Al-Jazeera, Qatar
Aug 16 2014
Turkey: Voting out founding ideology
The Turkish people not only elected Erdogan, but they also voted
against the founding ideology of the Republic.
by Galip Dalay
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the presidential
elections on August 10 [AP]
As widely expected, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
emerged victorious in the first round of Turkey's presidential
elections with about 52 percent of the votes. This is his ninth
consecutive election victory (3 general and 3 local elections, plus 2
referendums and the recent presidential elections) - a record that is
hard to beat by any politician in any democracy. The joint candidate
of the main opposition parties, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, received around
38 percent of the vote, whereas the pro-Kurdish and left-leaning
candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, took slightly less than 10 percent.
Erdogan the conciliator
In his victory speech, Erdogan struck a conciliatory tone and adopted
inclusive language. He called on the opposition and different sections
of society to leave behind the old rifts and to embark on establishing
a new Turkey.
While spelling out the names of groups making up the socio-cultural
and ethnic composition of Turkey, he did not only refer to the Muslim
sections of society, such as the Turks, Kurds, Circassians and others,
but he also included non-Muslim sections of society as well: Armenians
and Greeks, in particular.
Erdogan wins turkey's presidential elections
Referring to the primary foundation of Turkey's identity, he spoke of
the concept of Turkiyelilik in place of the official and
constitutional concept of Turkishness (the constitution defines all
citizens of Turkey as Turks).
The term Turkiyelilik stands for a more civic conception of
citizenship in place of the previous ethno-centric understanding of
Turkey's citizenship and identity. This term facilitates moving away
from ethnic and sectarian cleavages in Turkey.
The state's favouring of certain ethnicities and sects over others has
been the root cause of many of Turkey's woes. Moreover, such a
redefinition of Turkey's citizens is likely to contribute to Turkey's
ongoing Kurdish peace process, as the state's previous policy of
Turkification - strictly enforced, but utterly failed in the case of
Kurds - provoked the rise of Kurdish nationalism which later
manifested itself in the armed action of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK).
Erdogan also adopted a conciliatory rhetoric on Turkey's social and
political faultlines that have emerged recently around difference in
lifestyle. Erdogan said he will remain respectful of citizens'
different lifestyles from the presidential office as well. The debate
over lifestyle essentially accounts for the tension between Turkey's
conservative and secular sections of society. All these conciliatory
words illustrated that Erdogan is warming up to his role as the
president, a position that will require him to be even-handed towards
all citizen of Turkey.
Putting this aside, this election outcome essentially illustrated
first, that the majority of Turkey's population demand the revision of
Turkey's founding ideology (Kemalism); and second, that genuine
politics is the only game in town for any party that strives for
political success or popular support.
Revising the founding ideology
Election results indicate that both Erdogan and Demirtas earned more
votes compared to previous elections, hence both can count this
election as a victory.
Moreover, unlike Ihsanoglu, they both are political figures and
represent two social bases that had been marginalised by the previous
Kemalist establishment: the conservative and Islamic segments of
society and the Kurds.
In contrast, Ihsanoglu was running on the joint ticket of the main
opposition Republican People Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement
Party (MHP). Whereas CHP is primarily representative of the secular,
western-oriented part of the founding ideology of the Turkish
Republic, which was premised on laicism, nationalism (Turkishness) and
a western-orientation, the MHP is representative of the nationalism
(Turkishness) part of the same ideology. Thus, Ihsanoglu ran in this
election as the representative of the previous Kemalist establishment
and its founding ideology.
And at present, any party in Turkey which reduces its political
platform to protecting the old status quo is doomed to failure.
Erdogan and Demirtas represent the segments of society that demand the
revision of this ideology. Erdogan's social constituency was primarily
the victim of the republic's militantly enforced secularising policies
and demanded their relaxation. Demirtas's social base has essentially
been the victim of the republic's nationalist (Turkification) policies
and demanded the redressing of this aspect of the founding ideology.
In this election, Turkey's founding ideology was put to the vote. The
result was a clear victory for revisionist forces: conservatives and
Kurds. In fact, since the 1990s, conservatives and Kurds have been the
primary force for change in Turkey.
