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ARMENIA'S TECTONIC SHIFT TO THE EAST: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES
http://times.am/?p=32818&l=en
Today - 12:29
By Armen Sahakyan
Following the meeting in Moscow on September 3rd, the Presidents of
Armenia and Russia signed a joint statement, which confirms Armenia's
desire to join the Customs Union (CU) and willingness to participate
in the formation of the Eurasian Union (EAU) by 2015.
The government of Armenia on Thursday, September 19th, already approved
an action plan to join the Customs Union. Seven working groups have
been set up to accelerate the process.
These developments came in as a big surprise especially for the EU, as
Brussels expected to sign an Association Agreement along with a Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) component with Armenia
and other Eastern Partnership (EaP) states in Vilniusthis November.
For months, both the EU and Russia made it clear that Armenia had
to make a decision between the Customs Union membership or closer
association with the EU. The incompatibility of both blocs was
the center of gravity, despite official Yerevan'scontinuous (and
unsuccessful)attempts to break loose of that imposition.
Both the EU and Russia claim that their geostrategic plans are
not contrary to the other side's, and even claim the opposite. If
this were the case, Russia and the EU would be more willing to work
together to find a mutually agreeable format of cooperation with the
six EaP states instead of moving towarda head-to-head collision.
Considering the close collaboration between Armenia and Russia in the
economic, political, and military spheres, this news should not come
as a total surprise. Russia maintains an army base in Armenia, owns
most of the country's critical infrastructure, is the leading foreign
investor, and is home to the largest Armenian Diaspora in the world.
Having so much political and economic leverage over Armenia, Russia
did not face a major challenge in"convincing" Armenia of the greater
virtues ofthe CU over the AA/DCFTA.
Armenia's chances for a possible membership in the EU are currently
close to zero, whereas the CU and consequently EAU membership
might prove to be beneficial in increasing Armenia's international
relevance as part of a much larger entity. Taking into consideration
all the above-mentioned factors as well as the cultural and historical
connections with Russia, the CU was a more natural choice for Armenia
than the AA/DCFTA.
In making its decision, the Armenian leadership was not provided
with many (equally good) alternatives. Just like Russia, the EU was
not eager to allow Armenia much maneuver space: thus, Brussels has
its own share of the blame in regards to recent events. In choosing
between national security or further trade with the EU, Armenia chose
the former.
Armenia became a "victim" of the contention of the two sides,
regardless of its commitment to work with both. The question now,
however, is no longer if official Yerevan should choose between the
East or West, but rather how it should reap the utmost benefits from
the current situation and overcome its foreign policy challenges.
First, the Armenian leadership should, at the minimum, maintain
the same level of cooperation with the EU as it has thus far. The
EU remains a major trading partner and home to a sizable Armenian
Diaspora. This should be viewed in light of the country's policy of
"Complimentarity" in foreign affairs- Armenia cannot afford to have
tense relations with Russia,the EU, or other major powers due to its
geopolitical situation.
The challenge for Armenia now is, parallel to the Russian projects,
trying to draw other foreign investments into the country to make
sure that the state does not become too dependent on Russia (as it is
the largest and richest member of the CU). Continuous interaction and
attraction of both Russian and non-Russian (even Belarusian and Kazakh)
foreign investments into Armenia is important. Additionally, Yerevan
should focus on increasing Diasporan investments into the country,
which will solve several issues at once, including deeper commercial
interaction with the compatriots abroad, domestic job-creation,
economic growth, and (hopefully) repatriation.
Proactive diplomacy can turn the balance to Armenia's advantage. Given
the current strategic and political realities, Armenia can and should
capitalize on the situation to the maximum. The leadership mustbe more
engaged in the region and promote the state's national interests. In
exchange for the decision to join the CU over AA/DCFTA, Armenia should
attempt to reap greater benefits from Moscow- be those economic,
political, military, or otherwise.Additionally, Yerevan should try to
mediate the relations between Georgia and Russia, since normalization
in relations would benefit Armenia as well. This will not only
serve Yerevan's geopolitical interests, but also raise the country's
international image as a successful mediator and reliable partner.
Inclusion of Artsakh, even informally, in the CU ought to be an
important objective. In a press briefing, Secretary of the Armenian
National Security Council Arthur Baghdasaryan assured that Artsakh
will be incorporated into the CU- something very unlikely to have
happened with the AA/DCFTA.
Parallel to the "Complimentarity" policy towards Russia and EU,
Armenia should look into further deepening of its ties with India,
China, and others- something that the leadership has not given as much
priorityas available thus far. Further cultivation of apolicy inclined
to develop and strengthen ties with the East should be one of Yerevan's
top priorities. This will enable Armenia to create more alternatives
for itself and loosen its dependence on both Russia and the EU, hence
allowing for more flexibility in its foreign and domestic policies.
