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Turkey vulnerable to rising Russian power in the Black Sea
By MICHA'EL TANCHUM
04/19/2014
With the annexation of Crimea, Turkey faces a stronger and bolder
Russian naval power in the Black Sea. A resurgent Russia may be
tempted to exploit its temporary naval dominance to alter current
Black Sea energy exploitation and transportation arrangements more in
its favor and to the detriment of Turkey and its partners in the
Caucasus. The politically motivated stoppage of Turkey's National
Warship Project's production schedule has created a window of
vulnerability in Turkey's Black Sea naval defenses in the face of
rapidly rising Russian naval power.
Background:
The $3 billion `National Warship' Project, known by its Turkish
abbreviation MILGEM, seeks to upgrade the Turkish fleet by replacing
and augmenting its older foreign-made warships with eight domestically
produced Ada-class anti-submarine warfare corvettes and subsequently
four intermediate-class TF 100 frigates. After gaining experience from
the building of the slightly larger but more lethal TF 100 anti-air
warfare frigates, Turkey then intends to build a series of TF 2000
frigates. Double the size of the TF 100, the TF 2000 anti-air warfare
frigate will significantly advance the Turkish fleet's transformation
into a blue-water navy.
Aside from being an intermediate phase for the development of the TF
2000, the TF 100 frigates are of present vital importance as
replacements for the German-made Meko 200 frigates that form an
essential component of Turkey's force projection in the Black Sea. The
TF 100 frigates will be the first Turkish vessels to carry the
American-manufactured RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)
system capable of countering the current generation of supersonic
anti-ship missiles.
Prior to Russia's annexation of Crimea, the head of Turkey's
Undersecretariat of Defense Industries Murat Bayar publicly
acknowledged the need to replace the Meko 200 frigates with the
ESSM-equipped TF 100s by 2020.
However, in September 2013, upon the commissioning of the TCG
Büyükada, the second of MILGEM's eight Ada-class corvettes, the
Turkish government abruptly canceled RMK Marine's contract to build
the remaining six corvettes. A subsidiary the Turkish conglomerate Koç
Holding A.Å?., the cancellation of RMK Marine's contract appears to be
part of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's political vendetta
against the Koç family for providing assistance to anti-Erdogan
protesters from a Koç-owned Istanbul hotel during the summer 2013 Gezi
Park demonstrations.
The next two corvettes will be produced by Turkey's national shipyard
while the government evaluates bids for the building of the four
remaining corvettes. Despite Undersecretary Bayar's optimistic
forecasts that the government's cancellations will delay the
production schedule for the Ada-class corvettes by only one year, the
cascade effect of the production stoppage in setting back the building
of the TF 100 frigates, as well as the subsequent TF 2000s, has
created a four- to eight-year window of vulnerability for Turkey in
the Black Sea vis-Ã-vis a resurgent Russia.
Turkey's strategic vulnerability was not anticipated because of the
view in Turkish policy circles that Turkey enjoys a relative parity
with Russia in the Black Sea. However, the approximate parity exists
only when Russia's Black Sea Fleet is matched against all the major
assets of the Turkish navy. Prior to the Crimean conflict, Russia's
Black Sea fleet consisted of 24 major surface combatants and one
diesel submarine while Turkey's major naval assets consist of
approximately 24 surface combatants and 14 submarines. The parity is
illusory as it is unlikely that Turkey would be able to deploy all or
most of its naval assets in a Black Sea conflict.
Turkey's ability to deter Russian assertiveness in what Moscow regards
as its greater Black Sea sphere of influence, including the eastern
Mediterranean and the Caucasus, was already questionable. As Russia's
Black Sea Fleet disposed of Georgia's miniscule navy during the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, Ankara passively watched the Russian military
destroy Turkey's infrastructure investments in Georgia. Turkey's
supposed naval parity did not afford Ankara any significant policy
options.
Indeed, Ankara revealed its reluctance to provoke Moscow into
challenging the Montreux Convention, the 1936 treaty granting Ankara
exclusive control over the Bosphorous Straits and the Dardanelles and
restricting the transit of heavy warships through this strategic Black
Sea-Eastern Mediterranean access corridor.
