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David Phillips: Davutoglu wanted to scratch the Protocols and
negotiate a whole new agreement
Thursday 6 February 2014 10:19
Photo: from Edge.passblue.com website
David L. Phillips
Mediamax continues "Special File" project, that presents unknown or
less known details of the Armenian foreign policy.
David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-Building and
Rights at Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human
Rights. He has served as Senior Adviser to the Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs, Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs, and Bureau for
European and Canadian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, and as
Senior Adviser to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.
David L. Phillips has extensive experience working on Turkish-Armenian
issues as Chairman of the "Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation
Commission". He is the author of books "Unsilencing the Past: Track
Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation" (2005) and
"Diplomatic history: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols" (2011).
- The rapprochement process between Armenia and Turkey is now almost
completely stalled, and even the recent meeting between Edward
Nalbandyan and Ahmet Davutoglu not to have broken the ice. Do you
consider it possible to return Zurich Protocols on the agenda?
- The Protocols are suspended. Prime Minister Erdogan and his AKP-led
government are responsible for the diplomatic impasse. Ankara can
revive the process at any time by submitting the Protocols for
ratification by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. There's also
another way.
Erdogan can issue an executive order to open the Turkey-Armenia border
for normal travel and trade. He can instruct Turkey's Foreign Ministry
to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. Such steps take
leadership; they require statesmanship. It is unlikely that Erdogan
will act to repair relations with Armenia, as Turkey embarks on a
2-year election cycle.
- Once you mentioned that all the parties, including the stakeholders,
made some mistakes during the process. If we cast a retrospective
glance, which were the main mistakes of main parties - Turkey, Armenia
and US - and what lessons could they learn from that failed attempt of
normalization?
- Ankara repeatedly tried to link normalization of relations with
Armenia to events in Nagorno-Karabakh, even though there was no
mention of NK in either of the protocols or the annexes. Turkish
officials thought the normalization process would be served by
"constructive ambiguity." They assumed that the two issues would be
considered in parallel. There is no place for wishful thinking in
diplomacy.
When the Protocols were announced, there was a firestorm of
controversy in Azerbaijan. Ankara grossly underestimated Azerbaijan's
opposition and economic leverage. Erdogan travelled to Baku with his
newly-appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu who wanted to scratch
the Protocols altogether and negotiate a whole new agreement. Erdogan
dismissed reports of de-linkage as "slander." He emphasized the
principle of "one nation - two states," assuring Baku: "It is
impossible for us to open the border (with Armenia) unless the
occupation ends."
Ankara was unabashed about declaring that the "dialogue on historical
issues" would be used to contest whether events of the early 20th
century met the definition of genocide. Turkish officials expected a
historical commission to affirm its view that a "mutual tragedy"
occurred, and to consider the deportation of Armenians within the
historical context of Armenia's rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.
That was a serious miscalculation.
Ankara thought that normalization would mollify calls for recognition
of the Armenian Genocide. Turkish politicians mistakenly view Genocide
recognition as an obsession of the Diaspora. No Armenian - in any
country or belonging to any political faction -- would ever forsake
the goal of Genocide recognition for normalization of relations with
Turkey.
Armenian Foreign Minister Nalbandian announced the Protocols on April
22, 2009 but the text of the Protocols was not made public until
August 31. The Armenian Government should have been more transparent.
Failing to disclose details of the Protocols until months after they
were signed created a vacuum, which allowed speculation that the
Protocols sold out Armenia's core national interests.
The announcement was just two days before Genocide Remembrance Day.
The timing was wrong. Critics of the Protocols maintained that they
were announced to give President Obama cover so he wouldn't have to
use the "G-word" in his Presidential statement on Remembrance Day.