It is now in Yerevan's absolute interest to work towards and lobby for
Ukraine's (also Georgia and Moldova) membership in the CU, as Ukraine's
accession would ensure CU's, and subsequently ECU's viability. Ukraine
is a major economic and political player in Eastern Europe and its
accession to the CU will be a great benefit for Armenia. Since the CU
accession decision has already been made, Yerevan can no longer afford
to stand on the sidelines and needs to take a much more proactive
role in promoting the CU, together with Russia.
Aside from Ukraine, Armenia should particularly push for Georgia's CU
membership (or at least some other level of engagement) - something
not very likely in the near future, but not impossible either.
Georgia's membership would solve the issue of not having a common
border with the other CU states, and would provide Armenia with better
conditions to access the Black Sea region and international markets as
part of a single economic space. In such a scenario, the unilateral
coercive blockades of Azerbaijan and Turkey would be obsolete and
would additionally ensure Azerbaijan's relative regional isolation
from the ongoing processes.
In short, Armenia should intensively use its diplomatic clout,
Diaspora, and other channels present in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia
in a vigorous campaign to get those countriesto join the CU, or at
least gain an observer status.
Finally, Yerevan should push to accelerate the process of finalizing
the railway and oil pipeline projects with Iran, which would further
integrate Armenia into regional development projects and solidify
its position as a transit hub of goods and resources. This is a
project that Moscow and Beijing have shown interest in during recent
discussions with Armenian officials. A North-South transit route
would further (economically) legitimize the Eurasian Union project,
and prove to be a major boon to trans-regional firms engaged in
global commerce.Aside from regional and international benefits,
Armenia would simultaneously strengthen its domestic political and
economic environments.
If such a scenario is to play out, which is quiterealistic, Armenia
will come out much better positioned in the region and globally than
if it were to sign an AA/DCFTA with the EU. It is not too late to act
(if not already), but in this case the time is running against Armenia.
Armen Sahakyan is an Analyst of Eurasian Affairs at the Political
Developments Research Center (PDRC), Yerevan, Armenia. Previously, Mr.
Sahakyan has served as an Adviser to the Permanent Representative of
Armenia to the United Nations.
http://times.am/?p=32818&l=en
Today - 12:29
By Armen Sahakyan
Following the meeting in Moscow on September 3rd, the Presidents of
Armenia and Russia signed a joint statement, which confirms Armenia's
desire to join the Customs Union (CU) and willingness to participate
in the formation of the Eurasian Union (EAU) by 2015.
The government of Armenia on Thursday, September 19th, already approved
an action plan to join the Customs Union. Seven working groups have
been set up to accelerate the process.
These developments came in as a big surprise especially for the EU, as
Brussels expected to sign an Association Agreement along with a Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) component with Armenia
and other Eastern Partnership (EaP) states in Vilniusthis November.
For months, both the EU and Russia made it clear that Armenia had
to make a decision between the Customs Union membership or closer
association with the EU. The incompatibility of both blocs was
the center of gravity, despite official Yerevan'scontinuous (and
unsuccessful)attempts to break loose of that imposition.
Both the EU and Russia claim that their geostrategic plans are
not contrary to the other side's, and even claim the opposite. If
this were the case, Russia and the EU would be more willing to work
together to find a mutually agreeable format of cooperation with the
six EaP states instead of moving towarda head-to-head collision.
Considering the close collaboration between Armenia and Russia in the
economic, political, and military spheres, this news should not come
as a total surprise. Russia maintains an army base in Armenia, owns
most of the country's critical infrastructure, is the leading foreign
investor, and is home to the largest Armenian Diaspora in the world.
Having so much political and economic leverage over Armenia, Russia
did not face a major challenge in"convincing" Armenia of the greater
virtues ofthe CU over the AA/DCFTA.
Armenia's chances for a possible membership in the EU are currently
close to zero, whereas the CU and consequently EAU membership
might prove to be beneficial in increasing Armenia's international
relevance as part of a much larger entity. Taking into consideration
all the above-mentioned factors as well as the cultural and historical
connections with Russia, the CU was a more natural choice for Armenia
than the AA/DCFTA.
In making its decision, the Armenian leadership was not provided
with many (equally good) alternatives. Just like Russia, the EU was
not eager to allow Armenia much maneuver space: thus, Brussels has
its own share of the blame in regards to recent events. In choosing
between national security or further trade with the EU, Armenia chose
the former.
