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The Sunday Times, Sri Lanka
Nov 22 2014
Post-Soviet confidence games
By Stefan Wolff
LONDON - It is starting to look like a pattern. After painstaking
talks, the parties in the Ukraine conflict come to an agreement - only
to have it fall apart or fail to be fully implemented. At least three
separate deals to resolve the crisis have been struck, and each has
quickly unravelled.
Even a unanimous vote in the United Nations Security Council
condemning the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and demanding
access to the crash site has failed to produce the desired results.
Over three months later, Dutch investigators have still not been able
to conduct all necessary visits.
The usual diagnosis for the repeated failure to forge a lasting
agreement is a lack of trust on both sides of the conflict, for which
the usual prescription is to introduce a series of confidence-building
measures. If only the Ukrainian national government in Kiev, its
Western allies, Russia, and the Ukrainian separatists could learn to
trust each other, the thinking goes, perhaps a settlement could be
reached.
But confidence-building measures are not the panacea that they are so
often portrayed to be. To be sure, there are cases where the absence
of trust-building efforts could partly explain why a conflict drags
on. The 25-year tug-of-war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the
region of Nagorno-Karabakh is a prime example. But there are also
conflicts in which years of confidence-building measures have not only
failed to produce a solution but have also prevented one from taking
shape.
The parties tussling over Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia spent some 15 years taking part in confidence-building
measures, before Russia upended the status quo in 2008 by recognising
both regions' independence. Since then, confidence-building has
continued in the form of regular talks in Geneva, but nearly 30 rounds
of meetings over the past six years have yet to yield tangible
progress.
Of all of the so-called "frozen conflicts" in the former Soviet Union,
the dispute over Transnistria, the strip of land between the Dniester
River and Moldova's border with Ukraine, was once considered the most
amenable to resolution. And yet, even there, two decades of
confidence-building measures have been unsuccessful.
Yes, such measures have helped to maintain open lines of
communication, preventing small disputes from escalating into violent
conflict. But, despite the best efforts of the OSCE, the European
Union, the United States, Ukraine, and even Russia, the conflict is no
closer to a settlement than it was when the process began.
There are three major reasons why real progress has failed to
materialise in Transnistria. For starters, the confidence-building
measures put in place lack local support. Neither the elite nor the
public, on either side of the conflict, see a realistic chance for
rapprochement in the near future.
Second, confidence-building, to some extent, has worked against an
ultimate settlement of the conflict. Since the 1990s, the two sides
have struck some 170 agreements. But, by making the status quo more
comfortable and reducing the need for game-changing moves, these have
been steps away from, not toward, a solution.
Finally, confidence-building does not happen in a vacuum, but within a
specific regional and global geopolitical context. More often than
not, the conflicting agendas of the great powers have stood in the way
of a final settlement.
The lesson for Ukraine is that while building confidence may be
necessary, it is not sufficient to resolve the crisis. If it is to
help move the parties toward a final agreement, certain conditions
must be met. Technical expertise is needed to design and implement
measures that are part of a strategic vision to end the conflict. But
such measures will be effective only if the regional and global
geopolitical environment supports the search for a resolution. Most
important, local leaders must be genuinely committed to the process,
rather than seeking to curry favor with donors.
The lack of technical expertise is not a major problem in eastern
Ukraine. But, as in all of the post-Soviet conflicts, the search for a
solution is not taking place in a favorable geopolitical climate. Nor
are local leaders committed to building trust and confidence; indeed,
separatists are engaged to just the opposite.
Confidence-building measures can help to stabilise a conflict, but the
stability they generate is often fragile and temporary. In an
environment like that in Ukraine, there is a risk that such measures
will sustain, not end, the conflict.
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/141123/sunday-times-2/post-soviet-confidence-games-129198.html
Nov 22 2014
Post-Soviet confidence games
By Stefan Wolff
LONDON - It is starting to look like a pattern. After painstaking
talks, the parties in the Ukraine conflict come to an agreement - only
to have it fall apart or fail to be fully implemented. At least three
separate deals to resolve the crisis have been struck, and each has
quickly unravelled.
Even a unanimous vote in the United Nations Security Council
condemning the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and demanding
access to the crash site has failed to produce the desired results.
Over three months later, Dutch investigators have still not been able
to conduct all necessary visits.
The usual diagnosis for the repeated failure to forge a lasting
agreement is a lack of trust on both sides of the conflict, for which
the usual prescription is to introduce a series of confidence-building
measures. If only the Ukrainian national government in Kiev, its
Western allies, Russia, and the Ukrainian separatists could learn to
trust each other, the thinking goes, perhaps a settlement could be
reached.
But confidence-building measures are not the panacea that they are so
often portrayed to be. To be sure, there are cases where the absence
of trust-building efforts could partly explain why a conflict drags
on. The 25-year tug-of-war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the
region of Nagorno-Karabakh is a prime example. But there are also
conflicts in which years of confidence-building measures have not only
failed to produce a solution but have also prevented one from taking
shape.
The parties tussling over Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia spent some 15 years taking part in confidence-building
measures, before Russia upended the status quo in 2008 by recognising
both regions' independence. Since then, confidence-building has
continued in the form of regular talks in Geneva, but nearly 30 rounds
of meetings over the past six years have yet to yield tangible
progress.
Of all of the so-called "frozen conflicts" in the former Soviet Union,
the dispute over Transnistria, the strip of land between the Dniester
River and Moldova's border with Ukraine, was once considered the most
amenable to resolution. And yet, even there, two decades of
confidence-building measures have been unsuccessful.
Yes, such measures have helped to maintain open lines of
communication, preventing small disputes from escalating into violent
conflict. But, despite the best efforts of the OSCE, the European
Union, the United States, Ukraine, and even Russia, the conflict is no
closer to a settlement than it was when the process began.
There are three major reasons why real progress has failed to
materialise in Transnistria. For starters, the confidence-building
measures put in place lack local support. Neither the elite nor the
public, on either side of the conflict, see a realistic chance for
rapprochement in the near future.
Second, confidence-building, to some extent, has worked against an
ultimate settlement of the conflict. Since the 1990s, the two sides
have struck some 170 agreements. But, by making the status quo more
comfortable and reducing the need for game-changing moves, these have
been steps away from, not toward, a solution.
Finally, confidence-building does not happen in a vacuum, but within a
specific regional and global geopolitical context. More often than
not, the conflicting agendas of the great powers have stood in the way
of a final settlement.
The lesson for Ukraine is that while building confidence may be
necessary, it is not sufficient to resolve the crisis. If it is to
help move the parties toward a final agreement, certain conditions
must be met. Technical expertise is needed to design and implement
measures that are part of a strategic vision to end the conflict. But
such measures will be effective only if the regional and global
geopolitical environment supports the search for a resolution. Most
important, local leaders must be genuinely committed to the process,
rather than seeking to curry favor with donors.
The lack of technical expertise is not a major problem in eastern
Ukraine. But, as in all of the post-Soviet conflicts, the search for a
solution is not taking place in a favorable geopolitical climate. Nor
are local leaders committed to building trust and confidence; indeed,
separatists are engaged to just the opposite.
Confidence-building measures can help to stabilise a conflict, but the
stability they generate is often fragile and temporary. In an
environment like that in Ukraine, there is a risk that such measures
will sustain, not end, the conflict.
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/141123/sunday-times-2/post-soviet-confidence-games-129198.html