Yerevan thought the historical commission and other commissions would
buttress facts affirming the Genocide and provide a forum for
resolving issues, including legal matters. However, Dashnaks and
others suspected that Turkey would manipulate the historical dialogue
to question the veracity of the Genocide. Questioning the Armenian
genocide is tantamount to undermining the Armenian state that,
according to Article 11 of the 1990 Declaration of Independence, stood
for "achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in
Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."
The Armenian Constitutional Court opinion on the Protocols, gave
Turkey something to complain about. The United States welcomed the
Court's opinion. But Ankara did not. Opponents of rapprochement in
Turkey used the Constitutional Court to raise questions about
Armenia's goodwill.
The State Department heralded the Protocols as a "diplomatic
breakthrough" because it delinked bilateral issues between Turkey and
Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh. This understanding should have been
made explicit when President Barack Obama met President Abdullah Gul
and Erdogan during his trip in April 2009. Instead of affirming
de-linkage, Obama was silent on the issue.
David L. Phillips.
Photo: from 3.bp.blogspot.com website.
The U.S. should have worked with the Swiss Authorities to make sure
that the text of remarks by Davutoglu and Nalbandian were exchanged
well in advance of 5.00pm on October 10, 2009 (when the Protocols were
to be signed). More advance notification would have prevented last
minute problems that poisoned the atmosphere of the signing ceremony.
There's a golden rule of diplomacy: no surprises!
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's personal involvement was critical
to rescuing the signing ceremony and keeping the deal on track.
Subsequently, monitoring ratification and implementation was assigned
to U.S. officials of lesser rank. Secretary Clinton placed her
personal prestige on the line. She could have helped maintain momentum
by designating a Special Envoy for Ratification of the Protocols.
State Department officials working on the file were competent, but
more pressure at a higher level was needed to seal the deal.
- In your monograph titled "Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia
Protocols", you recalled the details of signing ceremony on October
10, 2009 and the last-minute hitch over the final statements. Can we
conclude that such a step of the Turkish delegation demonstrated that
Ankara didn't have enough political will and readiness to carry out
the Protocols and Armenians just could not have any trust to Turkey
after that?
- Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, the Turkish official who managed the
negotiations, told me: "Reality has two shores." There was fundamental
disconnect between the Turkish and Armenian sides. The last minute
misunderstandings at the signing ceremony was a harbinger of problems
to come. It was more than a problem of political will. There exists
deep distrust between the parties. More work was needed then - and is
still needed to build confidence. Civil society can play an important
role with confidence-building measures. Even though the Protocols are
suspended, it is still possible to open the border gate for tourism
and commercial contact.
DOSSIER
Passages from David L. Phillips monograph "Diplomatic history: The
Turkey-Armenia Protocols"
Signing Ceremony
The signing ceremony was scheduled to be held at the University of
Zurich on October 10, 2009. Davutoglu and Nalbandian each planned
remarks to commemorate the "historic moment in Turkish-Armenian
bilateral relations." Turkish and Armenian negotiators had reached an
understanding: they would avoid open discussion of sensitivities. To
maintain constructive ambiguity, they agreed that neither Davutoglu
nor Nalbandian would mention the genocide or refer to NK.
Ten minutes before the signing ceremony, which was scheduled for 5:00
p.m., the Armenian delegation asked to see the Turkish statement.
Texts were exchanged through the U.S. delegation. Nalbandian saw
Davutoglu's text and was aghast. According to an anonymous Turkish
official, the Armenians objected to Davutoglu's emphasis on the joint
historical commission, insisting that allowing the commission's work
was tantamount to denial of the genocide. Armenian officials have a
different recollection. An anonymous Armenian official insists that
Davutoglu intended to speak about the historical commission's
importance, as well as NK. Ambuhl reflects on their different
memories, "Both sides were speaking the truth." Implicit and explicit
differences were conflated.