Implications:
With the annexation of Crimea, Turkey faces a stronger and bolder
Russian naval power in the Black Sea. Russia now possesses the
Ukrainian navy's submarine and several, if not most, of Ukraine's 11
major surface combatants. Even without the Ukraine's naval assets,
Russia's own new additions to its Black Sea Fleet will enable Moscow
to dominate the region. Russia recently put to sea the first of its
six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates. All six frigates are
designated for service in the Black Sea Fleet.
Larger and more advanced than Turkey's four modified Meko 200
Barbaros-class frigates, each of the six Admiral Grigorovich-class
frigates will be the first vessels equipped with the state-of-the-art,
supersonic Shtil-1 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) air defense system.
Moscow expects all six frigates to be in service in the Black Sea
Fleet by the end of 2016. Turkey's now delayed TF 100 frigates, slated
to carry the ESSM system, would be the only Turkish vessels with a
comparable SAM capability.
Within the same 2016 timeframe, Russia will also add six newly
improved Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines to its Black Sea Fleet
ahead of Turkey's deployment of an equivalent number of Ada-class
anti-submarine corvettes. These two Russian procurement programs alone
will quickly tilt the balance of naval forces in Russia's favor,
giving Russia a significant strategic advantage for a window of four
to eight years depending on the pace of Turkey's resumed production
schedule.
In addition, Russia is in the process of acquiring two French-made
Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, to be named the Vladivostok
and Sevastapol, the latter being the namesake of the Russian Black Sea
Fleet's base in Crimea. The amphibious assault ships are helicopter
carriers that can accommodate 16 attack helicopters as well as 13
battle tanks and 450 combat soldiers.
A Mistral-class helicopter carrier in the Black Sea Fleet would
provide Russia with unprecedented power projection capability in its
greater Black Sea region. Russia's recent announcement that it has no
plans to deploy either of the helicopter carriers in the Black Sea may
simply constitute a temporary measure by Moscow to assuage French
sensibilities in order to ensure that France does not rescind the sale
as a result of Moscow's annexation of Crimea. Turkey cannot discount
the likely possibility that the Sevastapol will serve at the Black Sea
Fleet base after which it was named.
Russia's reassertion of naval power in the Black Sea has already been
accompanied by Moscow's first action to change the status quo in
relation to Black Sea energy exploitation. With the formal annexation
of Crimea, Ukraine's Black Sea Oil and Gas company, ChronomorNaftohaz,
was made into a whole-owned subsidiary of the Russian state-controlled
joint-stock company Gazprom. Between the acquisition of
ChronomorNaftohaz itself and Gazprom's now exclusive license for all
offshore energy development in Crimea's continental shelf, the Russian
energy giant has acquired an estimated $50 billion in capital assets.
Turkey's national oil and gas company TPAO has itself spent $2.5
billion on offshore energy exploration in Turkey's continental shelf.
Current estimates predict Turkey's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in
the Black Sea contains 10 billion barrels of crude oil and two
trillion cubic meters of natural gas. However as ultra deep-water
wells are drilled in the region, more hydrocarbon resources may be
discovered. Even if Russia, whose continental shelf now projects from
Crimea and therefore closer to Turkey, does not attempt to dispute the
demarcation of Turkey's EEZ, Turkey's drilling platforms can no longer
be defended as easily from Russian warships.
Of greater concern for Ankara is the more likely possibility that
Russia may use Turkey's window of vulnerability to alter the status
quo in relation to the transport of natural gas through Russia's
`South Stream' gas pipeline. The Russia-to-Bulgaria pipeline had been
routed through Turkey's territorial waters to avoid the Ukraine's EEZ.
Russia's annexation of Crimea renders this longer and more expensive
route unnecessary and may lead Moscow to abrogate this very lucrative
agreement for Turkey.
Moreover, Moscow may seek to affect the development of the
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline intended to transport Azerbaijani natural gas
to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. To prevent the breaking of its
stranglehold over gas exports to Europe, Russia may resume its
simmering conflict with Georgia or even expand the use of military
pressure to Azerbaijan. Ankara would have fewer options to block such
an exercise of Russian power, as Turkey is now in a weaker relative
position than during the time of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.
