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Foreign Policy Journal
Nov 14 2014
States and Security Perceptions: Keeping Azerbaijan at Bay
by Grigor Boyakhchyan | November 14, 2014
The priority that states place on military power stems from the
anarchic structure of the international system, which constantly
shapes the security perceptions of the individual entities operating
within. The anarchic system of international politics obstructs the
existence of an international sovereign above the level of states to
create and enforce international law or resolve disputes that surface
among them. Since there is no single international agency that wields
a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, foreign policy interests
that a state pursues are vitally affected with military power. In an
anarchic environment, force and politics are interrelated, even when
states are at peace.
The anarchic system of the international politics breeds skepticism
regarding the motives and intent of other state units and necessitates
a constant assessment of the dynamism of shifts in power relationships
that, in the aggregate, heighten the central premise of the security
dilemma--the means by which a state attempts to increase its security
decreases the security of others. Because even high levels of military
spending scarcely create feelings of complete security, weighing the
likely consequences of action in specific situations--and prospects of
success or failure in invoking force--sharpen the contours of national
security dilemma. The classical maxim--si vis pacem, para
bellum--appears to show no fading signs.
The structure of the international system is also marred by the
presence of weak and falling states whose outlook on international
politics and the emanating challenges vis-a-vis the preservation of
their statehood constitute the very medium through which their
national security perceptions are informed and shaped, as well as
serve as benchmark against which the future course of their actions is
charted. Weak states continue to generate specific threats, often
beyond the accomplishments of international military intervention, and
serve as a blueprint for perpetual instability.
While there is a general tendency to perceive national security
through the prism of external threats and challenges, for weak states,
however, national security also embraces broader internal dimensions
and domestic implications. Among other reasons, this is largely due to
a lack of sociopolitical cohesiveness and consent in regard to the
nature of the state, as well as the ensuing patterns of political
rivalry and fragmentation that cripple the internal dynamics of weak
states. Because their internal cohesion rests more on power than on
any broad-based political consensus, the primarily external
orientation of the concept of national security increasingly tilts
toward embracing the domestic agenda of threats.
The security dilemma that the states confront is further exacerbated
in terms of the impact of great power politics on local regional
relations. Once the domestic political life of states becomes
intertwined in the rivalries of great powers, the pattern of perpetual
instability becomes even more acute. The effect is one of replicating
a complicated overplay of global patterns of competition and rivalry
on the local setting. As a consequence, weak states are vulnerable to
external powers willing to marshal the right combination of recourses
to affect their foreign policy alternatives and choices.
Both Middle East and South Asia illustrate this process through the
competitive and intricate metrics of great power arms sales that make
the security environment more prone to the use of force. American
prolonged military aid to Israel and Pakistan, for example, serves as
the principle means of entry into the regional politics with the
potential to sway instability and mutate into wider conflicts. So,
too, does the Russian strategic engagement in the already volatile
South Caucasus region through the sales of military hardware and power
projections that have the potential to dramatically affect the
delicate regional balance of power.
Not only is the South Caucasus region inherently conflict-prone, but
it is also extremely vulnerable to changes in the local security
environment resulting from arms trade. As opposed to a race between
arms producers and the ensuing predictability associated with it,
there are fewer limitations placed on the race between non-producers
except the scope of budgetary constraints and the rate of absorption.
As a consequence, races between non-producers are much less stable and
predictable, and can cause large and abrupt changes in the local
balance of power.
However, even a relatively small state operating within strict
budgetary confines can effectively hedge against the action-reaction
driven arms race instigated by the opposing party through a set of
well-elaborated and properly orchestrated peace enforcement
measures--both political and military--that are well adjusted to meet
the prevailing security challenges and are, in the aggregate, geared
toward raising the costs of fighting to an unacceptable level. These
measures should not be confused with conventional peace enforcement
actions taken the world over. Rather, they should be tailored to
enforcing peace and compelling the opponent to rule out war as a
viable option both on the ground and as a coercive strategy at the
table of negotiations.
The advantageous position of the Mountainous Karabakh defense
posturing and the strong fortifications along the line of contact do
not solely mean that a relatively small state can effectively hold off
larger ones. It also means that a status-quo state can often maintain
a high degree of security with a level of arms--as far as the
quantitative balance of power is concerned--lower than that of its
expected adversary. This is not to say, however, that the Mountainous
Karabakh defense forces need not develop robust retaliatory
capabilities to resist aggression, and inflict an intolerable damage
on the enemy. Rather, it is to do away with the simple and mechanistic
thought patterns building on the calculation of Azerbaijani
procurement of armaments per se and its predictive force. Not only
will this help avoid being entrapped in escalatory dynamics and
mutually reinforcing action-reaction driven arms race, but also, this
will help avoid the tendency to treat military power--let alone the
sheer procurement of armaments--as the ultimate measuring rod. This it
is not.
Wars are not instigated by the mere buildup of weapons, however
worrisome that development may be. They are caused when the political
tenets of the war are likely to be satisfied and an aggressor believes
it can achieve objectives at an acceptable cost. In simple terms,
states conduct cost-benefit calculations when deliberating about
whether or not to attempt expansion, and calculations based on the
procurement of armaments per se offer only part of a larger
picture--and an insignificant part that may be.