Calmy-Rey stayed upstairs in the "Aula," the auditorium where the
signing ceremony was to take place. She was with the VIPs who were
waiting to witness the signing of the Protocols. The media was off to
one side of the auditorium. The Zurich mayor and university rector
were mingling, trying to keep everyone engaged. Ambuhl left the
Turkish delegation in the University of Zurich's Senate hall and
rushed two kilometers in a police vehicle to the newly-renovated
Dolder Hotel where the U.S. and Armenian delegations were staying. It
was highly unusual in Zurich for a police vehicle with flashing blue
lights to go speeding through town. He and Clinton went to
Nalbandian's room. Nalbandian was visibly agitated, channel-surfing
between football matches. The Swiss came up with a compromise: neither
side would make remarks. Clinton and Nalbandian drove in the same car
to the University of Zurich--three hours behind schedule.
Diplomats attending the ceremony responded to the delay differently.
Secretary General of the Council of the European Union Javier Solana
was concerned, but followed the U.S. lead. French Foreign Minister
Bernard Kouchner was energized, but did not play a major role; Ankara
would never accept a mediation role for France. It viewed France as
pro-Armenian because of the French Senate resolution recognizing the
genocide and France's outspoken Diaspora community, which is a force
in French politics. Lavrov used his influence to help seal the deal,
providing Nalbandian with a strongly worded letter that urged him to
sign.
The Protocols were finally signed at 8:00 p.m. As agreed, no
statements were made after the signing. Clinton, Solana, Calmy-Rey,
Lavrov, and Kouchner stood behind Nalbandian and Davutoglu as
witnesses, and as a signal of the international community's support.
Calmy-Rey was the only speaker. Welcoming the agreement, she addressed
the audience and media assembled in the Aula. Winston Churchill spoke
in that same auditorium on September 19, 1946, saying: "The first step
in the recreation of the European family must be a partnership between
France and Germany." The historic address concluded, "Let Europe
Rise." The symbolism was trenchant. If France and Germany could
overcome their enmity and Europe could bind together in common
purpose, then Turkey and Armenia could also overcome their
differences.
- Prime Minister Erdogan is actively seeking to succeed President Gul
in 2014. According to British Oxford Analytica's report, "Erdogan
could take the Armenian issue away from Gul and make it his own". Do
you consider such a prediction realistic?
- Erdogan is pugnacious and confrontational. He always acts in his own
political interest, especially during an election cycle. When it comes
to domestic politics, Erdogan risks more than he gains by focusing
constructively on Armenian issues. There are more friendship monuments
and churches to destroy, if Erdogan has his way. Anti-Armenian
politics played well in Turkey. A return to that mentality would be a
major setback.
- In 2015, Armenians will commemorate the Centennial of Genocide. What
impact will this date have on policies and moods both in Armenia and
Turkey? Do you think the Turkish government will keep the protocols to
make another "political show" ahead of 2015?
- 2015 is an important centennial anniversary. Armenians wake up every
morning, gaze across the border at Mount Ararat and lament the
suffering of their ancestors and lost territories in "Western
Armenia." On the other hand, Turkey is surrounded by problems, many of
its own making. Davutoglu's "zero problems with neighbors" policy is a
total fiasco. Armenian issues are way down the list of Turkish
concerns. Initiatives such as the Gallipoli anniversary are clearly
an attempt to dilute the centennial of the Genocide. But nothing has
changed since Hillary Clinton observed, "The ball is in Turkey's
court."
The Obama administration can take the issue of Genocide recognition
off the table by simply recognizing the Armenian Genocide. Rather than
refer to his "well-known personal view," President Obama should
characterize the events as genocide in his 2014 Presidential Statement
on Armenian Remembrance Day. Secretary of State Kerry has always been
a strong supporter of Genocide recognition.
Turkey is increasingly an unreliable ally of the West. Erdogan
tarnished his democratic credentials by cracking down on peaceful
protesters last summer. The AKP is rife with corruption and cronyism.
U.S. officials should see Turkey as it is, not as it was or how they
want it to be.
