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Armenia Between Europe and Eurasia: Return to Policy of Balancing?

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  • Armenia Between Europe and Eurasia: Return to Policy of Balancing?

    Politkom (in Russian), Russia
    Dec 16, 2013


    Armenia Between Europe and Eurasia: Return to Policy of Balancing?


    by Sergey Minasyan, leader of political studies department of
    Yerevan's Caucasus Institute

    "The EU and Armenia are now working on a new juridical basis for their
    relations, and it is possible that this will be a new association
    agreement," Zdzislaw Raczynski, Polish ambassador extraordinary and
    plenipotentiary to Armenia, declared 13 December 2013 in an interview
    for Radio Liberty's Armenian editorial office. These words can, in
    part, be described as the first public signal that, following the
    virtual failure of the Eastern Partnership programme's Vilnius summit,
    Brussels may be displaying a somewhat more flexible approach to the
    concept proposed by Armenia for combining its involvement in both the
    Customs Union and the Association Agreement with the EU.

    It should be pointed out that official Yerevan declared its readiness
    to combine European association with membership of the Customs Union
    back at the time of the celebrated meeting of Presidents Vladimir
    Putin and Serzh Sargsyan 3 September 2013, when Armenia's wish to join
    the Customs Union was announced. This was aired in the Armenian
    president's speech in the presence of Putin, who declared that Armenia
    would continue its cooperation with the EU in those spheres (primarily
    economic policy) that would not run counter to the country's future
    membership of the Customs Union. It is possible to believe that this
    was agreed by Sargsyan with the Russian president beforehand in the
    course of previous complex Armenian-Russian negotiations and was one
    element of Yerevan's package decision to join the Customs Union.

    In an interview with Armenian media the very next day, 4 September,
    Vigen Sarkisyan, leader of the Armenian president's administration,
    stated Armenia's readiness to initial the Association Agreement with
    the EU at the upcoming Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership, but
    without a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). It was
    obvious to the Armenian side that this was a technically impossible
    option ahead of the Vilnius summit (the DCFTA was an inalienable part
    of Association). Nevertheless, official Yerevan advanced a kind of
    proposal which at that time, quite predictably, was rejected by
    European officials. However, it can also be assumed that this
    statement was not only meant to show Yerevan's readiness to retain at
    least the level of agreements already reached with the EU. This may
    have also been an attempt by the Armenian authorities partially to
    shift the responsibility for the subsequent failure of the process of
    initialing the Association Agreement onto the EU. Be that as it may,
    at that moment Yerevan's initiative was predictably doomed to failure.

    On the one hand, the EU displayed a certain "grudge" against Yerevan,
    manifested even in the statements of European officials at the highest
    level. This was because the success of the Vilnius summit was a matter
    of "personal prestige" for some of them -for example, for Stefan Fule,
    European commissioner for enlargement issues. After the initial milder
    statements regarding official Yerevan's choice, in the second half of
    September the EU beefed up its rhetoric. Brussels doggedly endeavoured
    to ignore the circumstance that the process of initialing (and in the
    case of Ukraine -also signing) the Association Agreement by the four
    Eastern Partnership countries had, precisely because of the European
    officials' imprudent stance, turned from a purely technical process of
    economic integration into a tough geopolitical struggle with Russia
    (with Moscow's perfectly predictable tough reaction in return).
    Therefore the EU's Brussels attempted to portray Yerevan's refusal to
    initial the Association Agreement as a result of the Armenian side's
    lack of steadfastness in its perception of the "European dream" and of
    obvious pressure on Moscow's part, and not as Armenia's reluctance to
    sacrifice its priorities in the security sphere in the geopolitical
    confrontation in the post-Soviet area.

    On the other hand, based precisely on the priorities of classic
    "Realpolitik," European officials had more serious and pragmatic
    reasons to display inflexibility in the fall of 2013 with regard to
    the choice made by Armenia. The EU needed to support Ukraine in its
    resistance to Russia (with simultaneous pressure on Viktor
    Yanukovych's administration in the matter of releasing Yuliya
    Tymoshenko), but since the "Ukrainian question" had to all intents and
    purposes turned into a no-score draw between Brussels and Moscow,
    under these conditions this required, a priori, a show of European
    "principledness" with regard to Armenia. Therefore it was publicly
    declared that it was not possible to sign the Association Agreement
    because of Armenia's possibly joining the Customs Union (which runs
    counter to the terms of a free-trade zone with the EU).