War is an extremely unpredictable endeavor, fraught with unintended
consequences and costs--both in blood and treasure. It also is an
extremely adversarial activity in which the enemy has a vote. Although
a state might be willing to engage in a lightening war (blitzkrieg)
and plan accordingly, it is hardly likely that the other side would
have sufficient faith to respond in kind. Many of the simplistic
scenarios advanced by military analysts capitalizing on the
preponderance of a lightening war across the Mountainous Karabakh and
Azerbaijani border suffer grave shortcomings. The competing party to
warfare is not an inert and reactive organization and may not work
from the same playbook. Besides, scarcely has there ever been a war
that fulfilled the initial plans and expectations of the party that
initiated it. Ultimately, what the careful analysis of enumerable
prewar strategies suggests is that all war-fighting plans are useless;
it is the process of continuous planning that is essential.
While the purpose of military organizations is to win wars, it is also
to avert wars by being able to change the adversaries' behavior and
the underlying mentalities prevalent in policy-making, thwart its
military strategy by undercutting its effectiveness and making
aggression difficult, costly, and unattractive. The key is to align
contextual intelligence with tactics and objectives, as well as gain
technological edge over the enemy that would allow conducting
precision strikes against long-range targets. In a region of complex
threats, deterrence and defense, along with the ability to attack
targets from great distances, should be aligned to serve as a potent
hedge against risk and uncertainty.
To ultimately prevail in this contest of wills and strength, there is
a clear need to shift the focus on qualitative attributes of the
balance of power and power projection capabilities through the
acquisition of cutting edge technologies and long range penetrating
capabilities, deterrence and denial strategies that seek to exploit
the adversary's center of gravity (in case of
authoritarian/dictatorial regimes this entails holding at risk those
value assets of the opponent that bring devastation at home and
possible removal from power). Even dictators tend to put certain vital
interests on top of all else - primarily their survival in power.
Aggression or resort to arms becomes unattractive if the price is too
dear and too high.
Grigor Boyakhchyan holds a Master's Degree in International Security
Studies (ISS) from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University. He currently serves as Head of Foreign Relations
Department of the Center for Information and Analytical Studies under
the Government of the Republic of Armenia. Prior to service, he taught
a full-time course on International Security Challenges for Master's
Degree students at Yerevan State University.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/11/14/states-and-security-perceptions-keeping-azerbaijan-at-bay/
From: Baghdasarian
Nov 14 2014
States and Security Perceptions: Keeping Azerbaijan at Bay
by Grigor Boyakhchyan | November 14, 2014
The priority that states place on military power stems from the
anarchic structure of the international system, which constantly
shapes the security perceptions of the individual entities operating
within. The anarchic system of international politics obstructs the
existence of an international sovereign above the level of states to
create and enforce international law or resolve disputes that surface
among them. Since there is no single international agency that wields
a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, foreign policy interests
that a state pursues are vitally affected with military power. In an
anarchic environment, force and politics are interrelated, even when
states are at peace.
The anarchic system of the international politics breeds skepticism
regarding the motives and intent of other state units and necessitates
a constant assessment of the dynamism of shifts in power relationships
that, in the aggregate, heighten the central premise of the security
dilemma--the means by which a state attempts to increase its security
decreases the security of others. Because even high levels of military
spending scarcely create feelings of complete security, weighing the
likely consequences of action in specific situations--and prospects of
success or failure in invoking force--sharpen the contours of national
security dilemma. The classical maxim--si vis pacem, para
bellum--appears to show no fading signs.
The structure of the international system is also marred by the
presence of weak and falling states whose outlook on international
politics and the emanating challenges vis-a-vis the preservation of
their statehood constitute the very medium through which their
national security perceptions are informed and shaped, as well as
serve as benchmark against which the future course of their actions is
charted. Weak states continue to generate specific threats, often
beyond the accomplishments of international military intervention, and
serve as a blueprint for perpetual instability.
While there is a general tendency to perceive national security
through the prism of external threats and challenges, for weak states,
however, national security also embraces broader internal dimensions
and domestic implications. Among other reasons, this is largely due to
a lack of sociopolitical cohesiveness and consent in regard to the
nature of the state, as well as the ensuing patterns of political
rivalry and fragmentation that cripple the internal dynamics of weak
states. Because their internal cohesion rests more on power than on
any broad-based political consensus, the primarily external
orientation of the concept of national security increasingly tilts
toward embracing the domestic agenda of threats.
The security dilemma that the states confront is further exacerbated
in terms of the impact of great power politics on local regional
relations. Once the domestic political life of states becomes
intertwined in the rivalries of great powers, the pattern of perpetual
instability becomes even more acute. The effect is one of replicating
a complicated overplay of global patterns of competition and rivalry
on the local setting. As a consequence, weak states are vulnerable to
external powers willing to marshal the right combination of recourses
to affect their foreign policy alternatives and choices.