Aram Araratyan talked to David Phillips.
http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/special-file/9013/
From: A. Papazian
negotiate a whole new agreement
Thursday 6 February 2014 10:19
Photo: from Edge.passblue.com website
David L. Phillips
Mediamax continues "Special File" project, that presents unknown or
less known details of the Armenian foreign policy.
David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-Building and
Rights at Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human
Rights. He has served as Senior Adviser to the Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs, Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs, and Bureau for
European and Canadian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, and as
Senior Adviser to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.
David L. Phillips has extensive experience working on Turkish-Armenian
issues as Chairman of the "Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation
Commission". He is the author of books "Unsilencing the Past: Track
Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation" (2005) and
"Diplomatic history: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols" (2011).
- The rapprochement process between Armenia and Turkey is now almost
completely stalled, and even the recent meeting between Edward
Nalbandyan and Ahmet Davutoglu not to have broken the ice. Do you
consider it possible to return Zurich Protocols on the agenda?
- The Protocols are suspended. Prime Minister Erdogan and his AKP-led
government are responsible for the diplomatic impasse. Ankara can
revive the process at any time by submitting the Protocols for
ratification by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. There's also
another way.
Erdogan can issue an executive order to open the Turkey-Armenia border
for normal travel and trade. He can instruct Turkey's Foreign Ministry
to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. Such steps take
leadership; they require statesmanship. It is unlikely that Erdogan
will act to repair relations with Armenia, as Turkey embarks on a
2-year election cycle.
- Once you mentioned that all the parties, including the stakeholders,
made some mistakes during the process. If we cast a retrospective
glance, which were the main mistakes of main parties - Turkey, Armenia
and US - and what lessons could they learn from that failed attempt of
normalization?
- Ankara repeatedly tried to link normalization of relations with
Armenia to events in Nagorno-Karabakh, even though there was no
mention of NK in either of the protocols or the annexes. Turkish
officials thought the normalization process would be served by
"constructive ambiguity." They assumed that the two issues would be
considered in parallel. There is no place for wishful thinking in
diplomacy.
When the Protocols were announced, there was a firestorm of
controversy in Azerbaijan. Ankara grossly underestimated Azerbaijan's
opposition and economic leverage. Erdogan travelled to Baku with his
newly-appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu who wanted to scratch
the Protocols altogether and negotiate a whole new agreement. Erdogan
dismissed reports of de-linkage as "slander." He emphasized the
principle of "one nation - two states," assuring Baku: "It is
impossible for us to open the border (with Armenia) unless the
occupation ends."
Ankara was unabashed about declaring that the "dialogue on historical
issues" would be used to contest whether events of the early 20th
century met the definition of genocide. Turkish officials expected a
historical commission to affirm its view that a "mutual tragedy"
occurred, and to consider the deportation of Armenians within the
historical context of Armenia's rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.
That was a serious miscalculation.
Ankara thought that normalization would mollify calls for recognition
of the Armenian Genocide. Turkish politicians mistakenly view Genocide
recognition as an obsession of the Diaspora. No Armenian - in any
country or belonging to any political faction -- would ever forsake
the goal of Genocide recognition for normalization of relations with
Turkey.
Armenian Foreign Minister Nalbandian announced the Protocols on April
22, 2009 but the text of the Protocols was not made public until
August 31. The Armenian Government should have been more transparent.
Failing to disclose details of the Protocols until months after they
were signed created a vacuum, which allowed speculation that the
Protocols sold out Armenia's core national interests.
The announcement was just two days before Genocide Remembrance Day.
The timing was wrong. Critics of the Protocols maintained that they
were announced to give President Obama cover so he wouldn't have to
use the "G-word" in his Presidential statement on Remembrance Day.
Yerevan thought the historical commission and other commissions would
buttress facts affirming the Genocide and provide a forum for
resolving issues, including legal matters. However, Dashnaks and
others suspected that Turkey would manipulate the historical dialogue
to question the veracity of the Genocide. Questioning the Armenian
genocide is tantamount to undermining the Armenian state that,
according to Article 11 of the 1990 Declaration of Independence, stood
for "achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in
Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."