    However, after the end of the Vilnius summit with its well-known
    results, one gets the impression that the EU became more flexible in
    respect of the format of a possible new Association Agreement with
    Armenia. Having realized that a geopolitical struggle in terms of
    "either-or" is becoming too costly and complex a task even for the EU
    itself (and too serious a choice for many post-Soviet countries),
    Brussels may well reconsider its approaches. Particularly as the EU
    must make haste on this issue so as not to lose what it is still left
    with in the post-Soviet area, where Moscow is alternating its "carrots
    and sticks."

    For example, when the main aim of Moscow's pressuring the Armenian
    leadership was not even so much Armenia's joining the Customs Union as
    preventing Yerevan's initialing of the Association Agreement in
    Vilnius, then the main tool for "persuading" Moscow was pressure on
    Yerevan in matters of security (mainly connected with the Karabakh
    conflict) and deliveries of energy resources. But after the virtual
    torpedoing of the Vilnius summit, after the political decision adopted
    by Yerevan to join the Customs Union and Kyiv's decision to abandon
    the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, Moscow somewhat
    changed its approaches and its position on a number of aspects of
    great importance to Yerevan.

    The time came for "carrots" -not only addressed to Yerevan but also
    capable, to a considerable degree, of serving as a "clear example" to
    Kyiv as well. In particular, some signs of a correction of the Russian
    position on matters of regional security and the Karabakh conflict and
    also a galvanization of military-technical cooperation and
    preferential deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia became apparent. A
    reduction in the price of the Russian gas being delivered to the
    republics, fixed through 2018 and tied to internal Russian prices, was
    also announced during Putin's visit to Armenia. Some other
    Armenian-Russian accords in the economic and investment spheres were
    also announced.

    Accordingly, the EU must make haste, for the policy of robust pressure
    on the Armenian leadership is now counterproductive and can only
    prompt Yerevan still harder to turn once and for all towards Moscow.
    As a result, quite a favourable situation can take shape for Armenia
    to continue its traditional policy of balancing between the leading
    foreign policy players in the post-Soviet area. At the same time
    Armenia's attempts effectively to combine two integration projects can
    also serve as a good example to Moscow and Brussels themselves, whose
    geopolitical confrontation in the Ukrainian political field at the
    present time will, to all appearances, only intensify.

    In his interview Ambassador Z. Raczynski described the political
    realities that have taken shape around Armenia as follows: "My view of
    the situation is as follows: Armenia's security is guaranteed, first,
    by its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and,
    second, by special bilateral relations with Russia, and these
    components are not at variance with association with the EU.
    Admittedly, we do not yet have such examples, but why should Armenia
    not be among the pioneers? That is, I mean that Armenia remains in the
    security area guaranteed by Russia, but at the same time it enjoys the
    privileges and the know-how that the EU can provide. This could have
    been a very interesting and even historic political experiment."

    It has to be emphasized that Zdzislaw Raczynski is one of the most
    professionally trained EU ambassadors presently accredited in Armenia
    with a good grasp of the regional political realities. The ability to
    have a clear understanding of the specific nature of the very complex
    political context in the South Caucasus, as well as of the framework
    and the limitations of Armenia's traditional policy of balancing
    between the most important geopolitical poles, was always
    characteristic of the diplomats representing Warsaw in Yerevan. At the
    same time it is possible to assert that the Polish ambassador's
    statement is not only a manifestation of his personal perspicacity but
    also a symbol of some kind of trend in overall EU policy towards
    Armenia. As long ago as 11 December, as a first step in implementing
    the declaration on the development of cooperation, signed between
    Armenia and the EU at the Vilnius summit 29 November, the European
    Parliament adopted the decision to include the republic in a number of
    internal European programmes, particularly in the spheres of
    education, science, and culture.

    The example of Armenia, where it is likely that the European
    integration processes will return to the former, mainly technical
    format of joint economic projects, of comprehensively promoting
    reforms, of deepening democratic institutions, and defending
    fundamental human rights, may also mean that the EU in its post-Soviet
    policy may not intensify the struggle with Russia in the field where
    Moscow "by default" is stronger and more confident -in the field of
    "classic" geopolitics within the coordinates not even of the 20th
    century but almost the 19th century. It must not be forgotten, in the
    end, that the geopolitical ghosts of Bismarck and Metternich roam the
    Kremlin's dark corridors far more frequently than the glass stories of
    the European Commission's Brussels building.

    [Translated from Russian]

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