Conclusions:
The politically motivated stoppage of the MILGEM's production schedule
has created a window of vulnerability in Turkey's Black Sea naval
defenses in the face of rapidly rising Russian naval power. The
delayed production of the Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes will put
Turkey at a disadvantage relative to Russia's imminent deployment of a
new fleet of Black Sea submarines. Russia's Black Sea Fleet will also
possess six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates capable of countering
supersonic anti-ship missiles while Turkey will lack the comparable
capability because of the setback to MILGEM's four TF 100 frigates.
Until Turkey can build and deploy these naval assets, Ankara's
deterrent capability has eroded and Russia will dominate the Black
Sea. Exercising sea control, Moscow can more easily deploy its newly
acquired Mistral-class helicopter carrier to stage amphibious assault
operations against other Black Sea littoral states including Georgia
and Azerbaijan.
Having taken control of Ukraine's offshore oil and natural gas
operations, Moscow will likely attempt to alter regional energy
transport arrangements in Russia's favor while Rusia still enjoys
naval dominance. With Moscow's annexation of Crimea, Russia no longer
needs to route its `South Stream' gas pipeline through Turkish waters
to avoid Ukraine's EEZ. Moscow may attempt to cancel its agreement
with Ankara and reroute the pipeline through Crimea's continental
shelf, resulting in a considerable revenue loss for Turkey.
Until Ankara can rectify the gap in naval capabilities created by
MILGEM's delays, Turkey will not be able to defend its national
interests adequately as Russia attempts to reestablish its sphere of
influence in the greater Black Sea region.
The author is a Fellow at the Shalem College, Jerusalem, and at the
Middle East and Asia Units of the Truman Research Institute for the
Advancement of Peace at Hebrew University. Dr. Tanchum teaches in the
Departments of Middle Eastern History and East Asian Studies of Tel
Aviv University.
This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst
(www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.
Turkey vulnerable to rising Russian power in the Black Sea
By MICHA'EL TANCHUM
04/19/2014
With the annexation of Crimea, Turkey faces a stronger and bolder
Russian naval power in the Black Sea. A resurgent Russia may be
tempted to exploit its temporary naval dominance to alter current
Black Sea energy exploitation and transportation arrangements more in
its favor and to the detriment of Turkey and its partners in the
Caucasus. The politically motivated stoppage of Turkey's National
Warship Project's production schedule has created a window of
vulnerability in Turkey's Black Sea naval defenses in the face of
rapidly rising Russian naval power.
Background:
The $3 billion `National Warship' Project, known by its Turkish
abbreviation MILGEM, seeks to upgrade the Turkish fleet by replacing
and augmenting its older foreign-made warships with eight domestically
produced Ada-class anti-submarine warfare corvettes and subsequently
four intermediate-class TF 100 frigates. After gaining experience from
the building of the slightly larger but more lethal TF 100 anti-air
warfare frigates, Turkey then intends to build a series of TF 2000
frigates. Double the size of the TF 100, the TF 2000 anti-air warfare
frigate will significantly advance the Turkish fleet's transformation
into a blue-water navy.
Aside from being an intermediate phase for the development of the TF
2000, the TF 100 frigates are of present vital importance as
replacements for the German-made Meko 200 frigates that form an
essential component of Turkey's force projection in the Black Sea. The
TF 100 frigates will be the first Turkish vessels to carry the
American-manufactured RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)
system capable of countering the current generation of supersonic
anti-ship missiles.
Prior to Russia's annexation of Crimea, the head of Turkey's
Undersecretariat of Defense Industries Murat Bayar publicly
acknowledged the need to replace the Meko 200 frigates with the
ESSM-equipped TF 100s by 2020.