The Armenian Constitutional Court opinion on the Protocols, gave
Turkey something to complain about. The United States welcomed the
Court's opinion. But Ankara did not. Opponents of rapprochement in
Turkey used the Constitutional Court to raise questions about
Armenia's goodwill.
The State Department heralded the Protocols as a "diplomatic
breakthrough" because it delinked bilateral issues between Turkey and
Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh. This understanding should have been
made explicit when President Barack Obama met President Abdullah Gul
and Erdogan during his trip in April 2009. Instead of affirming
de-linkage, Obama was silent on the issue.
David L. Phillips.
Photo: from 3.bp.blogspot.com website.
The U.S. should have worked with the Swiss Authorities to make sure
that the text of remarks by Davutoglu and Nalbandian were exchanged
well in advance of 5.00pm on October 10, 2009 (when the Protocols were
to be signed). More advance notification would have prevented last
minute problems that poisoned the atmosphere of the signing ceremony.
There's a golden rule of diplomacy: no surprises!
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's personal involvement was critical
to rescuing the signing ceremony and keeping the deal on track.
Subsequently, monitoring ratification and implementation was assigned
to U.S. officials of lesser rank. Secretary Clinton placed her
personal prestige on the line. She could have helped maintain momentum
by designating a Special Envoy for Ratification of the Protocols.
State Department officials working on the file were competent, but
more pressure at a higher level was needed to seal the deal.
- In your monograph titled "Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia
Protocols", you recalled the details of signing ceremony on October
10, 2009 and the last-minute hitch over the final statements. Can we
conclude that such a step of the Turkish delegation demonstrated that
Ankara didn't have enough political will and readiness to carry out
the Protocols and Armenians just could not have any trust to Turkey
after that?
- Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, the Turkish official who managed the
negotiations, told me: "Reality has two shores." There was fundamental
disconnect between the Turkish and Armenian sides. The last minute
misunderstandings at the signing ceremony was a harbinger of problems
to come. It was more than a problem of political will. There exists
deep distrust between the parties. More work was needed then - and is
still needed to build confidence. Civil society can play an important
role with confidence-building measures. Even though the Protocols are
suspended, it is still possible to open the border gate for tourism
and commercial contact.
DOSSIER
Passages from David L. Phillips monograph "Diplomatic history: The
Turkey-Armenia Protocols"
Signing Ceremony
The signing ceremony was scheduled to be held at the University of
Zurich on October 10, 2009. Davutoglu and Nalbandian each planned
remarks to commemorate the "historic moment in Turkish-Armenian
bilateral relations." Turkish and Armenian negotiators had reached an
understanding: they would avoid open discussion of sensitivities. To
maintain constructive ambiguity, they agreed that neither Davutoglu
nor Nalbandian would mention the genocide or refer to NK.
Ten minutes before the signing ceremony, which was scheduled for 5:00
p.m., the Armenian delegation asked to see the Turkish statement.
Texts were exchanged through the U.S. delegation. Nalbandian saw
Davutoglu's text and was aghast. According to an anonymous Turkish
official, the Armenians objected to Davutoglu's emphasis on the joint
historical commission, insisting that allowing the commission's work
was tantamount to denial of the genocide. Armenian officials have a
different recollection. An anonymous Armenian official insists that
Davutoglu intended to speak about the historical commission's
importance, as well as NK. Ambuhl reflects on their different
memories, "Both sides were speaking the truth." Implicit and explicit
differences were conflated.