Armenia became a "victim" of the contention of the two sides,
regardless of its commitment to work with both. The question now,
however, is no longer if official Yerevan should choose between the
East or West, but rather how it should reap the utmost benefits from
the current situation and overcome its foreign policy challenges.
First, the Armenian leadership should, at the minimum, maintain
the same level of cooperation with the EU as it has thus far. The
EU remains a major trading partner and home to a sizable Armenian
Diaspora. This should be viewed in light of the country's policy of
"Complimentarity" in foreign affairs- Armenia cannot afford to have
tense relations with Russia,the EU, or other major powers due to its
geopolitical situation.
The challenge for Armenia now is, parallel to the Russian projects,
trying to draw other foreign investments into the country to make
sure that the state does not become too dependent on Russia (as it is
the largest and richest member of the CU). Continuous interaction and
attraction of both Russian and non-Russian (even Belarusian and Kazakh)
foreign investments into Armenia is important. Additionally, Yerevan
should focus on increasing Diasporan investments into the country,
which will solve several issues at once, including deeper commercial
interaction with the compatriots abroad, domestic job-creation,
economic growth, and (hopefully) repatriation.
Proactive diplomacy can turn the balance to Armenia's advantage. Given
the current strategic and political realities, Armenia can and should
capitalize on the situation to the maximum. The leadership mustbe more
engaged in the region and promote the state's national interests. In
exchange for the decision to join the CU over AA/DCFTA, Armenia should
attempt to reap greater benefits from Moscow- be those economic,
political, military, or otherwise.Additionally, Yerevan should try to
mediate the relations between Georgia and Russia, since normalization
in relations would benefit Armenia as well. This will not only
serve Yerevan's geopolitical interests, but also raise the country's
international image as a successful mediator and reliable partner.
Inclusion of Artsakh, even informally, in the CU ought to be an
important objective. In a press briefing, Secretary of the Armenian
National Security Council Arthur Baghdasaryan assured that Artsakh
will be incorporated into the CU- something very unlikely to have
happened with the AA/DCFTA.
Parallel to the "Complimentarity" policy towards Russia and EU,
Armenia should look into further deepening of its ties with India,
China, and others- something that the leadership has not given as much
priorityas available thus far. Further cultivation of apolicy inclined
to develop and strengthen ties with the East should be one of Yerevan's
top priorities. This will enable Armenia to create more alternatives
for itself and loosen its dependence on both Russia and the EU, hence
allowing for more flexibility in its foreign and domestic policies.
It is now in Yerevan's absolute interest to work towards and lobby for
Ukraine's (also Georgia and Moldova) membership in the CU, as Ukraine's
accession would ensure CU's, and subsequently ECU's viability. Ukraine
is a major economic and political player in Eastern Europe and its
accession to the CU will be a great benefit for Armenia. Since the CU
accession decision has already been made, Yerevan can no longer afford
to stand on the sidelines and needs to take a much more proactive
role in promoting the CU, together with Russia.
Aside from Ukraine, Armenia should particularly push for Georgia's CU
membership (or at least some other level of engagement) - something
not very likely in the near future, but not impossible either.
Georgia's membership would solve the issue of not having a common
border with the other CU states, and would provide Armenia with better
conditions to access the Black Sea region and international markets as
part of a single economic space. In such a scenario, the unilateral
coercive blockades of Azerbaijan and Turkey would be obsolete and
would additionally ensure Azerbaijan's relative regional isolation
from the ongoing processes.
In short, Armenia should intensively use its diplomatic clout,
Diaspora, and other channels present in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia
in a vigorous campaign to get those countriesto join the CU, or at
least gain an observer status.
Finally, Yerevan should push to accelerate the process of finalizing
the railway and oil pipeline projects with Iran, which would further
integrate Armenia into regional development projects and solidify
its position as a transit hub of goods and resources. This is a
project that Moscow and Beijing have shown interest in during recent
discussions with Armenian officials. A North-South transit route
would further (economically) legitimize the Eurasian Union project,
and prove to be a major boon to trans-regional firms engaged in
global commerce.Aside from regional and international benefits,
Armenia would simultaneously strengthen its domestic political and
economic environments.
If such a scenario is to play out, which is quiterealistic, Armenia
will come out much better positioned in the region and globally than
if it were to sign an AA/DCFTA with the EU. It is not too late to act
(if not already), but in this case the time is running against Armenia.
Armen Sahakyan is an Analyst of Eurasian Affairs at the Political
Developments Research Center (PDRC), Yerevan, Armenia. Previously, Mr.
Sahakyan has served as an Adviser to the Permanent Representative of
Armenia to the United Nations.