However, in September 2013, upon the commissioning of the TCG
Büyükada, the second of MILGEM's eight Ada-class corvettes, the
Turkish government abruptly canceled RMK Marine's contract to build
the remaining six corvettes. A subsidiary the Turkish conglomerate Koç
Holding A.Å?., the cancellation of RMK Marine's contract appears to be
part of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's political vendetta
against the Koç family for providing assistance to anti-Erdogan
protesters from a Koç-owned Istanbul hotel during the summer 2013 Gezi
Park demonstrations.
The next two corvettes will be produced by Turkey's national shipyard
while the government evaluates bids for the building of the four
remaining corvettes. Despite Undersecretary Bayar's optimistic
forecasts that the government's cancellations will delay the
production schedule for the Ada-class corvettes by only one year, the
cascade effect of the production stoppage in setting back the building
of the TF 100 frigates, as well as the subsequent TF 2000s, has
created a four- to eight-year window of vulnerability for Turkey in
the Black Sea vis-Ã-vis a resurgent Russia.
Turkey's strategic vulnerability was not anticipated because of the
view in Turkish policy circles that Turkey enjoys a relative parity
with Russia in the Black Sea. However, the approximate parity exists
only when Russia's Black Sea Fleet is matched against all the major
assets of the Turkish navy. Prior to the Crimean conflict, Russia's
Black Sea fleet consisted of 24 major surface combatants and one
diesel submarine while Turkey's major naval assets consist of
approximately 24 surface combatants and 14 submarines. The parity is
illusory as it is unlikely that Turkey would be able to deploy all or
most of its naval assets in a Black Sea conflict.
Turkey's ability to deter Russian assertiveness in what Moscow regards
as its greater Black Sea sphere of influence, including the eastern
Mediterranean and the Caucasus, was already questionable. As Russia's
Black Sea Fleet disposed of Georgia's miniscule navy during the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, Ankara passively watched the Russian military
destroy Turkey's infrastructure investments in Georgia. Turkey's
supposed naval parity did not afford Ankara any significant policy
options.
Indeed, Ankara revealed its reluctance to provoke Moscow into
challenging the Montreux Convention, the 1936 treaty granting Ankara
exclusive control over the Bosphorous Straits and the Dardanelles and
restricting the transit of heavy warships through this strategic Black
Sea-Eastern Mediterranean access corridor.
Implications:
With the annexation of Crimea, Turkey faces a stronger and bolder
Russian naval power in the Black Sea. Russia now possesses the
Ukrainian navy's submarine and several, if not most, of Ukraine's 11
major surface combatants. Even without the Ukraine's naval assets,
Russia's own new additions to its Black Sea Fleet will enable Moscow
to dominate the region. Russia recently put to sea the first of its
six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates. All six frigates are
designated for service in the Black Sea Fleet.
Larger and more advanced than Turkey's four modified Meko 200
Barbaros-class frigates, each of the six Admiral Grigorovich-class
frigates will be the first vessels equipped with the state-of-the-art,
supersonic Shtil-1 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) air defense system.
Moscow expects all six frigates to be in service in the Black Sea
Fleet by the end of 2016. Turkey's now delayed TF 100 frigates, slated
to carry the ESSM system, would be the only Turkish vessels with a
comparable SAM capability.
Within the same 2016 timeframe, Russia will also add six newly
improved Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines to its Black Sea Fleet
ahead of Turkey's deployment of an equivalent number of Ada-class
anti-submarine corvettes. These two Russian procurement programs alone
will quickly tilt the balance of naval forces in Russia's favor,
giving Russia a significant strategic advantage for a window of four
to eight years depending on the pace of Turkey's resumed production
schedule.
In addition, Russia is in the process of acquiring two French-made
Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, to be named the Vladivostok
and Sevastapol, the latter being the namesake of the Russian Black Sea
Fleet's base in Crimea. The amphibious assault ships are helicopter
carriers that can accommodate 16 attack helicopters as well as 13
battle tanks and 450 combat soldiers.
A Mistral-class helicopter carrier in the Black Sea Fleet would
provide Russia with unprecedented power projection capability in its
greater Black Sea region. Russia's recent announcement that it has no
plans to deploy either of the helicopter carriers in the Black Sea may
simply constitute a temporary measure by Moscow to assuage French
sensibilities in order to ensure that France does not rescind the sale
as a result of Moscow's annexation of Crimea. Turkey cannot discount
the likely possibility that the Sevastapol will serve at the Black Sea
Fleet base after which it was named.