Calmy-Rey stayed upstairs in the "Aula," the auditorium where the
signing ceremony was to take place. She was with the VIPs who were
waiting to witness the signing of the Protocols. The media was off to
one side of the auditorium. The Zurich mayor and university rector
were mingling, trying to keep everyone engaged. Ambuhl left the
Turkish delegation in the University of Zurich's Senate hall and
rushed two kilometers in a police vehicle to the newly-renovated
Dolder Hotel where the U.S. and Armenian delegations were staying. It
was highly unusual in Zurich for a police vehicle with flashing blue
lights to go speeding through town. He and Clinton went to
Nalbandian's room. Nalbandian was visibly agitated, channel-surfing
between football matches. The Swiss came up with a compromise: neither
side would make remarks. Clinton and Nalbandian drove in the same car
to the University of Zurich--three hours behind schedule.
Diplomats attending the ceremony responded to the delay differently.
Secretary General of the Council of the European Union Javier Solana
was concerned, but followed the U.S. lead. French Foreign Minister
Bernard Kouchner was energized, but did not play a major role; Ankara
would never accept a mediation role for France. It viewed France as
pro-Armenian because of the French Senate resolution recognizing the
genocide and France's outspoken Diaspora community, which is a force
in French politics. Lavrov used his influence to help seal the deal,
providing Nalbandian with a strongly worded letter that urged him to
sign.
The Protocols were finally signed at 8:00 p.m. As agreed, no
statements were made after the signing. Clinton, Solana, Calmy-Rey,
Lavrov, and Kouchner stood behind Nalbandian and Davutoglu as
witnesses, and as a signal of the international community's support.
Calmy-Rey was the only speaker. Welcoming the agreement, she addressed
the audience and media assembled in the Aula. Winston Churchill spoke
in that same auditorium on September 19, 1946, saying: "The first step
in the recreation of the European family must be a partnership between
France and Germany." The historic address concluded, "Let Europe
Rise." The symbolism was trenchant. If France and Germany could
overcome their enmity and Europe could bind together in common
purpose, then Turkey and Armenia could also overcome their
differences.
- Prime Minister Erdogan is actively seeking to succeed President Gul
in 2014. According to British Oxford Analytica's report, "Erdogan
could take the Armenian issue away from Gul and make it his own". Do
you consider such a prediction realistic?
- Erdogan is pugnacious and confrontational. He always acts in his own
political interest, especially during an election cycle. When it comes
to domestic politics, Erdogan risks more than he gains by focusing
constructively on Armenian issues. There are more friendship monuments
and churches to destroy, if Erdogan has his way. Anti-Armenian
politics played well in Turkey. A return to that mentality would be a
major setback.
- In 2015, Armenians will commemorate the Centennial of Genocide. What
impact will this date have on policies and moods both in Armenia and
Turkey? Do you think the Turkish government will keep the protocols to
make another "political show" ahead of 2015?
- 2015 is an important centennial anniversary. Armenians wake up every
morning, gaze across the border at Mount Ararat and lament the
suffering of their ancestors and lost territories in "Western
Armenia." On the other hand, Turkey is surrounded by problems, many of
its own making. Davutoglu's "zero problems with neighbors" policy is a
total fiasco. Armenian issues are way down the list of Turkish
concerns. Initiatives such as the Gallipoli anniversary are clearly
an attempt to dilute the centennial of the Genocide. But nothing has
changed since Hillary Clinton observed, "The ball is in Turkey's
court."
The Obama administration can take the issue of Genocide recognition
off the table by simply recognizing the Armenian Genocide. Rather than
refer to his "well-known personal view," President Obama should
characterize the events as genocide in his 2014 Presidential Statement
on Armenian Remembrance Day. Secretary of State Kerry has always been
a strong supporter of Genocide recognition.
Turkey is increasingly an unreliable ally of the West. Erdogan
tarnished his democratic credentials by cracking down on peaceful
protesters last summer. The AKP is rife with corruption and cronyism.
U.S. officials should see Turkey as it is, not as it was or how they
want it to be.
Aram Araratyan talked to David Phillips.
http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/special-file/9013/
From: A. Papazian