They are both ascending in Turkey's politics and possessed the
necessary will, energy, and motivation to change the country to make
space for themselves in the socio-political and economic centre, and
to revise Turkey's founding orthodoxies. And at present, any party in
Turkey which reduces its political platform to protecting the old
status quo is doomed to failure, as repeatedly demonstrated by the
dismal election performance of Turkey's main opposition party.
As the military was pushed backed to its barracks and its influence
curtailed, politics in Turkey has been freed from its previous chains.
Therefore, political parties should engage in politics in earnest, if
they strive for political success and public support. No longer is it
possible for any political party to come to power and shape public
politics through means other than genuine political processes.
As Turkey has changed in this regard, political parties need to
reconsider their political platform, strategies, and language. They
have to start to genuinely engage people and produce policies and
politics that aim at their base. The insistence of Turkey's moribund
opposition not to understand and execute this basic form of PR is at
the root of its repeated failures.
For instance, in a context, where people were going to vote to elect
Turkey's next president, the opposition chose an apolitical name with
generic messages as their candidate. Opposition candidate Ihsanoglu
spent the whole campaign period just trying to make himself known to
the public.
He succeeded at this: only around 10 percent of society knew him at
the time of his nomination, but this figure reached 90 percent by the
end of the campaign. But by the end of his election campaign, the
general public still did not know where he stood on major social and
political issues. Being politically unknown was a significant setback
for Ihsanoglu.
In a political environment unburdened by the vestiges of military rule
and of extra parliamentary forces' influence, Turkey's people voted to
revise its founding ideology by choosing Erdogan and emboldening
Demirtas. As Erdogan changes his role from being the prime minister
and the chairman of the AKP to being the president of the Republic, he
has recognised the content and imperatives of his new job and adopted
a conciliatory rhetoric of unity.
Galip Dalay works in the political research department at the SETA
Foundation in Turkey. He is currently a PhD candidate in International
Relations at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/08/turkey-voting-out-founding-ideo-201481682423243421.html
Aug 16 2014
Turkey: Voting out founding ideology
The Turkish people not only elected Erdogan, but they also voted
against the founding ideology of the Republic.
by Galip Dalay
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the presidential
elections on August 10 [AP]
As widely expected, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
emerged victorious in the first round of Turkey's presidential
elections with about 52 percent of the votes. This is his ninth
consecutive election victory (3 general and 3 local elections, plus 2
referendums and the recent presidential elections) - a record that is
hard to beat by any politician in any democracy. The joint candidate
of the main opposition parties, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, received around
38 percent of the vote, whereas the pro-Kurdish and left-leaning
candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, took slightly less than 10 percent.
Erdogan the conciliator
In his victory speech, Erdogan struck a conciliatory tone and adopted
inclusive language. He called on the opposition and different sections
of society to leave behind the old rifts and to embark on establishing
a new Turkey.
While spelling out the names of groups making up the socio-cultural
and ethnic composition of Turkey, he did not only refer to the Muslim
sections of society, such as the Turks, Kurds, Circassians and others,
but he also included non-Muslim sections of society as well: Armenians
and Greeks, in particular.
Erdogan wins turkey's presidential elections
Referring to the primary foundation of Turkey's identity, he spoke of
the concept of Turkiyelilik in place of the official and
constitutional concept of Turkishness (the constitution defines all
citizens of Turkey as Turks).
The term Turkiyelilik stands for a more civic conception of
citizenship in place of the previous ethno-centric understanding of
Turkey's citizenship and identity. This term facilitates moving away
from ethnic and sectarian cleavages in Turkey.
The state's favouring of certain ethnicities and sects over others has
been the root cause of many of Turkey's woes. Moreover, such a
redefinition of Turkey's citizens is likely to contribute to Turkey's
ongoing Kurdish peace process, as the state's previous policy of
Turkification - strictly enforced, but utterly failed in the case of
Kurds - provoked the rise of Kurdish nationalism which later
manifested itself in the armed action of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK).