Russia's reassertion of naval power in the Black Sea has already been
accompanied by Moscow's first action to change the status quo in
relation to Black Sea energy exploitation. With the formal annexation
of Crimea, Ukraine's Black Sea Oil and Gas company, ChronomorNaftohaz,
was made into a whole-owned subsidiary of the Russian state-controlled
joint-stock company Gazprom. Between the acquisition of
ChronomorNaftohaz itself and Gazprom's now exclusive license for all
offshore energy development in Crimea's continental shelf, the Russian
energy giant has acquired an estimated $50 billion in capital assets.
Turkey's national oil and gas company TPAO has itself spent $2.5
billion on offshore energy exploration in Turkey's continental shelf.
Current estimates predict Turkey's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in
the Black Sea contains 10 billion barrels of crude oil and two
trillion cubic meters of natural gas. However as ultra deep-water
wells are drilled in the region, more hydrocarbon resources may be
discovered. Even if Russia, whose continental shelf now projects from
Crimea and therefore closer to Turkey, does not attempt to dispute the
demarcation of Turkey's EEZ, Turkey's drilling platforms can no longer
be defended as easily from Russian warships.
Of greater concern for Ankara is the more likely possibility that
Russia may use Turkey's window of vulnerability to alter the status
quo in relation to the transport of natural gas through Russia's
`South Stream' gas pipeline. The Russia-to-Bulgaria pipeline had been
routed through Turkey's territorial waters to avoid the Ukraine's EEZ.
Russia's annexation of Crimea renders this longer and more expensive
route unnecessary and may lead Moscow to abrogate this very lucrative
agreement for Turkey.
Moreover, Moscow may seek to affect the development of the
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline intended to transport Azerbaijani natural gas
to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. To prevent the breaking of its
stranglehold over gas exports to Europe, Russia may resume its
simmering conflict with Georgia or even expand the use of military
pressure to Azerbaijan. Ankara would have fewer options to block such
an exercise of Russian power, as Turkey is now in a weaker relative
position than during the time of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.
Conclusions:
The politically motivated stoppage of the MILGEM's production schedule
has created a window of vulnerability in Turkey's Black Sea naval
defenses in the face of rapidly rising Russian naval power. The
delayed production of the Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes will put
Turkey at a disadvantage relative to Russia's imminent deployment of a
new fleet of Black Sea submarines. Russia's Black Sea Fleet will also
possess six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates capable of countering
supersonic anti-ship missiles while Turkey will lack the comparable
capability because of the setback to MILGEM's four TF 100 frigates.
Until Turkey can build and deploy these naval assets, Ankara's
deterrent capability has eroded and Russia will dominate the Black
Sea. Exercising sea control, Moscow can more easily deploy its newly
acquired Mistral-class helicopter carrier to stage amphibious assault
operations against other Black Sea littoral states including Georgia
and Azerbaijan.
Having taken control of Ukraine's offshore oil and natural gas
operations, Moscow will likely attempt to alter regional energy
transport arrangements in Russia's favor while Rusia still enjoys
naval dominance. With Moscow's annexation of Crimea, Russia no longer
needs to route its `South Stream' gas pipeline through Turkish waters
to avoid Ukraine's EEZ. Moscow may attempt to cancel its agreement
with Ankara and reroute the pipeline through Crimea's continental
shelf, resulting in a considerable revenue loss for Turkey.
Until Ankara can rectify the gap in naval capabilities created by
MILGEM's delays, Turkey will not be able to defend its national
interests adequately as Russia attempts to reestablish its sphere of
influence in the greater Black Sea region.
The author is a Fellow at the Shalem College, Jerusalem, and at the
Middle East and Asia Units of the Truman Research Institute for the
Advancement of Peace at Hebrew University. Dr. Tanchum teaches in the
Departments of Middle Eastern History and East Asian Studies of Tel
Aviv University.
This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst
(www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.