Akif Naghi as much as you like, but there are
in that same Azerbaijan about 120,000 Russians, and in Uzbekistan,
more than 1 million, and in Kazakhstan this figure is altogether
in excess of 3 million. And if incidents like Biryulevo continue
to erupt, no one will guarantee that some groups of radicals would
not attempt to retrieve their losses on Russian compatriots. Not to
mention that the immigrant-phobia within the Russian Federation would
push into power in the Eurasian countries outright Russophobes and the
foes of Russian integration projects. Those that would with pleasure
speculate on the themes of "occupation," "imperial legacy," and similar
topics. Extremes, as we know, urge on and feed one another. And in
this respect the supporters of "Russian purity" strengthen extreme
nationalists and haters of Russia outside. The trick is to see to it
that "Russia for Russians" and "Moscow for Muscovites" are unable to
lay claim to some in any way pronounced role beyond the Garden Ring,
not to mention the global arena.
[Translated from Russian]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Politkom.ru , Russia
Oct 22 2013
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow of the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (Washington, United States)
The unrest in the Moscow district of Biryulevo Zapadnoye has once
again made nationality a matter of current interest in Russia. But
aside from the domestic dimension, this event has directly impacted
foreign-policy storylines also. But this time things have not been
confined to the customary debate about the correlation of Russian
interests in the "near abroad" and a readiness to take in citizens
of the Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The
Biryulevo incidents have had a distinct influence on bilateral
Russo-Azerbaijani relations.
Following the arrest of Azerbaijani citizen Orkhan Zeynalov, who is
suspected of the murder of Yegor Shcherbakov (it was this actual
incident that largely incited the wholesale disturbances), there
was a strongly-worded statement from Polad Bulbuloglu, ambassador of
Azerbaijan in Moscow: "We also have a press, we also have television
stations, we also have the possibility of raising a crowd and saying
that a Russian killed an Azerbaijani, that all Russians should
be kicked out, but we are not doing so." The Foreign Ministry of
Azerbaijan also sent its Russian counterparts a protest note.
But a strong response was heard not only from representatives of
official bodies. Both Azerbaijani media outlets and the public have
made their contribution to the interpretation of events also.
Commentator Akper Gasanov stated in an article with the telling
headline "The Russia That We Have Lost": "Alas, instead of thinking
about how to rectify the state of affairs, how to restore the respect
and love of residents of the republics that were once part of the USSR,
such gentlemen as Kolokoltsev and Sobyanin are doing everything to
repel Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, and
Ukrainians and Belarusians." But perhaps the most cutting statement
was made by representatives of the Karabakh Liberation Organization,
which threatened Russians in Azerbaijan with "appropriate steps" in
the event of occurrences like the Biryulevo disturbances continuing
in Russia. This remark was quoted extensively in Russia's news media,
although the organization is not a government body. Be that as it may,
such people as Akif Naghi, leader of the "liberators," are giving
voice to a definite mood within Azerbaijani society.
Does this mean that a "chill" has entered relations between Moscow
and Baku? And if so, how long might it last?
Before answering these questions, we need in the most abbreviated form
to consider the general dynamics of bilateral relations. Azerbaijan
occupies a special place in Russian policy in the South Caucasus. You
could say that it is positioned between two extreme poles -Armenian
and Georgian. On the one hand the Caspian republic is not a member of
the CSTO (whereas Armenia is a member of this organization) and is not
planning (again, as distinct from Yerevan) to accede to the Customs
or Eurasian unions. Baku treasures its energy partnership with the
EU and the United States, such projects with its participation as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil line and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas conduit
are seen in Moscow as strategic competitors. On the other, the recent
presidential elections in Azerbaijan showed that the West does not,
for all that, accept the Caspian republic as a representative of
"its world". As an important strategic partner, yes, but not as a
"democratic-camp" associate. Azerbaijan itself has been drawn into a
pragmatic partnership with NATO. As distinct from Tbilisi, it is not
Baku's aim to join the alliance. Nor does Azerbaijani foreign policy
have such a strategic goal as membership of the EU.
The Azerbaijani leadership appreciates Moscow's support on issues of
domestic policy here (the continuity between the Aliyev father and
son and the preservation of "sovereign democracy"). The propinquity of
the two countries is an important factor also. The Russian Federation
and Azerbaijan share 284 km of common land border. As distinct from
Georgia, the Azerbaijani authorities have not emphasized such a topic
as "Soviet occupation". Having such a neighbour as Iran, Azerbaijan
has no interest in any foreign interventions in Iranian or Syrian
affairs. Such interference could have negative consequences for Baku.
Whence the extreme caution of Azerbaijani policy and a readiness
to balance between the main power centres in the Caucasus and the
Middle East. All these factors determine the assessments of Russia's
priorities also. From Moscow's perspective, Armenia is a strategic
ally of Russia, Azerbaijan, a strategic partner. Businesslike and
mutually beneficial contacts are paramount in relations with Baku.