Both Middle East and South Asia illustrate this process through the
competitive and intricate metrics of great power arms sales that make
the security environment more prone to the use of force. American
prolonged military aid to Israel and Pakistan, for example, serves as
the principle means of entry into the regional politics with the
potential to sway instability and mutate into wider conflicts. So,
too, does the Russian strategic engagement in the already volatile
South Caucasus region through the sales of military hardware and power
projections that have the potential to dramatically affect the
delicate regional balance of power.
Not only is the South Caucasus region inherently conflict-prone, but
it is also extremely vulnerable to changes in the local security
environment resulting from arms trade. As opposed to a race between
arms producers and the ensuing predictability associated with it,
there are fewer limitations placed on the race between non-producers
except the scope of budgetary constraints and the rate of absorption.
As a consequence, races between non-producers are much less stable and
predictable, and can cause large and abrupt changes in the local
balance of power.
However, even a relatively small state operating within strict
budgetary confines can effectively hedge against the action-reaction
driven arms race instigated by the opposing party through a set of
well-elaborated and properly orchestrated peace enforcement
measures--both political and military--that are well adjusted to meet
the prevailing security challenges and are, in the aggregate, geared
toward raising the costs of fighting to an unacceptable level. These
measures should not be confused with conventional peace enforcement
actions taken the world over. Rather, they should be tailored to
enforcing peace and compelling the opponent to rule out war as a
viable option both on the ground and as a coercive strategy at the
table of negotiations.
The advantageous position of the Mountainous Karabakh defense
posturing and the strong fortifications along the line of contact do
not solely mean that a relatively small state can effectively hold off
larger ones. It also means that a status-quo state can often maintain
a high degree of security with a level of arms--as far as the
quantitative balance of power is concerned--lower than that of its
expected adversary. This is not to say, however, that the Mountainous
Karabakh defense forces need not develop robust retaliatory
capabilities to resist aggression, and inflict an intolerable damage
on the enemy. Rather, it is to do away with the simple and mechanistic
thought patterns building on the calculation of Azerbaijani
procurement of armaments per se and its predictive force. Not only
will this help avoid being entrapped in escalatory dynamics and
mutually reinforcing action-reaction driven arms race, but also, this
will help avoid the tendency to treat military power--let alone the
sheer procurement of armaments--as the ultimate measuring rod. This it
is not.
Wars are not instigated by the mere buildup of weapons, however
worrisome that development may be. They are caused when the political
tenets of the war are likely to be satisfied and an aggressor believes
it can achieve objectives at an acceptable cost. In simple terms,
states conduct cost-benefit calculations when deliberating about
whether or not to attempt expansion, and calculations based on the
procurement of armaments per se offer only part of a larger
picture--and an insignificant part that may be.
War is an extremely unpredictable endeavor, fraught with unintended
consequences and costs--both in blood and treasure. It also is an
extremely adversarial activity in which the enemy has a vote. Although
a state might be willing to engage in a lightening war (blitzkrieg)
and plan accordingly, it is hardly likely that the other side would
have sufficient faith to respond in kind. Many of the simplistic
scenarios advanced by military analysts capitalizing on the
preponderance of a lightening war across the Mountainous Karabakh and
Azerbaijani border suffer grave shortcomings. The competing party to
warfare is not an inert and reactive organization and may not work
from the same playbook. Besides, scarcely has there ever been a war
that fulfilled the initial plans and expectations of the party that
initiated it. Ultimately, what the careful analysis of enumerable
prewar strategies suggests is that all war-fighting plans are useless;
it is the process of continuous planning that is essential.
While the purpose of military organizations is to win wars, it is also
to avert wars by being able to change the adversaries' behavior and
the underlying mentalities prevalent in policy-making, thwart its
military strategy by undercutting its effectiveness and making
aggression difficult, costly, and unattractive. The key is to align
contextual intelligence with tactics and objectives, as well as gain
technological edge over the enemy that would allow conducting
precision strikes against long-range targets. In a region of complex
threats, deterrence and defense, along with the ability to attack
targets from great distances, should be aligned to serve as a potent
hedge against risk and uncertainty.
To ultimately prevail in this contest of wills and strength, there is
a clear need to shift the focus on qualitative attributes of the
balance of power and power projection capabilities through the
acquisition of cutting edge technologies and long range penetrating
capabilities, deterrence and denial strategies that seek to exploit
the adversary's center of gravity (in case of
authoritarian/dictatorial regimes this entails holding at risk those
value assets of the opponent that bring devastation at home and
possible removal from power). Even dictators tend to put certain vital
interests on top of all else - primarily their survival in power.
Aggression or resort to arms becomes unattractive if the price is too
dear and too high.
Grigor Boyakhchyan holds a Master's Degree in International Security
Studies (ISS) from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University. He currently serves as Head of Foreign Relations
Department of the Center for Information and Analytical Studies under
the Government of the Republic of Armenia. Prior to service, he taught
a full-time course on International Security Challenges for Master's
Degree students at Yerevan State University.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/11/14/states-and-security-perceptions-keeping-azerbaijan-at-bay/
From: Baghdasarian