Erdogan also adopted a conciliatory rhetoric on Turkey's social and
political faultlines that have emerged recently around difference in
lifestyle. Erdogan said he will remain respectful of citizens'
different lifestyles from the presidential office as well. The debate
over lifestyle essentially accounts for the tension between Turkey's
conservative and secular sections of society. All these conciliatory
words illustrated that Erdogan is warming up to his role as the
president, a position that will require him to be even-handed towards
all citizen of Turkey.
Putting this aside, this election outcome essentially illustrated
first, that the majority of Turkey's population demand the revision of
Turkey's founding ideology (Kemalism); and second, that genuine
politics is the only game in town for any party that strives for
political success or popular support.
Revising the founding ideology
Election results indicate that both Erdogan and Demirtas earned more
votes compared to previous elections, hence both can count this
election as a victory.
Moreover, unlike Ihsanoglu, they both are political figures and
represent two social bases that had been marginalised by the previous
Kemalist establishment: the conservative and Islamic segments of
society and the Kurds.
In contrast, Ihsanoglu was running on the joint ticket of the main
opposition Republican People Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement
Party (MHP). Whereas CHP is primarily representative of the secular,
western-oriented part of the founding ideology of the Turkish
Republic, which was premised on laicism, nationalism (Turkishness) and
a western-orientation, the MHP is representative of the nationalism
(Turkishness) part of the same ideology. Thus, Ihsanoglu ran in this
election as the representative of the previous Kemalist establishment
and its founding ideology.
And at present, any party in Turkey which reduces its political
platform to protecting the old status quo is doomed to failure.
Erdogan and Demirtas represent the segments of society that demand the
revision of this ideology. Erdogan's social constituency was primarily
the victim of the republic's militantly enforced secularising policies
and demanded their relaxation. Demirtas's social base has essentially
been the victim of the republic's nationalist (Turkification) policies
and demanded the redressing of this aspect of the founding ideology.
In this election, Turkey's founding ideology was put to the vote. The
result was a clear victory for revisionist forces: conservatives and
Kurds. In fact, since the 1990s, conservatives and Kurds have been the
primary force for change in Turkey.
They are both ascending in Turkey's politics and possessed the
necessary will, energy, and motivation to change the country to make
space for themselves in the socio-political and economic centre, and
to revise Turkey's founding orthodoxies. And at present, any party in
Turkey which reduces its political platform to protecting the old
status quo is doomed to failure, as repeatedly demonstrated by the
dismal election performance of Turkey's main opposition party.
As the military was pushed backed to its barracks and its influence
curtailed, politics in Turkey has been freed from its previous chains.
Therefore, political parties should engage in politics in earnest, if
they strive for political success and public support. No longer is it
possible for any political party to come to power and shape public
politics through means other than genuine political processes.
As Turkey has changed in this regard, political parties need to
reconsider their political platform, strategies, and language. They
have to start to genuinely engage people and produce policies and
politics that aim at their base. The insistence of Turkey's moribund
opposition not to understand and execute this basic form of PR is at
the root of its repeated failures.
For instance, in a context, where people were going to vote to elect
Turkey's next president, the opposition chose an apolitical name with
generic messages as their candidate. Opposition candidate Ihsanoglu
spent the whole campaign period just trying to make himself known to
the public.
He succeeded at this: only around 10 percent of society knew him at
the time of his nomination, but this figure reached 90 percent by the
end of the campaign. But by the end of his election campaign, the
general public still did not know where he stood on major social and
political issues. Being politically unknown was a significant setback
for Ihsanoglu.
In a political environment unburdened by the vestiges of military rule
and of extra parliamentary forces' influence, Turkey's people voted to
revise its founding ideology by choosing Erdogan and emboldening
Demirtas. As Erdogan changes his role from being the prime minister
and the chairman of the AKP to being the president of the Republic, he
has recognised the content and imperatives of his new job and adopted
a conciliatory rhetoric of unity.
Galip Dalay works in the political research department at the SETA
Foundation in Turkey. He is currently a PhD candidate in International
Relations at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/08/turkey-voting-out-founding-ideo-201481682423243421.html