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Causes and Consequences of the Helicopter Attack, and Baku's Motives
for Escalation
Friday, November 14th, 2014
http://asbarez.com/128901/causes-and-consequences-of-the-helicopter-attack-and-baku%E2%80%99s-motives-for-escalation/
BY ARMEN SAHAKYAN
>From the Armenian Weekly
The continuous state-sponsored terrorism campaign of the Republic of
Azerbaijan against the Republics of Artsakh and Armenia recently
culminated in a shooting of an unarmed helicopter belonging to the Air
Force of the Republic of Artsakh. The helicopter was conducting a
training flight within its sovereign air space. It is intellectually
naive to attribute such aggressive behavior to one factor. Rather,
there is a host of major drivers of Azerbaijan's adventurism, which
this article will address. They are namely heavy petrol-reliance,
increasing domestic illegitimacy of the governing regime, loss of
international reputation, the ongoing Ukrainian Crisis, the false
parity of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, and the projected perpetual
decline of Azerbaijan's relative regional power and role.
Major current events have the tendency to be analyzed in isolation
from history and overall trends with an added component of emotions
that further distorts the real picture. Keeping this in mind,
Azerbaijan's petro-aggression, as defined by Jeff Colgan, should be
viewed within the wider historical and political economy contexts.
Azerbaijan's economy has been heavily reliant on oil exports, which
peaked in the 2010s and has been steadily decreasing by each passing
year ever since. The decline in world oil prices combined with
reduction in oil output have put greater pressure on the state and
further exacerbated its Dutch Disease--the inability to develop other
export industries in the economy due to high exchange rates caused by
heavy reliance on oil. The natural gas sector is much less profitable
than oil, implying that the "golden age" of Azerbaijan may be well
behind us, if no new major oil fields are found.
The Aliyevs' almost-uninterrupted dictatorial reign of Azerbaijan for
over four decades is showing signs of crippling. With the forces of
globalization providing citizens with easier access to alternative
information, paralleled by the intensifying levels of repression
within the country, the governing regime finds itself ostracized both
by its citizens as well as the international community. The government
denies fundamental rights to its national minorities, such as Lezgins,
Avars and Talysh; jails human rights advocates as well as journalists;
and keeps the general population economically worse-off due to
systemic rent-seeking and increasing income inequality. The tally of
political prisoners currently stands at over 100 individuals and
increasing, further cornering Azerbaijan on the international stage.
The international criticism of Azerbaijan's worsening domestic
situation has also been intense. Organizations such as the Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Journalists without Borders, and
many others have repeatedly condemned the government's actions and
even called for international sanctions.
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Russia and the West's swerved
attention provide a window of opportunity for Azerbaijan to maneuver.
Armenia's strategic partner Russia serves as one of the major
deterrent forces against Azerbaijani aggression. Certainly, the armed
forces of Armenia and the defense army of Artsakh are the primary and
best guarantors of security, yet Armenia's membership in the CSTO
alliance provides an extra layer of security. Aliyev is taking his
bets by testing the resoluteness of the CSTO as well as the
Russian-Armenian bilateral pact.
Graph produced by the author, with data from the Correlates of War Project.
By looking at the graph above, it is clear that Russia has
historically maintained disproportionately more power than Turkey and
Iran combined. This is obviously an analysis looking at the three
states as a subsystem of their own, isolated from the rest of the
world, and discounting for the effect of alliances. Nevertheless, it
is helpful to visualize the stark power discrepancy among the three
major South Caucasus players in order to appreciate the deterrent
feature of Russian involvement. It also has additional advantage over
the Western powers due to its geographic proximity, cultural affinity,
and immediate national security concerns.
The August meeting in Sochi of the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Russia after the Azerbaijani provocations on the border and the
immediate cease of violence by Azerbaijan following the meeting is an
indication of Russia's strong influence in the region. Armenia should
also appeal to its Western partners for support in an effort to end
Azerbaijan's petro-aggression, and aid Baku in establishing democratic
oversight institutions that would allow for more predictable
negotiations in the future, insuring against Aliyev's unilateral
warmongering attempts.
Given all these constraints and opportunities, the Azerbaijani junta
seeks maximum benefits especially knowing that the OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chairs will continue a policy of false parity. Such an appeasement
strategy may well have been justified for the Minsk Group Co-Chairs in
the past, but the circumstances have changed drastically since 1994,
making such a policy today not only ineffective but also
counterproductive, further exacerbating the impunity of the Aliyev
regime.
By instigating provocations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border as well
as Artsakh-Azerbaijan line of contact, the Aliyev regime is pursuing
at minimum two objectives: first, trying to send a signal to the
international community that it is opposed to the status quo (this
becomes especially clear when looking at the timing of Azerbaijani
sabotage activities), and second, silencing its own disgruntled
domestic population, which has witnessed an extraordinary increase in
income inequality and intensifying repressive crackdowns. As much as
international developments may have an effect on a state's foreign
policy conduct, it is unwise to dismiss the domestic considerations
that play into power calculations. Rather, there exists a mutual
reinforcement of international and internal factors that result in
rational decisions of governments, including in the case of
Azerbaijan.
It is important to keep in mind though that rationality is a type of
subjective thought-process that is not guaranteed to lead to optimal
outcomes for actors. More often than not, bounded rationality is also
coupled with non-rational elements further increasing the level of
uncertainty. Therefore, even if there are no questions about the
premeditated nature of Azerbaijan's provocations, there always exists
a margin of error that, if large enough, may prove to be detrimental
to the state's national security interests.
The authorities in Yerevan and Stepanakert need to be vigilant and
level-headed when making their decisions on retaliation. Further
intensification of violence is exactly what Azerbaijan would want in
order to try to move up the spiral of violence in an attempt to
eventually reap significant concessions in exchange for de-escalation.
The question is not about the "if," but rather about the "when" and
"how" of planning an operation. This incident may be a good
opportunity to open the airport in Stepanakert for commercial flights,
to convince the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs into admitting the fallacy
of their outdated policy, and to further isolate Azerbaijan from the
international community given its bad reputation for dictatorship,
gross human rights violations, and organizing state-sponsored
terrorism campaigns against a democratic and free people. Now is the
time for the international community to stop the Aliyev regime from
future attempts to destabilize the region.
Armen Sahakyan specializes in international political economy and
international economics. He serves as the executive director of the
Eurasian Research and Analysis (ERA) Institute (Washington, D.C.
branch), and as analyst of Eurasian affairs at the Political
Developments Research Center (PDRC) based in Yerevan, Armenia.
Sahakyan is a Master of Arts candidate at the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has previously
served as an adviser to the Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Armenia to the UN in New York.
From: Baghdasarian
for Escalation
Friday, November 14th, 2014
http://asbarez.com/128901/causes-and-consequences-of-the-helicopter-attack-and-baku%E2%80%99s-motives-for-escalation/
BY ARMEN SAHAKYAN
>From the Armenian Weekly
The continuous state-sponsored terrorism campaign of the Republic of
Azerbaijan against the Republics of Artsakh and Armenia recently
culminated in a shooting of an unarmed helicopter belonging to the Air
Force of the Republic of Artsakh. The helicopter was conducting a
training flight within its sovereign air space. It is intellectually
naive to attribute such aggressive behavior to one factor. Rather,
there is a host of major drivers of Azerbaijan's adventurism, which
this article will address. They are namely heavy petrol-reliance,
increasing domestic illegitimacy of the governing regime, loss of
international reputation, the ongoing Ukrainian Crisis, the false
parity of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, and the projected perpetual
decline of Azerbaijan's relative regional power and role.
Major current events have the tendency to be analyzed in isolation
from history and overall trends with an added component of emotions
that further distorts the real picture. Keeping this in mind,
Azerbaijan's petro-aggression, as defined by Jeff Colgan, should be
viewed within the wider historical and political economy contexts.
Azerbaijan's economy has been heavily reliant on oil exports, which
peaked in the 2010s and has been steadily decreasing by each passing
year ever since. The decline in world oil prices combined with
reduction in oil output have put greater pressure on the state and
further exacerbated its Dutch Disease--the inability to develop other
export industries in the economy due to high exchange rates caused by
heavy reliance on oil. The natural gas sector is much less profitable
than oil, implying that the "golden age" of Azerbaijan may be well
behind us, if no new major oil fields are found.
The Aliyevs' almost-uninterrupted dictatorial reign of Azerbaijan for
over four decades is showing signs of crippling. With the forces of
globalization providing citizens with easier access to alternative
information, paralleled by the intensifying levels of repression
within the country, the governing regime finds itself ostracized both
by its citizens as well as the international community. The government
denies fundamental rights to its national minorities, such as Lezgins,
Avars and Talysh; jails human rights advocates as well as journalists;
and keeps the general population economically worse-off due to
systemic rent-seeking and increasing income inequality. The tally of
political prisoners currently stands at over 100 individuals and
increasing, further cornering Azerbaijan on the international stage.
The international criticism of Azerbaijan's worsening domestic
situation has also been intense. Organizations such as the Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Journalists without Borders, and
many others have repeatedly condemned the government's actions and
even called for international sanctions.
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Russia and the West's swerved
attention provide a window of opportunity for Azerbaijan to maneuver.
Armenia's strategic partner Russia serves as one of the major
deterrent forces against Azerbaijani aggression. Certainly, the armed
forces of Armenia and the defense army of Artsakh are the primary and
best guarantors of security, yet Armenia's membership in the CSTO
alliance provides an extra layer of security. Aliyev is taking his
bets by testing the resoluteness of the CSTO as well as the
Russian-Armenian bilateral pact.
Graph produced by the author, with data from the Correlates of War Project.
By looking at the graph above, it is clear that Russia has
historically maintained disproportionately more power than Turkey and
Iran combined. This is obviously an analysis looking at the three
states as a subsystem of their own, isolated from the rest of the
world, and discounting for the effect of alliances. Nevertheless, it
is helpful to visualize the stark power discrepancy among the three
major South Caucasus players in order to appreciate the deterrent
feature of Russian involvement. It also has additional advantage over
the Western powers due to its geographic proximity, cultural affinity,
and immediate national security concerns.
The August meeting in Sochi of the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Russia after the Azerbaijani provocations on the border and the
immediate cease of violence by Azerbaijan following the meeting is an
indication of Russia's strong influence in the region. Armenia should
also appeal to its Western partners for support in an effort to end
Azerbaijan's petro-aggression, and aid Baku in establishing democratic
oversight institutions that would allow for more predictable
negotiations in the future, insuring against Aliyev's unilateral
warmongering attempts.
Given all these constraints and opportunities, the Azerbaijani junta
seeks maximum benefits especially knowing that the OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chairs will continue a policy of false parity. Such an appeasement
strategy may well have been justified for the Minsk Group Co-Chairs in
the past, but the circumstances have changed drastically since 1994,
making such a policy today not only ineffective but also
counterproductive, further exacerbating the impunity of the Aliyev
regime.
By instigating provocations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border as well
as Artsakh-Azerbaijan line of contact, the Aliyev regime is pursuing
at minimum two objectives: first, trying to send a signal to the
international community that it is opposed to the status quo (this
becomes especially clear when looking at the timing of Azerbaijani
sabotage activities), and second, silencing its own disgruntled
domestic population, which has witnessed an extraordinary increase in
income inequality and intensifying repressive crackdowns. As much as
international developments may have an effect on a state's foreign
policy conduct, it is unwise to dismiss the domestic considerations
that play into power calculations. Rather, there exists a mutual
reinforcement of international and internal factors that result in
rational decisions of governments, including in the case of
Azerbaijan.
It is important to keep in mind though that rationality is a type of
subjective thought-process that is not guaranteed to lead to optimal
outcomes for actors. More often than not, bounded rationality is also
coupled with non-rational elements further increasing the level of
uncertainty. Therefore, even if there are no questions about the
premeditated nature of Azerbaijan's provocations, there always exists
a margin of error that, if large enough, may prove to be detrimental
to the state's national security interests.
The authorities in Yerevan and Stepanakert need to be vigilant and
level-headed when making their decisions on retaliation. Further
intensification of violence is exactly what Azerbaijan would want in
order to try to move up the spiral of violence in an attempt to
eventually reap significant concessions in exchange for de-escalation.
The question is not about the "if," but rather about the "when" and
"how" of planning an operation. This incident may be a good
opportunity to open the airport in Stepanakert for commercial flights,
to convince the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs into admitting the fallacy
of their outdated policy, and to further isolate Azerbaijan from the
international community given its bad reputation for dictatorship,
gross human rights violations, and organizing state-sponsored
terrorism campaigns against a democratic and free people. Now is the
time for the international community to stop the Aliyev regime from
future attempts to destabilize the region.
Armen Sahakyan specializes in international political economy and
international economics. He serves as the executive director of the
Eurasian Research and Analysis (ERA) Institute (Washington, D.C.
branch), and as analyst of Eurasian affairs at the Political
Developments Research Center (PDRC) based in Yerevan, Armenia.
Sahakyan is a Master of Arts candidate at the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has previously
served as an adviser to the Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Armenia to the UN in New York.
From: Baghdasarian