Before the Biryulevo business, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia
had, seemingly, demonstrated positive dynamics. Vladimir Putin visited
Baku in August 2013. The parties displayed a readiness for cooperation
on a broad range of issues, in the military-technical sphere included.
It is notable that before Putin's visit to Azerbaijan, the two
countries were experiencing what was not the most dazzling period in
the history of bilateral relations. The negotiations on operation
of the Qabala radar (a military facility on Azerbaijani territory
leased by Russia) were proving unsuccessful. Contradictions in the
approaches to the delivery of Baku oil via the Baku-Novorossiysk
oil line had emerged also. But the visit of Putin accompanied by
influential ministers and captains of Russian big business proved
beneficial. The former contradictions were overshadowed by positive
statements of future intent. Presidential elections, based on the
outcome of which Moscow and Baku were hoping to move closer in
accommodation of each other, were held. The assessment of Aleksandr
Lukashevich, representative of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry,
was highly typical here: "We have the best, most diversified relations
with Azerbaijan in all fields, and I hope that President Aliyev's new
term will help us arrive at a qualitatively new level of strategic
partnership."
The incidents in West Biryulevo disrupted the positive development
of the trend in Russo-Azerbaijani relations. But there should be no
rush to conclusions concerning a total cold snap. It should be borne
in mind primarily that no diplomatic service, as a rule, stints on
strongly-worded comment if it is a question of the persecution of
citizens of the country which it represents. Whether there were any
need for such altogether would otherwise be arguable. The difference
in potentials between Azerbaijan and Russia should be noted also. For a
small country, a former Soviet republic all the more, all that happens
in the "former metropolis" is of tremendous significance. We recall
the "excesses" against ethnic Georgians in 2006 or the recent traffic
accident involving the ethnic Armenian Grachya Arutyunyan. All these
incidents became in the Caucasus republics the No 1 item of news,
although they were not seen as such in a Russian context. But not only
the official response of Russian spokesmen but also the "information
accompaniment" of this incident or the other is important for the
authorities and societies of the Caucasus republics. Your author
has heard repeatedly from his Azerbaijani counterparts the following
interpretation: "Well, they should have arrested this Zeynalov, this
would not have been the end of the world. But why make a spectacle
out of this? Why take him to the office of the head of the MVD? Are
there no other high-profile killings or robberies in Russia?
It turns out that our fellow countrymen are to blame for everything!"
A similar assessment was reproduced practically word for word
by their Armenian counterparts after the business of the traffic
accident involving Grachya Arutyunyan hit the newspapers and television
screens. And it would be naive to think that Baku's chief geopolitical
opponents are today rejoicing in the Biryulevo saga. On the contrary,
many are attempting to try this "shirt" on for themselves, rightly
believing that the pogrom efforts will repel from Russia (not from
the authorities in the Kremlin, from Russia, as from the image of a
potentially attractive country) their compatriots.
Of course, we should note that the big guns of Azerbaijani policy in
the Biryulevo saga have yet to have their say. Baku would obviously
not want to cross red lines and go the Georgian route (as Saakashvili
did in 2004-2008). Nor is Moscow eager for a deterioration in the
relations with Azerbaijan for in this case its positions in the
Caucasus would be weakened. But no matter what the plans are, it
is obvious that no leader of Azerbaijan can ignore the nationalist
and immigrant-phobic protests. Simply because many kinfolk of the
guest workers are potential voters, and large-scale emigration is
a favourite topic of the oppositionists. Both the head of state and
his team are being blamed for it.
To speak of Russia, though, immigrant-phobia is making extraordinarily
complicated its conversion to a Eurasian power laying claim to the role
of a magnet which is an alternative to North Atlantic integration. To
any other integration at all, for that matter. Nor is the problem
confined merely to Azerbaijan. Moscow's CSTO allies (Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan) and its SCO partners (Uzbekistan)
are being mentioned as being among the potential contenders for the
introduction of visa procedures. Nor should the Russian population in
the CIS countries be forgotten either. You may criticize (and rightly
so) the radicalism of Akif Naghi as much as you like, but there are
in that same Azerbaijan about 120,000 Russians, and in Uzbekistan,
more than 1 million, and in Kazakhstan this figure is altogether
in excess of 3 million. And if incidents like Biryulevo continue
to erupt, no one will guarantee that some groups of radicals would
not attempt to retrieve their losses on Russian compatriots. Not to
mention that the immigrant-phobia within the Russian Federation would
push into power in the Eurasian countries outright Russophobes and the
foes of Russian integration projects. Those that would with pleasure
speculate on the themes of "occupation," "imperial legacy," and similar
topics. Extremes, as we know, urge on and feed one another. And in
this respect the supporters of "Russian purity" strengthen extreme
nationalists and haters of Russia outside. The trick is to see to it
that "Russia for Russians" and "Moscow for Muscovites" are unable to
lay claim to some in any way pronounced role beyond the Garden Ring,
not to mention the global arena.
[Translated from Russian]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress